row interests than the interests of humanity."

While there is reported to be considerable sympathy in both the faculty and the administration for these general positions, and considerable alertness to the threat of possible restrictions on publication, the difficulty is that the relationship of these principles to specific cases such as Themis is not always clear. Publishable or not, much of the proposed research—such as a project for improving "the detection of small military targets"—is directed at exclusively military applications. On the other hand, research in information-processing systems, for example—another area in which DOD will support studies, may be put to both military and non-military uses.

The present overall disposition at Montana seems to be, in the words of one official, that "the project is innocent until proved guilty." Three groups of faculty members have submitted contract proposals to the Pentagon, and, according to administration officials, the difficult questions will arise later when, if the proposals are accepted, the terms of the research will have to be worked out. But the details are one thing; the long-term implications, with which the AAUP is concerned, are another.

The unseen presence in the debate over military involvement in the universities is obviously Viet Nam. When the country is at peace, the military establishment is somewhat shadowy. It has been viewed in academic circles as just another source of funds; its commitment to basic research, education, and the other values of academe have been rather easily taken for granted. While many institutions and individuals have had their disagreements with DOD, many others have a long history of honorable and satisfactory dealings, and there is some reluctance, as one Montana official said, "to set the DOD apart and treat it differently from other federal agencies." But when the country is fighting a war—and a war that seems to be unpopular with the intellectuals—the Pentagon no longer seems benign, and the fact that its mission involves killing people is hard to ignore. As long as the war goes on, the issue, in one fashion or another, is certain to continue to come to the surface. Researchers frequently complain about the cumbersomeness of federal granting procedures, and they have their differences on a variety of matters with NSF and NIH. But while these institutions may have their faults, war, at least, is not their job. If the movement at Montana can be taken as symptomatic, academic researchers these days are finding the civilian agencies very attractive indeed.

—ELINOR LANGER

White House Science Office: Report Urges Expanded Role

Critics of the Office of Science and Technology (OST) generally split into two camps: those who argue that the organization exerts too much influence over federal science affairs and those who argue that it exerts too little. The clear thrust of a recent report issued by the Holifield subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee is that OST should exert more influence.

The OST, founded in President Kennedy's administration, is nearly 5 years old. During its initial period of existence, OST seemed to play a highly constructive role, mostly attributable to the close relationship between President Kennedy and Jerome B. Wiesner, presidential science adviser and first director of OST. Wiesner and his staff took an important part in providing advice on national security issues and in achieving the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963. But, as the report indicates, the circumstances surrounding OST have changed in the intervening years: "The Nation has a different President. In turn, he has a different man in charge of the White House science establishment. The problems confronting the President have changed." The report argues that some Congressmen wish that OST would show the kind of creativity in the civilian field that it previously displayed in military affairs.

The report itself is an indication of the growing concern which Congress is exhibiting about science policy. The study was commissioned by the House Military Operations subcommittee, a group which has jurisdiction over OST and other science-related agencies, as well as fulfilling its primary job of looking at Defense Department operations. Although he made no specific recommendations, chairman Chet Holifield (D-Calif.) said that the report would serve as background for possible hearings or "the development of new legislation." The study was made by the Science Policy Research Division of the Library of Congress, a group which is becoming increasingly important in providing advice for the legislative branch. It was prepared under the general supervision of division chief Edward Wenk, Jr., who is now on leave to serve as executive secretary of the Marine Sciences Council. Wenk, a former member of the OST staff, wrote the first chapter, the report's most analytical and controversial section. Holifield called the 326-page document* the "most comprehensive account of OST activities ever presented," a judgment which will not be disputed. OST officials admit that the report is more detailed and better-organized than anything OST itself has ever compiled to describe itself.

The authors of the report, who relied on written sources for their study, found some difficulty in answering the question—what does OST do? The authors cite Donald Hornig's statement that the White House scientific advisory network is "too complicated to describe." The report indicates that the advisory role that OST plays to the President implies a host of unpublicized activities—"Like an iceberg, only a relatively small tip is visible."

Part of the complexity is due to the fact that the White House science chief has four jobs: special assistant to the President for science and technology, director of OST, head of the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST), and chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).

*The report is available from the Military Operations Subcommittee, House of Representatives, B 373 Rayburn Building, Washington, D.C. 20025. In addition to Wenk, others who played a major part in preparing the report included Warren H. Donnelly and Dorothy M. Bates.

The Office of Science and Technology provides him with staff assistance in all four capacities.

One of the main troubles with OST, the report suggests, is that it has too small a staff. The office is expected to deal with a wide range of science-policy issues and brush-fire emergencies on a continuing basis. But with an OST group consisting of only 20 professionals, the report states, "its staff must be thinly spread." The report notes that OST's attempts to add a few extra staff members have met with rejections from some congressional committees.

