edly, the shuttle's payload bay will accommodate satellites broader than those that will fit atop conventional rockets, but new rockets might just as well be built and some in the Air Force are advocating this anyway. Because rapid advances in surveillance and communications require that new satellites be launched frequently, the advantages of in-orbit servicing may be slim.)

Air Force officials stress that even the orbiters scheduled to fly out of Vandenburg will conduct some civilian missions, and that they will primarily be under NASA's control. But some of them privately share the desire of former Secretary Mark to obtain independent control of the orbiters. Mark had expressed concern that NASA would object to some of the military missions, although he never said what these missions might be.

One exotic mission would be the construction and deployment of a manned orbiting military base. Another is the highly publicized concept of laser battle stations that could be used to attack missiles or planes from either low-earth or geosynchronous orbit. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told *MacNeil-Lehrer* that "there is in my judgment no doubt that you can send up spacecraft . . . with laser beams to defend themselves, that's the easiest of all; to defend other satellites, considerably harder but probably feasible; or even to, in principle, destroy ballistic missiles—conceivable, but in my judgment not practical . . . at least not for decades and not without costs running into the $100 billion range." Brown says he agrees with those in the arms control community who believe it would be a mistake to incite a competition with the Soviets over lasers in space. But a contingent of senators, led by Malcolm Wallop (R–Wyo.), strongly supports such weapons and has pressured the Reagan Administration into expanding the Pentagon's laser weapons research.

Any organized plan to launch such weapons would run into a number of diplomatic barriers. The U.S.-Soviet treaty on antiballistic missile systems requires that both nations discuss limitations on any unconventional, newly invented technology. Discussions are reportedly already under way on a ban of space-based antisatellite weapons. A United Nations resolution also demands that space be restricted to peaceful uses, although the laser weapons advocates want to avoid the requirement by calling the laser weapons purely defensive in nature, and therefore peaceful.

Those who are concerned about the militarization of space take comfort in the fact that the Pentagon's goals—beyond the obvious immediate ones involving satellites or reconnaissance—are as yet ill-defined. An Air Force spokesman says, "We will define a military role for man in space during the next 5 to 10 years." Considerable debate should ensue, whatever the decision is.

—R. JEFFREY SMITH

Afghanistan: The Politics of a Tragicomedy

Anthropologist Louis Dupree believes both the Afghan Marxists and the Russians have failed to understand the cultural norms of Afghan society

Afghanistan has largely dropped from the headlines since the invasion by Soviet troops in Christmas 1979. Yet the country remains as much as ever in turmoil, with the provinces in revolt against the alien occupier and a constant stream of refugees leaving their war-torn villages for sanctuary in Pakistan.

One of those refugees, in a sense, is Louis Dupree, an American anthropologist who through his work in Afghanistan over the past 30 years has acquired an unrivaled knowledge of its political affairs. On a recent visit to Washington to lobby for the sending of American arms to the Afghan resistance fighters, Dupree talked about the latest vicissitudes in the country's turbulent political history.

A member of the American Universities Field Staff and of the University of Pennsylvania, Dupree is the author of *Afghanistan* (Princeton, 1973), a cultural and political history of the country. Unlike some scholars, who choose to cultivate no larger an area than they can keep exclusive, Dupree's range of interest in Afghanistan extends from its Neolithic archeology to its contemporary politics. In the latter domain, his expertise is based on a circle of acquaintances that extends to all parts of Afghan society. His house in Kabul was something of a floating international seminar, a unique meeting place for Afghans and foreigners, Russians and Westerners, visitors and residents.*

Dupree sees the present debacle in Afghanistan as the product of general miscalculation. The Russians, he believes, "planned a Dominican Republic–style invasion, after which they could pull out. But now they are stuck." As for the Afghan leadership, its politics may have been Marxist, but more in the style of Groucho than Karl. Almost entirely Western-educated, but during the period of the Cold War, the Afghan leaders attempted to play off the Russians and Americans in traditional fashion, and were bewildered when the Americans, in a spasm of post-Vietnam guilt, just withdrew from the ball game. The Afghans' other miscalculation was that they could sprinkle their essentially nationalist program with Marxist slogans without confusing anyone. Like the American embassy, the population, familiar with Soviet propaganda, assumed that the Kabul government must be either pro-Soviet or under Soviet domination. This was the signal that started the countrywide re-

> Afghan Marxism—more Groucho than Karl.

