# News & Comment

# U.S. Technology Strategy Emerges

After a decade of debate, the federal government has begun to invest in new civilian technologies; skeptics say the gesture is just a "spit in the ocean"

ON 17 MAY GEORGE SUTHerland plans to throw open the doors of the Great Lakes Manufacturing Technology Center in Cleveland to show off the \$5 million worth of robots and exotic metal-working machines he has acquired. Sutherland, a Ph.D. mechanical engineer, isn't the

proud manager of a high-tech auto plant or a steel factory that will save Ohio. What he does operate is a nonprofit industrial research center. It produces nothing tangible but, rather, aims to educate small manufacturers-basically "people who make things out of metal," says Sutherland-in the use of advanced, computerized machine tools and efficient management techniques. The Great Lakes Center, located at an interstate crossroads, has a national as well as a local mission. It uses workshops, symposia, even site visits-and, of course, fancy machines-to help local companies turn themselves into 21st-century operations. Its objective is to make U.S. industry more competitive, in other words.

What makes Sutherland's place particularly unusual is that, in addition to receiving support from the state and more than 100 local companies, it gets help from the feds. During most of the 1980s, the Reagan Administration blocked attempts to use federal money to give U.S. industry a boost. The guiding philosophy was to fund basic research and shun applied research-or to put it another way, to leave product development entirely to the private sector. Indeed, the idea of pumping money into promising new technologies was tagged "industrial policy" and the idea was treated as anathema in the Executive Branch-something to be expected in Romania or Bulgaria but not in the American heartland. And this is why the decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce to support George Sutherland's shop-and four other regional centers-is radically new.

Until very recently, the Bush Administration toed the Reagan-hatched ideological line on supporting industrial technology. But of late there have been three signs that it is softening its stance. Those who read the tea leaves on federal research policy point to



by presidential science adviser D. Allan Bromley: In black and white, it says that the federal government should help develop generic industrial technologies.

The second signal of a sea change is that, after more than 2 years of congressional pressure, the Administration is finally willing to put some money—albeit piddling amounts so far—into technology development programs in the Commerce Department—not only the five regional centers, but also directly into products being developed for the commercial market.

And third, there's a still nascent but promising new policy thrust: The development of a list of critical technologies for the



**Robots to the rescue.** *Does U.S. industry need Uncle Sam's help to compete in high technology?* 

economy being developed by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) at the urging of Congress. The list is expected to help guide future government investments.

Yet these modest steps have been controversial within the Administration, and key White House officials, including Chief of Staff John Sununu and budget director Richard Darman, are said to be reluctant to see industrial research programs expand too rapidly. Moreover, some critics think that while the Administration is beginning to become more generous in supporting industrial technologies in civilian agencies, it is cutting back on the same kind of projects funded by the Pentagon (see box, p. 22). Throughout the Reagan era, the Pentagon was the only federal agency that invested directly in industry in this way. And even for those who believe they see a thaw in the rigid laissez-faire stance, the melting seems too slow. For example, Guyford Stever, former director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), would like to see the

> government directly finance civil R&D projects, but says that "we are far from having a coherent technology policy in this country."

> Nevertheless, the Administration's recent statements are prompting cautious optimism among some of the harshest critics of the previous donothing approach. Robert White, president of the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), who in a widely quoted 1988 speech blasted ideological "hangups" that have prevented the establishment of a "workable technology structure in the federal government," now sees "good forward motion" in the Administration. "You've got to start someplace," he says, and recent policy statements represent "a beginning." Still, he adds, "I would not say we had reached a consensus" yet on the need for bold federal action. Another advocate of federal intervention, Representative George Brown, Jr. (D-CA), gave an optimistic reading in a speech to the Semiconductor Research Corporation on 26

### NIST: High Command for Industrial Research?

technology development. which for a decade has resisted Japanese-style investments in program marks a significant new step for the federal government, million in total, were announced on 5 March. Though small, the broad value for the nation. The first ATP awards, providing \$9

amount in 1992. Congress, which is dragging a reluctant Adminnow the Administration has followed suit by seeking the same Then in 1991, Congress increased the figure to \$36 million, and by Congress in 1990 "before the Administration asked for it." Lyons says the initial ATP budget of \$10 million was provided

