from its separate specialties." Moore speaks not of a reunion but of the end of a union: "It is probable that ours is the last generation of biologists that can attempt to take all of biology as its domain." One may agree that these symposia marked the end of an era and yet have different reasons.

Reunion and synthesis in science are not obtained by mere physical juxtaposition of disparate and independent studies. Most of the chapters in this book, each excellent in itself, are one- or at most two-level studies, as noted at the beginning of this review, highly restricted, and with few or no broader implications. Subjects that necessarily involve more levels and true synthesis are either omitted or treated in a different way. (Note Oppenheimer's review of "classical" questions in embryology and conclusion that they "are the questions we are still asking today.")

There are indications that the next era will be one of tackling more complex problems, linking together the one-level contributions of the recent past. If this fine symposial volume marks the end of an era, it excellently exemplifies the firm basis for the next era of biology.

Academic Cargo Cult

The Revolution in Anthropology. I. C. Jarvie. Humanities Press, New York, 1964. xxii + 248 pp. $6.75.

This book is a critical evaluation of the shortcomings in the theoretical orientation of the functionalist (Malinowski) and structural-functionalist (Radcliffe-Brown) schools of anthropology—that is, of British social anthropology. At the same time it presents a critique of interpretations of cargo cults in Melanesia and offers the author's own interpretation. More important, it is the first step in the evolution of the author's own thinking as a philosopher and critic of the social sciences, for whatever the deficiencies of this work (it is a revision of the author's Ph.D. dissertation) it reveals a young scholar of promise.

British social anthropology has been as much a "closed society" as the Melanesian communities that Jarvie characterizes by this term, for until recently its members communicated almost entirely with one another and some even boasted that they read no psychology and no works written by Americans. Jarvie claims that, when the members of closed societies suffer severe feelings of deprivation, they tend to develop a theory of their problems. A prophet will then claim to have a way of translating the theory or ideology into a specific program for action. People follow him insofar as they feel they have the same problem and subscribe to the same general theory of what is wrong. Jarvie's problem was that as a student of anthropology at the University of London he was frustrated by what he felt to be the shackles of social anthropological dogma. He switched to philosophy and discovered the saving doctrine of his teacher, Karl Popper, whose ideas he applies to specifying what is wrong with social anthropology and what it needs in order to be saved. If other social anthropologists feel similarly frustrated, Jarvie may gain something of a following and may even be cast in the role of prophet.

These remarks should not be taken as condemnation of Jarvie's work. My point is simply that Jarvie himself is a protagonist in a particular enactment of the same general kind of social-psychological process of which cargo cults in Melanesia are also particular enactments. Scientists and philosophers are not supermen, and academic communities are unexceptionally human communities. Change in intellectual circles follows the same general patterns that characterize change in primitive societies. The "uniformitarian" principle applies to human behavior as well as to geological process.

Jarvie's criticism of the failings of social anthropological theory and his analysis of what is basically at fault are essentially sound. Sociology deals with the recurring patterns of event and social arrangement that characterize human communities. These patterns are obviously products or artifacts of what individual human beings do. They are explained by human behavior. Social anthropologists have argued, on the other hand, that they explain human behavior. This tautology forces social anthropologists to conclude that people act as they do in order to maintain the patterns and the equilibrium of the whole society, making of these things a final cause. As Jarvie points out, this theoretical stance makes it impossible to deal satisfactorily with social change. To do this, theory must deal with people, with their aims and their circumstances as they perceive them. Such an approach, which Jarvie labels "situational logic," allows for more satisfactory explanations of change, as he undertakes to show in relation to cargo cults.

It is here that the parochialism of English social theory is evident. American social psychology, since Cooley and G. H. Mead, has used a "situational" approach in its analysis of human behavior. American anthropology has been much concerned with culture as the conventional standards by which people perceive their situations and make their choices relating to them. It is interesting to learn that such an approach to behavioral phenomena is original with Karl Popper.

There are other points of criticism, such as equating psychology with the study of the irrational and using the term "rational" without definition but in a sense that I find strange. Not having done field work, Jarvie fails to understand its complicated and important role in anthropology. The writing is overly polemical, and the book was badly edited—many references cited in the text do not appear in the bibliography, for example.

The important point remains that Jarvie is constructively challenging what has been going on in social anthropology. His thinking has not been influenced by the body of American behavioral and social theory most closely akin to his own. We in America may regret this, and Jarvie's book may seem less revolutionary to us. But its appearance is, in the context of British social anthropology and by Jarvie's own situational logic, a noteworthy and welcome event. It will be a pity if it is dismissed out of hand.

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Comparative Pathology

The Principal Diseases of Lower Vertebrates. H. Reichenbach-Klinke and E. Elkan. Academic Press, New York, 1965. xii + 600 pp. Illus. $20.

After some 19 years of training and study in comparative pathology, I am not inclined to read 600-page texts in my field from cover-to-cover at one sitting. But I challenge anyone who nodded in agreement with my opening sentence to resist the temptation to do