entific integrity of these existing unmanned programs. The board rightly sees as its primary task the definition of the ends, rather than the means, of the space science enterprise.

What then is the attitude of a scientist who is actively engaged in scientific space activities toward a project such as Orion? He has perhaps just been denied by NASA a half-million-dollar ground-based telescope with which to observe planets. Or he has designed an experiment which was excluded, because of space limitations, from the next orbiting solar observatory. And then he hears that a wonderful new propulsion system has been invented which might allow him, 15 years later, to make high-quality nearby observations of Jupiter and Saturn. The price of the new system is quoted as only a few billion dollars. He is understandably not enthusiastic.

This brief summary of Orion's history has shown that every one of the four murderers had good and laudable motives for killing the project, or, in the case of the scientific community, for not lifting a finger to save it. Orion had a unique ability to antagonize simultaneously the four most powerful sections of the Washington establishment. The remarkable thing is that, against such odds, with its future never assured for more than a few months at a time, the project survived as long as it did. It held together for 7 long years a band of talented and devoted men, and produced in that time a volume of scientific and engineering work which in breadth and thoroughness has rarely been equaled.

The story of Orion is significant, because this is the first time in modern history that a major expansion of human technology has been suppressed for political reasons. Many will feel that the precedent is a good one to have established. It is perhaps wise that radical advances in technology, which may be used both for good and for evil purposes, be delayed until the human species is better organized to cope with them. But those who have worked on Project Orion cannot share this view. They must continue to hope that they may see their work bear fruit in their own lifetimes. They cannot lose sight of the dream which fired their imaginations in 1958 and sustained them through the years of struggle afterward—the dream that the bombs which killed and maimed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki may one day open the skies to mankind.

Reference

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Conformity as a Tactic of Ingratiation

Uses of agreement to enhance one's power in a social relationship are explored experimentally.

Edward E. Jones

There seems to be much promise in looking at social interaction with an eye to the unfolding of strategies designed to gain or maintain personal power. There is nothing novel in the suggestion that there is a strategic side to social behavior—that people try to calculate ways to make the most of a particular relationship—but the attempt to study such strategies by laboratory experimentation is a recent development. Here I shall review several studies which especially concern ingratiation, or "strategic behaviors . . . designed to influence a particular other person concerning the attractiveness of one's personal qualities" (*1*). I hope, in the process, not only to present results relevant to a developing theory of strategic overtures, but also to illustrate a form of experimental research which seems to show promise of unraveling the subtleties of social behavior.

All interpersonal relationships involve mutual dependence; this is the equivalent of saying that each party to a social interchange has potential influence over certain rewards available to and costs incurred by the other. If the dependences of one on the other are not only mutual but approximately equal, then there is a balance of power in which each can enforce a certain minimal receipt of rewards through his capacity to enact or fail to enact the responses sought by the other. When the power in a two-person relationship is asymmetrical, however, the more dependent person is somewhat at the mercy of the more powerful one. In any event, we can well understand why the more dependent person is concerned about his poor position and, under most circumstances, tries in various ways to improve it.

When we look at the strategic alternatives available to the more dependent person, it appears that some of these strategies guarantee him at least a certain minimum of rewards but do so at the expense of confirming or strengthening the power asymmetry which defines his dependence. Other strategies, however, may be effective in modifying the asymmetry itself so that the dependent person's power is, in the long run, increased. Compliance is an example of one kind of dependence-confirming tactic. The dependent person may, through overt obedience, avoid punishment and secure the rewards available to him, but such compliance tends to perpetuate the power differential to which it is a response. For example, the more reliable the worker becomes in meeting the supervisor's demands, the more confident the supervisor will be that these demands are reasonable, and that the worker is happy with the "bargain" symbolized by the difference in their

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power. In contrast to compliance, we may view ingratiation as power-enhancing or dependence-reducing. By making himself attractive to the more powerful person, the more dependent person increases the value of his own sanctioning responses at the same time that he makes it more difficult for the powerful person to apply the full range of sanctions that were initially part of his repertory. In other words, as the dependent person becomes more attractive, the powerful person cannot punish him without greater cost to himself. This, in effect, means that his power has been reduced.

