

of fully qualified applicants, and far more applicants, presumably, would be "fully qualified" than not.

The thesis of Humphrey Doermann's study is that Thompson's tidal wave, while clearly upon us with respect to sheer numbers of students, has sent only a trickle into the pools where the flow is regulated by the academic quality and the economic affluence of the applicants. Doermann shows that these pools, when defined by high scores on the verbal section of the College Board's Scholastic Aptitude Test and by substantial family financial capacity, contain many fewer candidates than has generally been assumed. By way of an example, he estimates that there were 1,353,000 male high school graduates in 1967-68, and that of these only 71,000, or 5.15 percent, could score better than 500, the median, on the SAT-V and also came from families whose gross annual income exceeded \$14,800. Doermann provides tables showing the annual volume of candidates for 1954-55 through 1963-64 (actual) and for 1964-65 through 1974-75 (estimated or projected). The implication of these tables is clear. The rather large number of colleges that seek to enroll well-qualified students who can pay their own way are competing for a very small portion of the total candidate pool.

Doermann's use of verbal aptitude scores alone to define academic quality is, of course, open to challenge. So is his formulation of the financial capacity of new students on the basis of the annual income of a "normal-budget, three-child family" residing an "average" distance from a residential college. But the challenger should be able to suggest other, more valid empirical measures than those Doermann uses, and more adequate measures simply do not exist. Doermann recognizes, throughout his study, the problems inherent in the use of the only data available. He regularly advises the reader that his estimating procedures are rough rather than precise. The cells in his distribution tables contain, for example, two pool figures—one resulting from a "conservative" correlation of 0.4 between aptitude scores and family income and one from a correlation of 0.7, probably "too high" but included to suggest "the largest reasonable estimate of the candidate pool." Various elements of uncertainty do exist, but none serious enough to damage significantly Doermann's major conclusions.

Doermann's study has much to say to the trustees, faculties, and administrative officers of private colleges, people who must make policy decisions on admission standards, tuition charges, size of freshman classes, amounts budgeted for student financial aid, and a host of other institutional concerns. But these matters are of tremendous concern also to the public sector of higher education, to government at all levels, and to the taxpaying public. Doermann speaks of the need to "preserve and encourage flexibility in the mechanisms by which students distribute themselves throughout many kinds of colleges." He fears that "important elements of flexibility seem in danger of being withdrawn from our system of higher education," primarily as a result of increasing tuition costs in the private sector of higher education and decreasing numbers of students who can exercise genuine choice (on educational rather than economic grounds) in selecting a college or university.

If the narrowing market Doermann describes leads to either a qualitative or a quantitative loss in the private sector, all of higher education and all of the nation will be the losers. If, for whatever reason, private colleges no longer are able to enroll the number of high school graduates they are equipped to handle, the flow of new students into the public institutions will be accelerated. As Doermann puts it, this is "an important financial and edu-

cational issue, not only for individual private colleges, but for the taxpayers who will be called upon to pay the bill for sharply increased enrollment capacity in public higher education." The solution, clearly enough, is to expand federal and state programs offering financial assistance to the individual college student. Doermann's study is a first step toward determining just how many public dollars will be needed to close the gap between the amount available from nonpublic sources and the amount needed to provide not only equal opportunity for higher education but also equal opportunity for meaningful choice by the individual student.

The first version of this study, Doermann tells his reader in the preface, was written as a Ph.D. dissertation. The published version is remarkably free from the self-conscious detail and pedantic formalism one often associates with such efforts. The statistical system used to develop the joint distribution tables, along with the principles of computation, are wisely relegated to the appendix. All in all, this is an immensely readable little volume, tightly constructed and very much to the point in the case it presents. Its conclusions are sobering. The author has performed a valuable service in focusing the attention of what should be a wide spectrum of readers on an increasingly serious educational problem.

BERNARD S. ADAMS

Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin

Quick Thinking

Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. Community Action in the War on Poverty. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN. Free Press, New York; Collier-Macmillan, London, 1969. xxii + 218 pp. \$5.95. Clarke A. Sanford Lectures on Local Government and Community Life.

The former Assistant Secretary of Labor who was once honored as "an architect of the nation's program to eradicate poverty" has written a book to explain what has happened to part of that program, why it is in difficulty, and (despite what the jacket says) who is to blame. He has a wide variety of human targets but only one programmatic one: the somewhat diffuse idea of "community action."

The origins of the community action idea are located in the thinking of some officers of the Public Affairs Program of the Ford Foundation and the views of two faculty members of the School of Social Work at Columbia University. The ideas of the latter were embodied in a plan called Mobilization for Youth, designed to combat juvenile delinquency in New York's lower East Side. Moynihan shows the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to be remarkably parallel to those of the Mobilization proposal. He traces the line of influence—through meetings, conferences, and memoranda inside the White House staff—from Mobilization through the President's Committee on

Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime to the drafters of the anti-poverty legislation. This is political reminiscence and gossip, by someone who was obviously close to inside happenings when he wasn't himself a part of them. He concentrates on the community action component of these plans—the notion that remedies for poverty ought to be designed and executed by local groups in which those to be affected by the program participate. The objections of experienced advisers are recorded: they doubted that good plans would emerge from such groups and that enough could be accomplished soon enough by these means to have the political impact desired of the anti-poverty effort. The supporters of community action argued that local plans could be manned by the poor themselves, and that federal funds could be used to bring about change where local governments were resistant to it.

