

outsider, in order for the faculty to prove to itself that it had the power and the potency to attract a great leader. . . .”—A faculty committeeman.

“One of the persons nominated to our original list was dead, it turned out. A committee member recalled seeing an obituary notice, some time before. Otherwise, there’s no telling how long we would have continued to carry the name on our list of serious prospects.”—A faculty committeeman.

“While a nominee met with the selection committee, his wife would be taken in tow by the wives of the trustees. They would show her the president’s house, the town. . . . And they would evaluate her.”—A trustee.

“After one interview, we asked the candidate to leave the room because we had other business to attend to. A little later he knocked on the door. . . . He told us he had just telephoned his home campus, had arranged to sell his house, and had secured the help of friends to pack suitcases and trunks. A most embarrassing moment for the board and for the poor guy, because while he was out of the room we had decided we weren’t interested in considering him further.”—A trustee.

Bolman offers no simple recipe for filling campus presidencies. “A president who might have been an institution’s savior 20 years ago may bring about its ruin today,” he states. “Or a man who would be ideal at the helm of one college or university might nearly cause a shipwreck at another.” But he offers some guidelines, that are intended to make the selection process less haphazard. He suggests, for example, that, “before launching their search, the trustees should have a full and candid appraisal of the institution at this moment of its history.” It should have a clear idea of the role it wants the president to play. And it should seek the faculty’s advice, but not before there is a clear understanding of the faculty’s authority and responsibility in the selection process. Bolman further suggests that a quest for candidates go far and wide, with names solicited from the heads of other institutions, from educational associations and foundations, and from other persons with “special knowledge of the field of higher education.” The faculty and trustees committees, he suggests, should rank the candidates, and then the most likely candidates should be interviewed—preferably away from the campus. Finally, the top two or three candidates should be interviewed on campus before the final

recommendations of the trustees and the faculty committees are submitted to the board.

Following Bolman’s recommendations would probably improve the selection process at many institutions, but would be unlikely to remove the nonsense, the wheeling and dealing, and the dubious values that mark the presidential hunt at many institutions of higher learning.

The big and middling universities in this country have long since passed the stage where they are simply centers for acquiring and passing along knowledge. Just what is the role of the president at these places and at many of the smaller institutions that would be happy to emulate their growth? There’s no easy job description, and this may explain the muddle that often develops when institutions go on a hunt for the man who is supposed to lead the way to preeminence in everything from football to government grants and contracts, without neglecting buildings and grounds, the alumni, the English department, or the parking problem.

—D. S. GREENBERG

### **Space: Administration Official Says Some Harsh Things about Scientists Opposing Moon Landing**

Administration leaders have generally chosen not to engage in public controversy with scientists who question the high priority of Project Apollo, the moon-landing program. The reasons are probably twofold: it doesn’t look good for politicians to fight scientists, and an open row would only serve to advertise the critics’ arguments. But the sniping from the scientific community has been getting somewhat more intense over the past year, and just a few weeks ago one of the administration’s leading space spokesmen, Edward C. Welsh, executive secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, had some unusually harsh things to say about scientists who criticize the space program.

His forum was the New York Academy of Sciences, and though the press speculated that his goad was the anti-Apollo remarks contained in “The Integrity of Science,” a report by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, Welsh points out that he wrote his speech 4 weeks before the committee presented its report at the AAAS Montreal meeting in December. (The committee,

chaired by Barry Commoner, of the University of Washington, St. Louis, criticized a number of government-sponsored research efforts as inimical to the “integrity of science.” The Apollo program, it stated, was pursuing a politically inspired technological goal “in advance of the orderly acquisition of the related basic knowledge.” And it criticized scientific advisory groups for defending Apollo on the grounds of “national prestige” and other nonscientific values.)

Without referring by name to the object of his criticism, Welsh said, “[It] should be noted, that organized science has not always been outstanding for its courage, its vision, or its optimism regarding goals for human efforts. Elements of conservatism, parochialism, and even reactionary thinking do appear among scientists just as they do among many other groups in our society. Many important projects, later proved to be entirely feasible, have been reviewed earlier by distinguished panels of scientists and found wanting.”

Continued Welsh: “Regardless of their motivations, the pessimists who cry out against aerospace research and technological endeavors have clearly set themselves against progress.” Arguing that “science is only one element among the considerations which should shape policy goals in the field of aerospace,” he said that “scientists should not set themselves up to judge the overall value of aerospace missions or aerospace hardware construction by narrowly comparing the dollars spent for space with what those same dollars might accomplish if devoted to other purposes, scientific or otherwise.” And he added that, “since space expenditures seek broader goals than those of science, the comparison may well be invalid on the face of it.”

Welsh explains that he was speaking for no one but Welsh when he made his remarks, and he described himself “as quite surprised that anyone got excited about what I had to say. I was simply trying to put some of the issues in perspective.”

In any case, it would appear to be somewhat far-fetched to conclude that the administration is feeling bothered by scientific picking on the space program. With Lyndon Johnson wholeheartedly for going to the moon and with most of the capital investment for that project already paid for, it is going to take more than a few dissents to inspire Congress to toy with Apollo.—D.S.G.