leapt with pleasure at encountering Rommetveit's *ganz amerikanisch* skepticism about the merits of such rule-giving ex cathedra. In what I take as an indirect rejoinder to Israel in the guise of criticism of the hermeneutic-dialectic philosophers, he writes (p. 222),

> It is puzzling . . . that a theory of science which is explicitly formulated within the context of an anthropology of knowledge as opposed to a "logic of science" . . . should be outlined in the terminology of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Dilthey, as if psychological enquiries during the last fifty years into the acquisition of knowledge and ontogenetic development had added nothing to our insight into the anthropological problems raised by Kant.

Rommetveit draws effectively on Piaget in this connection, pointing out that Piaget's account of "decentering" bears directly on the conditions and limits of *Wertfreiheit* (value-free cognition or science)—a perennial issue in this volume.

Rommetveit's essay holds other delights. Among them I count his defense of manipulative deception in social psychological experimentation, seen not as an "instance of tacit positivistic metaphysics of causation and denial of human intentionality" but rather as detour strategies that "testify to a clear recognition of the crucial role of human intentionality and of Man's capacity for self-reflection and self-control" (pp. 224–25). He even finds inadequacies in "the novel commandment, *Thou shalt not seek knowledge about thine Brother that cannot be converted into self-insight in Him*" (p. 227), which, as he notes, cannot give good guidance to research in psycholinguistics (lest we become verbal centipedes attentive to our feet) or, for that matter, to unquestionably valuable research in mental retardation and schizophrenia. Generally, Rommetveit seeks accommodation between voluntarism and determinism, between *Verstehen* and *Erklärung*, in the interest of a humanly relevant empirical social science. As with Moscovici, American social psychologists can learn from him. The degree of tension with American thoughtways is in the right range.

The chapters already noted are the rewarding or challenging substance of the volume for me. Wiberg (Lund) also contributes a long and scholarly critical exegesis of rational and nonrational models of man, using game and decision theories as examples of the former and instinct and motive theories as examples of the latter. The analysis is exhaustively thorough and seemingly competent, and brings together areas of specialized expertise that are not commonly conjoined. But there is probably not much here that will be novel to American specialists in these topics. Slighter contributions are included from Asplund (Copenhagen) on the concept of value relevance, from von Cranach (Berne) on methodological problems in relating ethology to human behavior, from Flament (Aix-en-Provence) expounding an abstract model derived from Boolean algebra for examining in principle the asymmetrical relationship between the cognitive structures of the persons being studied and of the scientist studying them, and from Harré (Oxford) on the analysis of episodes within a rule-role approach to social psychology as "critical natural history" rather than as science.

How, then, are we to understand this volume, as a specimen and omen in the present crisis of social psychology? At first glance most American readers are likely to conclude that if social psychology continues to be *done* as a science, mainly Americans rather than Europeans will continue to be the ones to do it. This understandable reaction is not quite fair; it does not take sufficient account of the European intellectual tradition, or of the fact that some of the spinners of abstractions in this volume also do excellent empirical research. Still, one wonders. The time and effort devoted by empirical social scientists to sophisticated philosophy of knowledge is at a cost of other possible investments. And a belief in "total interactionism" (that everything is consequentially related to everything else) as endorsed at one point by Israel can provide a totally inhibiting rationalization against undertaking empirical first steps in any causal direction.

On the other hand, American social psychology cannot afford to take lightly the fundamental criticisms aimed at it by this book. Although many of the same criticisms have recently been advanced by internal critics, the divergent societal and intellectual perspective of the European group gives a special cogency to their evaluation. And as Moscovici notes, European social psychologists, being few, are also compelled to pay more attention than Americans to the currently productive lines of thought among their colleagues in other scientific and humanistic traditions. In America, it has been easier to remain smugly specialized and attentive only to a narrowly like-thinking audience, dangerous hubris for a discipline that claims to be a science of social man.

My own hope is that social psychology will emerge from its present crisis better equipped to consider man both as subject and as object, as actor and as acted upon, and to come to terms with social *inter*active processes, especially symbolic communication in a context of rules and roles. Here I agree with much of the argument of the book. But I am sufficiently American in my presuppositions to believe that, for the most part, advance in this direction will come more from the development of methods and techniques (including conceptual tools) to cope with this complexity than from preoccupation with "methodology" in the philosophical sense that predominates so heavily in this volume.

M. BREWSTER SMITH
Division of Social Sciences,
University of California,
Santa Cruz

Disaffection

Reinventing Anthropology. DELL HYMES, Ed. Pantheon (Random House), New York, 1972. vi, 470 pp. $12.95.

It is reasonable to ask, as the editor of *Reinventing Anthropology* does, whether anthropology would be invented today if it did not already exist. For when the social sciences are arrayed, each of the others will be seen to focus on some one aspect of social interaction (as perceived by Western man)—economic transactions, man-land relationships, and the like. Only anthropology has no domain of its own. The array is like an intelligence test problem: Which item is not part of a natural set?

Yet the authors of the 16 essays in this volume do not ask why this strange circumstance should exist or why anthropology is nevertheless a flourishing discipline or even whether its generality has direct implications for its future.

These self-styled radical anthropologists take as their point of departure the proposition that anthropology is expendable ("This analysis of anthropology is radical at least in this, that it . . . can envision a world in which [anthropology] has no separate identity" [p. 54]). In Hymes's long introduction he argues for the need for a reinterpretation of the field, but that "each anthropologist must reinvent it, as a general field, for him or herself, following personal interest and talent . . ." (p.

