fiscal 1966, and the prospect is that future appropriations for that purpose will mount steadily (OE's current request is for $145 million). Grants under this program can be used for educational parks and other innovations designed to bring about racial integration and improved methods of instruction (although it now appears that the legislation authorizing continuance of the program will state that, in reviewing proposals for approval, special consideration is not to be given the promotion of integration). It is in part because this well-financed program exists that school administrators are listening to Howe with more than just academic interest.

The evolution of OE from a weak, relatively unimportant agency to a strong one of the first rank occurred largely during the tenure of Howe's predecessor, Francis Keppel, the commissioner from late 1962 to early 1966. Keppel, who recently left HEW after a short stint as Assistant Secretary for Education and is now with General Learning Corporation, undoubtedly would not have escaped criticism had he remained commissioner.

Keppel was spared a violently angry reaction from the southerners principally because the desegregation guidelines which he issued last year were comparatively lenient. They drew heavy fire from civil rights spokesmen, especially Adam Clayton Powell, the Harlem congressman who chairs the House Education and Labor Committee. Keppel could not have avoided issuing more demanding guidelines this year. But some of Keppel's former associates believe he would not have made the controversial speeches Howe has made. They observe that Keppel was too sensitive politicially to have spoken out so. And, in their view, he was less inclined than Howe to feel that the commissioner should pioneer new ideas, although this observation would surprise Keppel.

Many people, conscious of the absence of any commonly observed standards in U.S. public education, look with favor on OE's new assertiveness and leadership. As a pioneer of ideas, Howe has by no means confined himself to the subject of racial integration. For example, he has told school teachers frankly that, as a group, they lack the exacting standards and other characteristics of a profession. He said that, in seeking professional standing, they should "grasp from administrators the responsibility for deciding which of their fellows shall be promoted and which shall not."

In urging that state departments of education be strengthened, Howe has told elected chief state school officers that, in the interest of protecting education from political intrusions, their posts should be held by appointive officials. Some who regard Howe as a courageous advocate of constructive, though often unsettling, ideas already are wondering whether a worthy successor can be found if Howe ever should be driven from office by unremitting criticism or presidential displeasure.

Many school administrators seem to agree that Howe's emphasis on the problem of the ghetto schools is not misplaced. They are thankful that he is trying to stimulate a serious public dialogue on the subject, although some have wished he would choose his words more carefully, and some feel that Howe would have the schools assume too much responsibility for social change. Forrest Conner, executive secretary of the American Association of School Administrators, told *Science*, "personally, and as the representative of AASA, I am pleased to say that we are very glad to have a man of Howe's caliber as Commissioner of Education."

A review of Howe's tribulations suggests a few tentative conclusions. Howe is a strong, unusually forthright man in a job which, as he has defined it, carries the heavy and incompatible responsibilities of serving as a counselor, on the one hand, and as a judge and policeman on the other. Giving the commissioner enforcement responsibilities under the Civil Rights Act appears to have been a mistake.

Howe says, no, the enforcement responsibility should rest with OE, the agency most familiar with practical school problems. Nevertheless, it does not seem impossible that a special agency, run by qualified people, could have been established within HEW but outside the Office of Education. The existing arrangement is contributing to a charged atmosphere in which efforts to attain one goal may contribute to the defeat of those made in the interest of another. "It's a little bit like turning over the discipline problems in a high school to the student counselor," John Letson, Atlanta's superintendent of schools and one of Howe's admirers, remarked to *Science*.

The leaders of the House Judiciary Committee have promised that a fair-minded inquiry on the administration of the desegregation guidelines will be undertaken after the November election. If this is done, the cloud of controversy surrounding Howe may lift somewhat, but the commissioner still will be faced with the task of reconciling the irreconcilable.

—LUTHER J. CARTER

U.S. China Policy: Conciliation or "Collision Course"?

The iceberg of U.S. policy toward Communist China has begun a slow melt during the past few months. Although the recent internal turmoil in China has made Washington more hesitant to consider a new policy than it was earlier this year, autumn finds officials still anticipating future U.S. gestures to Peking.

Perhaps the most surprising thing is not that a small thaw has been initiated in Washington but that it has taken so long to bring this about. Since 1950 there has been little but acrimony between the governments of the two countries.

