also denounces Fulton's action. If Fulton knew more about the unmanned space program, Karth says, he would be aware that there is only one launch vehicle for each satellite to be launched. "We were very discreet in our cuts [in committee]," he adds. "We went at it with a surgical instrument, rather than with the meat ax used by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. We could have a couple million dollars worth of satellites waiting for launch vehicles."

Karth is worried, too, about the effect of the Fulton cuts on Voyager. The Senate cut out all funds for Voyager, thus ratifying a decision of its Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee that this costly program ($2.3 billion, by NASA estimates, for the 1973 and 1975 Voyager missions) should be deferred in view of the budgetary situation. Now that the House has reduced the Voyager authorization from the $71.5 million NASA requested to $50 million, Karth is in a weaker position for bargaining with Senate conferees for an authorization large enough to enable NASA to take advantage of the 1973 "launch window."

Karth fears that the NASA request itself was too small to permit a 1973 launch. A $50-million authorization—now the maximum possible—will make it harder to meet this schedule, though Fulton insists that such an authorization would be adequate.

Besides cutting out the Voyager funds, the Senate, on the advice of its space committee, eliminated $10.1 million that NASA would use to start work on a two-flight Mariner flyby of Mars in 1971. The 1971 Mariner mission, following up the Mariner-Mars flight scheduled for 1969, would include atmospheric probes, which would contribute substantially to its estimated cost of $216 million. The committee questioned whether enough information would be produced to justify the mission's high price. For the 1970's, the committee suggested, NASA should schedule Mariner flights (without atmospheric probes) for the investigation of Mars, Venus, and other planets and conduct a complementary program of small interplanetary probes.

Actions and pronouncements of this kind by a congressional committee frequently are influenced by a desire to wield maximum leverage in bargaining in the House-Senate conference. Sometimes a committee recommends that a program be cut out entirely when what it really expects to accomplish is to take a slice off the program budget. The Senate space committee acted in the belief that the House would cut neither the Voyager nor the Mariner programs. If the House-Senate conferees should agree to authorize appropriations for both these programs it will be no surprise.

Some critics of NASA maintain that, with the peak of Apollo spending now past, the agency is influenced, in its post-Apollo planning for both manned and unmanned flights, by its desire to keep a high budget and to show that its huge investment in Saturn rockets was, and is, justified. AAP, with its lunar missions, orbital workshop, and telescope mount, would depend upon Saturn boosters. So would the Voyager missions. A Saturn-launched mission, if only because of the cost of the launch vehicle, entails major expenses which are avoided in missions, such as those of the Mariner class, where smaller rockets are used.

According to the Senate space committee, the number of missions planned by the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), which runs NASA's unmanned scientific flight program, decrease sharply in the early 1970's—from 21 in 1967, to about 13 in 1970, to 2 in 1973 (the Voyager "orbiter" and the Voyager "lander"). Voyager, by demanding more than $300 million a year from fiscal 1969 on, will crowd out most other flights unless the OSSA budget is substantially increased, the committee indicated.

Moreover, while the space panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee have endorsed NASA's plans for Voyager, at least a few panel members believe that, technologically speaking, 1973 will be too early to attempt a soft landing on Mars. This opinion is held by both Gordon J. F. MacDonald, professor of geophysics now on leave from UCLA to serve as vice president for research at the Institute of Defense Analyses, and Bruce C. Murray, associate professor of planetary science at Caltech. Noting that Voyager cannot escape a budget cut this year, Murray told *Science*: "In budget cutting the difficulty is that carefully worked out alternative programs may not be available to Congress. For example, one possible way to have a good planetary exploration program and yet avoid for the next 2 fiscal years the increased cost necessarily associated with a Voyager-lander would be to develop only the orbiter portion of Voyager. The orbiter mission does not involve the expensive technology required for sterilization and atmospheric entry. The Voyager-lander effort could be delayed until 1975. This delay only makes sense, however, if high priority is given the 1971 Mariner mission. The cost-effectiveness of the 1975 Voyager effort would be greatly enhanced because of the experience with sterilization and atmospheric entry of a simple payload gained from Mariner. Futhermore, this procedure may allow greater freedom to pursue Mariner pioneering missions to sample directly the atmosphere of Venus in 1972 and perhaps get a first look at Mercury in 1973."

Matters are still unsettled, and plans for NASA's planetary explorations beyond 1969 and for some of its other scientific investigations are not now predictable. Whether things go well or badly, however, the space science program is sure to be influenced by haphazard tactical and political maneuvering—certainly in Congress and perhaps within NASA as well.

—LUTHER J. CARTER

Communication Gap: LBJ's Monologue with the Intellectuals

"Now I am the most denounced man in the world."—President Johnson

Just as Captain Ahab tied his fate to the pursuit of Moby Dick, the white whale of the Pacific, so has Lyndon B. Johnson tied his Presidential reputation to the pursuit of the Vietnam war. One difference, however, is that President Johnson's crew is generally more apprehensive than was that of the *Pequod*.