Congressional opinion, however, is diversified on the question of the proper role of the OST. The study says that virtually all the Congressmen who propose a change advocate "a strengthened and enlarged role for the agency." The report notes several areas to which the White House science staff does not currently seem to devote much attention. Although the space budget accounts for more than a third of federal research and development expenditure, the OST does not spend a corresponding part of its time in dealing with space issues. The report also notes White House deficiencies in fields such as transportation and, more importantly, in the establishment of priorities for federal spending in the science area. At several points, the authors indicate that they believe that OST should give serious consideration to issuing an annual report on federal science activity, partly as an aid to better planning and coordination.

A major feature of the report is an expression of congressional concern that OST is not devoting sufficient attention to the problems of civilian technology. The report states that President Kennedy clearly intended to employ OST on technological problems, but that "OST's response to the Presidential directive to engage in technological affairs has not been strong." The clear implication is that the Office of Science and Technology has been concentrating on science and ignoring the technology part of its mandate, even though the bulk of the decisions which the President must make on scientific and technological subjects "necessarily center on technology."

To the authors of the report, "The current high level of congressional interest in OST" is due to a belief that "matters which the Congress feels are of a Presidential level of importance are not gaining adequate attention. . . ." One of the principal needs mentioned is the exertion of leadership necessary to facilitate a transition, in governmental attention to scientific and technical matters, from a military to a social and economic orientation.

Reorganization Suggested

To help achieve such leadership, the authors of the report suggest a change in the present structure of White House scientific advisory organization. They argue that it would be possible to have the Office of the Special Assistant and PSAC concentrate on military affairs and have OST and the FCST concentrate on the public, civilian-oriented issues in science. They note that a new multidisciplinary committee with an orientation toward technology might be needed to assist in rendering advice.

Both men who have directed OST, Wiesner and Hornig, have opposed the compartmentalization of scientific advice to the President, an opposition which is currently reiterated by other OST staff members. One, Charles V. Kidd, commented, "It would be a big mistake to split this operation." His colleague, David Beckler, said that "one of our great strengths is that one man is in charge of all these interrelated activities."

Although disagreeing with many of the report's ideas, the OST staff seems to be giving the document a good deal of attention. "We don't regard it as just another congressional print," Beckler said, "We regard this office as in a state of steady evolution and we want to learn how to evolve in better ways in the future . . . We have been making progress but we may not be making full use of our capability."

One of the main faults that OST finds with the report is that it was based largely on the public record and does not, by definition, deal with the unpublicized activities. For instance, OST leaders think that the report underestimates the contribution that their office has made in focusing the attention of the federal agencies on civilian technology.

More Coordination?

Another point with which OST officials disagree is the need for a greater coordination of federal science activities. "All through this report, it is accepted that coordination is good," Kidd commented, "as the saying goes, 'that ain't necessarily so.'" Kidd thinks that "coordination by itself is a static concept" and feels that OST can help coordinate, not by directing agencies to do things, but rather by helping agencies communicate more effectively with each other. Kidd said that OST is also skeptical whether long-range planning for science is either feasible or desirable.

OST does agree with the report's contention that the office needs a larger staff, and thinks that a group of about 28 professionals could do a more effective job. "We're all somewhat overworked and overwhelmed," Beckler commented. However, OST leaders are skeptical about the worth of a staff substantially larger than the present one. For instance, all professional staff members can currently take major problems directly to Hornig. If the office grew much larger, such access to the top would become impossible.

OST officials wonder whether many Congressmen are actually interested in a greatly expanded role for their agency. They note that they have received only a couple of specific legislative requests from Congressmen to add new functions to OST. They believe that the chairmen of congressional committees having jurisdiction over science-related agencies are generally either hostile or neutral to the idea of an expanded role for OST in federal science coordination.

The OST's functioning is hardly a burning issue in Congress. A great number of Congressmen have no opinion about what OST does, and those who do have ideas are often reluctant to urge change in such advisory offices to the President, since they regard it as a Presidential prerogative to organize these offices. There are, however, a number of Congressmen who have become concerned about lack of coordination and planning of federal science activities. Although there is no sizable body of agreement in Congress on the direction of reform, there is, in the language of the report, "an uneasy quest for change." The report released by the Holifield subcommittee may well serve as the basis of new congressional hearings and the introduction of legislation on the OST, possibly in the current congressional session. In any case, the report will help promote informed discussion on the complicated problems of the proper structure of the Office of Science and Technology and the formulation of a federal science policy.

—BRYCE NELSON