The complex history of Chinese and American attitudes is responsible for much of the bitterness. For many decades Americans have regarded the Chinese as "friends," partly due to the activities of American missionaries in China, and have prided themselves on what they considered a benevolent "open door" policy toward a weak, though vast, nation. The identification

with the Chinese was further enhanced by the joint effort against the Japanese in World War II and by the publicity given the Nationalists' Christianized leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and his American-educated wife.

When China was finally conquered by the Communists in 1949, a substantial body of Americans felt guilty that they had not done more to help the Nationalists, and many, especially Republicans, cried out that the Truman administration had "lost" China. The loss seemed especially severe after Chinese soldiers began fighting the Americans in Korea. The McCarthyism of the early 1950's helped foment the frustration that Americans felt in facing a now hostile China, and John Foster Dulles, the hard-nosed Secretary of State, was not about to persuade a cautious Eisenhower to adopt a less rigid policy toward mainland China.

Rusk's Role

Dean Rusk, who became Secretary of State in 1961, was also disinclined to change China policy. Rusk fitted well into the State Department, an agency which has been described as a curator of old policies rather than a creator of new ones. To many in Washington it appears that Rusk sits Buddha-like atop old foreign policies, allowing them to be neither revised nor replaced. Some sympathetic observers consider his unchanging views on China policy a legacy of the tough years from 1950 to 1952, when, as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, he had to deal with Chinese military might day by day. Rusk's attitude during that period can be discerned in a speech he gave on 18 May 1951. He said, in part:

> But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

To this day Rusk calls the Chinese capital "Peiping," the name favored by the Nationalist government. Other American officials, including President Johnson, use the commonly accepted "Peking."

Given Rusk's resistance to changing U.S. China policy, it is surprising that he delivered a somewhat conciliatory statement on China policy on 16 March 1966, the first comprehensive statement on China by a Secretary of State since 1958. Although it bristled with hard-line passages, the tone of other parts of the statement was cordial enough to be described by the press as a major "softening" of U.S. policy.

Rusk manifested his ambivalence about the direction of U.S. China policy by the manner in which he presented his statement. Instead of making it a major public address, he delivered it in a closed session of the Far East subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Official sources indicated privately that pressure from his advisers helped Rusk decide to make a major statement on China, and that urging both from the China experts and from the House subcommittee impelled him finally to consent to release his text publicly more than a month later on 17 April.

In addition, Rusk could not help but be influenced by a group of recent events which have drawn Washington's attention to the need for a more flexible China policy. One impetus to policy change, especially inside the Executive branch, is the realization that support is rapidly dwindling for the U.S. attempt to keep Communist China out of the United Nations. In last autumn's General Assembly, 47 members voted for the seating of the Peking government, 47 voted against, and 20 abstained. This was the most support the seating of Communist China has ever received at the U.N., and this near defeat for the U.S. position led the administration to consider new approaches to the problem.

A second major cause of policy change is Vietnam, which raises the somber possibility of a Sino-American conflict. The threat of a war with China, which now is supplementing the strength of its human masses with nuclear weapons, is enough to force the administration to give a much higher priority to the China question.

The administration also seems to be utilizing talk about a change in China policy as a sop for the liberal discontent with its actions in Vietnam. For instance, Vice President Humphrey made many of his liberal friends unhappy by his militant speeches on Vietnam and China on his return earlier this year from Asia. Alarmed by this disaffection among his one-time supporters, Humphrey turned course and began making more positive statements about achieving a flexible China policy.

In making this switch, Humphrey demonstrated that he had picked up the new Washington mood on China, a mood shaped by the congressional hearings on the subject. These hearings began in the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January, when the Far East subcommittee, chaired by Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D–Wis.), began holding well-planned meetings with leading scholars. Appearing before the committee on 1 February, Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Kennedy administration, grabbed the headlines by saying, "Today, Communist China and the United States are on a collision course. The outcome can only be war."

On 8 March the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by J. William Fulbright (D–Ark.), began 3 weeks of highly publicized hearings on China. The lead-off witness was A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, who set the tone for the hearings by calling upon the United States to alter its policy toward China to one of "containment but not isolation," an idea which was paraphrased by Humphrey later in the week.

National "Teach-in"

These congressional hearings represented a highly important "teach-in" for Washington and the nation. Since the congressmen didn't know much about China, they were prepared to respect the authority of the academic witnesses. In the Senate hearing, most of the witnesses calmly advocated such heretofore "radical" ideas as the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, the opening up of trade relations, and increased visits between the two nations, and some mentioned the possibility of recognizing the Peking government. Although the members of the Senate committee vary greatly in political views, none except Frank Lausche (D–Ohio) argued extensively against such ideas when they were expressed by the witnesses. The congressmen did not denounce the professors for heresy either during the committee hearings or in the chambers of the two Houses.

