

cial Security payroll tax payments. Boskin and Puffert's study also indicates that changes in the performance of the economy, the policies affecting the accumulation of trust fund reserves, and the rules of the program will have an impact (as one would expect) on who gains or loses the most in terms of future benefits relative to tax contributions.

What we know as retirement today is a relatively new social experience. Unlike the pension plans (both public and private) that emerged after World War II, early plans were not designed to allow aging workers to "retire"—that is, to withdraw from the labor market in advance of physiological decline. Rather, they focused on providing "survival" benefits if and when old age began to take its toll on an individual's earning capacity and sought to respond to the needs of government and business. From these early beginnings evolved a new view of old age and pensions, however, in which benefits were based upon years of service, rather than on need per se, and were designed to replace pre-retirement earnings. Pensions became an "earned right" and (as was pointed out by Eugene Friedman and Harold Orbach in their now classic article in *The Foundations of*

Psychiatry, vol. 1) became "instrumental in defining a retirement status as appropriate for the older worker."

In contrast, as is suggested in the papers by Kingsley Davis, Uhlenberg, and Malcolm Morrison, there currently seems to be a growing interest in employing older workers longer. In my opinion, Kotlikoff gets at the heart of the issues we now face when he says at the beginning of his paper:

The success of the new public policy toward employment of the elderly is predicated on two ifs. The first is that the elderly will choose to remain employed, the second is that they will remain employable. There is little evidence at the moment that the trend toward increasingly earlier retirement has slowed, let alone reversed. Although much of the postwar increase in early retirement may reflect a response to Social Security and private retirement incentives, much appears to reflect a strong desire of the elderly for significant leisure. But, even if the often substantial retirement incentives were eliminated and preferences shifted in the direction of more old-age labor supply, the question of the productivity of the elderly would remain.

I couldn't agree more. The biggest "retirement issue" of the next century will be whether both workers and employers see the need and are willing to modify the retirement "right" to include what each group

sees as viable work options in later life to complement the retirement life everyone now expects and almost all enjoy.

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International Relations


U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PHILIP J. FARLEY, and ALEXANDER DALLIN, Eds. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. xii, 746 pp. \$42; paper, \$18.95.

The editors of this book set themselves the task of providing "the first comprehensive and systematic study" of efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II to develop cooperative arrangements to enhance security. They express the hope that the study will "stimulate serious discussion, reflection, and additional research" on the subject (p. vii). This is an ambitious undertaking, but the book well justifies the effort. It is an analysis based on what is now termed "cooperation theory" in

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Blue whale stock

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Brown, S.

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international relations, grounded on a broad foundation of 22 summary case studies, by 23 authors, of a wide range of U.S.–Soviet cooperative endeavors over the past 40 years. The cases are all focused on security issues, thus omitting scientific, cultural, and commercial arrangements and dealings. They cover negotiations on political settlements such as that on postwar Germany, the Austrian State Treaty, the international regime on Berlin, the Treaty on Antarctica, the neutralization of Laos, and the Helsinki Accord on security and cooperation in Europe; arms control negotiations and agreements on strategic arms limitations, nuclear testing, conventional force reductions in Europe, and confidence-building measures; and regulation of political and political-military competition by attempts to develop a regime of constraint on activities in space, to prevent naval incidents at sea, to constrain political confrontations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the like. The case studies, most of them written by specialists, are all competent, and while there are variations in style and level of detail, all not only encapsulate an account of what occurred but present it with an eye to the analytic purpose of the book.

Cooperation is recognized to embrace unilateral and tacit actions as well as formal negotiated bilateral or multilateral agreements, and to cover crisis avoidance and management as well as establishment of regional or global security arrangements. The analysis in several concluding chapters usefully draws upon the material in the case studies. One conclusion that may surprise some is that formal agreements are not always necessary or even useful; there has been an increase in unilateral actions intended to contribute to security (for example, through reducing the adversary's perception of a threat in one's own behavior). Cooperation is understood not as an end in itself but as a means to serve various objectives (which can include enhancement of security). The importance of the quality of leadership in Washington and Moscow comes through both in the case studies and in the editors' analysis.

