fairly late in the game.

What Mahoney concentrated on instead was compiling the most authoritative scientific document yet on acid rain: the 27 "State of Science and Technology" reports, numbering more than 6000 pages, which were released in draft form in February 1990. But by that time, Congress was grappling with political issues—like who was going to pay and not scientific ones, says Michael Rodemeyer, a key aide on the House Science Committee. "There had not been any real scientific debate for a good 5 or 6 years, in terms of where the stuff was coming from and how to get rid of it."

Mahoney did steer NAPAP back to its original mandate of policy analysis, but by that time, says Rubin, "it was too little, too late." NAPAP's final integrated assessment, evaluating likely emission reduction scenarios, was released in draft form last September, almost at the moment Congress was passing a bill mandating a 10-million ton reduction in sulfur emissions.

Because policy concerns had rarely been used to shape the research agenda over the years, NAPAP staff had to cobble together the final assessment from the pieces they had on hand. The patchwork shows, says Rubin, who says it is "embarrassingly short" on economics. It also gives fairly cursory treatment to what turned out to be two major policy issues: visibility loss and the effects of acid aerosols on human health.

Mahoney doesn't argue with the criticism but simply explains: "I wanted to create a highly credible set of scientific documents. We kept on track and made a sound contribution that will stand well. And we did it at the expense of greater policy relevance. I had the sense that if we tried to do both, we would have failed at both."

With the benefit of hindsight, Mahoney says he would have done things differently, like diverting some of the resources away from NAPAP's enormously complicated atmospheric transport model toward simpler models that could have provided answers sooner (see box on page 1304). But the scientific mind set at NAPAP militated against it, he says.

Mahoney, Rubin, and others warn that the scenario is already repeating itself in the new federal climate change program, coordinated by the interagency Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences. "Global change is driven too much by raw science," says Mahoney, referring to the current push to improve the general circulation models. "The real aim [of that work] is to understand atmospheric physics. Any questions about effects or policy exist in a separate sphere. That is the kind of thing that happened to NAPAP." **LESLIE ROBERTS**

NIH Takes Heat for Lax Investigation

Several top officials at the National Institutes of Health took a beating at the hands of Representative John Dingell (D–MI) last week over NIH's performance in investigating allegations of financial wrongdoing. At a 6 March hearing, Dingell lambasted acting director William Raub, cancer etiology director Richard Adamson, and audit director Howard Hyatt for failing to investigate thoroughly an intramural scientist suspected of what Dingell called "an extraordinary series of potential felonies."

The case that drew Dingell's ire involves Prem Sarin, who until last December served as Robert C. Gallo's chief lab deputy at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) (Science, 11 January, p. 151). NIH had twice investigated Sarin's relationship with the Wisconsin-based Responsif Corporation and found little to warrant concern. But two General Accounting Office (GAO) investigators, brought in by Dingell, presented evidence last week that Sarin may have lied to Congress last April when he testified that he represented Reponsif without pay at a 1985 hearing before the Food and Drug Administration. In fact, said the GAO investigators, Reponsif had paid Sarin to represent the company at the hearing. Furthermore, they testified, Sarin may have improperly received \$31,000 from two other pharmaceutical companies-the Pfizer Corporation and Degussa/ASTA Pharma-for testing drugs at Gallo's lab, and they said he apparently attempted to disguise his consulting income by using a dummy account and asking ASTA Pharma to describe a consulting fee as a research award. The GAO investigators also said Sarin may have forged signatures on financial disclosure forms.

Sarin declined to testify last week. NIH has suspended him without pay pending

investigations by the inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Attorney's office in Baltimore.

But Dingell wasn't satisfied. His subcommittee uncovered these alleged misdeeds "with relatively little effort," he declared. By contrast, a 1987 NIH inquiry never questioned Reponsif officials or verified the signatures on Sarin's financial disclosure forms. NCI officials interviewed Sarin after his testimony last April but decided the matter merited no further action. Only after Dingell's subcommittee requested records from NCI last December pertaining to collaborations with ASTA Pharma and Pfizer did officials there find evidence of Sarin's financial dealings with the three companies.

Apparently taken aback by the GAO evidence, Raub, Adamson, and Hyatt were abject in declaring that NIH had handled the case badly, particularly in taking Sarim's explanations at face value. "In hindsight, sir, the level of trust was too high," Raub testified. Raub also suggested that the greater autonomy given to scientists over the past two decades in research matters had carried over into the administrative realm. "We need to develop a greater talent for directed suspicion," he said.

Raub described Sarin's alleged misdeeds as "isolated events." Dingell and his staff are skeptical, however. Last April, a similar investigation into the financial affairs of Syed Zaki Salahuddin, a former Gallo researcher, ended in a guilty plea to two felonies conflict of interest and accepting an illegal gratuity. "We hope they get their act together over there," says a Dingell staffer. "We've tried to impress on NCI that we don't want to keep doing this."

■ DAVID P. HAMILTON



You can save some postage: Yes, we goofed last week (p. 1173), but not because we can't do elementary math. The problems were "wrong"; not the answers. Late in production, our original problem 1 was replaced with a different one and the positions of problems 3 and 4 were switched. Unfortunately, the answers were not changed accordingly. The correct answers are, of course: (1) D; (3) D; and (4) A.