Throughout, apparently, the accepted view of community action was that local groups would design and propose projects which would then be approved at the federal level. As Moynihan points out, this view incorporated the incompatible tenets of local activism and participation on the one hand and central coordination on the other. Furthermore, almost everyone concerned with the planning seems to have assumed that there would emerge from local planning a kind of simple will of the community to act in a unified fashion. True, the mayor of Minneapolis, a practical politician as well as an academic political scientist, warned against expecting much from undiscovered community leadership, and suggested that it might be better to make existing bureaucracies work than to build new ones alongside them. No one seems to have paid controlling attention to this sound doctrine.

Moynihan tries to show that what did happen was quite different from what the planners expected. Mobilization for Youth, the scheme from which they had drawn their inspiration, was already in crisis by the time the anti-poverty program was getting started ("MFY did not long remain the carefully calibrated social experiment it set out to be"), and Moynihan analyzes the course of MFY in some detail. He sees that course as typical of what befell the community action component of anti-poverty programs in many (perhaps most) cities. His analysis of these programs is history written on the fly. He

selects a few cases, notably Syracuse, New York, to document his assertions, and his summary of how community action got into trouble is that it

led first to the radicalization of the middle-class person who began the effort; next to a certain amount of stirring among the poor, but accompanied by a heightened racial antagonism *on the part of the poor* if they happened to be black; next to retaliation from the larger white community; whereupon it would emerge that the community action agency . . . was powerless. A creature of a Washington bureaucracy subject to discontinuation without notice. Finally, much bitterness all around.

There were many conflicts over the intention of the program. Some reformers envisioned the poor as designers and executors of plans to help themselves; some politicians saw community action programs as ways of giving employment to poor people who would carry out plans made by others. Ironically, the goal of employing the poor sometimes was achieved by using most of the anti-poverty funds to pay them salaries for administering the program. Outcomes of this sort led to further attack on community action and to congressional as well as Administration pressure to reduce its funds.

Moynihan charges the inspirers of the anti-poverty legislation, as well as those who drafted it, with failure to foresee the politicization of community action. Neither the drafters themselves, he asserts, nor the professional politicians they consulted anticipated that the poor would think of themselves as a political force. They also failed to foresee the rapid rigidification of local anti-poverty bureaucracies, the competition for high-salaried administrative jobs, and the divisive effect on local community of struggles for control of the community action agency. Why was that so? Partly, because the various parties to the arrangement were thinking about community action in terms of some favorite but different analogue: the Peace Corps, the revolutionary movement, the industrial union, an urban version of the Civilian Conservation Corps. All these disparate models were entertained simultaneously by different people, each conceiving the success of the anti-poverty program in terms of the successes of his favorite model. Apparently no one thought through the consequences of holding out to "powerless" people the possibility of controlling their own fate. No one tested the reasonableness of assuming that those who held power would

readily yield it up; or, in other words, that the society could subsidize an overturn in social control without having both resistance on the part of those whose power was threatened and disappointment among those who were given hope of securing it. It is, of course, a sign of supreme confidence in rational social process that any group even contemplated offering to the powerless resources which they might use to increase their power at the offering group's expense. There seems to be no parallel in history on this scale.

Another point of view lays blame on Congress, the Budget Bureau, and the Vietnam war on the ground that whatever failure the community action program had was attributable to underfunding—to trying to do a huge job with small sums. This argument has much merit, but it is hard to see how an increase in funding alone would have abated the contest for power between haves and have-nots. It might have become prolonged and, indeed, more bitter. Moynihan points out that entrenched holders of power can outlast revolutionaries who depend upon the bounty of the central government which the power holders know *they* control.

The last chapter of the book is probably the most interesting for social scientists. It is devoted to telling who is to blame for the mistakes of the community action program, what these were, and what should be the relation between "social science and social policy." Indeed, that is the title of the chapter, and one might easily get the impression that Moynihan has placed all the blame on social scientists. In fact, the book has been treated by reviewers as a devastating critique of social science; but it is not that. Moynihan's target is not so narrow. He indicts "lawyers and economists" (apparently excluding the latter from the social science community), "high-level staff aides, some nominally political, some nominally in the career service," and "foundation executives" *in addition to* social scientists. He says that "it was not social science competence that was missing in the conception and management of this program; it was intellect." The heart of Moynihan's criticism is that the social scientists involved did not take responsibility for asserting the limits of their knowledge for guiding practical conduct. He says that their passion for social justice (a stigma that he generously lays on social

scientists as a class) overpowered their detachment in searching for truth. This led them, presumably, to collaborate with those other ranks (enumerated above) whose lack of intellect enabled flimsy sociological hypotheses to gain the stature of revealed truth.

