teragency group known as the Committee of Principals, which is made up of the director of ACDA and other topranking officials concerned with the national security. These include the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and two White House aides, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the President's Science Adviser. Inevitably, given the diversity of interests and viewpoints represented, much pulling and hauling goes on, as for example between the ACDA and the Joint Chiefs on questions such as the extent to which on-site inspections are necessary.

Maintaining a reasonable continuity in arms-control planning may be a problem, for most of the present members of the Committee of Principals and many of their top assistants will be leaving the government with the change of administration. Presumably, however, many of the people in the committee's working group will be remaining, at least for a time.

This policy-making machinery, though cumbersome, appears to be fairly well regarded by ACDA people and other officials who must use it. Of overriding importance, of course, is whether the President himself takes a strong interest in arms-control issues, and whether he and his ACDA director are in close rapport. Also, as one official remarks, "the President needs a Secretary of Defense who can take a broader view of the national security than the military chiefs of staff, and who doesn't simply pass the buck on to the White House."

Science Adviser's Role

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy years the President's Science Adviser (who doubles as chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee) played more of a role in developing arms-control policy than President Johnson's adviser, Donald Hornig, has. To some extent this is due to the development of expertise and initiative in other agencies, especially ACDA, which was created in 1961, partly at the urging of Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy's Science Adviser.

Leaders of two groups having arms control as their dominant concern—Cameron B. Satterthwaite (a physicist at the University of Illinois), chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, and William Doering (a Harvard

DuBridge Named Science Adviser

Lee A. DuBridge, president of California Institute of Technology since 1946 and a prominent nongovernmental figure in the arena of national science policymaking since World War II, has been named Science Adviser to the President in the Nixon Administration.

Speculation on the top science post ended Tuesday when Nixon appeared with DuBridge at Nixon's New York headquarters and the president-elect announced the appointment. DuBridge told newsmen that expanding federally sponsored basic science would "certainly be my first concern."

It was known that DuBridge, 67, planned to retire soon from the Caltech presidency. He indicated Tuesday that he has been able to advance the date of his retirement and will soon begin working full-time for the new administration.

DuBridge, a physicist, earned his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. From 1940 to 1945 he was director of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory, which made key contributions to radar development and provided many postwar leaders in science from among its alumni.—J.W.

chemist), board chairman of the Council for a Livable World, wish the Science Adviser and PSAC would again become more a center of initiative in the arms-control field. On 3 December, Lee A. DuBridge, 67, president of Caltech, was appointed science adviser. And another academician, Henry A. Kissinger, head of Harvard's International Seminar and Defense Studies Program, has been named national security affairs adviser.

Whatever Nixon's policies on arms control, the U.S. Senate will continue to play a major role in this field, because of its constitutional power to ratify treaties and because of the influence, positive and negative, of individual senators and of committees such as those on foreign relations and armed services. Three of the senators most articulate in support of arms control-Wayne Morse of Oregon, Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, and Ernest Gruening of Alaska-have been defeated and will not return to the Senate in January. On the other hand, several of the new senators just elected, such as Harold E. Hughes of Iowa, Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri, Charles McM. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland, and Alan M. Cranston of California, are expected to back arms-control measures.

In fact, support in the Senate for arms control may be growing, as the substantial (though insufficient) backing Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky got in his recent effort to stop the proposed ABM deployment gave witness. But the cold-war hardliners, such as Senator Richard B. Russell of Geor-

gia (chairman of the Armed Services Committee) and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, are still present in strength, and could make trouble for any new arms-control agreement, particularly if it failed to provide for on-site inspection and verification.

In sum, the prospects for arms control, while less favorable now than they were last July, are not altogether discouraging. Insofar as progress in this field depends on the United States, Nixon's attitude is the crucial determinant, and on it may rest the fate of the nonproliferation treaty and the proposed missile-limitation talks. The Czech crisis—coming when Nixon himself, as the newly chosen Republican nominee, was calling for an era of East-West negotiation—has without doubt created a dilemma.

For the United States to join now with the Soviet Union in making new treaty commitments, and, especially, to engage in bilateral arms-control talks, may invite the suspicion that the two superpowers are tacitly, and cynically, recognizing each other's "spheres of influence." But being confronted with a hard choice does not spare Nixon the duty of decision. If he should decide that the urgency of suspending the arms race must be given precedence over other foreign policy considerations, this might prove easier, politically, for him than it would for someone with a well-established record as a proponent of arms control and détente. For, as one official observed, "No one will accuse Nixon of being soft on communism."-Luther J. Carter