

Book Reviews

Sociological Perspectives

Embattled Reason. Essays on Social Knowledge. REINHARD BENDIX. Oxford University Press, New York, 1970. xii, 396 pp. \$9.75.

Very few collections of essays are distinguished books. This is one of the exceptions. Bendix has brought together revisions of seven formerly published papers and five new "essays on social knowledge" in an impressive work which, together with *Work and Authority in Industry* (1956), *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (1960), and *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (1964), establishes him as perhaps the outstanding of Weber's sociological heirs among present-day sociologists. Like Weber's monumental studies, Bendix's writings are marked by great breadth of scholarship and analytical rigor, theoretical and methodological prowess, distrust of empirically unanchored general theory, conceptual precision and inventiveness, sensitivity to the differences between the social and the natural sciences, a central interest in historical and comparative analysis, and, not least, deep concern with the state of contemporary society and its "disenchantment." This concern is signaled by the title of the book at hand, a title appropriate to parts 1 and 2 of the volume but much less applicable to the final six essays. At the end, however, Bendix, in a Weber-like mood, returns to his titular theme:

... science and scholarship presuppose a belief in knowledge "for the benefit and use of life" (Bacon), a belief in the perfectability of man. They do not flourish amidst preoccupation with destructive repercussions, or where the value of knowledge is doubted. The last decades of this century may well witness a crisis of conscience, raising long overdue questions concerning the purpose of knowledge. The prospect inspires anxiety and hope, but hardly confidence [p. 348].

The several riches of *Embattled Reason* can only be suggested here. A model of discursive or "narrative" theory (with merely a nod toward the

austere paradigm of "true" science), these essays are essential reading in the sociology of knowledge, historical sociology, social change and "modernization," comparative sociology, and intellectual history—there are revealing discussions of Weber, Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Freud, and others, as well as informed and wise social commentary. Bendix's theoretical formulations, which he presents as an "approach" and not a "system," are firmly grounded in the specifics of history, societies, and cultures: the abstract and the concrete are mutually supporting.

Part 1 (Conditions of Knowledge) is introduced by an essay in which the strain between mounting knowledge and the growing "distrust of reason" is adumbrated, and in which are contrasted three "images of man": the Marxist historical view, the widespread conception of reason as a part of the pursuit of knowledge, and the perspective of *Wissenssoziologie*. This stage-setting piece is followed by an expanded version of Bendix's well-known paper on "The age of ideology," an age that emerged in the 18th century, when reason and the "ends of action" began to be questioned, and that continues today (clearly, there is no "end of ideology"); this succinct essay depicts and contrasts diverse efforts in "the quest for objectivity and the uses of ideas," ranging from Bacon's idols to the classical formulations of Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Freud, concluding that the "ends and uses of knowledge (and that means the ideological dimensions of intellectual effort) call for critical examination—more urgently than ever" (p. 61). In a third paper, "Changing conditions of scholarly detachment," this examination is directed toward the putative crisis in the university today, a situation with deep historical roots, including the latent effects of knowledge itself, and evidenced by a marked decline of scholarly values, the ascendancy of "perspectivism" and "radical subjec-

tivism," the weakening of academic self-rule by external pressures, the rejection of tolerance by both reactionary and radical forces, and a "failure of nerve and conviction" among academic men. This sorry state of affairs, fortunately, has not yet curtailed such scholars as Bendix himself in their rational pursuit of knowledge.

The three essays in part 2 explicate Bendix's "theoretical perspective." In "Sociology and ideology" he examines the nature of ideology, notes the sociologist's commitment to the "ideology of analysis," develops the concept of "perspectivism" (differentially illustrated in the writings of Dilthey, Weber, and Mannheim), and, echoing Weber, underscores the scholarly and "civic" responsibilities of social scientists. "Images of society and problems of concept formations in sociology" (written with Bennett Berger in an earlier version) advocates a theoretical pluralism, links the restrictive and permissive aspects of society ("dual tendencies") to the ubiquitous "paired concepts" or "dichotomous classifications" of sociology, and stresses their theoretical usefulness in comparative analysis. In "Culture, social structure, and change," Weber's paired concepts move center stage in a systematic treatment of elites and masses, doctrine and conduct, stratification and legitimation, "breakthrough and routinization," charisma and rationalization, structure and change; this essay is a demonstration by theoretical deed of the continuing utility of Weber's work and, implicitly, of the disutility of the functional "universals" of systemic theory.

