ers would counsel anything less than a $10- to $30-billion annual increase. The most extravagant of all the wish lists was put together by the Committee on the Present Danger, a group opposed to SALT II headed by Paul Nitze. Many of its members, including Nitze, are Reagan advisers and would conceivably be invited to join his administration. This committee's recommended budget would increase defense spending authority by $260 billion through 1985, or by about $50 billion a year.

Reagan's camp includes a group of defense planners with an appetite for big programs. If Reagan were elected, he would not be able to win approval for everything they seek. Some would be deferred. The most important objectives, his advisers say, are the following:

- Something would be done to remove what is perceived as the vulnerability of U.S. strategic missiles (Minuteman) to a first-strike attack. Reagan's people have decided that a solution is needed quickly, but they haven't agreed what it should be. Carter's solution was to approve the construction of a massive base for the new MX missile. But the first MX will not be in place until 1986 at the earliest. Some of Reagan's advisers would like to speed up construction; some advocate building a cheaper shelter for the MX; some would scrap the current basing concept entirely and dig new silos for the Minuteman, filling them with MX missiles when the MX is ready. The trouble with these options is that some might violate the terms of the SALT II treaty. Reagan has not decided whether, or to what extent, he wants to stir up that hornet's nest.

- Reagan wants a new strategic bomber, quickly. The Carter Administration decided in 1977 to cancel a program to build the B-1, a successor to the 20-year-old B-52 now in use. The Administration said then, as it does now, that the B-1 would have been obsolete by the time it was built. Carter chose instead to invest heavily in the cruise missile, an unmanned drone which has all the good qualities of the bomber, but is smaller and thus harder to detect with radar. The Administration also publicized the fact that it was investing in Stealth technology that could make aircraft invisible to Soviet radar. If a new bomber is to be built, the Administration argues, it should incorporate this new technology, which will not be available until the end of the decade. Reagan proposes to build a Stealth bomber, but he would also

Anderson Stresses Conventional Arms

Independent candidate John B. Anderson is not rocking any big boats with the defense policy he has outlined so far. But he does represent himself as willing to reexamine some of the fundamental concepts on which defense is now based.

Chief among these is the land-based missile system, one leg of the air-land-sea strategic nuclear triad. Anderson, in his most pointed difference with President Carter's defense policy, flatly opposes construction of the racetrack MX missile basing system planned as a successor to the Minuteman system. He prefers the notion of putting missiles in a large number of small submarines in coastal waters, as recommended by defense analysts Richard Garwin and Sidney Drell. Anderson recently told an approving audience of aerospace workers at TRW, which has a $50 million contract for research on the MX, that he wanted the money saved from scrapping the racetrack to be applied to basic research and the space program.

Anderson, like Carter, favors "essential equivalence" with Soviet military capabilities, as well as ratification of the SALT II treaty, which he maintains is "adequately verifiable" as negotiated.

The Anderson defense plan soft-pedals nuclear weapons and places emphasis on building up various aspects of the country's conventional forces. He wants to beef up the Navy and steer its shipbuilding program away from big high-technology ships to larger numbers of small ships.

This is in line with his concern over the trend toward big "gold-plated" multipurpose weapons systems. Says the position paper: "Too often . . . we forego simple, reliable, rugged weapons systems with clear missions in favor of expensive, complex systems which yield only marginal improvements."

As for Presidential Directive 59, in which it was announced that Soviet military installations and command posts would be priority targets in a defensive nuclear strike, Anderson shares concerns voiced by others, including the Federation of American Scientists, that the Russians will be hard put to limit a nuclear exchange if their command centers are knocked out. He also believes that the MX system and the presidential directive, when taken together, may constitute a disturbing signal to the Soviets that this country is moving closer to developing a first-strike capability.

Anderson has made it clear that he is as worried as anyone about the declining military competence and morale in the all-volunteer force, but he is firmly opposed to restoration of the draft or peacetime draft registration. Instead he has outlined a number of steps—acknowledgedly expensive—to attract qualified manpower, including basic pay increases, more bonuses, and improved housing, social services, and educational benefits.

An Anderson defense budget, like everyone else's, would be a rising budget. He supports the commitment of the United States and NATO allies to raise defense budgets by 3 percent a year. Dollar figures are expected to be named shortly in an overall "budget impact statement" on his platform.

Much of Anderson's defense position has been structured by his principal issues coordinator Alton Frye, an expert on strategic balance who is on leave from his post as director of the Council on Foreign Relations. But Frye says the candidate reads widely and deeply (he is a regular reader of *Foreign Policy* and *Foreign Affairs* magazines), is a rapid absorber of complicated material, and that his defense policy is very much a "personal set of positions." Other chief advisers on foreign policy and defense are Robert Bowie, former deputy director of the CIA under Stansfield Turner and before that head of policy planning at the State Department under President Eisenhower; Harvard professor Thomas Schelling; J. Robert Shaetzel, ambassador to the European Economic Community under Presidents Johnson and Nixon; and Nathaniel Samuels, an undersecretary of state under Nixon. —CONSTANCE HOLDEN

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