

to achieve implosion of a core containing plutonium and beryllium components, the overall system being arranged in an essentially spherically symmetrical configuration." But Linschitz says that the drawing is incorrect in crucial details and that "essential information needed to make clear the 'principle' of initiating a chain reaction in plutonium is *not* given. . . ." Linschitz's position is that by even asking the questions about "secrets" and "principles" about an immense technological enterprise the prosecution was on a hopelessly wrong track:

It is also astonishing, but critically relevant . . . that despite so many authoritative statements to the contrary by scientists over the past two decades, the layman still clings to the misconception that there is a "secret" or key "formula" for the construction of an atomic bomb. . . . At the risk of being tedious, it must be repeated until it is definitely and finally recognized that the construction of an atomic bomb, assuming the generally widespread distribution of fundamental knowledge prevailing in, say, 1941, involved no single "secret" in the scientific sense. It did involve a highly complex set of technical tricks, devices and processes, combined of course with an immense and versatile industrial capability. . . . The statement made by Judge Kaufman, when passing sentence on the Rosenbergs, regarding the technical importance of the information conveyed by Greenglass has no foundation in fact. Rather it expresses a misunderstanding of the nature of modern technology, a misunderstanding which, in this case, has had tragic consequences.

Morrison, in a separate affidavit, characterized the sketch as a "some-

what schematized cross-section, which might be called a pedagogical descriptive picture." He described Greenglass's testimony as "confused and imprecise . . . both qualitatively and quantitatively incorrect and misleading." Morrison addressed himself particularly to the testimony of John Derry.

If, in truth, Major Derry had occasion to see the actual atomic bomb under development at Los Alamos "many times" as he stated, he ought to have added "and it did not look like that." . . . Major Derry was not justified in saying, when asked if he understood the entire subject matter, "Yes, sir, I did." . . . His later testimony showed he was not at all knowledgeable with respect to neutrons and beryllium. He was also in error when he answered in the affirmative the question "Can a scientist and can you . . . perceive what the actual construction of the bomb was?" (And, he was even more misleading when he answered a subsequent question "Does the sketch . . . concern a type of atomic bomb . . . actually used . . .") Answer: "It does. It is the bomb we dropped at Nagasaki, similar to it.") Say rather it was a caricature of the bomb.

In another affidavit, Harold Urey, one of the few prominent scientists active in opposing the execution of the Rosenbergs, associated himself with the statements by Morrison and Linschitz.

It is clear that the issues raised by Sobell's attorneys bring forth more new questions than they answer. The lawyers are saying more than that the government was mistaken: they are saying that the government made its mistakes deliberately. If they are right

—if the registration card is forgery, and if the government willfully misrepresented Derry as an expert and avoided calling in the real experts who might have offered conflicting testimony—the suspicion is strong that the defendants were framed. Who, then, participated in the frame-up, and why?

At this point, there is no definite evidence that to accept the version of the case proposed by the defense would not be merely to substitute one fantasy for another. At the preliminary hearing, the government denied the charges but offered no proof in support of its denial: to have done so would have been to concede that a factual issue existed. This in turn would have made it binding on the judge to grant Sobell's request for an "evidentiary hearing." The government opposes a hearing and is concentrating on arguing that, for procedural reasons, Sobell is not entitled to one. If a hearing is granted, the issue before the judge will be whether Sobell's conviction was "tainted" by prosecution fraud; if fraud is proved, the conviction would be thrown out, though Sobell would then be subject to a new trial, if the government wished. All subsequent stages, including the judge's ruling on a hearing, carry with them the possibility of appeals. Conspiracy theories that involve the government are difficult to accept; nonetheless they are also apt to linger.—ELINOR LANGER

Exit Goldman, Enter Roche: Can LBJ and Intellectuals Be Friends?

The circumstances surrounding the exit of historian Eric P. Goldman from the White House staff have created a bigger stir in Washington than any other resignation that has occurred during the Johnson Administration. Others who have resigned their jobs have been dissatisfied with aspects of their relationship with President Johnson, but none has made his discontent as publicly known as Goldman has.

Goldman, who was hired 2½ years ago to act as the President's liaison to the intellectual community, submitted

his resignation to the President in August. Johnson likes to announce such departures to suit his own needs or desires, not those of retiring officials. Unable to force the White House to announce his resignation, Goldman took the unusual step of announcing it himself.

If Goldman had merely said that he was resigning because he wished to return to Princeton, no one would have noticed his leaving very much. But he did more—he called together a group of newspaper reporters and held a back-

ground discussion with them about the circumstances of his departure. Goldman made it plain that he did not find the job of tame White House intellectual an easy one. In effect he admitted he had given up on his effort to achieve a rapprochement between the President and the intellectuals.