The President is aware that some of the more intellectual types under his care are in violent disagreement with the course he is steering. In mid-May the President called together 16 leading "intellectuals" in the Administration for a luncheon discussion of how to improve his standing in the nation's

intellectual community. Included at the White House lunch were HEW Secretary John Gardner, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, and Presidential aides John P. Roche and Harry C. McPherson, Jr.,

The President suggested that Vietnam was responsible for his trouble with the intellectuals, an interpretation with which his audience agreed. Despite his realization that Vietnam had blackened his image among the thinkers, President Johnson expressed his puzzlement about why this should be so. In the President's estimation, how could he have been better to the intellectuals? The President has dwelt at length on several public occasions about the great number of college professors, Rhodes scholars, and members of Phi Beta Kappa who serve in his administration. The implication seems clear to many: Why are you intellectuals so ornery when I appoint so many of you to Federal office?

The Appointments Game

Part of the answer lies in the question. When he speaks to academic audiences, the President sometimes seems to be playing the old game of ethnic and special-interest group politics. (I have appointed x Negroes, x Jews, x Spanish-speaking Americans, x farmers, x Californians, x intellectuals.) It is doubtful whether this kind of special-interest appointment assures the support of any group today, and it certainly has little effect on the intellectuals. The man of thought is primarily interested in the President's receptivity to new ideas, especially to his own; he is unlikely to be won over by a mere listing of the numbers of professors feeding at the federal trough.

Why should President Johnson care so much about the support of the intellectuals, an admittedly small part of the American electorate? There are several possible explanations. First, most politicans want to be loved by all the people; the desire for this kind of mass gratification is one of the main factors which propels them into the demanding political profession in the first place. And, it is natural that Johnson would want to enjoy the respect among intellectuals which President Kennedy did. In fact, Johnson seems even more eager to woo them than Kennedy. Kennedy was much surer of the members of the Eastern intelligentsia, surer about their values, their worth, and their weaknesses. He was better able to take their support or lack of it with equanimity.

Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith, a leading critic of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, addressing the "Negotiation Now!" meeting in Washington on 28 June. (Wide World photo)

Despite his years in Washington, Johnson still seems an immigrant from the prairies; he combines the immigrant's adulatory respect for the formally educated with the jealous provincial's fear of those whom he suspects would use their learning to oppose his will.

Another reason Johnson worries about his intellectual support is that he realizes that intellectuals possess power greater than their numbers would indicate. The ambitious President knows that he needs "idea men" to help construct programs which will insure his place in history. In addition, intellectuals, especially professors, influence the student generation and also affect those who control the communications media.

Galbraith's Criticism

At his luncheon with his "in-house" Administration intellectuals, the President expressed special regret about those intellectuals who have been his longtime friends but have broken with him over Vietnam. One whose loss particularly affects him, he mentioned, is that of John Kenneth Galbraith, former ambassador to India and the recently elected chairman of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). The President has good reason to deplore Galbraith's defection from the ranks of his supporters. The lanky Harvard economist is no "New Left" firebrand, but a moderate who can serve as a rallying point for many critics of what Galbraith has called "this miserable war." The ADA recently served notice that the organization might support a Republican presidential nominee next year if he were more inclined to a peaceful solution of the Vietnam war. The perceptive English magazine, the *Economist*, recently reported: "There are, indeed, increasing signs of the Democratic party's first leftwing revolt of any consequence since 1948 and potentially the most serious defection since William Jennings Bryan's disastrous campaigns 70 years ago."

This year, several top Administration officials connected with the Vietnam war, including the President, Dean Rusk, and Robert S. McNamara, stayed away from delivering commencement addresses at major universities. Certainly, they had reason to fear the tumult that their appearances might initiate. During the past academic year, McNamara and Vice President Humphrey provoked commotions when they visited college campuses, and McNamara doubtless remembered that students staged well-publicized walkouts at commencement addresses which he gave last year.

The Campus Villain

By deciding to stay away, Administration leaders seem to have accurately gauged the possibility of student antipathy to the President's policies. In an extensive series of articles on colleges last month in the Washington *Evening Star*, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Haynes Johnson concluded: "There are no heroes on college campuses today. The word itself is suspect. But there is a villain—Lyndon B. Johnson. The feeling against the President is so widespread that it is possible to visit campuses all across the country without finding a single student who expresses enthusiasm for him. The reasons for the almost universal antipathy vary. The war in Vietnam is mentioned most often."

This general antipathy is reflected in specific student actions. During the past academic year, moderate student leaders warned the President that many students would choose jail over Vietnam, and other students have started to join the "We Won't Go" movement to refuse induction into the armed forces.

