Hoover Institution Comes On Strong

Links with Reagan reflect rise to national notice by Stanford think tank with conservative birthright

With Ronald Reagan's presidential nomination virtually assured, much more is likely to be heard from a California think tank named for another conservative Republican, Herbert Hoover.

The Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, has been a fixture at Stanford University for 60 years, and a highly visible one since the 285-foot tower of the Hoover library is the dominant landmark on the campus. But for much of that time the Hoover's institutional and intellectual ties with the rest of the university have been decidedly strained.

In the 1950's the Institution was deep frozen in Cold War attitudes and its ideological leanings upset its scholarly balance. Since then the Hoover has increased its scope and ideological breadth. In the 1970's it branched vigorously into research on domestic issues. Now, it is almost routinely referred to as a conservative counterpart of the Brookings Institution in Washington, often characterized as the leading liberal think tank.

Signaling the Hoover's arrival in the big leagues of policy advice, several scholars with ties to the Hoover figure prominently on the list of advisers to candidate Reagan. Hoover senior fellow Martin C. Anderson is taking a leave of absence to head the group of advisers on domestic and economic policy and will travel with Reagan on the campaign trail. Reagan himself has been an honorary fellow of the Hoover for several years and gave his gubernatorial papers to the Institution.

The Reagan connection aside, public awareness of the Hoover has been heightened in recent years by the presence of its staff of eminent senior scholars such as Nobel economist Milton Friedman and physicist Edward Teller. The Hoover has also appointed several social scientists who do not fit the Hoover archconservative stereotype. The appointment of Seymour Martin Lipset, who is unabashed about his affiliations with the Democrats, is often cited by those who argue that no ideological litmus test is applied by the Hoover in recruiting staff.

At Stanford, tensions between the Hoover and the university at large persist, resulting in part from the unusual autonomy the Institution claims as its birthright. For Stanford faculty, however, questions of sovereignty have been much less an issue than the Hoover's conservative orientation. The critics, mostly social scientists, argue that, as a matter of principle, no university should have a component with a pronounced political identity such as the Hoover has. Spokesmen for the Hoover counter by citing the dominant liberal campus atmosphere and question whether the critics' concern would be so great if the Hoover's tilt were not conservative.

Organizationally, what sets the Hoover apart from freestanding think tanks like Brookings and the conservative American Enterprise Institute in Washington is its university base and the fact that the Hoover administers a major library and archives. These developed from materials collected by Herbert Hoover and others he encouraged when he served as American relief administrator in Europe during World War I. The effort garnered a particularly rich collection of materials from Russia and Eastern Europe, and even now materials from that area continue to be regarded as the special strength of the library and archives. Established in 1919 as part of the university library, the Hoover collection became a major national resource for those writing political, military, and diplomatic history.

W. Glenn Campbell

In its first three decades the Hoover remained essentially a library and archive with a small research and publications program. After World War II, the research reputation of the Institution declined as the small research staff, with a heavy representation of Eastern European émigrés promulgated a captive-nations view of world affairs.

Hoover himself remained interested in the Institution he had established. As Stanford's most illustrious alumnus ('95), who played a prominent role in university affairs for half a century, he used his influence to make sure that the research institute he created embodied his views and values.

As he aged, Hoover grew restive at the way he saw the world and Stanford going and in the late 1950's he negotiated an agreement with the Stanford administration and trustees formalizing the Institution's status in a way that reinforced its unusual independence within the structure of the university.

In a statement prepared for the trustees Hoover wrote, "The purpose of this institution must be, by its research and publications to demonstrate the evil of the doctrines of Karl Marx. . . ." The statement is often brandished by critics as proof of the Hoover's fixed ideology. These days Hoover spokesmen tend to call the statement "unfortunate," describe it as an example of obsolete Cold War rhetoric, and complain that the excerpt is never put in the context of the full text which also stressed a commitment to free inquiry.

A new era began for the Hoover in 1959 with the appointment as director of W. Glenn Campbell. A Harvard-trained economist, Campbell was handpicked by the "Chief," as Hoover was called, and imposed without what Stanford faculty regarded as academic due process, thus increasing the tensions between the Hoover and the campus. To make things more difficult, Campbell took over an organization in delicate financial health.