In its final report, the Zablocki subcommittee called for the United States to expand its peaceful contacts with

China despite the rebuffs from Peking. In an interview, William S. Broomfield, the ranking Republican on the Far East subcommittee, said that he thought many Republicans in Congress would accept a change in China policy, and he noted that, according to his polls, a substantial portion of the people in his suburban Michigan district favored admission of Peking to the United Nations.

On 3 May, two senators, George S. McGovern (D–S.D.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D–Mass.), urged a major liberalization of U.S. China policy, in prepared Senate speeches. McGovern criticized the administration for a "paralysis of policy," and Kennedy said that "a rigid emotional straitjacket" had encased the subject of U.S. relations with China for years. The speeches were applauded by fellow Senators, despite the one-time congressional taboo on such expressions.

One of the main fears which has hampered the administration in changing China policy is the fear of a hostile Congress and populace. When congressmen demonstrated their willingness to stand up and say that they and their constituents favored a more liberal China policy, the administration could move ahead with more courage. Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, both of whom had attempted in the past to paint China as Number One World Enemy, expressed more conciliatory views. At West Point, on 8 June, Vice President Humphrey returned to the China theme, saying that the administration would continue to seek "to build bridges, to keep open doors of communication to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China. . . . Prudence and reason," he continued, "not slogans of the past, will guide us." In July, President Johnson gave a speech sympathetic to the possibility of contact with Peking, stressing "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies."

In addition to the change of tone in the statements of U.S. leaders, the State Department has liberalized travel regulations to China and some other formerly restricted Communist countries. On 11 July the State Department said that it would consider travel of several categories of people to be in the national interest. Two types of travel specifically labeled as in the national interest were a professional journey of "a doctor or scientist in the field of public health" and of a scholar who planned "to obtain, for public dissemination, further information in his field of research." State Department officials now say that an application by any person having a specific purpose for traveling to China is likely to be given sympathetic consideration by U.S. authorities. More than 88 U.S. passports have been validated for travel to China since 11 July, including those of 35 scholars and three physicians.



Senator George S. McGovern (D–S.Dak.), leading advocate of a more flexible policy toward Communist China.

State Department officials, in explaining the U.S. government's willingness to let private citizens communicate with the Chinese, also mention the fact that the United States permits a free flow of mail and publications between the two countries. (It seems that more Chinese publications reach the United States than vice versa; nonetheless, the Chinese buy some American periodicals, including five subscriptions to *Science*.)

Other efforts to increase contact are taking place in the nongovernment sector. Recently a Committee on Scholarly Communication with Mainland China was established under the chairmanship of Alan T. Waterman. The committee is jointly sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council for Learned Societies, and the Social Science Research Council, and is financed by foundation grants. The committee has just begun meeting and is expected to tread cautiously in the sensitive world of exchange with the Chinese. For instance, American scholars are wary about endangering the security of a Chinese scholar by issuing him an invitation which exposes him to the possible wrath of the Red Guards or of Chinese officials. The State Department has made it known that it would not object if universities sent invitations to Chinese scientists, even if China did not reciprocate with similar offers to Americans. However, the invitations issued during the past few months have not been accepted by Chinese scientists.

The Chinese government currently seems unwilling to allow travel of its citizens to America and travel of American citizens to China. Several congressmen have tried without success to gain China's permission for entry. The case of Senator McGovern is illustrative. McGovern was assured by the State Department that the government would not object to his traveling to China. McGovern tried to obtain China's permission through the government of a third nation which has direct communication with Peking. He also wrote letters directly to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai requesting permission to come to China; these were never answered. "I didn't receive a nibble anywhere," he told *Science*, in summing up his efforts to throw his line over the Bamboo Curtain.

Communication with China is made difficult by what seems to be a growing Chinese tendency to turn inward. The recent order from Peking to oust the relatively few foreign students studying in China, including those from friendly Albania and North Vietnam, is scarcely a good omen for travel between China and America. Peking's attention to internal matters is more dramatically illustrated by the incitement of the youthful Red Guards during recent months to purge the bourgeois element by spreading the "cultural revolution" through the society. (In August the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party warned the revolutionaries to take it easy when dealing with the scientists and technicians. Part of the twelfth point the committee announced was: "Special care should be taken of those scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made contributions. Efforts should be made to help them gradually transform their world outlook and their

style of work." Despite this concern of the party leaders about China's scientific manpower resources, it would be difficult for Chinese scientists not to be affected by the recent violence.)

