technology, for education and economic expansion, for military research and development, and for modernization programs abroad. Since the U.S.S.R. does in fact now have many achievements to talk about, its propaganda strategy has shifted considerably from the doctrinal dogmatics of earlier decades. The recent line has been the "overtake and surpass" theme, with its visionary projection of the U.S.S.R. as the "reliable cosmodrome" of the drive to a Brave New World for all mankind.

In the emerging nations of Afro-Asia, and in the revolt-torn lands of Latin America, the Soviet appeal has fitted nicely with local wants. Castro's Cuba is an obvious success for Soviet foreign propaganda—unique today but indicative of a potential for future successes. The legal conviction of communists for organizing the egg-throwing party against Richard Nixon is less important than the recognition of their contribution to the shaping and sustaining of an environment in which this action was felt by its perpetrators to be a "blow for freedom." (No American should overlook the fact that the Boston "tea-party" had much of the same sort of euphoria that animated the Latino "egg-party.")

Soviet success grows more doubtful as one comes nearer home base. It is true that in the modernized world the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow is the first university to be named for an African, but it is also true that this university witnessed the first organized demonstrations of Africans against "discrimination" in the U.S.S.R. The male vanity culture of the Russians is not quite up to the "universalistic" proclamations of Soviet propagandists.

In the rest of Africa, Soviet propaganda has had little resonance. The U.S.S.R. got out of the Congo fast and gave up its potential influence there, and at the same time put itself in a dog-in-the-manger posture by refusing to contribute to the operational costs of the United Nations. In South Africa, the U.S.S.R. trailed the West by far in denouncing apartheid as a viable social policy. In the Middle East, despite substantial commitments of money and motivation, the U.S.S.R. has gotten nowhere. Neither Egypt nor Syria nor Iraq has been willing to become a Soviet agency. Indeed, each has, by its handling of the local Communist Party, kicked the U.S.S.R. in the shins.

In Asia, given the Sino-Soviet split, the U.S.S.R. has become increasingly less effective. Giving India military aid against Red China only accentuates the essential opportunism (and hence the floundering) of Soviet practice. The U.S.S.R., despite its dialectical virtuosity, is likely to come some croppers as it tries to maintain the dual posture of "peaceful coexistence" with the West while sponsoring "national liberation" in the East. The Eastern peoples are likely to perceive their own victimization by Soviet opportunism, just as the Western peoples have come to see Soviet efforts to exploit their war fears as, according to Barghoorn, "a gigantic piece of bluff" (presumably since the Cuba missile crisis).

Summary

The effects of Soviet foreign propaganda, so evaluated, are diffuse and limited. In the underdeveloped areas, Soviet output nurtures and sustains a "climate of opinion" that predisposes "oppressed" peoples, under the leadership of indigenous "progressive intellectuals," to think and act anti-American. In the advanced countries of the West, it helps to "neutralize" pronational and anticommunist thought and action. Throughout the world it has constructed linkages among the radicalized intelligentsia, linkages that are sustained by many subsidiary non-Soviet channels of information and propaganda manned by just these radicalized individuals.

Barghoorn's measured evaluation culminates a thoughtful and documented study. He neither views with alarm nor emulates the ostrich. His judicious, scholarly, and perceptive analysis is a genuine contribution to our understanding of Soviet foreign propaganda in the disorderly arena of contemporary world politics.

International Order and the Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons

Hedley Bull

The ideas that the increase in the number of nuclear states is corrosive of international order, and that a proper concern of arms control is to arrest or inhibit it, have been familiar to students of international security problems for almost a decade. In the last few years, however, and especially since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, these ideas have become part of the currency of debate among the great powers themselves. In particular, the ideas have taken their place in what may be called the ideology of the Soviet-American détente; they serve as weapons with which the United States and the Soviet Union rally support for their own policies and opposition to those of France and China. Thus pressed into the service of powerful interests, predictions about the dire consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons have become more shrill and demands that it be brought to a halt more insistent.