Hoover died in 1964 and Campbell became chief keeper of the Hoover flame and a man in very firm control of both policy and the day-to-day operation of the Institution. Essentially an administrator, Campbell proved determined to

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strengthen the Hoover's research side. About his effectiveness as a fundraiser there is no dispute. During his tenure, endowment has increased from barely $2 million to about $26 million. The current annual budget is $5.7 million with expenditures split about evenly between support of the collection and funding of the research and publication program. Along the way, Campbell and his colleagues raised money for two major new buildings adjacent to the tower. The second, a presidential memorial, was financed partly with matching funds from Congress, which voted $7 million. Professional staff engaged in research now number about 50, roughly a trebling in the 1970's.

Campbell's most important program initiative has been establishment of a domestic studies program early in the 1970's. This involved not only a vigorous buildup of research on domestic issues, which previously existed in only the most rudimentary form, but also a heavy emphasis on policy relevance.

Three topics have been getting particular attention—income distribution, government regulation, and taxation. Typical of this policy-oriented work is that of Martin Anderson on welfare reform. Anderson's study of the welfare system led him to conclude that the effect of U.S. poverty programs had been to substantially reduce the number of people living at the poverty level. He argues, however, that the payments and services received by welfare clients, combined with the design of the programs and the present tax laws, create a "poverty wall" which deters those on welfare from achieving independence from the welfare system. Anderson does not propose a radical reform of the system, but says that improvement can be made by emphasizing a "needy-only" philosophy for welfare, enforcing fair work requirements, increasing efforts to eliminate fraud and inefficiency, and shifting responsibility for welfare programs from the federal government to state and local government and private institutions.

Anderson served as a special assistant in the Nixon White House and played a significant role in carrying through the plan for the volunteer army. Increasingly, he and other Hoover staff members are on the national policy circuit, testifying at hearings, participating in conferences and seminars, and turning up in the media. Anderson could obviously be the forerunner of a type of Hoover scholar who helps to formulate policy and then takes a hand in implementing it, a la Brookings.

Is there a Hoover view of the world? The affirmative is suggested by *The United States in the 1980's*,* published by the Hoover's own press. The book offers some 30 essays, divided about equally between domestic and international topics; half were written by Hoover staff. According to the editors' introduction, a "single theme that ties together all the essays in this volume is that we have entered into an era of limits and limited government." In domestic affairs Keynesian economics are seen as having generated inflation and unemployment and as now being a source of economic instability. Running through many of the essays on domestic problems is the refrain that government regulation must be reexamined and increased use made of the free market to allocate resources. The book is pervaded by a sense that the political climate has changed in the United States and other Western industrial countries, a view crystallized in the title of an essay by Milton and Rose Friedman, "The Tide is Turning."

Friedman and his free market theories recently became the center of a first-magnitude furor in Great Britain. Critics of the Friedman-influenced economic policies of the Thatcher government, including a number of academic economists, have been attacking the policies as disastrous and Friedman's theories as simplistic. Friedman, characteristically a happy warrior in such debates, seems to be fulfilling the Hoover aims of getting attention for conservative ideas and influencing policy, although, in Britain, Friedman is usually identified with the University of Chicago, where he made his career, rather than the Hoover where he is a part-timer.

In international affairs, the authors offer a generally somber assessment: dé-

**The United States in the 1980's*, Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka, Eds. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. $20.



Hoover Tower is a Stanford campus landmark.

Advising Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan's affinity for the Hoover Institution is reflected in the selections for the groups of policy advisers he has been announcing. Included in the group of domestic and economic policy experts announced on 3 July and headed by **Martin Anderson** are **Glenn Campbell** and **Milton Friedman**, Hoover associate director **Richard T. Burness**, **Thomas Gale Moore**, head of the Hoover's domestic studies program, and fellows **Michael Boskin**, a Stanford economics professor, **Rita Ricardo Campbell**, **Alvin Rabushka**, **Dan Throop Smith**, and **Thomas Sowell**, a UCLA economist who is joining the Hoover as a senior fellow, and **Roger A. Freeman**, fellow emeritus. Hoover regulars on the foreign policy and defense advisory group announced earlier are Campbell, **Peter Duignan**, director of African and Middle East Studies, and **Richard F. Staar**, director of international studies. Others with part-time ties or former links to the Hoover are also on the list. The advisory groups were formed on the understanding that they need not necessarily be Republicans or support Reagan's candidacy, but most of them clearly hold views congenial to Reagan.—JOHN WALSH

tente has failed, American military dominance has disappeared, United States foreign policy is wavering, and the Soviet Union has shifted to an overtly aggressive posture and appears willing to risk nuclear war in pursuing its goals. The introduction warns that "American policies in the early 1980's will determine who is to win this ideological and military struggle." The book does provide a fairly comprehensive and self-consistent set of conservative policy recommendations, on which the Hoover, so to speak, holds the copyright. Perhaps another point to be made is that such an effort, so well financed and well produced, would have been beyond the Hoover 10 years ago.

