ber of typographical and other errors (for example, incorrectly capitalized species names and misspelled proper names) in the text.

These criticisms should not detract from this volume's indisputable usefulness as a major reference work on African prehistory. The wide variety of topics, the tables that summarize current opinions on stratigraphic chronology, the maps that outline climates, distribution of mammals, vegetation and fossil sites, the informal (and occasionally unfortunate) comments of respected field workers on the relative values of data presented, the difficulties inherent in problems yet to be solved, the obvious transition to a biological approach in human paleontological and archeological thinking and techniques —these are the things that will make this volume a sought-after reference by students of African prehistory, and of human evolution in general.

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Experimental Studies

Bargaining Behavior. Lawrence E. Fouraker and Sidney Siegel. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963. x + 309 pp. Illus. $8.95.

This volume represents the fruits of an unusually productive collaboration between an economist (Lawrence Fouraker) and a psychologist (the late Sidney Siegel). It reports on a series of laboratory experiments designed to test the empirical implications of several economic models concerned with bargaining outcomes in two- and three-party transactions. The experiments are neatly done, reflecting the laboratory skills of the experimental social psychologist, and they throw light on several models of economic conflict, reflecting the theoretical sophistication of the economist.

The first series of experiments is concerned with bilateral monopoly. Here, the basic experimental format involves two college students who are told that they are participating in a study of economic decisions. The students are in separate cubicles, and they are told that they will not get to know each other during or after the experiment. One student is assigned the role of "seller"; he selects a *price* which is announced to the other student, "the buyer," who then selects a *quantity* to buy. Each student is given a table (the row headings are "prices," the column headings are "quantities") which specifies the profit or the loss that results from the selection of a given price by the seller and a given quantity by the buyer. In one experimental treatment, called "Incomplete Information," the table given to the student contains information only about his own profit or loss; in another, called "Complete Information," the table contains information about the other's as well as his own profit or loss. A second experimental variation is concerned with whether the buyer-seller transaction was limited to a single transaction or was repeated. A third variation has the "prominent solution" of equal profits to both parties favor either the Bowley equilibrium solution or the Paretian optima solution. The Bowley solution assumes that each player is motivated to maximize his individual profit without regard to whether it helps or harms the other and that each realizes that the other's motivations are purely self-centered; the Paretian optima assumes that the players are out to maximize joint profit. The results, not surprisingly, support the Bowley solution, indicating that when subjects have little or no basis for social motives toward one another, they will act on the basis of immediate self-interest.

The second series of experiments is concerned with economic conflict among two or three sellers. In one set of experiments, each of the subjects (all of whom are "sellers") has to decide what quantity to produce, his profits or losses being determined by two factors—how much he produces and how much the other sellers produce. In another set, each subject has to decide at what price to sell his merchandise, his profit or loss being determined by the relation of his price to the other sellers' prices. Several economic models are compared: the Cournot and Bertrand models, which assume that the subjects act as individual maximizers; the Paretian optima model, which assumes that they act cooperatively; and a rivalistic model, which assumes that they try to outdo one another. The results indicate clearly that the economic models are incomplete: subjects will act individualistically, cooperatively, *or* competitively depending upon the experimental variations to which they are exposed. Man is not inflexibly self-centered, cooperative, or antagonistic; differing circumstances elicit different responses.

The major flaw in this book is its title, which promises more than a research monograph. The title suggests a discussion of the varied aspects of bargaining behavior and an adequate review of other related research, but the book contains none of these. It is a report of some fine experimental studies of bargaining which merit serious attention.

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Sociology's Flexner Report

The Education of Sociologists in the United States. Elbridge Sibley. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1963. 218 pp. $3.50.

Elbridge Sibley, like Flexner, Conant, and other critics of American education, undoubtedly intended to stir up the lions, and, judging from the roars one hears among sociologists, he has succeeded quite well. However, the reader of his Charles Addams-like portrait of American graduate education in sociology should approach the report properly armed with Bernard Berelson's observation that criticism is endemic in the world of graduate education and that a fairly high level of dissatisfaction is, and ought to be, expected, no matter what is being done. He should also be prepared to discount Sibley's conclusions in the light of the standard perceptual error by which we upgrade our predecessors, downgrade our contemporaries, and view our successors as taking the discipline canineward.

Sibley paints a dismal, funereal picture, indeed. The average caliber of the nation's graduate students of sociology, he reports, is unimpressive. Standards in graduate departments of sociology are generally lax. The objectives of graduate programs are ambiguous. Admission standards are too low. The process of professional socialization is often slow and difficult. There is an exceptionally great disparity between what is taught as sociology in most colleges and what is required of a professional sociologist. There is a low level of theoretical sophistication and lack of necessary competence in mathematics. Statistical