Broom cleaning the Sterkfontein skull (*Plesianthropus transvaalensis* Broom, now grouped as *Australopithecus africanus*) at the Transvaal Museum. [From *Dr Robert Broom, F.R.S.: Paleontologist and Physician*]

Many people are still active who worked directly with Broom. One of these is G. H. Findlay, who in recording Broom's career demonstrates the sources of his influence, which lay as much in the impulse to learn, to communicate, to proselytize, and to make his mark, which drove him to furious and single-minded activity throughout his life, as in his quickness and retentiveness of mind. Findlay's account should be useful to anyone interested in the motivation and development of a scientist, for although Broom's world view was strongly colored by Victorian idealism and may seem quaint to many readers, his motivation is more nearly comparable to that of James Watson, as depicted in *The Double Helix*, than it is to that of a Darwin or an Owen.

The book also provides an affectionate but balanced picture of Broom the man, including the inconsistencies and outright contradictions that made him an exasperating as well as a charming and inspiring human being. Finally, Findlay's recognition that the scientist and the man are one leaves us with some understanding of how Broom became a legend in his own time.

Findlay's style is highly conversational and in places disorderly, but this does not detract from enjoyment of the book, or from the information to be gained from it. On the contrary, style rather complements content, for it corresponds to the hell-for-leather nature of Broom's character and career, reflecting his impatience with pedestrian mentality, his verve and excitement in controversy, and his impulsive-appearing dashes halfway around the world, which if often justified by financial needs were always motivated by the requirements of scientific problems with which he was concerned at the moment.

In summary, this is an accurately documented and entertaining account of the career of a man who contributed significantly to the progress of science; it is valuable for its information alone, but he who seeks that information will have a pleasant hunt.

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Criticism of a Social Science

The Context of Social Psychology. A Critical Assessment. JOACHIM ISRAEL and HENRI TAJFEL, Eds. Published in cooperation with the European Association of Experimental Psychology by Academic Press, New York, 1972. viii, 438 pp., illus. $19.50. European Monographs in Social Psychology.

This volume is the product of a work group that met in 1970 at Elsinore, Denmark, under the sponsorship of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, to carry forward the discussion of fundamental epistemological and methodological issues underlying discontents with the state of social psychology that had surfaced at the 1969 plenary conference of the association at Louvain. The ten contributors come from seven countries.

As Tajfel notes in his introduction, Prince Hamlet would have been at home in the gathering—though he could not have made much of the elaborate texture of abstractions in which the European version of the current crisis of social psychology tends to get expressed in this serious and difficult book. The book will interest American social scientists primarily as a specimen of the best contemporary European thought in the largely American subdiscipline of social psychology. From an American perspective, the culture gap displayed is so great that the book is unlikely to be very influential on our own attempts to come to grips with the crisis in the field. The reader finds himself a vicarious participant in a European debate, rather than a participant in a Euro-American dialog. Nevertheless, American social psychologists need to understand the terms of this debate if we are to reduce our own parochialism. And some of the contributions should be directly useful to us in suggesting promising new directions for inquiry.

In the two postwar decades social psychology emerged in the United States as a field of vigorous laboratory experimentation that applied self-consciously scientific methodology to the clarification and elaboration of small theories about such topics as social influence, social comparison processes, strains toward consistency in beliefs and feelings, and the perception of other persons or the attribution to them of psychological states and dispositions. The results of this productive period are codified in the five volumes of the Lindzey-Aronson *Handbook of Social Psychology*. These American developments attracted the attention of a small number of psychologists and sociologists in both Western and Eastern Europe, and under the leadership of Leon Festinger (the prime mover behind much that was novel and interesting in American social psychology), a committee of the Social Science Research Council played a catalytic role in bringing the European experimentalists together and in proselytizing for the systematic empirical-theoretical study of social behavior on a cross-national basis. The European Association of Experimental Social Psychol-

ogy, now a vigorous and autonomous group, emerged as a result.

Near the end of the '60's, doubt and self-criticism became increasingly evident among American social psychologists—about the lack of cumulative gains commensurate with effort expended and of consensual paradigms to define the growing edge of scientific advance, about the artificiality and human irrelevance of some of the problems that had been pursued with great sophistication, about the instability of laboratory findings insofar as they often turned out to depend upon unexamined interpretations of the experimental situation by the human subjects, and about the questionable ethics involved in the deceptive manipulations that were typically required to attain some control over these interpretations. The field is still in crisis, with no predominant new directions clearly apparent, though there is greater emphasis on observation and experiment in real-life settings and on applied concerns. In Europe, if the book under review is representative, the crisis of confidence is more extreme. European social psychology is turning to bite the now faltering American hand that fed it. The reaction is accompanied by a full-scale return of the never fully repressed European preoccupation with speculative philosophy.

