ized libraries complementing each other and linked by advanced communications techniques; facsimile transmission is an example of a currently feasible procedure.

At present, Linda Hall is not "automated," and while space for a computer has been provided in a million-dollar annex opened earlier this month, it is clear that the library is biding its time until the state of the art has advanced and the cost has come down.

In its first two decades Linda Hall has served not only as the local and regional facility envisioned in the trustees' original plans but as a national and international facility as well. The quality of a library will to some extent be determined by the demands of its clientele, and Linda Hall from the outset seems to have set its sights on meeting big-league standards.

Linda Hall "business" is estimated as being about 60 percent national and international and 40 percent local. The growth of technically based industry in the area and the conversion of the University of Kansas City to a state university promises to place heavier local and regional demands on the library.

Under an original agreement with the U.K.C., Linda Hall acquired the university's science and technology collection, except for textbooks and basic reference works, and has served as the university's science research library. This arrangement will continue, but graduate education and research in the sciences at the university, which has been essentially an undergraduate college with a penumbra of professional schools, will increase sharply.

It would be misleading to say that the Linda Hall Library has grown up in a sort of technological vacuum, since the number of high-technology industries in Kansas City has shown a steady if not spectacular rise since the war, and a local patron and ally of Linda Hall has been the Midwest Research Institute, which is located literally down the hill from Linda Hall. (The institute, which was established at about the same time as Linda Hall and for many of the same reasons, will be discussed in a later article.)

The library has recently handsomely banished its space problem for at least the next several years. The first library building, which cost $1.25 million and was opened in 1957, was planned to handle growth for an estimated 20 years and to a half-million volumes. But with the collection at 300,000 volumes, a million-dollar wing, devoted mostly to storage, was deemed necessary and was dedicated early this month. The Hall mansion was razed to make room for it.

A staff of 50 operates the library, but many of these are college students who work part time. Only 25 are full-time employees. Eight of these are professionals, which leads some observers to wonder if the sound administrative principle of leanness may not be slightly overdone at Linda Hall.

Other criticism of Linda Hall seems to be rare in Kansas City. This visitor found nobody objecting to Linda Hall's national and international activities. So, by astute management, high-mindedness, hard-headedness, or a series of accidents, or more likely, a combination of these, Kansas City has one of the institutions needed to support its aspirations to scientific and technical growth.—JOHN WALSH

National Teach-In: Professors, Debating Viet Nam, Question Role of Scholarship in Policy-Making

Another block fell out of the ivory tower of the academic world last weekend with the national debut of a phenomenon that has recently affected dozens of university campuses—the "teach-in." Whether the National Teach-In that took place in Washington on 15 May was, as its program asserted, "perhaps the most significant political gathering of American intellectuals since the Constitutional Convention" is an arguable question. But there can be no doubt that the all-day, nearly all-night sessions on American policy in Viet Nam which involved over 3000 individuals in Washington and thousands of others in coordinated activities at campuses around the country reflect a new spirit of political concern among university faculties. And there is some evidence that the existence of university groups concerned with foreign policy, if not necessarily the proposals of such groups, have begun attracting attention in Washington.

The teach-in movement began at the University of Michigan in March, following the government's adoption of the policy of bombing in North Viet Nam. The original idea was to stage a 1-day faculty work stoppage or strike. But this proposal aroused so much opposition—even among those faculty members who favored making some kind of protest—that it was quickly dropped. And, out of what one of the organizers—a group of faculty members centered chiefly in the social sciences—described as "interminable tactical discussions," the idea of the teach-in came along to replace it. "We wanted to combine the idea of protest with some form of constructive action," Marshal Sahlins, Michigan anthropologist who is credited with inventing the idea, said in an interview with *Science*. "Basically we felt that it was too important to be shunted off to a convenient moment, such as the weekend; we wanted to show that we felt strongly enough to be willing to give something up." As it turned out, what they gave up was sleep: the teach-in became an occasion where, from dusk to dawn, faculty and students would meet in university buildings for lectures and seminars on topics ranging from the broad outlines of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia to the validity of the "domino theory."