As for the conservative image, Hoover sometimes seems to flaunt it. For example, its trinity of honorary fellows, Reagan, Frederick Hayek, the venerable anti-statist economist, and exiled writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn are, each in their own way, conservative avatars.

At the same time, the appointment of a cluster of social scientists to the Hoover staff in recent years appears to run against the grain of right-wing orthodoxy. In general, they occupy a centrist position politically and ideologically are unassertive. The main members of the group in addition to Lipset are sociologists Alex Inkeles, James March, and William S. Goode, political scientist Heinz Eulau, and economist Robert Hall. All have joint appointments in one or more Stanford departments and all have well-established reputations in academia at large.

While attitudes of the Stanford faculty toward the Hoover seem to have generally softened, some faculty remain bitterly critical. The sharpest critics these days seem reluctant to be quoted. Typical was one faculty member who said he did not want to air his differences with the Hoover in public. "It doesn't do the university any good," he said, and added that some faculty who have criticized the Hoover in the past have been "smeared" by Hoover staff.

"I think it was a terrible mistake to install a think tank with a special political orientation. I don't think it belongs on a university campus." This faculty member went on to say that he is convinced Campbell was determined from the beginning to "appoint conservatives to balance the liberals and radicals on campus." He knew what he wanted and "first did it bullheadedly." When he ran into opposition he changed tactics, but adhered to his purpose by creating "a facade of good appointments and publications."

One Stanford faculty member who has firsthand experience of the Hoover and is a source of open if measured criticism is Alexander Dallin. A political scientist, Dallin moved from Columbia to take a joint appointment, splitting his time between the Hoover and the political science department from 1971 to 1978. He then elected to shift to the Stanford department full time. Dallin, who first went to the Hoover as a visiting scholar, says he is grateful for the opportunity he had there. "They never told me what to say, what to write, what to do. But by and large, it was a crowd I didn't feel comfortable with." What made him uncomfortable was that the range of views of the staff was confined almost exclusively to varieties of conservative outlooks.

Dallin, an expert in Soviet affairs, like some others at Stanford, sees a downgrading of the Hoover's traditional program in international affairs. Dallin's view is that the international program "if not abandoned, has been subordinated to a concern with domestic affairs." He notes that in recent years several capable people have left the international program in dissatisfaction. Others at Stanford say it is ironic that the Hoover continues to be regarded as a stronghold of Cold Warriors when Campbell himself is more interested in domestic issues and has changed the program emphasis.

Hoover officials deny that the international program is being slighted, pointing out that half the permanent professional staff works in the international field, meaning that half the research budget is allocated there, and that the publications program reflects a continued concern with such issues.

Virtually all the critics come round to the objection on principle that, in Dallin's phrase, "an institution with a distinct political coloration has no place in a university."

Campbell's quick response when asked to comment on the criticism is that "We don't have a conservative bias in appointing people. Staff is appointed for their ability and accomplishments. Ideology enters into it no more than in any university department. In the final analysis performance counts." Campbell says he thinks the staff of the Hoover is well balanced. "We don't have extremists of the Left or the Right."

In respect to its general orientation Campbell says he sees the Hoover as "ideologically in the mainstream. University academics tend to be pretty well on the Left. Academics tend to compare us to other academics." When this is done Hoover may appear to be on the Right, says Campbell, but "when you compare us to the population at large this is not so." Campbell adds that he thinks its "a good thing to have an institution like that at one university."

The decade of the Stanford presidency of Richard Lyman, who is leaving the university this summer to head the Rockefeller Foundation, has been, toward the Hoover, by and large a time of quiet diplomacy. The period, however, began with a sharp collision when the Hoover moved to have its governing board invested with policy-making powers as an independent board of trustees. Lyman and the Stanford trustees resisted and, after some hard bargaining, a treaty was concluded under which the Hoover got a Board of Overseers which is principally advisory but has some substantive powers. The overseers, notably, will contin-

ue to play a significant role in selecting future Hoover directors. But it was agreed that, in the chain of command, the Hoover director would report to the Stanford trustees through the university president.

Since the modus vivendi was reached in the early 1970's, the Hoover and the university have, so to speak, avoided any serious constitutional issues. Recently, a nagging, long-term problem was apparently resolved when a formal agreement was nailed down between the Hoover and the university administration on procedures for appointment of Hoover senior fellows. These form the top category of the research staff and, although the Hoover does not formally grant tenure, senior fellows are assumed to be continuing appointments. Quality assurance in these appointments has been a matter of continuing concern to Stanford faculty, and the new procedures, which in effect gave the Stanford president power of approval, apparently satisfy scruples on the university side, applying even where joint appointments are not involved.