The contributors to the book write from varying perspectives but tend to share a common point of view toward recent social psychology. Especially as developed in the central critical essays by Moscovici (Paris), Tajfel (Bristol), and Israel (Lund), this point of view includes at least the following features: rejection of the positivist epistemology of social science, emphasizing instead the intrinsic importance of prior assumptions or stipulations concerning the nature of man and society; doubt about the possibility or desirability of value-free social science; rejection of the linear, one-way-traffic conception of causation implicit in much experimental social psychology in favor of an interactive view; and emphasis on meaning and symbolic communication as the hallmark of the social, with criticism of current social psychology as stopping short of its proper task in this respect.

So, among the familiar "great names," Marx, Piaget, and G. H. Mead receive much respectful attention. Dilthey's turn-of-the-century distinction between *Erklärung* (natural scientific explanation) and *Verstehen* (humanistic understanding or interpretation) lies at the font of much worry in the book about the epistemology of the social sciences. Some new names emerge as the focus of exegesis and debate, particularly the German "hermeneutic-dialectic" philosophers Habermas and Apel. It also helps to be familiar with the later Wittgenstein.

For this relatively parochial American, the essay by Moscovici on society and theory in social psychology is at once the most readable and the most thought-provoking. (Tajfel's parallel chapter covers more familiar ground.) More than the others, Moscovici helps us become aware of our parochialism. Writing autobiographically of his sense of strangeness and unreality in digesting the substance of such a respected American achievement as Thibaut and Kelley's *Social Psychology of Groups* (which analyzed interpersonal relations according to a narrowly rational utilitarian calculus at variance with Moscovici's sense of the wider range of possibilities), he goes on to note (pp. 18–19) that he

> encountered similar difficulties with some of the maxims implicit in a good deal of current research: "We like those who support us"; "The leader is a person who understands the needs of the members of his group"; "We help those who help us"; "Understanding the point of view of another person promotes cooperation."
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> This "social psychology of the nice person" was to me then—as it still is today—offensive in many ways. . . . I knew from my social experience that we seek out those who differ from us and that we can identify with them; that we can love someone who is contemptuous of us; that leaders may impose themselves on others through violence or through following unremittingly their own ideals—and that often, in doing this, they are not only admired but also loved; and that, after all, is it not an opponent who often comes to know us best?

The themes of American social psychological research, says Moscovici, arise from issues distinctive of American society. So (p. 19):

> The fact that social psychology is at present almost exclusively American constitutes a double handicap. From the point of view of American social psychologists, this cannot fail to set limits on the relevance of their results and to create uncertainty and doubt about the validity of the ideas and laws that they propose. For social psychologists elsewhere, this casts a doubt on the validity of their scientific attitude: they have the choice between building a social psychology appropriate to their society and culture or to rest content with the application to their teaching and research of a model from elsewhere which is highly restricted.

And again (p. 38), epigrammatically:

> Most of the experiments on social influence, on the effects of a majority, on leadership or on threat are no more than a long interview which we conduct with society about its social theory.

Touché!

At the close of a surefooted and always interesting selective commentary on the American experimental and theoretical literature, Moscovici decries the fetishism of the trappings of science that has resulted in a (once) smug little discipline with some of the features of a private club, and calls for a systematic psychology of social "subjects"—not just social "objects"—that might come up with some "dangerous truths." For Moscovici, the tacit ambiance of European Marxist thought is a provocative source of intellectual ferment, as it is not in the doctrinaire tract by Janoušek (Prague) on the Marxian concept of "praxis."

Israel's 90-page systematic disquisition on "stipulations and construction in the social sciences" is a fine source from which to gain acquaintance with contemporary European thought about the philosophy of social science—for those who can tolerate an unremittingly high level of classificatory abstraction that rarely descends from the realm of metatheory. Here we become acquainted with the "hermeneutic dialectics" of Habermas and the praxeological concepts of the Finnish philosopher von Wright. We see how Marx and Mead can be made to lie down together, and are offered a marriage of empirical and critical theory according to which man is viewed both as subject and as object: an active creator of his own social world as well as a result of the influences to which he is exposed as a member of it. The general drift of Israel's thought I find wholly congenial; its intellectual style en route is so foreign to my accustomed American thoughtways as to be more aversive than mind-stretching.

Rommetveit (Olso) operates in the same philosophical realm, but communication with an American reader is enhanced by his concern with a particular substantive problem: his essay is appropriately subtitled "In search of a preface to a conceptual framework for research on language and human communication." I lack competence to evaluate his technical contributions to linguistic analysis, which may be of interest to specialists in that field. After ploughing through Israel's philosophical prescriptions, however, I

leapt with pleasure at encountering Rommetveit's *ganz amerikanisch* skepticism about the merits of such rule-giving ex cathedra. In what I take as an indirect rejoinder to Israel in the guise of criticism of the hermeneutic-dialectic philosophers, he writes (p. 222),

> It is puzzling . . . that a theory of science which is explicitly formulated within the context of an anthropology of knowledge as opposed to a "logic of science" . . . should be outlined in the terminology of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Dilthey, as if psychological enquiries during the last fifty years into the acquisition of knowledge and ontogenetic development had added nothing to our insight into the anthropological problems raised by Kant.