In taking violent exception to the President's actions in Vietnam, students are echoing the disenchantment felt by many of their elders. Faculty members from universities around the nation sign public petitions of protest against the President's Vietnam policy. A year before becoming a White House aide, Administration sympathizer John

P. Roche wrote: "Never in my memory has the intellectual community been so bitterly anti-Administration." Earlier this year, noted M.I.T. linguistics professor Noam Chomsky, wrote of the responsibility of the intellectuals to oppose the war in Vietnam, and cited his own refusal to pay half his taxes in 1966 and 1967 to protest U.S. activities. Some publications have reported that the Vietnam war has lessened the willingness of scientists to do military research. These include *Science*, (21 April) and *Newsweek* (10 July); in that issue *Newsweek* concluded that "a substantial portion of scientists and researchers tends to oppose the American presence in Vietnam."



President Johnson addressing the national convention of the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Baltimore on 27 June: "It is not required that you tear our country down, and our flag down, in order to lift them up." (Wide World photo)

Johnson's June Victories

All this criticism of Johnson does not mean that the President has become incapable of scoring political points, even with his intellectual critics. For instance, since Israel won the Middle East war, Johnson has not been widely faulted for his handling of the Middle Eastern crisis. Also, the fact that Johnson was able to meet with Soviet Premier Kosygin is a mark in his favor with much of the American public, including that portion resident at universities. However, even the Glassboro summit did not satisfy some of Johnson's critics. Journalist I. F. Stone lambasted Johnson once again: "What the President should have done at Glassboro was to announce that we had stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, and hoped that Chairman Kosygin in return would arrange for peace talks with Hanoi. . . . This was Johnson's opportunity, and he did not take it. Instead we were treated to another episode in public relations flimflam."

Why don't the intellectuals love Lyndon? This simple question requires a complex answer. First, it is obvious that no one ever accused President Johnson of being an intellectual. He is not one of their crowd. The President is reported to have admitted that he hasn't read a half a dozen books all the way through since he finished college. This would not automatically disqualify him from being the thinking man's President, but he also displays, at times, noticeable antipathy to intellectuals. When Princeton historian Eric F. Goldman resigned from the White House staff in a huff last autumn, he told reporters that the President had become increasingly suspicious of intellectuals and artists, especially those from the East, and noted that the President's interest in the intellectual process was minimal. Before joining the White House staff, political scientist John P. Roche had written that President Johnson "seems to fall into the category of anti-intellectual politicians—or at least he has given little indication that he feels that the intellectuals have a meaningful and creative role in American society." Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak relate that the President once defined an "egghead" to a group of Texas cattlemen as "a man with strong opinions on things he knows nothing about."

The Texas Tradition

The President's supporters argue that the Eastern intelligentsia doesn't like Johnson merely because he is from Texas. Certainly, he is not helped by his constant references to his Texas background and by his "when I was a boy down on the Pedernales" kind of corniness. However, despite Johnson's Texas base, intellectuals gave him massive support in 1964, many worked with enthusiasm for his election. Their more profound disagreements with the President postdate their discovery of his Texas origin.

One White House aide is reported to have praised Johnson as a "peasant intellectual." To all too many, he seems much more peasant than intellectual. Some are repelled by the bullhorn and barnyard vulgarities either evident or reported in his speech. Even when not lapsing into vulgarity, Johnson's speech fails to inspire the intellectuals. His sentences and paragraphs are short, but this admirable brevity often seems to reflect simplistic ideas rather than mental precision.

On the other hand, the President and his supporters can protest that it is Lyndon Johnson who has been instrumental in passing the decade's significant liberal legislation—civil rights, aid to education, and the poverty program—rather than that Harvard man, John F. Kennedy. This is certainly true, but it also contains the reason for another of Johnson's troubles. After President Johnson commissioned the "Great Society" and the "war on poverty," many liberals feel that he did not commit the financial resources to make these dramatic phrases more than mere slogans.

The fact is that the sounds of domestic progress so dear to the ears of the liberal intellectuals has been drowned out by the din of explosions in foreign lands. And, as the President knows, it is his foreign policy actions, especially in Vietnam, that have been primarily responsible for the disenchantment of the intellectuals.

Few recent Presidents have been so often tagged with such a bald description as that of "credibility gap," which is, in effect, merely a polite euphemism for lying. The substantive reasons for this accusation are to be found mainly in the foreign policy area: in the unannounced escalation of the American

commitment in Vietnam, in the lack of full U.S. disclosure over North Vietnamese "peace feelers"; and in the explanations given for U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

The majority of American intellectuals voted for President Johnson as the "peace" candidate in 1964. Probably, most believed him when he said in the fall of 1964 that in Vietnam, "We are not going north and we are not going south," and that American boys should not be sent to do the job that Asian boys should do for themselves. President Johnson's credibility and his support among the intellectuals began to crumble in February of 1965 when the President started the systematic bombing of North Vietnam, thus taking the decisive step in enlarging an American military commitment which at present involves almost a half million men.

