Package Deals and International Negotiations

The function of diplomacy, it has been said, is to find a firm basis for agreement or for disagreement. It is unfortunate when diplomatists, through lack of skill or perseverance or through plain bad luck, fail to detect and define an interest shared by the countries they represent. It is tragic when the missed opportunity opens the way to unnecessary war. But diplomatists can err in the opposite direction, too. They may fail to detect and define a fundamental disagreement and thus blind their governments to the need for timely action to protect the jeopardized interest. They may even, to paraphrase General Bradley, lead their countries to preserve the wrong peace in the wrong place at the wrong time.

How Nations Negotiate (Harper and Row, New York, 1964. 288 pp., $5.95) is an attempt to codify negotiating behavior and to construct an operational code for 20th-century diplomatists. As the author, Fred Charles Iklé, is careful to acknowledge, he follows a path blazed by Nathan Leites in his studies of Soviet leaders and French politicians. If Iklé does not quite tell how *nations* negotiate, he does have a great deal to say about how diplomatists behave. He offers more, for the book is not only analytical and descriptive, but also prescriptive. He is not content to describe negotiating behavior and to give each kind of negotiator the high or low marks that he believes are warranted. He goes on to develop negotiating precepts, particularly for Western negotiators whom he finds sometimes needlessly inhibited in their past treating with the Russians. If, to reverse the Clausewitz dictum, policy is war by other means, this is sound advice.

It may be sound anyway, for a promise is no substitute for performance; and a few short-lived phrases in a communiqué, hinting at a thaw in the cold war, are no substitute for agreed solutions to conflicts or for concessions of substance. In this connection, Iklé shrewdly comments on the asymmetry of a summit negotiation in which the consequence of failure is more serious for the side that must give a public accounting if it returns home empty-handed. (Are there circumstances under which spotlighted negotiations in the United Nations may be similarly asymmetrical?)

Iklé makes explicit what has often been only implicit. With *How Nations Negotiate* at his elbow, a self-conscious diplomatist may be encouraged to make a fresh appraisal of his own and his country's negotiating techniques. Such a diplomatist may sometimes, however, have difficulty recognizing himself or any negotiations in which he has participated. Perhaps, he has unknowingly been making "the continual threefold choice" (chapter 5)—to take what is offered, to keep on talking, or to pick up his marbles and go home—but he may see this as more like breathing than like choosing, as an involuntary continuing calculation inherent in any negotiating process, which is hardly better understood by being given an unfamiliar name.

The book is likely to have a more important if less immediate impact of another kind. However much it may or may not prove useful as a manual, it is filled with researchable hypotheses. The hypotheses, moreover, are in an area where there is a dearth of either theoretical or practical studies.

Diplomatic historians, however brilliant and invaluable their reconstructions of the critical negotiations of the most celebrated diplomatists, are not disposed to make generalizations that they test rigorously by comparative and quantitative methods. Publicists writing about the national interest have shown more concern with the goals than with the techniques of diplomacy. International lawyers have made elaborate studies of the rights and duties of diplomats without systematically relating these to the nations' shared interest in having diplomacy so conducted that governments help each other behave rationally and thereby avoid conflicts that serve the purposes of none of them. By failing to see, or at any rate to act on the perception, that "organized interstate relations" is a unity, the student of international organization may have studied the institutions of multilateral organization more and those of bilateral negotiation less than would be necessary to make optimum use of either. Finally, although one need not accept the claim made on the dust jacket that "this book studies the strategies and tactics of negotiation with the same precision that has heretofore been devoted to the science of war," one can agree that there has not been a Clausewitz of modern diplomacy. Neither is there any "Study of Diplomacy" comparable to Quincy Wright's comprehensive *Study of War*, nor any pioneering "Makers of Modern Diplomacy" analogous to *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Edward Mead Earle two decades ago. (*The Diplomats*, edited by two of Earle's collaborators, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, admirably fills this latter need for the inter-war period.)

One Iklé precept illustrates the need for systematic verification and refinement (p. 223): "The time to propose a package deal is when your opponent fears that he may not get his way on an issue of particular interest to him unless he concedes you something in return." The one illustration given, an allegedly missed bet at the Potsdam Conference, is fair enough; but one swallow does not make a summer, particularly a swallow that never flew. And why could one not with equal plausibility assert that the time to propose a package deal is when the negotiator fears that his side will not get its way on a matter of importance, unless it concedes to the opponent something of slight value to one's own nation but of apparently great value to the opponent? These two plausible propositions taken together suggest that international agreements, like most other forms of contract, depend on a "package deal" in which each negotiator takes home something believed to be more valuable than what he brought.

Is it a "package deal" if one side makes a last-minute demand in an attempt to take advantage of the other's presumed greater eagerness to reach agreement? Fatigue, exasperation, and "adjournment fever" no doubt in-

fluence the outcome of negotiations, whether those negotiations are between representatives of sovereign states or between representatives of less august entities.