By what specific tactical means may the dependent person increase his attractiveness? Such tactics are undoubtedly as various as social behavior itself—there is an appealing and an unappealing way of doing almost everything. But I have found it particularly useful to consider three main classes of tactics available to the "ingratiator": compliments, agreement, and presentation of oneself in a favorable light. We may support and flatter others, convince them that we share their views, or present our characteristics in terms that they can appreciate. In this article, I single out agreement, or conformity of opinion, as the dependent variable of particular interest. The experiments reviewed all show how persons modify their publicly expressed opinions as a way of coping with a condition of social dependence.

First, however, it is appropriate to comment on some of the moral issues involved in the behavior we are studying. *Ingratiation*, like its sister term, *flattery*, is at least mildly pejorative in everyday usage. The word has connotations of dissimulation and deceit in social communication. Am I suggesting, then, that most of us are so concerned with the effects of our behavior on others that we deliberately engage in manipulative and deceitful tactics in order to gain their esteem? I do not know how one could ever obtain actuarial figures on this point, but I would argue—without great alarm—that all of us under appropriate circumstances do shape our social responses to increase our attractiveness to particular people. The scientific student of such response-shaping is unlikely to make much progress by interviews or naturalistic observation. In this particular area, I have learned through research experience that people are extremely likely to deceive themselves. Not only do they want to avoid publicizing the extent to which their responses to others are conditioned by approval-seeking motives, they work busily to protect themselves from awareness of the link between wanting to be liked and modifying one's behavior to this end. It is my current belief that only by comparing appropriate experimental and control treatments can we begin to explore the conditions favorable to the tactics of ingratiation and thus begin to specify the variables essential to construction of a theory concerning it. Questions of the frequency of occurrence and the extent of such behavior in the natural environment, and questions concerning individual differences, are not considered here.

The Ingratiator's Dilemma

Much of the fascination in studying ingratiation comes from the fact that the same situational factors that increase one person's desire to be found attractive by another alert the other (the "target" person) to the likelihood of tactical behavior. Thus, the dependent person will be strongly motivated to be ingratiating, but the fact that his dependence stands revealed reduces the likelihood that his overtures will be effective. His dilemma is magnified further by his natural reluctance to see himself as deceitful or manipulative. Thus, the more dependent he is on another, the more he will be forced to justify to himself any actions conceivably designed to curry favor with the other. These two factors—the target person's alertness to overtures from a dependent person and the dependent person's reluctance to see himself as one who uses manipulative social tactics—would seem almost to rule out ingratiating tactics in those very situations where it is important to be liked. Indeed, there is fairly good evidence that such tactics can boomerang; especially when the "actor" is highly dependent on the target person, the latter is apt to be more attracted to him if he shows some restraint in his praise or in the degree of his agreement. The results of three studies (*2*, *3*) show that, in the ambiguous area of social responses that may or may not make one seem attractive to another person, the role relation between the ingratiator and the target person is a critical factor which affects the latter's judgments of manipulative intentions or ulterior motivation.

To some extent, however, the ingratiator is protected by the vanity of the target person from having such judgments go against him. Each of us likes to believe the best about himself, and many of us must be exposed to the most blatant praise before we begin to suspect that we are the targets of manipulative intentions. Often, no doubt, the ingratiator joins his target in what might be called an autistic conspiracy, since, for understandable psychological reasons, both the ingratiator and the target person are anxious to believe that the latter is better than he is.

I now feel that this autistic conspiracy may be maintained by the most intricate interpersonal tactics—tactics designed to conceal from both the "tactician" and the target person the former's underlying intentions. Since I believe that not many of us deliberately and consciously calculate such tactical maneuvers, I am suggesting that, from well-learned orientations toward those more powerful than ourselves, we develop patterns of social behavior unwittingly designed to attract, while avoiding the extremes of sycophancy. Such extremes would reveal to both parties the true nature of the autistic conspiracy.