The movement spread with astonishing rapidity to other university campuses. How many teach-ins there have been is impossible to ascertain precisely because the movement has proceeded without central coordination. Those who are finicky about definitions run into the additional problem that not all the vents billed as teach-ins have included the all-night feature that some regard as its essential ingredient. But there are reported to have been between 30 and 50 authentically sleepless demonstrations. And there have also been dozens of sessions in which the participants trailed home around midnight. At some large universities, such as Michigan, the number of participants has exceeded 3000.

The transplantation of the teach-in from Michigan to other campuses appears to have been largely spontaneous, though to a certain extent it seems to have been facilitated by that network of personalities that links members of academia throughout the country. Members of the faculty at Michigan called their friends at other institutions and urged them to go and do likewise; they in turn called their friends; and the movement rolled on.

On 17 April, less than a month after the Michigan teach-in, a meeting of faculty members from the University of Chicago, M.I.T., Washington University, Wayne State, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Michigan was held at Ann Arbor, and the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Viet Nam was formed.

It was supported also by an older university group known as the Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace, and it has since been joined by representatives of additional institutions. It was the new committee (known briefly as the IUC), centered around a core of energetic faculty members at Michigan, that sponsored and organized the National Teach-In last week.

The format of the National Teach-In differed from that of the campus actions. Throughout the country the events were typically staged largely as protests against the administration's position, not as debates with administration spokesmen. "The administration can present its case through all the mass media all the time," one of the Michigan organizers commented. "We regarded as bizarre the suggestion that they needed to be given equal time." In planning for the National Teach-In, however, this policy was altered.

The organizers' initial intent was to invite an administration spokesman to address the audience, then submit to questioning from a panel made up of academicians who, it was generally assumed, would probably be hostile to the administration's views. This plan was relinquished when it was discovered that, although the administration might agree to a debate, it would not submit to an academic inquisition. The sponsors, whose negotiations were proceeding with McGeorge Bundy, former Harvard dean and professor of government who is Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs, then proposed a debate between two sets of panelists, one representing the academic community, the second representing the government. This format was also vetoed by Bundy on the ground that it created the erroneous impression that the entire academic community was uniformly opposed to the Viet Nam war.

Finally a format was devised that seemed acceptable to everyone: Bundy would debate a critic of U.S. policy in Viet Nam, but both the government and the opposition would be supported by teams of panelists drawn from the academic community, with the government retaining veto power over the participants. This power was exercised on at least two occasions, when Bundy indicated unwillingness to debate with the first choice of the teach-in sponsors, Hans Morgenthau, an influential academic critic of the administration from the University of Chicago; he also scotched suggestions that he debate with Wayne Morse, the Democratic senator from Oregon, who is the administration's most vociferous congressional critic. The individual finally accepted as Bundy's antagonist was George Kahin, an expert on Southeast Asia, from Cornell University.

Although Bundy's appearance was to be the leading event, the administration also agreed to participate—on the same terms—in other activities of the teach-in, including eight evening seminars on topics such as Chinese expansionism, U.S. military policy, and the political and moral consequences of American policy. For these debates with professors the administration also contributed some high officials, including the State Department's W. W. Rostow, head of the Policy Planning Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary William Jorden.

With the apparent support of the administration, the stage was prepared for a spectacular confrontation between academic dissenters and government policy makers in which the government would not be speaking from the unassailable fortress of television and the dissenters would not be issuing unrefuted attacks, but the two sides would be directly accessible to each other in responsible debate. On these terms the organizers recruited an impressive list of between 12,000 and 15,000 sponsors, including some exceedingly prominent representatives of academia. In general, support appeared to be concentrated in the social sciences and the humanities. But it included also Nobel prizewinners Hans Bethe, Felix Bloch, and Albert Szent-Györgyi, physicists Ragnar Rollefson and Philip Morrison, biologists Salvadore Luria and Hudson Hoagland, botanist Barry Commoner, psychologist B. F. Skinner, and many other scientists.