*Traveling through Afghanistan as a student in the 1960's, this writer called on Dupree and was whisked off on the activity of the day, a press conference held by the Minister of Justice on the proceedings of the newly elected parliament. Clad in jeans and a somewhat insalubrious shirt, I did not very strongly resemble a member of the working press, to whom the meeting was restricted. Dupree, whose practice in uncertain situations is to grasp the initiative, marched straight up to the minister and (without any prior warning to me) introduced his disheveled young companion as "the correspondent of the London *Times*." Fortunately the Minister of Justice was too courteous to express his skepticism, and the *Times*'s real correspondent in Kabul did not show up that day.

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

Nancy Dupree

A narrow escape from Kabul

Louis Dupree was caught up in the murderous Afghan purges.

volt, the success of which prompted the Soviets to invade.

The event that began the Afghan tragicomedy was perhaps the revolution of 1973 in which King Mohammad Zahir was overthrown. Revolutions in Afghanistan do not follow the precise pattern laid down elsewhere. Although the King was exiled and a Republic declared, the man who overthrew him was Mohammad Daoud, his first cousin and brother-in-law. Daoud assumed the more fashionable title of president, but he too failed to carry through the liberalization over which the King had dawdled.

The leftist opposition united to oppose Daoud. Previously the Parcham (or "banner") group under Babrak Karmal had split away from the parent Khalq (or "masses") party founded in 1965 by Nur Mohammad Taraki. Although Parcham was considered pro-Moscow, Karmal's father was a general in the army, and he had close ties with the Daoud establishment; so close in fact that Parcham was known in Kabul as "the Royal Afghan Communist Party." Daoud's delays in democratizing the government threw Parcham back into alliance with Khalq in 1977.

The coup of April 1978 that brought the Khalq to power was not, in Dupree's opinion, masterminded by the Soviet Union. It was more in the nature of the accidents that occur in Neil Simon plays. Alarmed by a public demonstration, the Daoud government decided to arrest the leftist leaders, including Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, the Khalq party's second in command. Amin, a graduate of the Columbia University Teachers College, had been radicalized while attending study-work camps at the University of Wisconsin. Daoud's police raided Amin's home but made the mistake of leaving him under house-arrest, with his teenage children free to come and go. In the space of 10 hours, using his children as couriers, Amin managed to patch together a makeshift coup with his supporters in the military. The police came to arrest him 15 minutes after he had sent the final order for the coup to begin.

What followed was a 2-day fire fight in the streets of Kabul in which chance and accident ruled supreme over design. Only some 3000 of the Afghan army's 92,000 troops played an active part on either side. Most chose to sit on the fence. The night before the coup, Daoud's defense minister, Ghulam Haider Rasuli, had told commanders to have their troops dance to celebrate the arrest of the opposition. When Rasuli called for the troops' support the following day, he was told they were still dancing. In the center of Kabul the taxis honked for the tanks to pull over, and wove in and out as the fighting continued. The traffic police found the tanks would not obey their signals, so sat on the curbs to watch the action. Rasuli was injured when his driver ran a red light and collided with a taxi. Fortune did not favor his cause. At the end of the day, he was found hiding in a chicken coop and shot. Daoud and 30 members of his family were machine gunned in the Presidential Palace.



Dilip Mehta/Contact

Loyal Student Amin under portrait of Great Leader Taraki.

The accidental coup succeeded. But the Taraki-Amin government enjoyed few successes thereafter. In their attempt to reform society, says Dupree, "they violated practically every Afghan cultural norm. . . . It almost appears that they systematically planned to alienate every segment of the Afghan people." A decree abolishing usury threw the rural credit system into havoc. A premature land reform scheme added to the confusion. The revolution's base of support, such as it was, grew increasingly slender. At the same time the revolution started to devour itself from within by a series of sanguinary purges. Babrak Karmal and the other Parcham leaders, who were merely exiled as ambassadors, got off lightly. Amin, as prime minister, proceeded to imprison or liquidate not only Parcham supporters but members of Khalq who seemed more loyal to President Taraki than to himself. Seeing Amin as an increasing liability, the Russians conspired with Taraki, the "Great Leader" of Khalq propaganda, to remove the "Loyal Student," his overbearing prime minister. But during another accident-ridden coup in high Afghan style, a shoot-out that took place on 14 September 1979, it was the Great Leader who got shot, and the Loyal Student stepped into his shoes as President.

Amin's regime continued to throttle itself. In Dupree's view, the Russians' "sensible first option" would have been simply to stop giving Amin military support. Whatever Afghan group overthrew him would still have found it necessary to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union. Invasion presented a multitude of risks with almost no extra gains. Russian Islamic specialists, Dupree believes, advised against intervention. Nevertheless, in a classically botched demarche, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, managing to kill Amin, the man who supposedly requested their help. But Babrak Karmal, the Parcham leader installed by Moscow, was no better able than Amin to strengthen the government's support among the people. In one precipitate act, the Russians found they had bought themselves an unwinnable war, alienated Third World opinion, and created the seeds of future dissension with the Central Asian peoples they rule.