Let us turn now to four illustrative studies which involve agreement as the dependent variable, and which show a few of the subtleties of behavior whereby the ingratiator tries to resolve his dilemma.

Issue Relevance and Agreement

My central thesis thus far has been that dependence increases the motivation to make oneself seem attractive, but public knowledge of this dependence makes it more difficult to gain esteem through such simple strategems as slavish agreement or effusive compliments. In order to be successful, the ingratiator must complicate his tactics and inject some subtlety. One obvious way to increase subtlety is to convey the impression of agreeing in a discerning way. The ingratiator must steer between the Scylla of errant disagreement and the Charybdis of blatant conformity, conveying minor disagreement within the context of a general similarity of position. Beyond

this, if we know something about the social context in which opinions are being exchanged, it may be possible to specify the issues on which agreement is most likely and the issues on which moderate disagreement may be expected.

One important aspect of the social context is the relative difference in status between the two persons involved in the interchange. Status differences usually imply asymmetrical power, which is one of the preconditions for ingratiation tactics, as noted above. Jones, Gergen, and Jones (*3*) conducted an experiment in which freshmen and upper-classmen were used as subjects. Moreover, these subjects were recruited through a campus ROTC unit, and it was emphasized that their participation in the experiment was relevant to an investigation of leadership in the Navy. Thus the status differences already implied by differences in undergraduate class were reinforced by systematic reference to status differences within the ROTC unit itself; throughout the experiment, to remove any final doubt about the status discrepancy, the freshman was called "subordinate" and the upperclassman was called "commander."

After initial instructions, summarized below, members of each pair of high- and low-status subjects purportedly exchanged written messages concerning their opinions on a variety of issues. Each subject was seated in a private booth, and it was possible to intercept all outgoing communications and to control the information received by the subject. Each "message" the subject received was allegedly from the partner of different status, but in fact all subjects received the same written statements of opinion. Twelve such "messages" were received by each subject. He was asked to indicate, on the same message form, his own opinion on the issue in question, in the belief that the message form would then be "returned" to the partner. Nine of the twelve statements received were expressions of opinions highly discrepant from norms which had been established earlier in questioning an equivalent population. Our measure of conformity was the degree of discrepancy between the subject's "opinion," as recorded on the message form, and the class norm on that issue, if this discrepancy was in the direction of the opinion received. (It was assumed that the subject would have scored at or near his class norm in the absence of any social-influence pressures within the experiment.)

Crucial for our study is the fact that the 12 statements of opinion ("items") concerned three classes of subject matter, varying in their relevance to the basis of the hierarchy relating the high- and low-status partners. Three of the items concerned highly relevant Navy matters, such as whether Annapolis graduates should be given positions of authority over ROTC graduates of comparable seniority; three items concerned issues of intermediate relevance to the hierarchy—college courses, fraternities, and so on; a final set of items concerned miscellaneous general issues quite unrelated to the specific basis for the status differential. Thus, in applying the measure of conformity it was possible to gauge the degree of agreement between the received statement and the subject's expressed opinion in each of these three content areas.

Different pairs of subjects "exchanged messages" under different instructions, this difference being a major variable in the experiment. Members of some of the pairs were urged not to mislead each other and were told that the experiment was being conducted primarily to find whether people of different status could form accurate impressions of each other. (This instruction established the "control" condition.) The experimenter told subjects in the remaining pairs that the study was concerned with testing leadership potential. These subjects were told that attempts to develop leadership tests in real-life settings had foundered because commanders and subordinates had not always been initially compatible, and that the purpose of the study was to find whether "compatible groups provide a better setting in which to test leadership potential than do incompatible groups." (This instruction established the "ingratiation" condition.) The subjects were told that leadership tests would be given during drill periods later in the year. The purpose of the experimental session, they were told, was to determine the degree of compatibility of each pair of subjects of different status; each was told that his partner had expressed an initial preference for him, and he was urged by the experimenter to make a special effort to gain the liking and respect of the partner.