Goldman emphasized that he thought both sides shared the blame—the intellectuals did not give the President sufficient credit for his great intelligence and his humanitarian instincts while the President distrusted the intellectuals, especially those from the East Coast. Goldman also exploded what proved to be one of the loudest detonations in his disclosure when he announced that he planned to write a book on the Johnson Administration which will be published by Alfred A. Knopf next fall.

President Johnson was quick to excommunicate the apostate. On the same day that the Goldman disclosures were published, White House press secretary



Eric P. Goldman, professor of history at Princeton, who resigned after serving 2½ years on the White House staff.

Bill D. Moyers moved to puncture Goldman's credibility as a knowledgeable White House insider. Moyers, a quick man with the verbal stiletto, pointed out to the press that Goldman had met with the President no more than a dozen times during his period in office, and had worked principally with Mrs. Johnson and her press secretary on cultural matters. Moyers also released figures which indicated that Goldman had never worked anywhere near a full-time schedule at the White House.

Much of the Washington press corps quickly took sides over the Goldman-Johnson flap. Liberal columnist Joseph Kraft said that Moyers' argument that the President hadn't seen much of Goldman "makes the point that the administration uses prominent academics merely for cosmetic purposes." The pro-Johnson *Washington Post* editorialized that Goldman's effectiveness had been questioned and denounced his departure statement as "undignified."

On the day the news of the Goldman resignation was published the President announced that he had appointed another professor—John P. Roche, chairman of the politics department at Brandeis University—as a full-time consultant to the White House.

Since Roche has been critical of the character of liberal dissent on Vietnam and has given general backing to the Administration's determination to preserve a non-Communist South Vietnam, he was widely described in the press as a backer of the Administration's Viet-

nam policy. Some accounts left the impression that he would be yet another obsequious White House lackey supporting whatever the President decided to do in Vietnam.

Serving on the White House staff does seem to compel a substantial degree of public conformity, but it would be a mistake to prejudge Roche as a sycophant on Vietnam or any other issue.

The mustachioed Roche looks like a cross between a Zapata-type rebel and a Boston heavyweight fighter of the 19th century. His personality matches his looks. In the past he has not been afraid to lay his views on the line and vigorously defend them.

One of Roche's long-time friends described him as "more anti the antis than pro-Administration on Vietnam," a view which is sustained by an examination of the speech he gave to the national convention of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) last year on 2 April.

In that speech Roche argued that the American intervention in Vietnam was not immoral, and he cautioned his fellow liberals not to "behave like a secular branch of the Holy Rollers" in protesting the morality of the American efforts. At the same time, he argued against the bombing of North Vietnam which the Administration had started 2 months earlier. He said that such bombing would force the North Vietnamese to send troops to the south, thus leading the United States into "a full-scale Balkan war" which would serve the interests of the Communist Chinese rather than the United States. More recently, Roche has said that the United States should not invade North Vietnam on the ground, but rather should attempt to build an "American Ulster" in South Vietnam.

Despite these comments on Vietnam, Roche sometimes describes himself as an "unabashed veteran cold warrior" who is firmly committed to resisting Communist expansion. He believes that the United States should help contain China within its present borders but should not "attempt any great rollback of Red Chinese power." When speaking at a *Commentary*-sponsored discussion earlier this year, Roche said, "I am neither a hawk nor a dove; I am a slightly frightened robin who wants to avoid a war with Red China as any sane man does."

However much some of Roche's fellow academics may disagree with him



John P. Roche—"Never in my memory has the intellectual community been so bitterly anti-Administration." October, 1965

on foreign policy, they should find it possible to talk to him on the subject. Roche himself is willing to admit he may be wrong on Vietnam, and he is judged an eminently "fair-minded" man by those who have worked with him. Although he has strongly held ideas, he has a great tolerance of political diversity. Some acquaintances attribute this to the fact that the liberal Roche was brought up in a family which was, to use his descriptive phrase, "in the bosom of the radical right" in political views.

Roche had other early lessons in human diversity. Of Irish descent, he grew up in a Yiddish-speaking neighborhood of Brooklyn. As a result of knowledge assimilated in his youth, Roche's conversation is marked by his natural and extensive use of Yiddish phrases and anecdotes.

After receiving his B.A. at Hofstra and his Ph.D. at Cornell, Roche began teaching political science at Haverford College in 1949. As a teacher, he gained great respect among the better students, although his sharp tongue did not win him much favor with the less intelligent types.

In 1956 Roche was offered, and accepted, the positions of chairman of the department of politics and Morris Hillquit Professor of Labor and Social Thought at Brandeis University. He has also served a 2-year term as dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences while at Brandeis. During his 10 years at the Massachusetts university, Roche increased his already prolific production of scholarly and political articles. He

feels most at home writing essays and is even more comfortable when he turns them out in abundance.