For new president Donald Kennedy and for any Stanford administration, handling the Hoover is likely to be a delicate matter for some time. The circumstances of the Hoover's creation bolster its claim to more than ordinary freedom of action. Any university move that was interpreted as a direct move against Hoover's conservative posture would offend generous contributors—not only to the Hoover, but to the university—who approve of the Institution's political orientation. And the interest of influential Stanford alumni, like former Defense Secretary David Packard, who strongly backed the Hoover's move into domestic policy research, strongly buttresses the

Insiders Guide to Science Advising

The scientific community has long had a kind of romantic attachment to the office of the President's science adviser; a special double issue of the journal *Technology and Society** entitled "Science Advice to the President" should go some way toward satisfying the interest.

The issue has an all-star cast of authors, with every science adviser but one, George Kistiakowsky, having contributed. Other perspectives are provided by a highly knowledgeable group of supporting players. Included is former President Gerald Ford, who won a place in science policy hagiography by restoring the science adviser to the White House after banishment by Richard Nixon.

Editor of the special issue is William T. Golden, who has had a long dual career in finance and as friend and adviser to scientists. His standing is indicated by his high batting average in persuading people to write.

The saga of the science adviser is an oft-told tale and old ground is inevitably gone over. And there could be fewer variations on JFK's remark about Thomas Jefferson being his own science adviser. But the collection does provide a panoramic view of the now near quarter century of the ups and downs of the office.

Credit for the idea of the science adviser post is awarded to physicist I. I. Rabi, the archetypal science policy insider of the last four decades. Rabi was head of the science advisory committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization at the time Sputnik induced panic among Washington planners. James R. Killian, Jr., the first to hold the formal title of President's science adviser, writes that Rabi made the specific proposal that President Eisenhower embraced. It was Killian, in turn, who came up with the design for the complementary President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).

The statute of limitations on ex-science adviser reticence seems to be running out and the collection has more plain speaking than is usually found in such articles. Here is how Jerome B. Wiesner, Kennedy's science adviser, sees the attitudes toward science advisers of successive presidents:

> In the instances of Eisenhower and Kennedy the President had a close relationship, not only to the Science Adviser, but to the PSAC as well, so that they felt very comfortable in letting their hair down in very frank discussions. Both of them obviously enjoyed the give and take. Lyndon Johnson was a poor listener and didn't trust anyone he didn't fully control. Nixon didn't like give and take, didn't trust many people, and was particularly mistrustful of scientists who were, in his view, all liberal and against him. The general perception is that President Carter too is uncomfortable with PSAC-like groups and thus shies away from them, but in my one close contact with him—at the Camp David energy meeting—he ran the meeting effectively, obviously enjoyed it, and seemed to benefit from it. Unfortunately the meeting was not as helpful to him as it would have been if the participants had been able to prepare for it.

The Wiesner article is essentially a brief for the resurrection of PSAC and, in fact, a nostalgia for PSAC pervades the issue.

Edward E. David, Jr., the science adviser evicted by Nixon, sees a new threat and sounds the tocsin. Says David:

> The inward-looking attitude of the Administration and consequently the science office is leading to a serious erosion of that office's influence on broad policy matters. We see other elements taking over the leadership which was previously exercised by that office. The National Academy of Sciences, the AAAS, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Industrial Research Institute, the American Chemical Society, and many others are assuming leadership in science and technology matters which the White House Science Office, through its previous mechanisms, once dominated. Indeed, we may very well be witnessing the demise of the White House Science Office in its traditional form and in a way that is more fundamental and serious than its clear abolishment in 1973. However, the Office can regain its proper function if it reverts to its traditional mechanisms, emphasizing excellence and scientific integrity.

Threaded through many of the pieces is a discussion of the chronic questions afflicting the incumbent of the office. How to reconcile scientific objectivity and loyalty to presidential policies. How to advise the President confidentially, while at the same time, being answerable to Congress as the statute demands. And perhaps hardest of all, how to keep the confidence and cooperation of the scientific community, as is necessary, while avoiding the occupational hazard of looking like a lobbyist for science to a suspicious White House staff.

Not surprisingly, the collection adds up to one long appeal for more and better science advice. But it may be most useful for these firsthand descriptions of where the pitfalls lie.—JOHN WALSH

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Hoover's position in university politics.