Now let us consider the psychological positions of the high- and low-status persons, especially in the ingratiation condition. Here, presumably, each would like to make himself attractive to the other, if only to avoid the embarrassment of ending up as a member of an incompatible pair. We would expect this desire to reflect itself in greater agreement in the ingratiation (as opposed to the control) condition. As Fig. 1 shows, this greater agreement was found: the level of conformity of opinion was significantly higher in the ingratiation condition for subjects in both low- and high-status groupings (for the moment I am disregarding the matter of item relevance). But it would be wrong to assume that the amount of agreement approached complete similarity of views, even in the ingratiation condition. The average subject typically moved about halfway between his initial ratings and the ratings on the bogus messages transmitted to him.

It is obvious from Fig. 1 that the issue under consideration and its relevance to the basis of the status hierarchy is an important determinant of the degree of conformity. Furthermore, it is clear that relevance has different effects on the responses of high- and low-status subjects. This difference may be plausibly related to the difference in their psychological positions. In our study, the high-status person is in the position of wanting to maintain his status, while at the same time showing the freshman that he is "approachable." It is not surprising that he resists changing his opinions on matters having to do with the Navy; after all, his higher relative status, emphasized by the experimental arrangements, is especially based on his more advanced standing in the ROTC. His rather high degree of agreement on the items not relevant to the hierarchy may be viewed as an overture manifesting his approachability. In fact the high-status subjects show more conformity on the items relating to miscellaneous matters than the low-status subjects do, although the difference is not significant.

The position of the low-status subject is different. He must make it perfectly clear that he has no intention of usurping the position of the potential leader, but he must also avoid slavish agreement, in view of his highly dependent position and the suspicions that such agreement might arouse. What better way to solve this problem than by deferring to the high-status

person's "expertise" on the Navy items and showing some spark of independence on the miscellaneous items? The result, in the ingratiation condition, is a pair of functions that are almost mirror images of each other.

This interpretation of the relation between relevance and social status is plausible and is in line with preexperimental prediction, but it is not forced upon us by the data; obviously, something approximating this relation obtains in the control condition too. It may be that differential conformity as a function of relevance and status has to do entirely with differences in experience or expertise between the partners of different status, and that the special pressures in the ingratiation condition do not bring out this particular pattern in response to strategic requirements.

Only future research can resolve this ambiguity, but certain conclusions relevant to our general proposition may be stated. If we assume that dependence is a function both of the ingratiation instructions and of the built-in differences in status, the subjects who are highest in dependence are those low-status subjects in the ingratiation condition, whereas the high-status subjects in the control condition are lowest in dependence. The former subjects are the most conforming, in general, and the latter subjects are least conforming. This is exactly what we would expect. But even the subjects who show the most conformity do not show uniform shifts from their initial opinions towards agreement with the received items; thus, whether intentionally or not, the variations from issue to issue must help protect the ingratiator from revealing his ulterior designs.



Fig. 1. Conformity as a function of status, experimental dependence, and issue relevance. *LS*, low status; *HS*, high status.

Optimum Conformity

A similar point is made by Jones and Jones (*4*). In their study, dependence was varied by fairly elaborate experimental staging, although in this instance the subjects were status peers. Here again, each subject, isolated in a private booth, ostensibly exchanged written opinions with another subject, and here again his responses were intercepted and a prepared set of opinions was delivered to him. These opinions, allegedly from the other subject (the "target" person), bore a systematic relation to prior opinion ratings made by the first subject in the classroom several weeks before the experiment began. In one condition (hereinafter called the "same" condition) the messages were so arranged that the subject's classroom opinions were "preempted" by the incoming statement; that is, the opinions expressed in the statements received from the target person were identical with those expressed several weeks earlier by the subject. In the second variation (the "discrepant" condition), the incoming statements expressed opinions 4 points removed, on a 12-point scale, from the subject's earlier opinion ratings. This means that, if all subjects held to their originally stated opinions, those in the "same" condition would present themselves as behaviorally conforming, while those in the "discrepant" condition would appear distinctly independent. The "same"-"discrepant" variation was cross-cut by the aforementioned variation in how much the subject was made to feel dependent on the target person.