The idea of addressing efforts at U.S.–Soviet security cooperation seems more routine today than it did when the project was conceived in the fall of 1985—then there had been six years and much tension since the last summit meeting; in the short span since the work was begun there have been four summits and a new rapprochement and burgeoning of cooperative activities. The editors' judgment that the overall U.S.–Soviet relationship is still highly competitive remains true; so too does their recognition that despite—and in part because of—that

rivalry, cooperative measures could still be found mutually useful.

In a lesser way, the normal publishing delay means that the book as a whole and the strategic arms control chapter in particular lag behind by not covering the INF Treaty, a breakthrough in arms control verification, two summits, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a number of other developments. This lag does not affect most of the book's content, and it by no means vitiates its findings.

It would have been useful to have a more extended discussion of the significant fact, noted in the concluding chapter (misdescribed, to my mind, as an "epilogue"), that "least progress has been made in formally structuring and regulating the over-all Soviet-American relationship" (p. 713). What is said in this connection is sensible, but spare. Another general criticism is that no "learning curve" has been traced over the 40-odd years covered in the case studies and by the analysis (which in general tends to address the latter half of that period, and especially the 1970s and early 1980s). It would also have been useful if the editors had identified missed opportunities. For example, there was no serious effort at (and hence there is no case study on) a strategic dialogue over military doctrine—something not only proposed formally by the Warsaw Pact in 1987 but under way in a series of meetings between the defense ministers and chiefs of staff of the United States and the Soviet Union. Abortive efforts to start such a dialogue did occur in the past—at the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958 (omitted, incidentally, from the chapter on efforts to reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent war, save for a passing reference, and not given a chapter of its own) and in SALT I. Such key questions as war termination in the event hostilities erupt has not even been raised, nor is it flagged in this study as a subject worth future attention.

I will forgo comments on the specific case studies, save to repeat that all are good and some are excellent. On only one do I have a dissenting judgment that warrants mention. The chapter on attempts to regulate military activities in space contends that the United States adopted and implemented "a strategy of contingent restraint" toward antisatellite (ASAT) weapons in the early 1960s (pp. 382–384 and 388–393) and that this led to a successful regime of reciprocal restraint during most of that decade, until the Soviet Union upset it by ASAT tests that "pose[d] a threat to the stability of the space regime that had evolved" (p. 390, and see p. 363). In fact, while the American ASAT programs in the 1960s were indeed of limited effectiveness, ASATs were deployed by the Unit-

ed States several years before the first Soviet ASAT tests that (though the Soviet system was also of limited effectiveness) upset the "stability" of an American monopoly on ASAT deployment. Moreover, the United States later obtained a confidential Soviet General Staff discussion from 1972, just as the Soviet ASAT testing program was being gotten under way, that showed clearly their concern over our existing operational systems as well as over more advanced ASAT systems under active development in the United States on which they had information—programs that were later not carried through. Rather than conducting a transient but successful "strategy of contingent restraint," the United States inadvertently triggered a familiar continuing cycle of reciprocal responses to perceived ASAT threats.

The editors, who are also the authors of several key case chapters and above all of the analytical discussions, have managed well a challenging task in producing this valuable contribution to thinking about a key aspect of national security policy. The book is especially timely, appearing as it does at a juncture of change in both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as in their relations with one another.

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Some Other Books of Interest

Mapping Our Genes. Genome Projects: How Big, How Fast? OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Congress of the United States. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1988. xiv, 218 pp., illus. \$30.

This volume is a report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment at the request of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to survey matters bearing on policy with respect to the mapping of the human genome: rationales for such projects, how they should be funded and coordinated, and their international scientific and economic impact. After an opening summary (including some reasons why much of the recent controversy has been "misplaced") the volume contains chapters on techniques for mapping DNA, potential uses of the knowledge obtained, social and ethical questions they raise, federal agencies and non-governmental bodies engaged in human genetic research, the organization and administration of scientific efforts, genome projects involving other nations, and considerations of technology transfer. The book is written in an elementary style and