the Hartley Springs Fault, decreasing influence of lithostatic pressure near the surface, or some other structural control.

An additional slanted drill hole aimed to hit the dike above or below the successful intersection of 1984 could help define the vertical gradient in the 550-year-old paleo–stress field in this currently seismic area. Such information might be used to help predict the location and migration of any future magmatic vents in the Mammoth Lakes area.

JONATHAN FINK
Department of Geology, Arizona State University, Tempe 85287
DAVID POLLARD
Department of Applied Earth Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

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2. D. D. Pollard and P. T. Delaney, *USGS Prof. Paper 1202* (1982).

Nuclear Reactor Safety

Susan J. Niemczyk (Letters, 3 May, p. 530) asks that her views on nuclear reactor safety not be misconstrued. But regrettably, in her gratuitous final sentence, she misrepresents my position.

My concern with regard to the study of the radiological consequences of nuclear accidents (known as "source terms") has simply been to ensure that public safety margins are not eroded, particularly on the basis of incomplete and contradictory data.

Although the assessment of nuclear accident consequences is still at a preliminary stage, some within the nuclear power industry have attempted to use this work to lobby the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to relax important safety regulations. In particular, industry lobbyists have sought reduction or elimination of requirements involving emergency planning, equipment qualification (intended to ensure that vital safety equipment functions properly during accidents which it is designed to mitigate), and backfitting (intended to correct design flaws in operating plants).

In reviewing the basis for this lobbying effort, I and my colleagues at the Committee to Bridge the Gap found numerous fundamental inadequacies in the source term research that make broad generalizations about accident consequences and drastic regulatory reductions impossible (*1*). These include unvalidated computer models that have been known to produce widely varying predictions of radioactive releases for the same accident sequence; quality assurance problems that make containment performance uncertain; and important accident sequences, such as those resulting from earthquakes or sabotage, that have been inadequately addressed.

While accident consequences may indeed have been overestimated for some accident sequences and for some radionuclides, we found that consequence estimates for others appear likely to remain the same or even to increase.

Many other technical criticisms have been offered by the American Physical Society (APS) Study Group on source terms and by Niemczyk, among others. The APS found that "the source term research cannot yet be regarded as adequate" (*2*, p. 216) and also pointed to some factors that could raise accident consequence estimates (*2*, p. 212), not lower them.

Because of these inadequacies, we concluded that emergency preparedness and other safety requirements should not be reduced.

STEVEN AFTERGOOD
Committee to Bridge the Gap, 1637 Butler Avenue, No. 203, Los Angeles, California 90025

References

1. S. Aftergood, "Nuclear accident source terms: No basis for eliminating safety regulations" (Committee to Bridge the Gap, Los Angeles, February 1985).
2. *Radionuclide Release from Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants* (American Physical Society, New York, February 1985).

CIBA-GEIGY Origins

David Dickson states (News and Comment, 29 Mar., p. 1560) that "CIBA was established by then Trinity Fellow Norman de Bruyne in the 1930's." I established Aero Research Ltd. in 1934. CIBA (of Basel) bought a majority shareholding in 1947, when the company became CIBA (A.R.L.) Ltd. Subsequently CIBA and GEIGY (both companies with worldwide ramifications) joined forces to form CIBA-GEIGY.

NORMAN A. DE BRUYNE
3700 Brunswick Place, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540

Erratum: In the Research News article by Jean L. Marx, "The polyphosphoinositides revisited" (19 Apr., p. 312), the discovery of inositol 1,3,4-trisphosphate was erroneously attributed to Michael Berridge of Cambridge University. Although Berridge presented some of the data at the Smith Kline & French symposium, the work was actually done by his Cambridge colleagues Robin Irvine and Peter Downes.