"They are using gunships to reduce whole valleys to rubble. Soviet tactics have two objectives: the rubblization of Afghanistan and migratory genocide," says Dupree. The number of refugees in Pakistan, less than 500,000 at the time of the Soviet invasion, has now reached more than 1.5 million people, an extraordinary 10 percent of the total population, and in January 1981 the monthly exodus reached 143,000, the highest on record. Another 300,000 to 400,000 Afghans are refugees in Iran.

It was a year before the Russian intervention that Dupree finally left Afghanistan. Told in August 1978 that his resident's visa would not be renewed, he approached Taraki and Amin, both of whom he had known personally in the 1960's. They refused to see him, and he and his wife Nancy left for Pakistan. But Dupree had not been forbidden to return. A few weeks later he received a visa and drove back to Kabul to test the waters. For a few days everything seemed normal. The day after Thanksgiving, while his wife was out shopping, he was arrested and taken to jail. Six days of interrogation followed. Though not physically abused himself, he was made to watch others in the Kabul jail undergoing intimidation and torture. He was accused of working for the CIA and was urged to name all his associates in Afghanistan. When this didn't work, his interrogators confronted him with a former Afghan colleague, badly tortured, who denounced him as a CIA agent. Dupree denied all charges and named no names. After 6 days he was released, the reason for his arrest remaining as obscure as ever, and he and Nancy were escorted back to the border. They were fortunate to escape. Probably 8000 people were executed during the period of the Taraki-Amin purges.†

Soviet tactics, Dupree believes, are unifying the different peoples of Afghanistan in a way that no previous government has been able to do. With their villages destroyed, Afghans are settling their families in Pakistan and returning to fight the invader. Without the usual ties to place, the guerrillas are free to join larger, multi-ethnic units. Dupree hopes that local units, in the manner of the Yugoslav partisans, will ultimately combine into a national liberation movement: "Such a movement, given the necessary weapons, could force the Russians, who already know they can't conquer Afghanistan, only destroy it, to settle the matter peacefully at the negotiating table."—NICHOLAS WADE

†The events of the Taraki-Amin regime, and of his own imprisonment, are described by Dupree in a six-part report "Red Flag over the Hindu Kush," published by the American Universities Field Staff, Wheelock House, Post Office Box 150, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 ($1.50 per part).

Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire

The government wants to keep foreign students and scientists away from unclassified high-technology research

A major struggle is shaping up between universities and the government over research with strategic and commercial implications, particularly in microelectronics. The issue also affects scientists in industry, many of whom are as much concerned as are those at universities.

The crux of the issue is the perennial problem of how to preserve for the United States the fruits of research in high technology while at the same time avoiding restrictions on researchers' freedom. No one has yet devised a perfect solution to the problem but new steps taken by Congress and the Administration to prevent technical data being transferred overseas have brought the issue to the fore.

On 27 February, a letter of protest was sent to the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Defense. The letter was signed by the presidents of five of the country's leading universities—Donald Kennedy of Stanford, Marvin Goldberger of the California Institute of Technology, Paul Gray of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Frank Rhodes of Cornell University, and David Saxon of the University of California. They claim that the government, in its attempts to restrict the export of technology, has resorted to measures that could irreparably harm university-based research.

The presidents tried to avoid publicizing their letter, hoping to quietly reach a compromise with the government. But the letter has been given to the press.

The university presidents are concerned about the implementations of existing regulations designed to limit technology leakage. The rub is that the regulations are so vague and so all-encompassing that, if they are strictly applied, they could shut down high technology research in both universities and industries.

The Defense Department regulates the export of technology through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). According to the ITAR, technical data are exported when they are "disclosed through visits abroad by American citizens (including participants in briefings and symposia) and disclosed to foreign nationals in the United States (including plant visits and briefings and symposia)." Technical data include unclassified data that can be used to manufacture or design an article with military applications. For example, since computer chips are being used in weapons, information on the design of certain microcircuits may be considered technical data. A license is required to export technical data.

The Commerce Department has a similar set of regulations, called the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which deal with technologies that have both commercial and military applications. Both the ITAR and EAR are difficult to interpret. George Dummer, who is director of the Office of Sponsored Programs at MIT, characterizes them as, "the most bewildering set of regulations I've ever had to deal with."

If strictly interpreted, these regulations could prohibit university engineering departments from admitting foreign students into their graduate programs, could forbid foreign scientists from attending certain scientific meetings and could prohibit United States corporations from hiring foreign engineers or even from communicating technical in-

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