48). This reinvented anthropology must be characterized by a suspension of judgment on the "received notions" of the establishment (Kurt H. Wolff), which is to be attained by self-examination through a "reflexive ethnology" (Bob Scholte) because its central purpose is self-knowledge (Stanley Diamond). It must be characterized by humanism, accountability, relevancy, and the end of hypocrisy (Joel Berremann). In the fulfillment of these goals, it should turn to the examination of urban culture and recognize the existence of an Afro-American cultural tradition (William S. Willis, Jr., John F. Szwed). It is imperative that it understand the role of imperialism in the research on subordinate cultures since anthropology is handmaiden to this imperialism (Mina Davis Caulfield), understand the problem of power in social relationships (Eric Wolf), and understand the relationship of these to the ecological disasters that characterize the modern world (E. N. Anderson, Jr.). This means, among other things, that it must concern itself with the study of elites in our society (Laura Nader) and examine the results of a controlled communication system in our "wired planet" (Sol Worth). In the process, it should involve the subjects of study in its research (Kenneth Hale; also Willis and Szwed), should take cognizance of the virtues of native cultures, whether these are exotic peoples or submerged elements in our society (Richard O. Clemmer and Robert Jay, but many of the other essays as well), and most particularly should evoke in the anthropologist an examination and reevaluation of himself (Jay, but also Scholte and others).

If all of this seems to be neither new nor radical, the reader has my sympathy. If it seems programmatic, I have made the authors' case too well, for it is at best preprogrammatic—a statement of general intent which the authors occasionally (for example, Scholte, p. 451, note 9) say they do not know how to put into practice—or praxis, as they like to call it.

One might expect that a series of essays critical of the current state of a discipline would demonstrate the existing inadequacies, but this is not the case. Most of the essays avoid discussion of what anthropology has been doing for over a generation. There are many more references to the philosophical underpinnings of anthropology, from Aristotle to Marx, than to current work or theory. Thus Nader appears to discover that anthropology should study elites of our society, but takes no cognizance of the extensive work of Lloyd Warner, of Hortense Powdermaker and Leo Rosten in Hollywood, or of the many community studies in the tradition of the Lynds. The authors appear not to recognize that their recurrent theme that anthropology should be made to reveal ourselves (both as a society and as persons) has been a cliché in anthropology since Clyde Kluckhohn expressed it in the title of his popular book *Mirror for Man*, and indeed since Tylor and Maine. The authors might have recognized the anthropologists' concern with relevance by finding in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* the article on the anthropological study of modern society, with its lengthy but still very incomplete bibliography, or by taking note of the fact that the Society for Applied Anthropology has been publishing a journal for over 30 years. Had they demonstrated that these endeavors have largely failed the services of a humanized society (as I think is in fact the case), and that this is because they have paid inadequate attention to the power structure (which I also think is the case) or because the authors are a part of that power structure (which I doubt), they might have done something to make anthropology the phoenix they would like it to become.

The shared disaffection with Western civilization that characterizes these authors (as it does most anthropologists) results in a subliminal theme that is essentially Rousseauean, a characterization of native society as homogeneous and personal rather than power-oriented and depersonalized. This is one of those "received notions" which the book warns us we must be wary of. We need not look to Colin Turnbull's Ik for examples of depersonalization; the objectification of others which these authors find characteristic of our society is, for example, implicit in the widespread custom of bride-price.

There are two essays that do not fit this general characterization. Clemmer deals with the research in the Hopi cultural revitalization in an essay that is poignant and important, though its conclusions are by no means novel. A. Norman Klein analyzes the "countercultures" of the '60's from the perspective of a true participant observer (as distinct from the anthropological *pretense* at participant observation) and demonstrates that their form in different countries reflects the culture—the cultural hegemony, as he calls it—of each period. In this exercise he is demonstrating the validity of the traditional approach of anthropology, namely that there are generalizations to be made and that these can be formulated in terms of that classic concept of the discipline.

If these essays are representative of what radical anthropology has to offer for the future, it would appear that the establishment has little to fear from it, and the liberals little to hope.

WALTER GOLDSCHMIDT
Department of Anthropology,
University of California,
Los Angeles

Personality: Adaptation and Individuation

Culture, Behavior, and Personality. An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Psychosocial Adaptation. ROBERT A. LEVINE. Aldine, Chicago, 1973. xvi, 320 pp., illus. $12.50.

The field of culture and personality emerged as a distinct focus of interdisciplinary study in the early 1930's. From the start it had wide appeal to students of anthropology, psychology, and sociology; viewing the development of personality within a sociocultural matrix promised a richer and more significant understanding of person, society, and culture. Many of the pioneers in the field were gifted writers. Poetic vision as well as exotic illustrations graced their writings.

For some early students, personality was little more than the subjective aspect of culture; in Ruth Benedict's phrasing, personality was "culture writ small." Other pioneers drew upon psychoanalytic formulations to propose linkages between child training techniques and cultural systems. For the most part, however, the studies were largely atheoretical, and personality types were posited rather than established through careful individual study. With World War II came "national character" studies, imputing traits and motives to allies and enemies in the service of war aims. The critical assessments that followed led to widespread rejection of the field and especially of the label "culture and personality," though they by no means diminished the significance and challenge of the basic questions in this area where so many of the behavioral sciences intersect.

Robert LeVine has undertaken the