Surely another reading of the evidence is possible: that a group of not very farsighted reformers, drawn primarily from the professions of law, social work, history, and literature, grasped at the most evident and most highly touted *novel* program idea around, and that it was transformed, through the perversities of the political process, from an exploratory notion into a cornerstone of the program. What started as an experimental feature of Mobilization for Youth became a requirement for every project in the anti-poverty program. The reason was at least partly political, as Moynihan himself testifies:

The President wanted action, not planning; wanted nationwide scope not target areas. . . . As a result . . . there was little life left in the notion of picking say, ten cities, and spending several years preparing them for the experiment.

The often frantic, usually contentious, frequently confused process of formulating new federal programs leads to decisions like that. When an idea has presidential backing, meets the political need for action, and has no reasonably matched competition, its time has come, and men must commit themselves to it if they are to survive in politics. Or so it would seem from Moynihan's account.

Need it always be so? Is there no possibility of genuine experimentation with social reform? Can we not design actions so that we can learn from them, test the admittedly incomplete theories and so add to the findings of social science? Moynihan, in recommending a role for social science, confines it to the measurement of results of social policy—in a word, to evaluation. This seems too narrow a role, for good experiments (which Moynihan approves of) need social science participation in planning and execution as well as in measuring outcomes. A skeptical social-scientific analysis of proposals for action, before they are tried out, might sometimes help. Nothing can substitute for intellect, to be sure, but even the inadequate conceptual tools of the social sciences can be a partial substitute for the genius that is not always

on hand in every social planner. What Moynihan is railing against is what a majority of social scientists would also decry: the enunciation of partisan passions of politics as if they were dependable discoveries of science.

But what his analysis and remedy neglect is the much deeper problem of applying rational methods to the solution of social problems. How can we circumvent what seem to be two incapacitating liabilities introduced by the political process itself: the pressure to take all actions on a national scale, with the appearance of equity being introduced (most easily and most superficially) by insisting on uniformity of treatment; and the apparent necessity to overpromise and oversell an idea in order to gain political acceptance of it? This latter demand exacerbates the distortion of the problems we seek solutions for and prevents learning from experimentation, for it tends to force men to make premature commitments to the validity of an idea. Furthermore, the more dubious or uncertain they may have been before making a public commitment to an idea, the more firm they become in its faith and the more energetic in proselyting for it. Moynihan may know that anyway. If he doesn't, social psychological research can explain it and provide the evidence.

HENRY W. RIECKEN

*Social Science Research Council,
Washington, D.C.*

Prisoners of War

Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity. The Communist Soldier in the Korean War. Research studies directed by WILLIAM C. BRADBURY, SAMUEL M. MEYERS and ALBERT D. BIDERMAN, Eds. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968. xxx + 377 pp. \$11.

It is now 16 years since a tenuous cease-fire ended the Korean War. Among the elements of that strange war that are best remembered today, the behavior of our prisoners of war stands out. The POW episode, with its lexicon of human behavior—"brainwashing," "collaboration," "give-it-up-itis"—still evokes strong feeling and opinions. In recent days, with the return of Captain Bucher and his *Pueblo* crew, the enigma arises once more. Again, as at the time of the repatriation of our Korean soldiers in 1953, the beating of

breasts can be heard across the land. Why is it, many ask, that our boys give up without a struggle? And (as if to prove the assumption valid), why is it that others are so much stronger and more steadfast in their ideological and national purposes?

Although based on considerably less rigorous data than earlier studies of American captives, the analyses reported in this volume of the attitudes and behavior of enemy POW's captured by American forces during the Korean campaign are valuable, if for no other reason, because they help to demolish such invidious comparisons. As Morris Janowitz points out in his thoughtful foreword, the most astounding aspect of the behavior of the Chinese Communist prisoners of war is that at the time of repatriation 14,325 of the 21,014 Chinese captured refused to return home—this in contrast to the 22 Americans who refused repatriation among the 4450 offered it. The behavior of the Chinese fighting man was unprecedented in the annals of modern history; in effect, says Janowitz, the unfavorable image Americans drew of our own men was more nearly a portrait of the Chinese soldier.

The studies brought together here were conducted during the Korean War and its aftermath to provide the Army with a fuller understanding of the Chinese Communist indoctrination system and its influence on prisoner-of-war behavior. The field conditions for this research were hardly ideal, and the sampling of enemy POW's leaves much to be desired, but the data collected constitute the only materials describing in depth the Communist prisoners of war in Korea. The reader is provided with a detailed picture of the Chinese system of indoctrination and social control. The Chinese government had reason to believe that it had developed an effective set of controls over its troops, but when the control system was disrupted by defeat in battle, the individual soldier revealed the extent to which the norms of the system had not been internalized. In captivity the control system was partly reestablished; but again, significant numbers of soldiers deserted when given an opportunity to change allegiance.

When our own POW's left their shabby compounds for Panmunjom and freedom, there began among Americans a search for an appropriate stance to adopt toward the 3400 hollow-eyed repatriates and toward the world we knew