that experimental animals exposed to atmospheric lead—at concentrations comparable to those experienced by humans—have shown markedly decreased resistance to bacterial infection. Keeping in touch with current research on such matters is an important part of the staff scientists' work. Charles Wurster, who still heads EDF's Scientists Advisory Committee, observes that "EDF is just not going to put itself in a position where the best scientists are on the other side. In a sense, a public interest organization such as EDF has no position of its own. It seeks out the most competent position it can find."

A succeeding article will discuss some of the more important results that have come from environmental law, as practiced by EDF and by certain other important groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Law and Social Policy, and the Sierra Club's Legal Defense Fund. Environmental law has shown promise in enforcing the will of Congress, making government administrators explain their actions, providing a form of "technology assessment," and demanding a searching and honest analysis of such politically charged questions as energy policy. Environmental law has indeed come a long way, but, as I shall point out, there remain many uncertainties—which Congress may ultimately have to resolve—as to how much farther it can and should go.—LUTHER J. CARTER

Institute for Advanced Study: Einstein Is a Hard Act to Follow

A dispute over the appointment of Robert N. Bellah, a Berkeley sociologist, to a permanent post at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., has developed into one of the bitterest fights in the institute's recent history. Involved in the issue is the stewardship of the director, Carl Kaysen, and, according to some, the survival of the institute itself.

The institute—which consists of four divisions that resemble academic departments and has about 150 visiting scholars and 26 permanent faculty—is known as one of the leading intellectual centers in the world. Founded in 1930 and having housed such giants as Albert Einstein (1933–1946) and John von Neumann (1933–1957), the institute was responsible for moving the world center of thought, particularly in mathematics, from Germany to the United States in the 1930's. From 1947 to 1967 its director was J. Robert Oppenheimer. Its mathematics department is still cited as the world's best.

One of the undercurrents of the fight over Bellah, whose opponents say he is second-rate, is whether the institute can maintain its high standard; there are some submerged feelings on both sides that it risks going into a decline. Kaysen, the director, says that Bellah and the new program in social sciences, which already has a full professor and visiting members, must be protected if it is to grow, thrive, and move the institute into a new era. In fact, the so-called "Bellah affair" has provoked overt academic tribal warfare, with the pure mathematicians among those most hostile to Bellah (one of them is no longer speaking to the sociology professor) and economist Kaysen and the social sciences school defending him.

Bellah is a Ford professor of sociology and comparative studies at the University of California at Berkeley, and a specialist in Japanese religion and social change, and what he terms American civil religion. This year he has been a visiting member of the program in social sciences at the institute.

At one time all faculty voted on every prospective new permanent member, but since the latter part of Oppenheimer's tenure, schools with three or more permanent members have selected their own colleagues. Other parts of the procedure—circulating the writings and biography of the candidate throughout the institute, and the director's forwarding a nominee's name to the Board of Trustees for approval—have been carried out on a pro forma basis. When Kaysen sought his first appointment in the new social sciences program, Clifford Geertz, then of the University of Chicago, a new procedure was devised since there were no existing faculty in the school: an outside ad hoc committee reviewed Geertz's credentials, and a vote of the faculty was taken on an "advisory" basis. Geertz was unanimously approved. For Bellah, then, a similar procedure was followed: an external ad hoc committee of five* reviewed Bellah's credentials and, on 15 January, the faculty, having read some of his writings and solicited outside opinions individually, met to vote in their advisory capacity.

When the vote was taken Bellah was disapproved by a margin of 13 to 8 with 3 absentions. Kaysen subsequently announced that he planned to forward Bellah's nomination to the trustees anyway. One of those who had voted for Bellah, Stephen Adler, a physicist, then initiated a motion that the faculty wished the director *not* to forward Bellah's name. The motion carried by a margin of 14 to 6. Nonetheless, at a meeting of the trustees on 20 January, Kaysen placed Bellah's name in nomination, and the trustees approved him, thus putting him on the faculty.

Kaysen's pressing for Bellah's appointment despite the two votes has led to a loud and bitter outcry from some segments of the faculty, principally from some in mathematics and history, that their prerogatives have been thrown to the winds. Five faculty members made impassioned speeches at a subsequent meeting of the trustees: after an awkward silence, they just left. One trustee, Robert Solow of M.I.T., said later that he felt embarrassed and couldn't think of anything to say, but that he was surprised at the impassioned

* Edward Shils, professor of sociology, University of Chicago; Robert K. Merton, Giddings professor of sociology, Columbia University; Stanley Cavell, Walter M. Cabot professsor of esthetics, Harvard University; Edwin O. Reischauer, university professor, Harvard University; and Joseph M. Kitagawa, professor of Far Eastern languages and civilizations, University of Chicago.

tone of the speeches. Since then, a group of 14 faculty members met and considered calling for Kaysen's resignation. Instead they asked the trustees to appoint an outside commission "to evaluate the director's stewardship." The trustees have replied by asking a group of their members, headed by J. Richardson Dilworth, vice chairman of the board, to hear, on 24 March, faculty views without Kaysen present. One faculty member, Deane Montgomery, seeks a constitutional change to guarantee that the director won't override the faculty again. Others say they seek an unwritten "basic understanding" with the trustees that this cannot happen again. Kaysen's resignation, however, remains a possible outcome.