How to sum up the Hoover today? Scholars generally regard the library as splendid and as enjoying a comparative advantage by being well financed. The archives are looked upon as a unique resource. As a research center the Hoover is a highly heterogenous place. Outside scholars who use the Hoover are a diverse lot and their product is equally varied.

Many observers say that Hoover policy-research publications still tend to have a hawkish tone on international affairs and a free market bias on domestic ones. At the same time, several Stanford faculty who say they disagreed with the Hoover's political orientation agreed that the Institution's publications have improved markedly in quality, and, as one put it, "the proportion of Hoover publications below acceptable level has shrunk close to zero; it's become a respected and respectable institution." The intellectual atmosphere of the Hoover is still apparently most congenial to conservatives, but the Institution has shown a willingness to add able scholars of a politically centrist persuasion in more than token numbers.

As for the future, there are no signs that the university will seek to resolve these seeming contradictions by ending its curious kind of coexistence with this very sui generis Institution. The Hoover is expected to maintain its financial strength which is a major source of its powers of independence. Modest expansion is expected, but inflation and the Hoover conservatism which extends to financial management will probably limit the rate of growth to well below that of the last decade.

As for its political impact, the Hoover is now being taken seriously as a source of policy analysis and advice, but the scale of the effort and the number of Hoover people circulating in the corridors of power are still too small to have made more than a modest beachhead. The 1970's were essentially a period of preparation. The 1980's will show whether the Hoover will really rival Brookings and AEI. The results of the elections in November will count significantly, but the Hoover's partisans are encouraged because they think that the changes at Hoover have come, so to speak, just when the times are Right.

—JOHN WALSH

Phosphate: Debate over an Essential Resource

Some see a need for a national phosphate policy, but the industry regards this as an invitation for federal meddling

Lakeland, Florida—The citrus groves and cattle ranches which once, years ago, gave the landscape south of here its special character have long since largely given way to one of the most remarkable concentrations of mining, minerals processing, and chemical production activity in America. Situated some 25 miles to the east of Tampa, this is a region known for its buried treasure: the Bone Valley formation, the richest deposit of phosphate ever discovered anywhere and hence a major source of an essential feedstock for fertilizer plants in this country and abroad.

The Bone Valley phosphate mining and processing area extends over some several hundred square miles. The landscape is dominated by strip mines, plants for the beneficiation of phosphate ore and manufacture of phosphoric acid and other products, and huge "slime ponds" and gypsum piles for residues. Walking draglines, some of them big enough to rival the giant machines of the open pit coal mines of the West, dig a series of parallel cuts, each a few hundred feet wide and several thousand feet long, in removing the shallow overburden and extracting the phosphate ore.

Mining of the Bone Valley formation, which is made up of the fossilized remains of marine animals laid down some 10 to 15 million years ago during the late Miocene or the Pliocene, began nearly a century ago as part of the Florida "phosphate rush" of the late 1880's and the 1890's. Production from this formation eventually became one of the dominant factors in the world market and this is still the case today. Indeed, Bone Valley phosphate has in recent years represented a third of total world production and about three-fourths of U.S. production.

But after all the years of mining, and especially the intensive mining of the last decade, the Bone Valley formation has been largely stripped of its richest ore and is expected to be exhausted within another 20 to 30 years. For some observers the coming dependence of the phosphate industry on ores that will be less rich, harder to get at, and more expensive to process signifies possible trouble ahead.

Some fear that within the next 10 to 20 years the United States will lose its position as the leading exporter of phosphate and that by sometime early in the next century it could even become a major importer, dependent on possibly unreliable foreign producers who may attempt to control the price through a new "OPEC" or Organization of Phosphate Exporting Countries. People in the phosphate industry, on the other hand, put down such fears as nonsense and indicate that Florida alone has enough phosphate left to sustain for 500 years the current domestic production of some 50 million tons a year.

Phosphate is not yet a hot issue nationally, but increasing attention is being given in Washington to the widely differing and contradictory phosphate reserve and resource estimates. There are even proposals afoot that call for a national phosphate policy looking to the development and conservation of this mineral as a vital resource.

But is such a policy in fact necessary, and, if so, what might it consist of?

Such questions have been brewing for quite a while. Even 6 years ago, the U.S. Bureau of Mines' commodity specialist for phosphate, William F. Stowasser, was concerned about what he perceived as the rapid depletion of high-grade phosphate reserves. In a memorandum to his superiors, he took strong exception to the Nixon Administration's decision—about which the Bureau of Mines was never consulted—to approve the 20-year, $20-billion deal that Armand Hammer and his Occidental Chemical Company had struck with the Russians

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