The Dominican Intervention

President Johnson's quick decision to send American troops into the Dominican Republic in April of 1965 and his varying explanations for that act also created a trigger-happy image of the President in the minds of some of his critics. After studying actions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, Theodore Draper, writing in *Commentary* earlier this year, concluded: "The hallmark of the Johnson administration's foreign policy has been its willingness to use and abuse naked military power."

After the Johnson Administration bitterly attacked the criticism of the Dominican intervention offered by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright, the angered Arkansas Senator then felt himself free to utter his long-suppressed doubts about the wisdom of the Vietnam intervention. Fulbright's own dissent gave a respectability and momentum to criticism of Vietnam policy which it had not previously possessed.

Johnson's abrupt treatment of Fulbright and his intemperate vendettas with other critics such as Walter Lippmann and Robert F. Kennedy illustrate what is probably the President's main weakness in dealing with the intellectual community—his seeming inability to respond in a reasonable manner to those who criticize his decisions, especially those of foreign policy.

What is wrong with the President's relationship with the intellectuals, and with much of the rest of the electorate, was symbolized in the White House luncheon mentioned earlier in this story. First, the President discussed his problems with a group of men who were dependent on him for their opportunity to exercise power and not with a group of independent outsiders. The President could hardly expect a full and frank discussion with such men in this kind of semipublic situation. Second, even though he had called the men together to elicit their opinions, the President did much of the talking. According to one participant, the luncheon closed with a 20-minute monologue by the President.

Simultaneous Monologue

Perhaps "simultaneous monologue" is the best description of the talk between the President and the intellectuals. They do not listen much anymore to the President's speeches, perhaps because they believe he plugged his ears to their arguments several years ago. President Johnson refuses to give any public recognition to the idea that the alternative courses in Vietnam suggested by his intellectual critics might be viable.

In dealing with his foreign policy critics, the President has seemed to adopt "If you can't join 'em, beat 'em" as his operating maxim. The possibility of more brutal internal conflict over Vietnam was foreshadowed on 23 June when the President addressed a Democratic dinner in Los Angeles. Although accounts of the confused struggle differ, reports appearing in the Los Angeles *Times* indicate that a fairly peaceful crowd of demonstrators was bloodily repelled by the nightsticks of fast moving Los Angeles police. Later, one UCLA zoology professor who demonstrated asked, "Will the next step be concentration camps for those who oppose the administration policies?"

Later that night, after hearing about the police success in breaking up the demonstration, the President is reported to have commended the police chief on the "fine job your officers have done tonight." In that Los Angeles speech, the President condemned the "faint-hearted and the weak-kneed" and set out what may well be a major theme of his coming campaign—"no President has ever been turned upon when he was engaged in trying to protect his country and its interests against a foreign foe."

More than any other man, President Johnson controls the buttons of escalation. Like any national leader, he can shape his use of military power to fit his own political needs. He can probably win support either by escalating the Vietnam war shortly before the 1968 elections or by declaring a peace campaign.

In the meantime, he seems to have staked out his strategy for dealing with his Vietnam critics. More frequently in his public addresses the President seems to imply that his critics are exacting a "price" of those Americans who are risking their lives in Vietnam. In his 27 June address to the Junior Chamber of Commerce at Baltimore, the President made ample mention of the flag and those who wanted to tear it down, deplored those whose criticism "upset our confidence in ourselves," talked about the "peace-niks," and expressed his hope that the "cussers and the doubters will be relegated to the rear."

The President seems to be trying to gain mass popular backing by abusing and isolating that minority which openly criticizes his Vietnam policies. Mr. Johnson has apparently decided that he can risk losing the support of those who believe that the American dream has turned sour during his Administration.

The National Mood

But the President should not make the mistake of believing that those former supporters who have become disillusioned with his leadership are all left-wing types or all intellectuals. One of the nation's most careful observers of national politics, columnist David S. Broder, has caught part of the national mood in an article published in the current issue of *Interplay*: President Johnson "is reviled by thousands of his former supporters and mistrusted by millions more. . . . this country . . . surely wonders when the dreams that were shattered on the streets of Dallas will become its dreams again."

It is doubtful whether the nation's voyage under President Kennedy was ever as idyllic as it now sometimes seems. What is more, that brief voyage seems to have been made years ago and to have become almost irrelevant to our national life. A new and different captain has long been in command. Many Americans, and perhaps even many intellectuals, may register their votes for President Johnson in 1968, but the national tragedy is that many will never again fully trust their captain to tell the truth about the fierce dangers into which their ship is heading.

—BRYCE NELSON