The faculty dissidents, including André Weil, a world-famous mathematician; Montgomery; Morton White, a philosopher and intellectual historian; and Harold F. Cherniss, a classicist, see the crisis as a threat to academic freedom and the institute's survival. In overriding their two negative votes, they say, Kaysen didn't break the written rules (since the faculty vote is only advisory) but was guilty of "a breach of understood procedure" that the faculty's judgment on its peers should be followed. Alte Selberg, a mathematician, cites a view by some institute founders that "one must keep to the highest standard in the collective judgment of a larger group" as protection against the "idiosyncratic" nature of any one man's vote on a colleague in making faculty appointments. Montgomery says, "The rest of the faculty is trying to save the social sciences from itself. You don't start up a great department with a lot of weak appointments. . . ." Selberg says, "Kaysen has very poor academic judgment . . . he hardly knows good from bad, and he doesn't care very much. Once control is taken out from our hands, he may go into computers, or statistics; that's his bent." Weil likens the Kaysen-trustee usurpation of what he views as the faculty's rights to a "law firm with a board of trustees made of mathematicians who could take all decisions. . . . One day they might say 'you people are good, but you're too narrow minded; you must go into architecture'. . . ."

Kaysen replies: "The faculty have enormous powers. They decide who is to be invited to the institute, how long they'll stay. Each of the existing faculties has been designating who will be their colleagues and who their successors should be. . . . The issue is whether the faculty shall have the power to appoint in a new school or to prevent a new school from coming into being."



Carl Kaysen

Freeman Dyson, of the School of Natural Sciences, defends Kaysen's and the trustees' actions, pointing out that the six faculty in his school are also "an oppressed minority group" at the institute. "It's a question of whether a majority of the faculty which is not expert has the right to outweigh a minority of the faculty which is expert. It seemed to me the action of the trustees was to establish the principle that the minorities have rights."

Those on the faculty and trustees who side with Kaysen's controversial decision regard the heat that is being generated from the classical scholars and mathematics faculty as anti–social science feeling in some measure. Geertz, the social scientist whose nomination was carried through successfully in 1970, says, "The real question is whether the social sciences are viable here." He thinks the dispute over Bellah could hurt the cause of setting up a group to do the rigorous and disciplined analysis which Geertz thinks social science work often lacks.

Dyson believes that there is latent prejudice against social science at the institute, but that it also extends to branches of physics, applied mathematics, and other fields where the "problems imposed by the world" are messier than those with intrinsic beauty. "In physics there are some problems that are really beautiful and elegant and a joy to work on. But there are others which are horribly messy but which the world imposes on you and they are terribly much more important." Dyson ventured that one physicist who works on these "messy" problems but has won two Nobel prizes, John Bardeen, of the University of Illinois, wouldn't be admitted to the institute physics faculty if the pure mathematicians there had to vote on it, because, "He's a plodder."

These three entwined issues—the wisdom of the Bellah appointment, faculty power, and the whole social science move—obviously come to roost at the door of the director. Inevitably, almost, Kaysen, as well as Bellah, has become an issue. Montgomery claims that some faculty feel that Kaysen, with his Kennedy Administration ties and his current Washington consulting work, has "contempt" for the faculty of scholars. Other faculty cite a general lack of confidence that Kaysen will reveal his moves to the faculty; the elaborate arguments on faculty power are matched only by the relative viciousness of the slights against Kaysen. Clearly the Bellah affair has brought out some long-standing grudges against the director. But one faculty member, who cited the fact that the institute has 26 'prima donnas,' no students, and no intermediate layer of deans to take the heat, stated, "I don't know who could run this place."

White claims that Kaysen's appointment in 1966 "wasn't entirely above board." Cherniss, who came to the institute in 1948, explained that while the trustees interviewed faculty in general terms concerning what they would like in a successor to Oppenheimer, no names were mentioned. To Cherniss's knowledge, "None of the members of the faculty had ever heard of Kaysen before. They didn't talk with members of the faculty about his appointment." When Kaysen was announced as director, it was also announced that he would hold a permanent post in the School of Historical Studies without the requisite faculty vote (the first two directors of the institute did not have faculty posts; Oppenheimer was made a professor by a regular procedure including a faculty vote). Kaysen rebuts this, saying that the school was asked if they would invite him and they did—hence the faculty were consulted.

