The fate of the compromise remained in doubt almost until October because of uncertainty about an Italian contribution of \$73 million which provided a kind of keystone to the financial arch. The collapsible condition of recent Italian governments has caused the wobble, but the Italians came through with their commitment and the compromise held.

The percentage of the costs of Spacelab, currently estimated at \$370 million, will be absorbed by the participating ESRO members as follows:

52.55 percen
18 percent
10 percent
6.3 percent
4.2 percent
2.8 percent
2.1 percent
1.5 percent
1 percent

Sweden is a member of ESRO and will participate in the L3S and Marots projects, but chose to finesse the Spacelab opportunity. The decision is attributed at least in part to the coolness between the United States and Sweden that is a legacy of the Vietnam war.

Informed observers feel that crucial elements in the ESRO package deal were German enthusiasm for cooperating with the United States in a major manned spaceflight program and British willingness to go along on European projects after joining the European Community. The key action on Spacelab probably occurred late last year when the French were still unenchanted with the idea of the Spacelab project and the Germans let it be known that they and some others were prepared to take up the NASA offer without France. The French then conceded, apparently in order to get German cooperation with the L3S. The operative understanding in ESRO has been and still is that a country can expect to be awarded contracts roughly in proportion to the funds its provides for a project.

It should be noted that in the Spacelab courtship, the Europeans have seen the United States at times as a difficult suiter. The chronology goes back to 1969 and the euphoric period just after the first manned landing on the moon. NASA officials toured Europe, and, not oblivious to the prospect of reducing costs, offered the Europeans a chance to participate in what was then an ambitious post-Apollo program. NASA was then thinking not only of the shuttle, but of a complementary space "tug" and space station. The tug would have been transported into orbit and then deployed to do odd jobs such as launching and servicing experiments in space. The space station would have been a sophisticated, permanent manned orbiting platform which would have given the United States a "presence" in space.

The history is tortuous, but some Europeans, particularly in the press and in industry, criticized the Americans for offering and then withdrawing opportunities for participation on major hardware programs. (The tug, for example, was scrubbed as a "participatory possibility" after the Europeans had spent time and money on technical studies.) The explanation from the American side, in general, was that cutbacks in the U.S. space program, the technological unsuitability of some things ESRO wanted to do, and the missing of deadlines by the Europeans caused the difficulties. From the European side, NASA was seen as having a fixation on keeping complete control of management and as adamant about keeping American dollars at home.

Despite the frictions, Spacelab is a testimonial to patience and skillful diplomacy. And the result is due not only to the big power partners. Belgian science minister Charles Hainan, for example, is credited with navigating the compromise through potentially fatal straits in the European Space Conference in August.

Internationalization, then, appears to be an important feature of NASA's new look in the post-Apollo era. With Spacelab, NASA has had a triple incentive—economic, diplomatic, and scientific. In the case of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, the rendezvous and docking experiment scheduled for 1975, the main reward would appear to be a demonstration of détente in space.

No one expects that the typical space crew of the near future will be a multinational mixture of Earthmen, but it is evident that events have tempered the space nationalism of the 1960's.

-John Walsh

## **Court Restores Training Money**

The U.S. government acted unlawfully when it impounded funds for biomedical research training grants, according to a 26 October ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has until 15 November to release about \$111 million that Congress appropriated for the National Institutes of Health training grant and fellowship programs for fiscal year 1973, which ended 30 June.

The ruling, by Judge George L. Hart, Jr., came in a case brought by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) against HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger. At the same time, Hart ruled in another AAMC suit against HEW involving impounded funds for "special projects" in medical schools, including support for increased enrollments generally and for women and disadvantaged persons in particular. In this case, Hart ordered the release of about \$29 million.

These two suits are among approximately 50 that have been filed to force the government to release impounded funds. Among them was a successful suit against the Office of Education for the release of \$25 million earmarked by Congress for Vietnam veterans (*Science*, 27 April). But the full impact of these suits is not yet entirely clear.

In his decision in the AAMC suit, Hart stated that the money in question had been ordered to be spent by Congress and that "the failure to obligate same by the Secretary was illegal." But his order that the money be released within 20 days has proved a source of some confusion because the government has 60 days to file an appeal. What AAMC officials want to know is this: What happens if money is actually released on 15 November and turned over for training and special projects—and then the government appeals and wins? Could schools be forced to give the money back? It is not certain; the best guess, though, is that the government would have a hard time getting it. Nor is it certain that the government will appeal—in many recent cases it has not. For the moment, all one can do is wait and see.—B.J.C.