The current uproar in China has made congressmen and Executive branch officials somewhat wary about pushing for further changes in China policy. American officials also believe that this commotion has not helped the case for seating Peking at the United Nations. This appears to be one of the reasons why the United States still seems ready to advocate continued exclusion of Peking from the world body in debates and voting on seating this autumn. Whether the United States will drop its opposition to Peking's admission to the U.N. in the 1967 session remains to be seen. Earlier this year administration officials, including Rusk, began to emphasize keeping Nationalist China in the U.N. rather than keeping the Peking government out.

In the Executive branch there is some reluctance to move much farther on a change in China policy until Peking shows some signs of reciprocating. But China seems in little mood to respond, especially when the U.S. Seventh Fleet still patrols the Formosa Strait and when American military forces battle along China's southern boundary in Vietnam. In addition to the aggravation of Vietnam, the State Department has, in effect, admitted that American warplanes have violated Chinese airspace. Chinese leaders act as if they must prepare for an attack from the United States, and U.S. leaders will probably shy away from giving absolute assurance that no attack is forthcoming.

In a British House of Lords debate on China earlier this year, Lord Kennet argued that both America and China seemed to pay attention only to one part of the other's behavior. The Americans, he said, pay attention to China's militant words but ignore the fact that Chinese soldiers are not employed outside China. The Chinese ignore America's peaceful words but concentrate on the great American military effort in Vietnam.

For any reconciliation to take place, both sides will probably have to do more to bring together the seeming disparity between national words and deeds. As another observer, A. Doak Barnett, warned in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "it is essential that the United States exercise great restraint in the use of its power, especially in North Vietnam, and demonstrate by deeds as well as words that we are determined to avoid provoking any direct American-Chinese conflict."

There may be those who would argue that Washington has done little to change its policy toward Peking. Although this may be technically true, this view does not take into account the significant change, toward conciliation, in the language American officials now use and, more importantly, in the attitudes which are the basis of that language. While the policy may not have changed markedly, the willingness to discuss the need for a more flexible China policy has increased sharply in Washington. Chinese officials who make some attempt to actually test American responses on different proposals probably will be shocked by the cordiality of the U.S. response. Washington is increasingly aware that attitudes toward China which were useful in 1950 are of limited relevance in today's world.

United States officials, however, have little hope that the Chinese will seek out greater contact with America in the next few months or even the next few years. In their opinion, America is still too useful to the Peking government in the role of villain to mobilize the energies of the Chinese people. Washington does not expect the old revolutionary cadre, composed of men like Mao and Defense Minister Lin Piao, to change attitudes about the United States. However, official Washington does hope for an eventual change in China similar to the relaxing of attitudes which occurred in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. In the past few months the U.S. government has been trying to communicate its potential goodwill to the post-Mao generation of Chinese leaders. A main concern of Washington today is the possibility that a future dialogue with China will be permanently forestalled by a direct Chinese-American military clash originating in the Vietnam war.—BRYCE NELSON

REPORT FROM EUROPE

Conference on Insect Endocrines

Brno, Czechoslovakia. Recent findings about insect hormones, of interest for both fundamental biology and insect control, were discussed here from 22 to 26 August. The occasion was a symposium on insect endocrines, sponsored by the Entomological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. About 130 scientists from 20 countries attended the meeting, at which about 80 papers were presented.

A central theme of the symposium was the importance of insect endocrine systems as models of the role of hormones in the differentiation of complex animals.

In the announcements and discussions at Brno, five main areas received particular attention.

1) It was announced that pure samples of juvenile hormone, which prevents maturation of insects, had been isolated in the United States from cecropia moths.

2) There was discussion of the juvenile-hormone-like effect of the so-called "paper factor," from balsam trees of North America, which affects only one group of insects, the Pyrrhocoridae—a group which does not occur in North America.

3) It was announced that the active principle of a terpenoid compound which had been synthesized at Harvard and found to be very active against a wide range of species had been identified in Czechoslovakia. Workers in Prague showed that the active material is a dihydrochloride of methyl farnesoate.

4) More data were presented in support of the idea that changes in the ion concentration in the nuclei of cells of the *Chironomus* midge can mimic the effect of the hormone ecdysone (which promotes moulting of insects