Another grudge involves the handling of the thrust into the social sciences. Weil says, "Gradually he [Kaysen] let it seep through that he was interested in starting a program of social sciences.

. . . The thing to have done would have been to set up from the beginning a committee on the social sciences." Cherniss says, "The general question of the nature of the program was never laid before the faculty for study. . . ." Kaysen replies that setting up a new school which dealt in some way with the "problems of man and society" was discussed with the trustees at the time of his appointment in 1967 and "at early faculty meetings and board meetings I talked about my ideas in that direction." He cites the consideration of the Geertz appointment as evidence that the faculty have had plenty of chances to review the issue of starting such a group. One of the trustees defended Kaysen's handling of the social science thrust and the Bellah affair by saying it is very important in university administrations for a president or director to protect fledgling departments against conservative "wolves" who oppose them but aren't actually threatened by the change.

Kaysen's caution in proceeding with the social science project and sticking by Bellah could very well be a sign of wise administration, reminiscent of the Harry Truman maxim: "The crackpots are having conniption fits. It convinces me I'm right." Conversely, in the name of making the institute more relevant to "man and society," Kaysen may be unwisely trying to distort a place whose identity is already well established among its own members and to the world.

Several faculty at the institute recall an attempt by the institute's first director, Abraham Flexner, in the 1930's to start an economics school there. According to various accounts, the appointments he made provoked controversy and led to a new appointments system using a full faculty vote. Flexner eventually left.

Now, however, a generation later, the institute also seems to be discovering that Einstein is a hard act to follow. Weil maintains that less important than Kaysen, Bellah, or the social sciences is the question of quality: continued so-called second-rate appointments will ultimately threaten the survival of the institute as he knows it. Dyson, on the other hand, says the argument for Kaysen, Bellah, and the social sciences is that "These 26 [permanent faculty] by themselves wouldn't justify the place. This institution ought to be doing whatever the most brilliant young people all over the world are doing. . . . There are a lot of very brilliant young people who have no interest in pure mathematics or classics."

Those who favor the institute's pursuit of the "relevance" theme in scholarship argue that while the "cities are burning and society has a million and one pressing problems" in the words of one, the Walden-like seclusion of the institute is harder and harder to justify and the place itself runs the risk of stagnation. On the other hand, those most violently opposed to the controversial new appointee say that such dilutions threaten the institute with mediocrity. So there seems to be a question as to whether the ivory tower at Princeton can survive at all—let alone whether these warring tribes can coexist within it.—DEBORAH SHAPLEY

White House Energy Policy: Who Has the Power?

President Nixon's message on energy, months in the making, and once scheduled for delivery in mid-March, is being revised extensively and probably won't be released until mid-April at the earliest, nearly 2 years to the month after the President's last major statement on energy. A variety of sources indicate that repeated delays in getting out the message stem partly from recent jostling for influence over energy policy within the Presidential palace guard and partly from the sheer difficulty of writing a major policy statement on issues whose form and dimension evolve by the week.

"The deeper they get into this, the more complicated the issues become," one former White House adviser says, and not without sympathy. As if energy issues were not complicated enough, this winter's fuel shortages have forced a critical reexamination of the oil import quota system and, apparently, an extensive rewriting of the energy message as well. From one point of view, the shortages compellingly underscored the advice of a 1969 Cabinet task force on oil import quotas, which was simply to scrap present limitations on the use of foreign oil and to replace the quotas with a declining tariff. At the same time, however, the United States' continued balance of payments problems and the dollar's continued instability are seen by some authorities as equally compelling reasons for reducing reliance on foreign—especially Middle Eastern—oil. Indeed, Arab banks in possession of billions of dollars paid as royalties on oil exported to the United States are widely presumed to have taken part in this year's rash of currency speculation that has sparked the dollar's latest difficulties abroad.

Further, the oil import dilemma has led to intense pressures on the Administration to promote expanded exploitation of the United States' own vast coal reserves—a move with a certain logic to it, but one that in turn has brought the federal Clean Air Act under threat of "softening" amendments, and one that conflicts directly with efforts to institute strict new regulation of surface mining.

Even as the White House found itself skewered ever more painfully by these dilemmas, the Presidential staff concerned with energy policy underwent a somewhat Byzantine, but nonetheless significant, revolution.

Unlike the energy message of June 1971, which was written and shepherded through numerous stages of approval by the White House Office of Science and Technology, the second message is being prepared on a higher tier of authority—by the Domestic Council staff—with essentially no help from the soon-to-be dismantled OST.

Up until late last year, the energy message was the specific responsibility of Peter Flanigan, then the President's chief adviser on business affairs; the message's main author then was James E. Akins, a respected authority on economic aspects of energy issues who was, and still is, on loan from the State De-