In planning the experiment we reasoned that in the "discrepant" condition the subjects would show greater conformity in a relationship of high dependence than in one of low dependence—that in the low-dependence relation the subject would try to ingratiate himself through the tactic of agreeing without agreeing completely, thus avoiding the risk of being judged a manipulative conformist. Our prediction was confirmed; in the "discrepant" condition the highly dependent subjects ended up expressing views significantly closer to the opinions in the received statements than the less dependent subjects did. We also reasoned that in the "same" condition the highly dependent subjects would show less conformity than the less-dependent subjects in order to avoid the appearance of slavish agreement. We were thus reaching for a paradoxical effect of approval-seeking, expecting to find that highly dependent subjects in the "same" condition would depart from their previously expressed views to avoid the appearance of conformity. Unfortunately, we did not find this; under the "same" condition, neither the average highly dependent subject nor the less-dependent subject changed his expressed views to any marked degree.

However, there is some interesting evidence indicating that in the "same" condition the highly dependent subjects were in something of a dilemma. The average mentioned above in fact reflected the ratings of some subjects who conformed slavishly and of others who were quite independent. Thus, the variability of conformity scores was significantly higher, in the "same" condition, for highly dependent than for less-dependent subjects. Furthermore, those highly dependent subjects in the "same" condition who showed the greatest desire to be respected (as revealed in replies to a questionnaire after the experiment) tended to avoid the extremes of great conformity and nonconformity in favor of moderate agreement. A third finding was that highly dependent subjects in the "same" con-

dition expressed more confidence in their opinions than was found for any other combination of dependence and discrepancy. Also, only for the highly dependent subjects in the "same" condition was there a striking tendency for those who expressed agreement with the received statement to express greater confidence in the validity of their opinions than did those who indicated greater disagreement.

Thus it appears that subjects who were dependent on the target person, needing his approval, and whose own opinions were preempted by the incoming statements supposedly from the target person, showed evidence of conflict and attempted to find ways of convincing the target person of their sincere agreement with his views. In part they tried to accomplish this by striking for optimum conformity with his opinions. In part they tried to resolve the conflict by making adroit use of the opportunity to rate the degree of confidence they felt in their own opinions. A plausible interpretation of the correlation between high conformity and the subject's professed high confidence in his opinions (a correlation found only for highly dependent subjects under the "same" condition) is that subjects who are concerned that they may have shown too much agreement can attempt, through professing high confidence in their opinions, to convince the target person of their autonomy in the agreement process. Those who are concerned that they may have shown too much disagreement can soften the impact of this disagreement by professing little confidence in the validity of their opinions. There was also evidence (not discussed, because of limitations of space) that, in the "same" condition, the highly dependent subjects tried to find ways to avoid any awareness that they had agreed with the partner from any motive of wishing to gain approval.

Self-Protective Conformity

The two studies discussed have shown, then, that the highly dependent person will try to complicate his conformity of expressed opinion in order to conceal any underlying intent to be ingratiating. Another form of complication is clearly revealed in a recent study by Davis and Florquist (*5*). These investigators were especially interested in studying the possibilities of conformity as a response to a threatening target person. The experiment was set in the context of a training experience. Each subject (all were female undergraduates) appeared for the experiment and saw that another subject was also there. Each was informed that she would be given extra credit in her psychology course for assisting in the preparation and analysis of data from a large experiment. As part of her assistantship duties she was to learn how to operate certain IBM equipment under the tutelage of the experimenter. When the supervisor-experimenter took the two subjects into a room containing an IBM key punch, one of the subjects was selected to undergo training first, while the other was given an elementary board-wiring task. Actually, the subject selected for key-punch training was an accomplice of the supervisor, and both had been carefully trained to play standardized roles during the "training session." Since the subject's task required little concentration, she could readily observe the "training" across the room. As the training of the accomplice proceeded, the supervisor played one of two roles: either he was irascible, supercilious, and contemptuous of the accomplice, criticizing her errors in an emotional manner (the "emotional" condition), or he was relatively helpful and matter-of-fact (the "stable" condition).