Essentially the day went pretty much as planned. Between 3000 and 5000 individuals were present at various times at the Washington hotel where the teach-in was held. Another hundred thousand at campuses around the country where the speeches and seminars were piped in over A.T. & T. wires joined the teach-in in spirit if not bodily, by staging simultaneous meetings of their own. The day's proceedings, which began at 9 a.m. and ended around midnight, were carried live on educational television, and portions of it appeared on commercial TV as well. Press coverage was remarkably heavy. But—there was one surprise. Bundy, whose promised appearance was the basis for most of the intellectual excitement as well as for the extensive interest from the press, failed to appear. He was replaced as key pro-administration speaker by Berkeley political science professor Robert Scalapino, who was originally supposed to be a member of the panel supporting Bundy. Speculation about the reasons for Bundy's absence (which many suggested was intended as an affront to the gathering) have now been partially answered by the revelation in the Monday papers that at about the time he was scheduled to appear Bundy was involved in preparation for a secret high-level mission to the Dominican Republic. On the other hand it must be said that he failed to send a replacement, which he might have done, and that, further, in a brief statement which he did send to the meeting, he indicated some of the problems which had troubled the administration about the teach-in. In this statement Bundy said:

> . . . I wholly disagree with those who have argued that it is inappropriate for a Government official to take part in a discussion of this kind. It may be true—although I have no firsthand knowledge—that some of your meetings on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards appropriate to university and college discussion. It may also be true—and I have thought so once or twice myself—that a few of those who feel strongly about the situation in Vietnam have been more interested in pressure upon the Administration than in fair discussion with its representatives. But the preliminary arrangements for this particular meeting . . . have been fair to a fault. . . . Members of the academic community and members of the Administration share a deep interest in the encouragement of such fair and open discussion.
>
> It has been argued that debate of this kind should be avoided because it can give encouragement to the adversaries of our country. There is some ground for this argument. . . . The Chinese will continue to pretend—and perhaps in part to believe—that American policy is weaker because 700 faculty members have made a protest against our policy in Vietnam. The American people—whatever their opinions—know better. They know that those who are protesting are only a minority—indeed a small minority—of American teachers and students. . . .

What many evidently took to be the lecturing tone of Bundy's remarks was greeted with some indignation by the audience. Representatives of the teach-in committee also took exception to his assertion that supporters of the teach-in represented a minority, and they were particularly puzzled by his use of the number 700, which they felt had no relation to reality. "The truth is," one committee spokesman said later, "we

don't know how much of the academic community we represent—and neither does the administration. But we do know that more than 1200 faculty members have expressed support by giving us money; that many, many more have expressed an interest in our work; and that when it came time for recruiting individuals to appear on the panels, it was far, far harder to find people willing to support the administration than to find people willing to oppose it."

Underlying the support for the teach-in movement, which is widespread regardless of the actual numbers, appear to be two principal factors. The first, quite plainly, is dissatisfaction in the academic community with the substance of U.S. policy in Viet Nam. That it exists, and that the administration is concerned about it, is testified to by the recent hasty organization of government "truth teams" led by a State Department officer to visit colleges and universities around the country. Some of the individuals involved in the teach-in feel that in the absence of significant opposition to Johnson's policies on the part of Congress or the press, criticism from the academic community has played a key role in encouraging the administration to stress its interest in negotiations, as in Johnson's recent speech at Johns Hopkins; some imaginative individuals have also suggested (they admit, without evidence) that the timing of the announcement of the decision to halt the bombings of North Viet Nam with the occurrence of the teach-in may not have been entirely coincidental.