Rommetveit draws effectively on Piaget in this connection, pointing out that Piaget's account of "decentering" bears directly on the conditions and limits of *Wertfreiheit* (value-free cognition or science)—a perennial issue in this volume.

Rommetveit's essay holds other delights. Among them I count his defense of manipulative deception in social psychological experimentation, seen not as an "instance of tacit positivistic metaphysics of causation and denial of human intentionality" but rather as detour strategies that "testify to a clear recognition of the crucial role of human intentionality and of Man's capacity for self-reflection and self-control" (pp. 224–25). He even finds inadequacies in "the novel commandment, *Thou shalt not seek knowledge about thine Brother that cannot be converted into self-insight in Him*" (p. 227), which, as he notes, cannot give good guidance to research in psycholinguistics (lest we become verbal centipedes attentive to our feet) or, for that matter, to unquestionably valuable research in mental retardation and schizophrenia. Generally, Rommetveit seeks accommodation between voluntarism and determinism, between *Verstehen* and *Erklärung*, in the interest of a humanly relevant empirical social science. As with Moscovici, American social psychologists can learn from him. The degree of tension with American thoughtways is in the right range.

The chapters already noted are the rewarding or challenging substance of the volume for me. Wiberg (Lund) also contributes a long and scholarly critical exegesis of rational and nonrational models of man, using game and decision theories as examples of the former and instinct and motive theories as examples of the latter. The analysis is exhaustively thorough and seemingly competent, and brings together areas of specialized expertise that are not commonly conjoined. But there is probably not much here that will be novel to American specialists in these topics. Slighter contributions are included from Asplund (Copenhagen) on the concept of value relevance, from von Cranach (Berne) on methodological problems in relating ethology to human behavior, from Flament (Aix-en-Provence) expounding an abstract model derived from Boolean algebra for examining in principle the asymmetrical relationship between the cognitive structures of the persons being studied and of the scientist studying them, and from Harré (Oxford) on the analysis of episodes within a rule-role approach to social psychology as "critical natural history" rather than as science.

How, then, are we to understand this volume, as a specimen and omen in the present crisis of social psychology? At first glance most American readers are likely to conclude that if social psychology continues to be *done* as a science, mainly Americans rather than Europeans will continue to be the ones to do it. This understandable reaction is not quite fair; it does not take sufficient account of the European intellectual tradition, or of the fact that some of the spinners of abstractions in this volume also do excellent empirical research. Still, one wonders. The time and effort devoted by empirical social scientists to sophisticated philosophy of knowledge is at a cost of other possible investments. And a belief in "total interactionism" (that everything is consequentially related to everything else) as endorsed at one point by Israel can provide a totally inhibiting rationalization against undertaking empirical first steps in any causal direction.

On the other hand, American social psychology cannot afford to take lightly the fundamental criticisms aimed at it by this book. Although many of the same criticisms have recently been advanced by internal critics, the divergent societal and intellectual perspective of the European group gives a special cogency to their evaluation. And as Moscovici notes, European social psychologists, being few, are also compelled to pay more attention than Americans to the currently productive lines of thought among their colleagues in other scientific and humanistic traditions. In America, it has been easier to remain smugly specialized and attentive only to a narrowly like-thinking audience, dangerous hubris for a discipline that claims to be a science of social man.

My own hope is that social psychology will emerge from its present crisis better equipped to consider man both as subject and as object, as actor and as acted upon, and to come to terms with social *inter*active processes, especially symbolic communication in a context of rules and roles. Here I agree with much of the argument of the book. But I am sufficiently American in my presuppositions to believe that, for the most part, advance in this direction will come more from the development of methods and techniques (including conceptual tools) to cope with this complexity than from preoccupation with "methodology" in the philosophical sense that predominates so heavily in this volume.

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Disaffection

Reinventing Anthropology. DELL HYMES, Ed. Pantheon (Random House), New York, 1972. vi, 470 pp. $12.95.

It is reasonable to ask, as the editor of *Reinventing Anthropology* does, whether anthropology would be invented today if it did not already exist. For when the social sciences are arrayed, each of the others will be seen to focus on some one aspect of social interaction (as perceived by Western man)—economic transactions, man-land relationships, and the like. Only anthropology has no domain of its own. The array is like an intelligence test problem: Which item is not part of a natural set?

Yet the authors of the 16 essays in this volume do not ask why this strange circumstance should exist or why anthropology is nevertheless a flourishing discipline or even whether its generality has direct implications for its future.

These self-styled radical anthropologists take as their point of departure the proposition that anthropology is expendable ("This analysis of anthropology is radical at least in this, that it . . . can envision a world in which [anthropology] has no separate identity" [p. 54]). In Hymes's long introduction he argues for the need for a reinterpretation of the field, but that "each anthropologist must reinvent it, as a general field, for him or herself, following personal interest and talent . . ." (p.