As in the experiments previously discussed, this comparison was cross-cut by another variation in the degree to which the subject was dependent on the supervisor. In the "high-dependence" condition, it was stressed that the subject would be expected to return for two additional training and data-analysis sessions, and the supervisor made it clear that he himself was going to rate the quality of her performance, a rating which would constitute 15 percent of her course grade. In the "no-dependence" condition the original supervisor was called away after training the accomplice and stating his opinions (see below), and it was made clear that the subject would be working with another supervisor (*6*).

Now, we may ask, how was conformity of opinion measured in this situation? After the accomplice had received her training (under the "emotional" or the "stable" supervisor) it was clearly pointed out to the subject that she would be trained in the use of the key punch during the next session. The supervisor then gave each girl a copy of a 20-item opinion questionnaire that was supposedly in use on the project for which she was being trained. He suggested that she fill out the questionnaire in order to become familiar with it. Before she began, however, he commented, "As you can see, there is only one sensible answer for some questions; for others, there is more room for disagreement." He then read the first five items and gave his alleged opinion, backed up with brief arguments. On three of these items he clearly deviated from college norms. On each of the three items, furthermore, he presented certain arguments supporting his opinions. Three of the remaining 15 items were clearly related to the arguments expressed by the supervisor. Thus it was possible to derive two different measures of conformity: one, a direct measure of agreement on opinions explicitly endorsed by the supervisor; the other, a more indirect measure of agreement with certain arguments or premises which had formed a part of his supporting statements.

In planning the experiment, Davis and Florquist had reasoned that the threatening or emotional manner of the supervisor would have radically different implications for conformity, as a function of the degree to which the subject was dependent on him. Specifically, they predicted that highly dependent subjects would agree more with the emotional than with the stable supervisor, and that independent subjects would agree more with the stable than with the emotional supervisor. The highly dependent subject would agree with the emotional person in the interest of self-protection, to decrease the likelihood that she would later be ridiculed and embarrassed by the supervisor. In the "no-dependence" condition, the investigators reasoned, agreement would be prompted by belief in the credibility of the information source and would not be professed as a protective maneuver. The stable supervisor was in fact seen as more able and intelligent and as less dogmatic and opinionated than the emotional supervisor.

Direct measures of agreement with the supervisor on the five items referred to above showed no important variations that could be attributed to the experimental conditions. On the other hand, the predictions were rather well supported when the second, more

indirect, measure of conformity was used. These results are presented in Table 1. When dependence is high there is more agreement with the implied views of the emotional supervisor than with those of the stable supervisor. When dependence is low, the converse is true.

It is interesting to speculate on why the results confirmed the predictions only for the indirect measure of conformity. Davis and Florquist feel (and this is quite in line with my present argument) that tactical conformity shows itself only in the indirect measure because agreeing with someone's premises while disagreeing moderately with his conclusions is a more subtle form of ingratiation than slavishly endorsing the conclusions he directly advocates. In addition, the subject's own picture of himself should again be considered. Presumably, if he resists the inclination to agree on issues on which he is openly invited to conform, he may continue to see himself as autonomous and able to resist the self-protective urge to curry favor by agreeing with a threatening target person.

Table 1. (Scores means and standard deviations) showing degree of indirect conformity on 3 items (see text). The higher the score, the greater the agreement with the supervisor's arguments. Interaction $t=3.67$, $p < .001$.