The ATP awards also seem popular in raise the ante again this year. istration down this path, will probably

tion by NIST's staff; and finally they suoky uyor then they submit to a technical inspecrigorous federal procurement review; First, grant applicants must survive a cess that is meant to tence politics out. to an elaborate three-stage review prosures in selecting winners, Lyons points to avoid political or pork-barrel preshe says. When asked how NIST intends got to choose the cream of the cream," leading to a 22-to-1 rejection rate. "We swamped with 250 applicants last fall, the private sector. Lyons says NIST was

the final selections. decides whether the projects look like good bets. Lyons approves like no other advisory board in government, says Lyons-which must get the approval of a blue-ribbon panel of business advisers-

than present machines. storing 2 gigabits of data and operating 100 to 1000 times faster inventors hope to build a prototype crystal array capable of imagery on photorefractive crystals. With NIST's grant, the cally steered light beam to store entire data "pages" of digital this gadget would require no motor. It would use an electronistorage system. Unlike the magnetic tapes and disks now in use, companies interested in manufacturing a revolutionary data Corp. of Austin, Texas, won \$823,000 to coordinate a group of For example, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology produce goods for the computer and communications industries. Among the 11 ATP winners this year were many who hope to

because they will benefit from the additional prestige. **E.M.** traditional research projects will do better than before, he argues, But Lyons says this is not about to happen. If anything, the neglects its old, less glamorous, but essential work on standards. NIST could become so swept up in its popular role that it works on technology issues. He echoed a common concern that wagging the dog" at NIST, says one White House staffer who awards and technology centers, "we could end up with the tail Concern. There's always a risk that with all the emphasis on ATP expectation that great results will follow. And that raises a Implicit in the new assignment Congress has given NIST is the

> choice. Created 90 years ago during the drafted for the role seems an unlikely sector. At first glance, the agency R&D command post for the civilian turing, it decided to create a new -acture of leadership in U.S. manufacand dramatic to remedy a perceived looking for a way to do something big Three years ago, when Congress was

stimulate innovation in the private sector. mission: to coordinate policy on industrial technology and ogy (NIST) got a new name and a new mission in 1988. The of Standards, the National Institute of Standards and Technolelectrical industry and known for 88 years as the National Bureau presidency of Teddy Roosevelt as a technical arbiter for the

terms with industry. Hollings prevailed. the National Bureau of Standards, which was already on good entrust the new mission to the well-established bureaucracy at a more cautious approach, he argued that it would be better to Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), had a different idea. Favoring dollars. Then the chairman of the Commerce Committee, "civilian DARPA" with a budget of several hundred million military applications are favored. So Glenn campaigned for a speed computer chips, lasers, and manufacturing processesabout \$1 billion a year backing new technologies-such as highbeen doing for the military (see page 22). While DARPA spends Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had an agency that would do for civilian manufacturing what the Congress led by Senator John Glenn (D-OH) wanted to create NIST got its facelift partly by default. A few members of

million, putting it on a 5-year doubling track. increase NIST's budget 15% in 1992, from \$215 million to \$248 tion has shown interest. In the last budget cycle, it proposed to Valentine (D-NC), to oversee the agency. Even the Administratechnology and competitiveness, chaired by Representative Tim created a new tailor-made panel called the subcommittee on this year, they were showered with praise. The House has even lliH lotida on Capitol Hunding hearings on Capitol Hill Robert White, undersecretary of commerce for technology, Congress. When NIST's director, John Lyons, and his boss, enjoys both the trust of industry and the enthusiastic support of The result is NIST, which in its honeymoon period today

many scientists knowledgeable about inside-the-beltway funding mural awards are even more interesting to Congress (and to may be transferred from one shop to another. But NIST's extrastandardizing manufacturing software so that electronic blueprints R&D-making self-correcting industrial robots, for example, and flat." The increase will make it possible to expand intramural after 15 years of drought during which funding was "essentially Lyons says this will bring welcome relief to NIST staff scientists

working on "generic technologies" that NIST believes will have ATP was created in 1988 to help finance private R&D projects shifts). Take the new Advanced Technology Program (ATP).

cision, he said, leaders have finally decided attitude is changing. After a decade of indefederal role for technology," but now that tional security mentality in interpreting the years "we have been imprinted with a na-February. Brown said that for almost 50

March to deliver a report prepared by the when he appeared before Congress on 20 Bloch endorsed a more aggressive policy structure." Former NSF director Erich can no longer be a stepchild of the defense that "commercial technology development

from military R&D and toward civilian

Bloch said, but "a more decisive" shift away

promoting better manufacturing methods,

rration has made an "admirable start" on

group for which he consults. The Adminis-

Council on Competitiveness, a nonprofit





technology is needed.

