they occupied the seat of action, they could decide the terms on which other elements of the government could approach them.

This remarkable situation began to change when the urgency of prosecuting the war fell away in mid-1945, and in fact Project Paperclip fell victim to a reverse case in which the military, with a sense of urgency growing out of their noncombat activities, attempted to induce the Department of State to venture—to run some risks—in the handling of one of its principal standard operations, the control of immigration through the visa issuance process. The interdepartmental clearance process now turned about. The War Department urged and advocated, and State deferred decision.

Patently, State's obstruction was not an isolated occurrence, nor was obstructionism conspicuously associable with State. Background information such as can be found here on the wolves in State's dangerous habitat is not a sufficient reference point for assessing that obstructionism. The obstructionist pattern is larger than that and poses a larger puzzle: why was interdepartmental business so vulnerable to obstructionist tactics by the JCS, State, or any other department within the same government?

Similarly, the factional struggle over Project Paperclip was one of several factional struggles that one finds within the American government at the end of World War II. Lasby's is one version of the extraordinary shift within the government from an operative objective of defeating Germany to one of opposing the Soviet Union and reconstructing Germany. In addition to relating the dispute over Project Paperclip to the other issues at stake in this period, larger factional analysis could more systematically relate the factions identifiable in terms of Paperclip to other factions. For instance, a complex structure of factions congealed in late 1944 about the closely related question of the postwar treatment of Germany. Proponents of the Morgenthau Plan (in Churchill's term, its goal was to "pastoralize" Germany) were potential supporters also of Project Overcast, the predecessor to Paperclip that intended only temporary exploitation of German scientists. Overcast could be intended to denude Germany of scientific prowess. By early 1945, when Overcast was proposed, Morgenthau Plan proponents had suffered setbacks that made them receptive to more palatable means than the Treasury Department's ambitious scheme to achieve their particular ends. It might have been a dangerous game for proponents of Overcast and later of Paperclip to link their advocacy with the general advocacy of a hard peace for Germany, and in fact they would have had difficulty with the suspicions of the Morgenthau Plan faction that Overcast and Paperclip were directed against the Soviet Union and in fact were a cause of Soviet intransigence. Alternatively, they might have felt their way into the opposite camp—as indeed they seem to have done, inadvertently. With some awareness of the sensitivities of the major executive departments involved in the Morgenthau Plan dispute, or simply of the Army's sensitivity to the prospect of criticism for unpopular policies in connection with its responsibility for governing postwar Germany, the advocates of Overcast would have been more aware than indicated in this book that Paperclip was much more vulnerable to criticism.

Such factional analysis would have given greater significance to the shift from Overcast to Paperclip. Lasby is himself alert to its full significance, but explains the shift as something that was brought about, without much concern over these matters, by military personnel wholly occupied with pragmatic problem solving, doing their work in a busy and complex bureaucracy that could be adamant or evasive. Patently, the governmental processes under view in this book had other cognitive dimensions.

Critics of Paperclip claimed that it supported German scientists at the expense of equally good or better Americans and produced mainly ordinary engineering outputs when the government should have been nurturing more fundamental work. Lasby does not assess the output of Paperclip, or its relation to other government-sponsored science. He mentions no attempt within the government to address these questions, although his account reads as though a strong motivating force was a special respect within the American military establishment for German science. It would have been difficult to assess the fruits of Paperclip with any precision, because most contributions were individual and hence both fragmented and integrated with other work. The easiest output to appraise was perhaps that of the von Braun team of rocket specialists, who evidently gave the American rocket effort a significant boost. Even here, however, the main question remains unanswered: Was the von Braun team important in the competition with the Soviet Union because we lacked the technology and the potential to get it, or were the constraints economic and bureaucratic? They were at least the latter. Hence, the von Braun team was a practical opportunity. But was it also a scientific or technological windfall? As important as this distinction may be to assessing the value of the general case posed by Paperclip, perhaps its practical significance is small. For, as with other enterprises, science is constrained by economic and organizational resources and time as well as by human talent.

Lasby's fine account of the adaptation, innovation, and conflict manifested in Paperclip is a solid base for more systematic studies of these organizational processes. For the reader interested in the governing of science, and in scientists in government, it is meritorious for having the detail and documentation that much of the literature on these subjects lacks.

PAUL Y. HAMMOND
*Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley*

## Public and Private Interests

**Professional Forestry in the United States.** HENRY CLEPPER. Published for Resources for the Future by Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971. xii, 338 pp. $10.

**The Forest Service.** MICHAEL FROME. Praeger, New York, 1971. xiv, 242 pp. + plates. $8.75. Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, No. 30.

In recent years historians have turned their attention to the conservation movement. The romanticism of the movement has suffered as a result, but our understanding of the development of concern for planned use of the public domain has greatly increased. Both Henry Clepper and Michael Frome in the books under review have added significantly to the literature of the subject.