Richard N. Rosecrance, editor of the volume under review—**The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons** (Columbia University Press, New York, 1964. 344 pp. $7.50)—and principal contributor to it, is, I believe, correct in taking a more sober view of this matter. The first important study of the spread of nuclear weapons, *The Nth Country Problem* by W. Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser (1958), confined itself

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to assessing the technical capability of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and thereby caused a certain alarm among those who assumed that any state which could produce an atomic or hydrogen bomb would do so and that any state which produced a bomb would be likely to go ahead and use it. The second important study, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox (1962), noticed that Canada had long been able to produce a nuclear bomb but had not yet developed the will to do so and that Britain, although she possessed the bomb, had in 1960 confessed herself unable to produce a delivery system effective with respect to the Soviet Union. By generalizing from these and other examples, the authors presented a picture of a process of diffusion very much impeded by political factors that disinclined many nations to exercise the option of becoming nuclear powers, although technology was rapidly making that option available to them, and by economic factors that seemed to place invulnerable delivery systems out of reach of all save the two founder members of the club.

Steps Up the Ladder

Richard Rosecrance, whose *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* is the third important study of this problem, takes the argument somewhat further. In the conclusion he states:

> Nuclear diffusion has an unstabilizing effect upon world politics only under a concatenation of circumstances. First, there must be dissemination of the ability to build or acquire nuclear bombs; second, a capability of creating or obtaining a delivery, command, and control system must be present; third, there must be a resolute national will to create a nuclear weapons capability; fourth, possible counter-action by major powers must not be permitted to nullify the advantages of nuclear status; fifth, and finally, the nuclear system developed must actually be used in such a fashion as to endanger local or international peace. Failure to pass through each of the five stages means that nuclear diffusion does not attain to international significance; it does not pose an independent problem to world stability and peace.

The book falls into two parts—one dealing with the process of nuclear diffusion to date and the other with the question of how far, in a world of rapid technological and political change, this past experience can be taken as a guide to the future. In the first part there are accounts, inevitably scrappy, of the British nuclear experience by H. A. De Weerd and Rosecrance; an account of the French nuclear experience by Ciro Zoppo; a chapter on China by Alice Langley Hsieh; a reprint of Albert Wohlstetter's now classic "Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country" (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1961); and a defense of the NATO force concept by Malcolm W. Hoag. In the second part Arnold Kramish, in a contribution entitled "The emergent genie," discusses the diffusion of the knowledge and materials required to produce nuclear force and Albert Wohlstetter expresses skepticism about the possibility of predicting either the future of technology or its political consequences. In his introductory and concluding chapters, Rosecrance draws some of the threads together and presents a general view of the problem. Two of the ideas that he puts forward may be singled out for mention: (i) the essential uncertainty and ambiguity of the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons upon international order and (ii) the possibility of dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons by mitigating its consequences rather than by preventing it from taking place.

The spread of nuclear weapons is often said to affect international order adversely because the likelihood of war increases arithmetically with the number of nuclear decision makers. There are two basic weaknesses in this view. In the first place, if we take the significance of nuclear diffusion to be that it reproduces the circumstances of the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation, then it must be taken to reproduce those features of the confrontation which enhance international order as well as those features which militate against it. If the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union has made war less likely between them as well as more dangerous if it occurs, then a process of diffusion which causes the Soviet-American relationship to be reproduced on a wider scale will multiply the factors making against the likelihood of war as well as those making for a kind of war that is more dangerous. In the second place, what will actually happen will be decided by history rather than arithmetic; the circumstances of future nuclear powers will not in fact be a mere reproduction of those of America and Russia.

It is possible, as is sometimes maintained, that future nuclear powers, or certain of them, will be more dangerous custodians of nuclear weapons than the first two states have been—that France or China, for example, as it is sometimes put, will prove less "responsible." On the other hand it is also possible that possession of nuclear weapons, as Rosecrance speculates, may have a disciplinary or sobering effect. Much will depend, he argues, on the *pace* of diffusion, which might be too fast to admit the adjustments necessary to accommodate it in a stable international order, but which might be slow enough to enable such adjustments to be made. As he points out, a great deal will also depend on the extent to which diffusion is *symmetrical*: a general and simultaneous acquisition of nuclear weapons might make for stability where a process of diffusion which left states in a position of military superiority with respect to their antagonists might create the temptation of preventive war.

International Politics and the Bomb

A great deal must depend also on the shape or structure of the international political system of which the diffusion of nuclear weapons forms a part and which it will have helped to bring about. The strictures leveled at French and Chinese nuclear policy in the name of international stability overlook the fact that the expansion of the nuclear club is only part of a wider change in which power is being more evenly distributed and the so-called bipolar system qualified or perhaps undermined. There are strong reasons for supposing that such a development, by taking some of the pressure off the central Soviet-American antagonism, and by restoring an element of flexibility into the diplomatic mechanism, considerably enhances international stability. Rosecrance thinks that the spread of nuclear weapons could have the effect of extending the existing nuclear alliances, and thus confirming the bipolar system, for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some states (for example, China) might lead certain others (for example, India) to seek the protection of a nuclear great power. Whether the effect of nuclear diffusion is to undermine existing alliances, to extend them, or both, Rosecrance is

surely correct in recognizing that its consequences for international stability must be determined by the wider political changes of which it is a part.