In part 3 (Studies of Modernization), Bendix is explicit and, in my view, convincing concerning the limitations of grand theory and of such "generalizations in disguise" as the concepts of "urbanism" and "industrial society." The advantages of the comparative approach, including the testing of such "composite" generalizations, are outlined and a conceptual scheme is proposed for the comparative study of "friction between private interest and public authority" in the first of these six essays. The following three papers (drawn largely from *Work and Authority in Industry*, but substantially updated) pursue several themes of strategic importance in the study of modernization: historical and functional relations between industrialization and ideologies; similarities and differences in managerial ideologies in Britain, the United States, Russia, and Japan; con-

trasting patterns of the "work ethic" and its institutionalization in these societies; the role of nationalist appeals and "civic integration" in modernization; interconnections between social stratification and political community in the modernization of Europe—and the misapplication of this historical model to present-day developing societies. By far the longest essay in the book, "Tradition and modernity reconsidered," is an extraordinary exercise in intellectual history, sociological critique (with assessments of the theories of such diverse scholars as Daniel Lerner, Robert Redfield, Clark Kerr, Lloyd Fallers, Neil Smelser, and Wilbert Moore), conceptual reformulation, and programmatic for the study of modernization. Here again Bendix invokes Weber's warning that "ideal types are not generalizations," questions over-easy convergence theory, and joins Robert Nisbet in attacking the systemic-functional idea of immanent change and the neglect of external factors by grand theory. The concluding essay, "Social and political changes in the twentieth century," a somewhat inappropriate paper for this volume, notes the limited applicability of 19th-century theories to ongoing changes; describes indicators of large-scale changes, including population growth, world urbanization, shifts in occupational structure, and the growing gap between rich and poor countries; sketches political alterations and traumatic events of the recent past; and comments briefly on unresolved current problems—the "crisis in legitimacy," autocracies in new nations, and the upsurge of racial minorities, youth, and women.

Readers of these essays will of course take issue with Bendix at some points; it could not be otherwise with such a wide-ranging work. Some may object to the considerable repetition, almost inevitable in a collection of papers written for different contexts. Others, especially advocates of expository *order*, may decry the author's discursive ventures, which are largely the product, I believe, of his erudition and venturesome mind. There is no index, but I was much more troubled by the location of the (indispensable) footnotes at the back of the book—surely a delinquency of the publisher. But these are trivial matters: this is a splendid volume.

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Archeological Inquiry into Social Organization

Reconstructing Prehistoric Pueblo Societies. A seminar, Santa Fe, New Mexico, April 1968. WILLIAM A. LONGACRE, Ed. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1970. xii, 248 pp., illus. \$8.50. School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series.

This book is a collection of eight articles by as many authors plus comments by David F. Aberle. The concern of the seminar of which it is an outgrowth was "the methodology and theory for achieving strong inferences about the nature of social organization in extinct Puebloan societies."

The first of two background articles is by William Longacre, "A historical review." Longacre discusses the history of intellectual interest in Puebloan archeology. His article makes it clear that something is happening in Southwestern archeology representing a new orientation in method and theory. This theme is taken up explicitly by James Hill in the second background article, "Prehistoric social organization in the American Southwest: theory and method." Hill treats the paradigm of thought which he believes to have dominated the research of earlier and more traditional researchers. He not only counters each point with explicit logical analysis but offers many operational suggestions as to how to proceed in the context of the paradigm he advocates. The significance of this article goes far beyond its application to the area under discussion.

Following the background papers are three substantive articles, "An inquiry into prehistoric social organization in Chaco Canyon, New Mexico" by R. Gwinn Vivian, "Anasazi communities in the Red Rock Plateau, southeastern Utah" by William D. Lipe, and "Aspects of Tsegi Phase social organization: a trial reconstruction" by Jeffrey S. Dean. These share as a focus the "interpretation" of specific archeological materials. Vivian presents new data regarding the irrigation systems in Chaco Canyon and suggests that the contrast in settlement noted in the canyon represents "the operation of two different systems of social organization" (pp. 61, 78). This proposal is followed by an argument that the small "villages" represent localized lineages whereas the "town" sites were "dual-division residence units characterized by nonexogamous moieties with a bilocal residence pattern" (p. 81). Vivian offers no suggestion as to how

these two forms of "social organization" are related. I question whether they represent independent social systems living side by side, however. Inference from differences in the archeological record of differences in social organization, and in turn of ethnic or societal differences, only adds an intervening step to the traditionalist's approach, without circumventing its pitfalls.

The paper by Lipe provides a fine example of a researcher in the process of coping with the significance of observed variability in the archeological record. Lipe outlines observations made on the record for a particular time period and bounded area. He summarizes the points of contrast that serve as the basis for model building. What conditions could have existed in the past that would serve to explain the observations? His suggestions manifest a realistic understanding of the way human adaptations might be organized and in turn revealed archeologically.

The paper by Dean is a treatment of archeological materials in the context of questions regarding the form and composition of social segments and how they might be related to one another. Dean brings to this task his special interest in detailed chronological controls based on dendrochronological data. Such control is rare in archeological investigations. Dean's studies demonstrate the dynamic character of events that result in the "building" of an archeological site. This case should stand as a warning to those who tend to treat complex archeological sites as "one-period" sites representative of a "point in time."

Dean cautions that archeologists should not confuse change occurring as a result of selection with changes that "reflect the passage of time." One of the old assumptions of archeology is that change is inevitable and goes on in the absence of selective pressures. Reflection on the demonstrable differences in the amount of change evidenced by different classes of artifacts, as well as the differences among archeological sequences from different areas, suggests that some determinant variables are differently operative. The search for "nonadaptive" traits in biological anthropology has been a clear failure. The assumption that characteristics observed to change are meaningful only as a way of measuring the