Fears of a timber famine in the late 19th century coupled with a growing awareness that engrossing businessmen were destroying the public domain at a furious pace gave rise to the conservation movement in the United States.

The activities of the German-trained forester Bernard Fernow and the politically astute Gifford Pinchot took the movement out of the hands of concerned amateurs and laid the foundation for forestry as a profession. In *Professional Forestry in the United States* Clepper traces the rise of forestry from its feeble beginnings in the late 19th century to the important position it occupies today. He notes the contributions that professional foresters have made to improved management techniques and fire fighting. Particularly significant has been the role they have played in developing a public policy of planned use of the nation's timber resources and the slow winning over of private timber interests to the idea of sustained yield. The professional forester acted as the agent through which former antagonists were transformed into cooperative partners. Today nearly all lumber companies in the United States use the services of professional foresters.

The rise of the professional forester, however, had a homogenizing effect, which Clepper implicitly demonstrates but passes over without comment. As private interests moved closer to acceptance of public policy toward use of the nation's timber supply, the Forest Service altered public policy to accommodate private interests. Though Clepper tells us a great deal about the contributions of professional forestry to state, federal, and private forestry practices, he tells us little about the profession itself. This became significant as professional foresters came to dominate both private and public forest policy. Clepper notes the increase in number of forestry schools and students, but seldom discusses the nature of the curricula. Whereas early forestry students imbibed a good deal of missionary zeal along with technical and scientific courses in silviculture, later students received instruction in the engineering and economics of forestry. The growing demand for professional foresters in the lumber industry after World War II might account for the shift. Professional schools tend to accommodate to the needs of potential employers. It is perhaps not surprising that forestry schools changed their emphasis from timber growing to timber harvesting.

The professionalizing of forestry created a community of interest between private and public policy makers. Today private lumber interests have again raised the specter of a timber famine as a rationale for increased harvesting in the national forests. The Forest Service has generally endorsed the lumber industry's demands. In the last decade the Forest Service has abandoned its historic policy of multiple use of the national forests in favor of the privately inspired idea of dominate use, the dominate use inevitably being accelerated timber harvesting. The concept of multiple use has once again found its major spokesmen outside the forestry profession.

In spite of not giving sufficient attention to these issues, Clepper's book makes a welcome contribution to our knowledge of the policy conflicts that characterized the conservation movement and the role of the professional forester in that movement. It suffers, on the other hand, from a stiff writing style and a topical organization which gives the story an episodic quality, blurring the relations between events and confusing the chronology. A sequential arrangement might have brought more clarity to an important story.

Michael Frome is the conservation editor of *Field and Stream* and a longtime friend of the Forest Service. His account of the Service is one of a series of books on government departments and agencies. It will rank as one of the best of the series. A lively writing style contributes to a brief description of the history of the Forest Service and its attempts to educate Congress and the public to the need for planned use of the nation's resources. Frome uses a discussion of the work of the Forest Service to lament the shift in public forest policy from a multiple purpose to a dominate use program. He interprets the Forest Service's loss of zeal for traditional conservation and its narrow economic approach to forestry as an abandonment of its historic mission. The Forest Service's endorsement of clear-cutting in the national forests and its lack of concern for the total ecology of an area raise important questions about professional forestry. Frome notes that professionals in the Forest Service have become protective of their decision-making prerogatives and unreceptive to recent attempts by conservation groups to share in policy formation. Where the Forest Service once found its most articulate allies among conservation groups the two have in recent years become antagonists. Frome places equal blame for this development on the archaic committee system of Congress. He states that western congressmen, more concerned with representing powerful interests than public need, dominate the committees of Congress that deal with natural resource policy. Frome writes as an informed advocate of a sound ecological approach to natural resource policy. His book deserves a wide audience.

THOMAS R. WESSEL
*University of Maryland, College Park*

# Polluters and Regulators

**Water Wasteland.** Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution. DAVID ZWICK and MARCY BENSTOCK. Grossman, New York, 1971. xviii, 494 pp. $7.95.

Not surprisingly, the theme of *Water Wasteland* is that the quality of our rivers, lakes, and coastal waters is getting worse; large industrial polluters, in particular, are making a shambles and a mockery of efforts to clean up the water; and governmental agencies responsible for controlling pollution are doing little to reverse this disturbing trend. Citing present and proposed legislation, testimony before the Congress, governmental reports, and newspaper articles, the Nader "task force" suggests a number of the reasons for this failure: the inadequacies of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 and its subsequent amendments; failure to recognize and deal properly with "non-point sources" of pollution; the lethargy of federal and state bureaucracies; the inadequacies of the technologies employed; but above all "the vast economic and political power of large polluters." The report treats these subjects in meticulous detail, and the indictment cannot be dismissed easily. Despite some unevenness in style, repetition of stories, and a few technical errors, *Water Wasteland* is a compelling book and a unique contribution to the