Dependence	Subjects (No.)	Mean score	Standard deviation
	"Stable" supervisor		
None	6	19.83	5.71
High	12	16.42	4.34
	"Emotional" supervisor		
None	6	14.50	6.57
High	10	23.30	2.54

Vulnerability of the Target Person

Another way to phrase the central argument of this article is to say that the tendency to try to be ingratiating is a function both of the incentive (that is, of the degree of the "actor's" dependence on the target person) and of the probability that the attempt will be successful. In the last study to be discussed, my colleagues and I (*7*) attempted to vary the perceived likelihood of success by varying the alleged personal characteristics of the target person. We predicted that tactics of agreeing would be tried only when the ingratiator had something to gain from the target person and at least a fair prospect of gaining it through agreement. If the target person allegedly places high value on agreement and cooperation, this should serve as an "invitation" to conformity, since he is unlikely to interpret agreement as stemming from manipulative intentions.

In this study (*7*) male college students were invited to participate in a "business game" in which they were to serve as subordinates to a supervisor presented to them as a graduate student in business administration. The supervisor would decide the correctness of the subject's solutions (thereby determining how much money the subject would win or lose), but he had varying degrees of freedom in reaching this decision. In one experimental condition it was clear that the supervisor was "closed-to-influence"—he had worked out the problem solutions in advance and would be simply matching the subject's attempts at solution against the predetermined "correct" answer. In the experimental condition for the remaining subjects, the supervisor was much more "open-to-influence"—he was free to determine, from problem to problem, whether the subject was correct, and had not worked out the solutions beforehand. Before the game was actually played, the subject was asked to work some practice problems to get the "feel" of the task confronting him. By rigging the results, the experimenter made it clear to each subject that he had done very poorly, promoting the inference that he would probably do quite poorly at the game itself (where monetary stakes and his prestige were involved).

After the practice game, the experimenter proposed that the subject and the supervisor communicate with each other in order to get acquainted before the real game began. (This, it was suggested, would make the game more realistic, since workers and supervisors do interact over coffee, in the lunch room, and so on.) During this get-acquainted session, a second independent variable was introduced, and our measure of conformity was obtained. The subject and the supervisor were stationed in separate rooms during the crucial interchange. Through a speaker in his room the subject "overheard" the experimenter interview the supervisor. What he heard was in fact one of two standardized tape recordings. On one recording, played to approximately half the subjects, the supervisor presented himself as especially interested in the "human" side of business. In his comments he stressed such factors as the spirit of cooperation, the importance of getting along with others, considerateness, and understanding; we shall call him supervisor S (for solidarity). On the other recording, the supervisor emphasized quality and quantity of job performance above all else; we shall call him supervisor P (for productivity). Our intent was to vary the alleged characteristics of the target person in such a way that the tactical use of agreement would be invited (supervisor S) or discouraged (supervisor P) in the "open-to-influence" condition. We expected this variation to have little or no impact in the "closed-to-influence" condition.

Table 2. Degree of conformity of opinion: scores indicating change of opinion toward the alleged position of the supervisor; the higher the score, the greater the tendency to agree with the supervisor. For each subject, each of 20 items was scored +1 when the subject moved from his original position toward the "position" of the supervisor, and zero when he did not. Interaction $t=2.25$, $p < .05$. *S*, "solidarity"; *P*, "productivity."

Supervisor	Subjects (No.)	Mean score	Standard deviation
	"Open-to-influence"		
S	9	8.9	1.6
P	10	6.7	1.9
	"Closed-to-influence"		
S	10	6.9	2.0
P	10	7.6	2.4

Conformity was measured by the now-familiar method of a bogus "exchange of notes." After listening to the supervisor being interviewed, the subject "exchanged views" with the supervisor on a variety of issues. Before expressing an opinion, the subject always received the corresponding "opinion" of the supervisor; through careful arrangement the received statements differed systematically from the opinions initially expressed by the subject on a classroom questionnaire. The degree of conformity was scored by noting, for each item on which there was a planned discrepancy, whether or not the subject had moved from his initial position toward the alleged position of the supervisor. If he had, a score of 1 was assigned for that item; otherwise no score was assigned. When these values were summed across items for each subject, the results came out as shown in Table 2. Here it may be seen that our theoretical predictions were quite nicely confirmed: conform-

ity is greatest when it is at least possible to affect the target person's disposition to reward or punish by currying favor with him, and when he seems to value accommodation and agreement in general.