In reality, Bloch's audience had already taken this advice to heart, for it was Congress that led the way in founding what is now being called the Administration's "technology policy." Congress's initial step, taken in 1988, was to pass the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, giving the Commerce Department authority over civilian technology and renaming its former Bureau of Standards the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The same law gave NIST a new portfolio: It was to oversee joint government-industry ventures in technology development and diffusion, including the establishment of educational centers like Sutherland's.

The first hint that the Administration might be willing to sign on to this congressional initiative came on 7 March 1990, when President Bush, in a speech to the American Electronics Association, said that his Administration would cooperate with industry in converting new discoveries into

#### **Beating Swords Into...Chips?**

Officials in the Department of Defense don't like to talk about the Pentagon's extensive efforts to help U.S. companies remain competitive in high-tech civilian markets. They have good reason. Last year, the Bush Administration removed physicist Craig Fields from his post as director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA), reportedly for pushing DARPA too strongly into civilian technology development. And, if that wasn't cause enough for defense officials to keep quiet, they now have another rationale: The Pentagon's civilian technology programs have

become caught in a tussle between Congress, which has come to view them as a vehicle for pork-barrel funding, and the Administration, which is trying to rein them in.

These trends have some old hands, such as former Pentagon R&D chief Robert Costello, concerned that research funds are being dissipated on projects that may not provide the most benefit for the military or the economy. Costello, now a fellow at the Hudson Institute in Indianapolis, says he believes the military is "re-

treating into a cocoon," isolating itself from the commercial market and from attempts to use its budget as a means of stimulating new technology. If the Pentagon's efforts shrink and similar programs in the Department of Commerce do not expand accordingly (see accompanying article), the upshot could be a net loss in federal support for high-tech manufacturing.

Controversy over the Pentagon's role as a technology support agency is relatively new, although the military has been supporting "generic" technology for several decades. For example, DARPA, which sprang to life in 1958 as manager of space projects, evolved into a backer of all kinds of novel gadgetry, especially electronics, in the 1970s. DARPA's rationale was that by betting its mad money shrewdly, it could speed the growth of critical new innovations, giving an edge to U.S. consumer and military goods and keeping costs down. In recent years, for example, DARPA has been bankrolling joint efforts in partnership with industry in areas such as high-definition displays—a critical element in the development of high-speed chips, specialized lasers, computer networks, and infrared sensors.

By the late 1980s, the Pentagon was also channeling hundreds of millions of dollars a year into generic manufacturing technologies likely to have both military and civilian applications. According to a report from the White House Office of Management and Budget in February, the federal government now spends \$1.3 billion on "advanced manufacturing and materials R&D," more than 40% of it in the defense budget. The most prominent of these defense programs is Sematech, a joint industry-government research center created in 1987 to focus on manufacturing processes for computer chips, costing the government \$100 million a year (see page 23). In addition, a department-wide program known as the Manufacturing Technology, or "Mantech," program has a budget of \$311.5 million this year to help improve technologies ranging from machine tools to automatic machinery for making military uniforms. Mantech's budget oscillated in the 1980s



between \$130 million and around \$200 million (see chart).

Congress is behind much of this growth, in part because it has insisted on bankrolling specific projects. For example, members of Congress huddled with the Reagan Administration in the late 1980s and put a machine tool program called the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences into the Air Force Mantech budget. Soon other members began inserting targeted funding into the DARPA and Mantech budgets for such things as x-ray li-

thography, optoelectronics, and "pre-competitive research" on unspecified manufacturing technologies. One military source says that it is difficult to spot these insertions, but "basically everybody who's got power" in Congress has a project.