As a political scientist, Roche is literary and historical rather than quantitative. He writes on topics chosen from American history, which include the preservation of civil liberties and the course of American foreign policy. His writing is strongly opinionated, highly readable, and quite autobiographical. Roche never seems hesitant about throwing in a few "I's" and relating a personal experience to illustrate his point. In many of his essays the reader senses—to use Roche's phrase—his "joyous commitment to battle against injustice and inequality." Roche believes that civil liberties have been increasingly well protected in the United States, and he often rails against the "Yahoos" across the nation who want to reverse this tradition.

In addition to his literary production, Roche has consistently maintained his political activism. After a 2-year term as a highly energetic national chairman of the ADA, he was given the unusual distinction of being asked to serve a third year, and he accepted. ADA national director Leon Shull termed this request "a mark of the affection that the membership held him in."

Roche, because of his buoyancy, forthrightness, lack of affectation, and loyalty to his friends, seems to inspire a corresponding loyalty in those who know him. He is free of pretensions which would hamper his relationships with those of a different age (he is 43) or intellectual status. One White House staff member curtly said that Goldman had, at times, been guilty of "academic pomposity." Whether or not this was true of Goldman, it is a charge not likely to be made about Roche.

While still chairman of the ADA, Roche was one of the chief speechwriters for Hubert Humphrey during the 1964 campaign. The Humphrey camp, which was under the constraint of trying to elicit Republican votes, was forced to keep a close watch on Roche's polemical speech-writing style. "Unleash John Roche" became the battle cry of the more militant Humphrey workers.

Since 1964 Roche has continued to work on a part-time basis for Humphrey. He has also kept contact with the White House staff, including Moyers, and has sent the President memoranda on various subjects. The

Roche on Johnson

"Yet despite his accomplishments President Johnson has achieved little standing among the intellectuals. . . . They have tended to see in him a reincarnation of William Jennings Bryan, the rural cornhusker. The contrast with President Kennedy is, of course striking—for lack of a stronger word. . . . Johnson seems to have come from a different universe; his rhetoric is extravagant, his hats are wide—everything about him seems to symbolize a reversion to the political style of yesteryear. . . . [Lyndon Johnson] seems to fall into the category of anti-intellectual politicians—or at least he has given little indication that he feels that intellectuals have a meaningful, creative role in American society. . . . —JOHN P. ROCHE, *New York Times Magazine*, 26 July 1964.

White House sent Roche to Vietnam in June for his advice on the development of a political structure in that country. The President had him brief congressional leaders at the White House upon his return from Vietnam. Roche is still close to Humphrey, a fellow ADA member, but the Vice President had no hand in getting him the White House assignment.

Although the White House has implied that Roche would work mainly on domestic problems, it is likely that he will become involved in foreign affairs as well. Roche was one of those considered for the recently-filled post of chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State. Vietnam is an obvious area for Roche's attentions, and he may become one of the principal people in government urging that greater emphasis be placed on the political and economic aspects of the Vietnam struggle. On the domestic side, it would be natural for Roche to be assigned tasks in such areas as racial problems, civil liberties, and immigration. In both the domestic and foreign fields he is likely to help fill the long-existent White House speech-writing gap. White House observers will watch carefully for any increase in the Presidential use of Yiddish phrases.

Roche's friends hope that the President will not use him to attempt to change the minds of liberal academics on Vietnam. They regard that attitude as a "frozen" one which a hundred White House resident intellectuals could not hope to change.

In light of his personality and political experience, those who know Roche think he is likely to survive in the White House jungle and retain his integrity while doing so. As one of his associates put it, "Roche is a tough guy. If someone kicks him in the groin, he'll kick him right back." In assuming his staff duties this week, Roche will be sure to avoid the pontifical role of "White House intellectual." No doubt, from his first day at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue he will be demanding real work to do.

In discussing the switch in resident intellectuals at the White House, Moyers noted that "you cannot consider the academic community a union. You have to deal with it on an individualistic basis with people on functional assignments. That is what we try to do and will continue to try to do, and no one man can be expected to be the liaison."

Despite the White House denial that Roche had been hired as a direct replacement for Goldman, the timing of the announcement of his hiring makes it clear that Roche is meant to be at least a partial substitute for the Princeton professor.

In his 1964 *New York Times Magazine* article on Johnson and the intellectuals, Roche blamed both sides but concluded that "a heavy burden of responsibility for this deterioration of relations lies on the White House. It would be ironic if in this year of fence mending, no efforts were made to reestablish the critical dialogue that existed between John Kennedy and the intellectuals. And it would be tragic if the Johnson Administration did not understand why these efforts are worthwhile."

Roche's appointment may be a sign that President Johnson has some hope that an effort to revive a dialogue with the intellectuals is still worthwhile. But patience is short in Washington these days. Some observers believe that if the President cannot adequately utilize a man like Roche, he might as well give up hiring independent-minded professors for the White House staff.

—BRYCE NELSON