With respect to the claims so often made that the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons are clearly evident and are for the worse, Rosecrance has concluded, in my opinion correctly, that they are not easily discernible and that, insofar as they are discernible, they are ambiguous. The other respect in which his contribution is perhaps valuable is in the stress that it places on the measures which may be taken to correct the destabilizing effect of nuclear diffusion, once it has occurred.

The weight of attention that has so far been directed towards finding a solution to "the Nth Country Problem" has concerned measures by which the expansion of the nuclear club can be stopped or at all events slowed down. There is every reason to think that efforts in this direction are soundly conceived and should continue to be made, if for no other reason than that they buy time in which the adjustments which the process of diffusion calls for may be thought out. The idea, however, that nuclear power will remain the permanent monopoly of the states which now possess it is contrary to the most elementary lessons of international history, and, indeed, the process of diffusion is already proceeding in a fashion which the present nuclear powers can influence but cannot control. A realistic approach to the Nth Country problem should therefore include the attempt to identify what the peculiar dangers of a world of many nuclear powers will be and the attempt to devise ways of minimizing them.

One of the most serious of these dangers is the possibility that nuclear states will find themselves drawn into conflicts against their will, either by accident or as the result of the catalytic action of other parties. Rosecrance distinguishes the dangers arising from the outbreak of war between Nth countries from the dangers arising from the involvement in war of the principal nuclear powers, and he considers some of the measures that the latter powers might take to reduce these dangers. A full investigation of the measures that are necessary to isolate conflicts in a world of many nuclear powers, it may be added, might show that policies are called for on the part of the principal nuclear states which are radically different from the policies that the United States is following now: declaratory policies, weapons deployments, and command arrangements designed not to show that she is committed to war when her allies and associates are at war, but designed precisely to show that she is not.

But What Are the Behavioral Sciences?

John L. Kennedy

Human Behavior—An Inventory of Scientific Findings (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964. 735 pp. $11), a storehouse of "findings" from the behavioral sciences, was compiled by Bernard Berelson, a sociologist who is vice president of the Population Council, and Gary A. Steiner, an associate professor of psychology, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. Berelson was formerly the director of the Ford Foundation's behavioral sciences program. By "findings," the authors "refer to *important statements* of *proper generality* for which there is *some good amount of scientific evidence*" (p. 5). The findings are explained and amplified by a running commentary of examples and definitions.

I find the range of subjects covered rather overwhelming. The first finding is presented in chapter 3, #A1 (p. 39)—"Human behavior is far more variable, and therefore less predictable, than that of any other species. The repertoire and range of behavior available to any given man, as well as the range that exists across men, is far broader than anywhere else in the animal kingdom." The last is found in chapter 16, #S3.2 (p. 655)—"Upwardly mobile people and those of higher socioeconomic status tend to acculturate faster than their nonmobile counterparts. Even within deprived ethnic groups, the middle class members are more acculturated to the larger society than are the lower." There are 1045 such generalizations drawn from the literature of psychology (behavioral development, perception, learning and thinking, mass communication, opinions, attitudes, and beliefs), sociology (the family, small groups, organizations, and society), and anthropology (institutions, strata, and culture).

In the first chapter the authors describe the nature and plan of the book and define the boundaries of behavioral sciences as "those sciences that deal directly with human behavior." In the second they describe and explain the principal methods used (the experiment, the sample survey, the case study) and the problems of data collection and analysis. The utility of this inventory and the image of man that emerges from its pages is discussed in the final chapter.

Berelson and Steiner have succeeded in the difficult task of communicating the method and substance of several fields of scientific inquiry to the general public. The audience for their book is definitely *not* the technical specialist in one of the behavioral sciences. The authors hope to explain the current state of the behavioral sciences to the physical scientist, the engineer, the senator, the humanist, the lobbyist, the labor leader, the industrial manager, the civil servant, the administrator—all of those who need to evaluate the progress of the behavioral sciences and who wish to understand and to use their products.

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