

stantially increased. However, the original objectives—to teach fundamental organic chemistry and to give the student an opportunity to unify his knowledge of the field—have been retained. The “Tables of derivatives” have been expanded from 2000 to 2700 entries. The only change in the sets of problems are minor deletions in sets 1, 6, and 10. A few new problems, whose answers would not be available in the fraternity files kept on many campuses, would have been welcomed by those who have used previous editions of the text.

The authors are aware of the fact that the advent of many instrumental methods of analysis means that it is possible to identify several substances without recourse to the more laborious and slower chemical reactions. They contend, however, that a student who plans to do basic research on organic compounds must have a thorough understanding of the chemistry of functional groups no matter what the nature of his research may be. Although many teachers of organic chemistry prefer to include qualitative organic analysis with the introductory laboratory work, it seems that a worthwhile case can still be made for teaching a separate course in this area. In an age when descriptive chemistry is fast fading from the curriculum, this method of approach to the subject matter is an excellent teaching device, and the authors of this text are to be commended for their attempts to keep the material up to date. The book is recommended without reservation, especially to the young instructor embarking on a teaching career.

JOHN DE VRIES

*Department of Chemistry,
Calvin College*

Hypotheses and Data

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. vol. 1. Leonard Berkowitz, Ed. Academic Press, New York, 1964. xiv + 319 pp. Illus. \$9.

In the editor's preface, Berkowitz suggests the *raison d'être* of this stimulating collection of monographs—“. . . it is the integration of facts with which we shall be primarily concerned.” At a time when almost every new book in social psychology is a collection of reprints, this creative endeavor, the

first in a series, is most welcome. Here is a judiciously selected pot pourri of original monographs that can inform the professional social psychologist as well as the psychologist outside of social psychology, who is genuinely interested in finding out what contemporary social psychological experimentation is all about. For example, although I am well acquainted with the current experimental literature in the area of social motivation, I found the monograph by Walters and Parke, “Social motivation, dependency, and susceptibility to social influence,” the most effective statement that Walters has yet made of his notion that the “. . . relationship between such variables as social deprivation, dependency, self esteem, and various measures of social influence . . .” can be explained in terms “. . . of the development of habits of orienting and attending to others” and the “. . . behavioral effects of variations in emotional arousal.”

The papers by Stanley Schachter, “The interaction of cognitive and physiological determinants of emotional state,” and William J. McGuire, “Inducing resistance to persuasion,” can be especially recommended to those “hard headed” experimentalists who are perpetually dubious about the possibility of doing good manipulative experiments in areas like emotion and attitude change. McGuire's monograph is particularly useful to the novice, since it is McGuire's first integrative theoretical statement pertaining to a series of complex, interlocking experiments that are designed to explore the power of the “inoculation model” in building defenses against persuasive attempts. When viewed in overall perspective, the logic of McGuire's research strategy stands out in sharp relief and is all the more impressive.

The area of small group research is also well represented by papers contributed by William A. Gamson, “Experimental studies of coalition formation,” Marvin E. Shaw, “Communication networks,” and Fred E. Fiedler, “A contingency model of leadership effectiveness.” Gamson's deftly done critical review of theory and research in coalition formation is particularly outstanding for its clarification of basic concepts. His definition of a coalition as involving “. . . the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a decision in a mixed motive situation involving more than two units,” represents an important step forward in de-

lineating the boundaries of this often loosely defined domain.

Berkowitz points out in the concluding section of his preface that “some problems obviously cannot be investigated adequately under the restricted and usually short-lived conditions of the laboratory.” It is in this spirit that the monographs by Harry C. Triandis, “Cultural influences upon cognitive processes,” and William A. Mason, “Sociability and social organization in monkeys and apes,” are included. Both monographs represent a scholarly and effective integration of the existing evidence in these areas.

In concluding this review, I can do no better than to quote once more from the editor's excellent preface—“By presenting their hypotheses, the writers have contributed to the data collection and theory development that will question their own formulations.” I can think of no more important function that a series of monographs could serve.

REUBEN M. BARON

*Department of Psychology,
Wayne State University*

Ethics as Technology

Ethics and Science. Henry Margenau. Van Nostrand, Princeton, N.J., 1964. xii + 302 pp. Illus. \$7.50.

The hope implicit in Margenau's book is not difficult to grasp; familiar with and impressed by the progress of physical science, Margenau wishes to find parallel possibilities for ethics so that it too can progress. The physical sciences have their postulates; ethics has its postulates which it calls “imperatives.” There is a kind of progressive verification in the sciences when things turn out to be the way the postulates predicted; comparably, ethical imperatives can be “validated,” and validated empirically, since each of them is but a rule that tells us what to do to reach certain “primary values.” We either can or can not reach those primary values by following the prescription of the imperative. The reader is cautioned that such a process of testing is difficult, that already we have much human experience to throw into the pot, and that such testing is far more difficult in this area than in, for example, astronomy. What about the “primary values”—