This year, the Bush Administration has decided to attempt to reverse the trend. The president's 1992 budget proposal, says a congressional aide, has "gutted" DARPA and Mantech. The x-ray lithography projects, the machine tool funding, and many other high-technology initiatives have been stripped away. The total Mantech funding, for example, is supposed to drop from the present level of \$311.5 million to \$96.9 million next year.

While the White House hasn't specifically articulated its rationale for the moves, Pentagon officials have privately expressed resentment at the "earmarking" of funds by Congress and regard the growing support for industrial projects as a form of porkbarrel politics that must be stopped, particularly at a time when the overall military budget is shrinking. However, these budget cuts, and the decision to remove Fields from office a year ago, has DARPA's civilian fans—like Senator Jeff Bingaman (D–NM) wondering how deep the Administration's commitment is to using the resources of the federal government to stimulate new technology.

"generic technologies that support both our economic competitiveness and our national security." Until this point, it was acceptable to spend federal funds to develop military hardware, but not on technologies that lacked a national security link of some kind. But now the rigid prohibition of the 1980s is giving way to a more tolerant approach in the 1990s, as revealed in a blue booklet (labeled "U.S. Technology Policy") issued last fall by the White House (Science, 9 November 1990, p. 747). In it, Bromley wrote that one of the federal government's responsibilities is "to participate with the private sector in precompetitive research on generic, enabling technologies that have the potential to contribute to a broad range of government and commercial applications."

To many, the book still seemed thin on substance, but, to some, it had set a precedent. This, at any rate, is what Lewis Branscomb argues. Branscomb, now at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has served on many White House advisory panels dealing with technology and was vice president and chief scientist at IBM from 1972 to 1986. He observed Bromley's negotiations with other, more skeptical White House officials and insists that getting the blue book published was a case of "masterful diplomacy." Because it has been endorsed by the White House, says Branscomb, "every agency that wants to fund industrial technology can quote this document as the justification for doing so."

To the doubters, cash carried more weight than a thin publication. The Great Lakes Center and four sister agencies in New York, South Carolina, Kansas, and Michigan have been allocated \$11 million this year though on a base of local business support and state funding that was required to get the federal funds. The cash isn't an endless stream, though: After 6 years the agencies must become self-supporting.

The White House science office deserves credit for pushing a few other technologyboosting efforts through the mill this year. These include Bromley's inauguration of a multiagency drive to improve the speed and quality of U.S. computer technology, an effort that has been accorded a 30% budget increase (*Science*, 15 February, p. 737). In the future, Bromley intends to promote materials research and biotechnology.

In April, at the urging of Congress, OSTP is expected to unveil a list of 26 critical technologies for civilian and military purposes that it judges to be the most important to target for special attention. Then, in June, OSTP will announce the membership of a new Critical Technologies Institute, a quasi-governmental agency advocated by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D–NM) and created



by an amendment to the defense authorization bill last fall. It will be run by a board chaired by Bromley and composed of other Cabinet representatives and leaders from industry and academia. According to William Phillips, associate director of OSTP, this institute will have \$5 million to spend over the next 2 years as it prepares "road maps"—or investment strategies—for each technology identified in the April document.

These steps, bolder than any taken by the Reagan Administration, are still viewed by the technology activists on Capitol Hill as extremely modest. And now that Bromley's office and even the Office of Management and Budget have opened the gate just a crack, those who advocate stronger action are likely to pour in and clamor for more funds. They clearly are not satisfied with what has been appropriated to date.

Supporting a handful of regional technology centers and spending \$36 million to help industry develop pathbreaking ideas, says Julie Fox Gorte, chief author of a 1990 study by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, is just a "spit in the ocean." Even if the Administration were to let these parts of the NIST budget grow to \$100 million, she says, this would merely amount to "a pittance" in the context of what other nations are doing. Japanese efforts to promote industry are much better funded, she says, and the Europeans are now gearing up to support "hundreds" of technology development efforts under two schemes known as ESPRIT and EUREKA.

Fox Gorte's views have plenty of supporters on Capitol Hill: Each year since the creation of NIST, Congress has tried to increase the budget rapidly and the Administration has put on the brakes. The pattern is likely to continue as the Administration is expected to keep NIST's policy experiments on a short leash until they have proved their value. Nevertheless, Congress will keep pushing. Last year, for example, the House Science Committee tried to increase funding for NIST's technology awards program, authorizing \$250 million for 1992. The bill didn't pass, but Representative Brown, the committee's chairman, recently promised to try again this year.