Another aspect of these results deserves comment. While, with the "open-to-influence" condition, subjects tend to agree more with S than with P, as predicted, with the "closed-to-influence" condition there is a smaller, reverse difference: subjects tend to agree more with P than with S. This is reminiscent of the results obtained by Davis and Florquist (see Table 1) who predicted and obtained more conformity with the "opinions" of the stable supervisor than with those of the emotional supervisor in the "no-dependence" condition. The emotional supervisor perhaps is analogous to S in the experiment just discussed, because his credibility as an informed communicator is relatively low. Therefore, when there is no prospect of influencing the supervisor (the "closed-to-influence" conditions), and, when the subject has no reason for agreeing with the supervisor other than that he respects his judgment, he tends to agree more with P than with S. This parallels the subject's tendency to agree more with the stable supervisor than with the emotional supervisor in the "no-dependence" condition of the Davis and Florquist experiment. The major finding, however, is that in both experiments the subject expresses most agreement with the (presumably) least-respected supervisor—the most feared or the most gullible—when the incentives for trying to win approval are high.

Summary

I have discussed four experiments concerned with the use of agreement as a tactic of ingratiation—as a means of currying favor with a more powerful individual. These experiments show that the subtleties of human interaction are amenable to controlled experimental research, and they reveal some of the specific tactical maneuvers likely to be employed by those in a position of contrived social dependence. I have emphasized the "ingratiator's" dilemma, pointing out that dependence makes ingratiation tactics less likely to succeed. In each of the four experiments, it can be argued, this dilemma is resolved by some mixture of agreement and disagreement, a mixture designed to reduce the target person's suspicions and to protect the "actor" from acknowledging his tactics to himself.

In the first experiment, agreement was seen to be a joint function of the status of the subject and the relevance of the issue to the status hierarchy. Agreement was neither uniform nor slavish, but high-status subjects conformed more on irrelevant items and low-status subjects conformed more on relevant ones. In the second experiment, the subject reduced the danger of being judged an opportunistic conformist by a tactical rating of his confidence in the validity of his own opinions. His disagreements with the supposed views of the target person were softened by public expressions of low confidence in his own views when he was highly dependent on a target individual whose alleged opinions were very close to his own. In a third experiment, dependent subjects avoided conformity on issues openly endorsed by a threatening target person but tended to agree with the latter's supporting arguments. In the last experiment reported, subtlety was reflected in the decision to conform only when the target person seemed likely to appreciate agreement. The research reported is obviously no more than a first step toward understanding the complexities of strategy in interpersonal behavior.

References and Note

1. E. E. Jones, *Ingratiation* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1964), p. 11.
2. ———, R. G. Jones, K. J. Gergen, *J. Personality* **31**, 436 (1963); H. Dickoff, thesis, Duke University (1961).
3. E. E. Jones, K. J. Gergen, R. G. Jones, *Psychol. Monographs* **77**, No. 566 (1963).
4. R. G. Jones and E. E. Jones, *J. Personality* **32**, 436 (1964).
5. K. E. Davis and C. C. Florquist, *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.*, in press.
6. In the original experiment a third condition of moderate dependence was also included. Consideration of this condition is omitted here because of space limitations.
7. E. E. Jones, K. J. Gergen, P. Gumpert, J. W. Thibaut, *J. Personality Soc. Psychol.*, in press.
8. Most of this work was supported by a NSF grant.