Common sense tells us that agreement depends on package in which there is something appealing to both sides; it also tells us that the side that "plays it cool" may extract some last-minute short-run advantage. What common sense does not tell us is whether to propose the package early or late, or to propose it by stages; nor does it tell us how to calculate the hidden costs of success in last-minute demands. It is at this level that the theorist searches for discriminating explanations and the practitioner for precepts. A more detailed investigation on a narrower front will be required to satisfy either.

Iklé's "rules of accommodation" (chapter 7) similarly invite further research to demonstrate when they have or have not been observed, and are or are not likely to be observed. Beyond that, if the objective is to promote more rational negotiating behavior, we need to know what are the benefits and what the penalties that flow from conformity to these rules of accommodation, and whether there are particular circumstances in which conformity is especially profitable or unprofitable.

Only on the last page of his excellent "bibliographic note" (pp. 256–264) does the author comment on the parallels and contrasts between labor-management bargaining and interstate negotiating. Had he pushed his analysis further at this point, Iklé might have wanted to deal explicitly with the question of which characteristics of diplomatic negotiations are inherent in any bargaining process, which are peculiar to bargaining among sovereign states, and finally, which are novel features of interstate bargaining in our time.

Obviously more can be done to codify the styles of negotiating behavior of different countries. How often, for example, does a particular opponent invent some new issue for trade-off purposes, once public expectations of a détente have been aroused? How regularly does he withhold significant concessions until one begins to pack one's bags? On these questions, too, the impressions of astute participant-observers, valuable as they are, need to be supplemented by systematic investigation.

During the period in which *How Nations Negotiate* germinated, Iklé was associated with three of the leading American groups concerned with research on international relations—at the RAND Corporation; at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, under whose auspices the book was written; and at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is now a professor. All three groups must have been greatly invigorated by this fresh attack on a neglected field of inquiry.

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Exploration and Exploitation

Islands in Space: The Challenge of the Planetoids. Dandridge M. Cole and Donald W. Cox. Chilton, Philadelphia, 1964. xii + 276 pp. Illus. $6.95.

This is an irritating book. It is irritating because of the use of the word *planetoid*, the least widely used of all the terms invented to name the objects that have orbits between Mars and Jupiter. It is irritating because of the unnecessary and gratuitous attack made on astronomers in general because some astronomers have outspoken opinions about the present goals of our national space program with which the authors disagree. The "journalese" science, the florid rhetoric, and the exhortations with which the book is filled are irritating. It is irritating to read the suggestion that an implausible hypothesis (Shklovsky's idea that the inner satellite of Mars is artificial) that has not been proved needs to be disproved.

Apart from the irritations that I have mentioned, there is quite a bit of interesting material in the book. The historical material, particularly in chapters 2 and 5, seems to be correct for the most part. However, a statement (p. 39) implies that the minor planet program carried on under my direction at Indiana University terminated in 1954, but that program is in fact still going on, undiminished, at the present time.

The more controversial parts of the book, such as the discussion of capturing and mining minor planets, are given far too many pages and printed words, with the result that a potentially interesting subject becomes dull. The unnecessarily large number of quotations and footnotes seems to be an attempt to make the book appear scholarly, and this is a mistake. This criticism does not apply, however, to the quotations given at the beginning of the different chapters. In particular, one would like to know the time, the place, and the circumstances that led Lyndon B. Johnson to make the very interesting statement quoted on page 122:

> Someday, we will be able to bring an asteroid containing billions of dollars worth of critically needed metals close to earth to provide a vast source of mineral wealth for our factories.

Appendix B (pp. 179 to 239) gives the orbital elements and photometric constants for minor planets with permanent numbers 1 through 1650. There is a useful bibliography (pp. 251 to 267).

In summary, this could have been a much better book. It is not uninteresting, but it could have been much more interesting. If the authors had had a little less missionary zeal and a greater desire to inform their readers, this book would have been half the size (and half the cost) and ten times more interesting.

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Diffusion Phenomena

Atomic Migration in Crystals. L. A. Girifalco. Blaisdell (Ginn), New York, 1964. xii + 162 pp. Illus. $3.75.

The diffusion of atoms through solids is of scientific and of technological interest. The scientist studies the phenomenon to learn more about imperfections in solids (such as vacancies, interstitial atoms, dislocations, and surfaces) and more about how they interact with one another and with impurity atoms. Moreover, diffusion processes are basic to the understanding of many other properties of solids, such as plasticity and radiation damage. The technologist uses solid-state diffusion in fabricating semiconductor devices, in preparing precipitation-hardened alloys, and in dealing with the problem of tarnishing and corrosion. The appearance, then, of a book that presents the fundamental notions of diffusion in crystals, and is addressed to readers who