The negotiations have just begun on where and in what quantity to invest federal dollars, and they could well become a regular feature of the budget dance, like the biomedical funding waltz, in which the White House and Congress each year start at a distance and make their way to middle ground. But the important change in technology policy is that the Administration is no longer starting at zero. And that, according to the optimists, makes all the difference. **ELIOT MARSHALL** 

### Calmer Waters at Primate Institute?

Last fall New Mexico State University's (NMSU) unique primate research institute one that could be crucial to the U.S. AIDS research effort—looked battered. It had lost its director and a new, prestigious AIDS research team in a falling out with the university administration. Suddenly endangered was an AIDS research resource of 100 chimpanzees, as many as one quarter of all the chimps available for AIDS research in the United States.

Six months later, prospects for the institute are either a whole lot brighter or still fraught with danger—depending on whom you listen to. To a group of researchers from the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centers for Disease Control, the worst may be over. A team from those three organizations visited the institute late last year, prompted in part by an article in *Science*. After inspecting the facilities and being briefed by high-level NMSU officials, the group's head, John Donovan of the NCI, concluded in a special statement provided to *Science* that: "Considering the nature and extent of problems," a "formidable effort" was under way by the university administration and the institute's management to make the institute a "national research resource." But the team also agreed, said Donovan, that "the next 6 to 12 months would be a critical time period" for assessing the institute's "ability to progress to a stable and smoothly functioning organization."

Meanwhile, the stream of resignations at the institute has continued. In January, Dave Rehnquist, a former NCI veterinarian who was universally respected at the institute, left his position as head of veterinary services. In February, Ron Couch, a toxicologist with some \$1 million worth of research grants, resigned to work for White Sands Research Center, a private primate-research operation in Alamogordo. And in April, Brenda Billhymer and the rest of her eight-person clinical chemistry group, which provided support for the institute's contract research, will also move to White Sands.

The resignations aren't likely to help the institute's new director, Preston Marx. Marx came to the institute last summer from the University of California at Davis to replace former director Bill Hobson, who had hoped to make the primate facility into an AIDS basic research lab of national stature. It was Hobson who lured virologist Mika Popovic from Robert Gallo's lab at the National Cancer Institute, along with a bevy of top talent. When Hobson was abruptly dismissed in December 1989, Popovic, his research group, and most of the rest of the institute's total of 15 Ph.D.s left one by one.

In interviews with the local press, Marx has reiterated optimism concerning the institute, which he maintains has the potential to be a great research facility of the kind Hobson envisioned. Marx has been struggling to fill the institute's many vacancies and has been working with the university to clean up accounting procedures, which had been a bone of contention with Hobson. Sources say he was particularly cheered by the recent hiring of Andrew Lachner, a pathologist and former colleague from the California Primate Research Center at UC Davis.

Marx also changed the institute's name from the Primate Research Institute to the New Mexico Regional Primate Research Laboratory (NMRPRL), a move he told the Alamogordo *Daily News* reflected the lab's position as a statewide resource—and had nothing to do with the bad press the lab got under its previous title. Marx himself is in Sierra Leone and could not be reached for comment. But many independent observers credit him with prodigious labors. Will they be sufficient?

The NCI team isn't the only one interested in the answer. Last week an advisory council appointed by the university administration met to review the institute's research activities. The council, chaired by Leonard Napolitano, dean of medicine at the University of New Mexico, includes Dani Bolognesi of Duke University Medical Center, Ronald Desrosiers of the New England Regional Primate Research Center, and Bill Goodwin, deputy director of the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research.

Napolitano told *Science* the advisory body thought "significant progress had been made in stabilizing the program." The institute seems to be "on its way to establishing programs in immunology and virology." But on the key question of whether PRL will ever house the kind of basic AIDS research group Bill Hobson intended, Napolitano responds: "I really can't answer that now."

In any event, Marx's efforts won't lack for scrutiny. The advisory council has become a permanent fixture, and, according to Donovan's statement, the NCI team will visit PRL within the next 6 to 12 months "to evaluate their progress." KAREN WRIGHT