The second factor encouraging the protests appears to be a deepening estrangement of the Johnson administration from many segments of the intellectual community, including many who supported the President in the election campaign. The sense of estrangement appears to have dual roots. In the first place, teach-in supporters, however disparate their political views, seem to share a feeling that the administration has been formulating and carrying out its Viet Nam policies in an undemocratic way. A statement issued last weekend asserts:

> A teach-in becomes necessary because of the way policy has been made, in private counsels beyond the reach of public debate, either in Congress or elsewhere; and then, the way consensus has been demanded, as an unquestioning acquiescence to higher authority. In all probability the academic community would not have risen in dissent had it not been provoked by the government's attempt to manipulate a consensus, to rally the people around a dubious rationale of escalation by the latest techniques of Madison Avenue. It is not just "democracy" in Southeast Asia that has been put at stake—it is democracy in America.

In addition, many faculty members, remembering their respectful treatment by John F. Kennedy, feel that they have gotten some extremely rough handling by members of the administration in recent months. One irritant was a speech by Secretary of State Dean Rusk criticizing the critics of U.S. policy. "I sometimes wonder," Rusk said, "at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—and especially to learn to think." (One speaker drew applause at the teach-in when, referring to the administration's White Paper on Viet Nam, he said it made him wonder about the "gullibility of Secretaries of State.") Also important in antagonizing some members of the academic community was an exceedingly acid exchange of letters between Bundy and a group of professors at Washington University in St. Louis. The professors, inviting Bundy to speak, adopted a tone which suggested that they demanded an accounting from the administration, and which seemed to offend Bundy mightily. His reply, however, which received considerable attention in the press and in academic circles, seemed equally calculated to provoke them. "I cannot honestly tell you," Bundy wrote, "that I think your letter reflects great credit on its authors, either as a piece of propaganda or as a serious effort to engage in discussion. . . ." Bundy continued:

> I find strange your assumption that a public official is somehow especially accountable to the profession in which he worked before coming to the Government. I have supposed that Government officials were supposed to work for all of the American people, and that a businessman was not especially accountable to business circles, a man from labor to the unions, or a professor to university people. The premise from which you appear to be working is that of the corporative state, and I myself do not find Mussolini a sound guide to the principles of public service. There is no reason why I should be especially accountable to you, even on the uncertain assumption that you are truly representative of the academic community. . . . If your letter came to me for grading as a professor of Government, I would not be able to give it high marks.

Not all the supporters of the teach-in movement share equally the feeling of alienation from the government that appears to characterize key segments of its leadership. But there does seem to be a growing search in academic circles for a way to fuse intellectual responsibility with political commitment. The program of the teach-in, for example, described it as a "*necessary* [underlining in original] extension of the intellectual's responsibility as a teacher and seeker of truth." How much the professors' new interest in politics owes to a similarly rising fervor among their students is hard to say; the initiative for the teach-in movement and its organization rested entirely with faculty members. But professors involved with teach-ins on various campuses report that a consequence of the teach-ins, while not a cause, was a renewed sense of community between faculty and students.

Bundy's absence from the teach-in did nothing to further discussion of the underlying issues of the relationship between government and scholarship. And not even the willing cooperation of other administration representatives in the rest of the teach-in program could quell the rising uneasiness of the professors about the administration's attitude toward them. Bundy's role in the teach-in had two important consequences, nonetheless. By consenting to appear, he gave the movement a significance and a legitimacy it could not otherwise have acquired. And by failing to appear he gave a new lease on life not only to the Inter-University Committee organizing the teach-in but to the idea of open debate between intellectuals and policy makers. The Inter-University Committee has already telegraphed Bundy an invitation to appear on national television with a panel representing the committee "to discuss the administration's position on Viet Nam and respond to the criticism of administration policy which has been expressed within the academic community." Whether Bundy will agree to appear, will refuse, or will merely enter into another series of negotiations that could end in a similar anticlimax, it is, of course, impossible to guess. But it is plain that the professors are serious in their attempt to assert the relevance of academic expertise to government policy makers, that they have attracted an astonishing amount of attention and have succeeded in unifying hitherto disparate movements on many campuses, and that their impulse to continue flexing their political muscles is very strong indeed.—ELINOR LANGER