beast of burden and, subsequently, of traction. The early harness seen on the onagers of Mesopotamia appears to have been borrowed from the equipment designed for cattle. The development of the wheel and plough was also closely connected with the domestication of cattle. Thus, the foundations for the establishment of higher cultures were laid down.

Ass, Onager, Camel, and Elephant

Zeuner's third group consists of mammals domesticated primarily for transport and labor. In the Near East there is the ass, the onager, the camel, and the elephant. The latter was known from the Middle Euphrates and Khabur down to the eighth century B.C. and, at that time, was one of the major sources of ivory, although it was never domesticated. In the Indus Valley, however, seals on which elephants seem to wear some kind of covering indicate that the elephant may have been domesticated as a work animal. The domestication of the onager in the third millennium in Mesopotamia is established by the bones found at Tell Asmar and by representational art. The original identification of onager bones in Shub-ad's tomb at Ur is now discounted. Zeuner suggests that the use of onagers was given up following the introduction of the horse from Central Asia or southern Russia in the second millennium. He does not mention the gold fillet from the Early Dynastic Cemetery at Ur (on exhibition in the University Museum of Philadelphia) which shows a man riding astride an equine of some kind. Asses were domesticated in Egypt and spread eastward, occurring in Mesopotamia in the third millennium B.C. The domesticated horse apparently was known between 3000 and 2500 B.C. but did not appear in the Mesopotamian area in quantity until the first quarter of the second millennium when the two-wheeled chariot was widely adopted. The dromedary camel was domesticated in Arabia by at least 1800 B.C. and the Bactrian in Central Asia by at least 1000 B.C.

Zeuner's New Hypothesis

From this general discussion, which Zeuner has documented with numerous illustrations drawn from life and from art and with references to specific sites, it may be seen that he has in effect also provided us with a new hypothesis about the stages of the early food producing "Revolution." This now appears not to be a "Revolution" at all, except when it is viewed as part of the total range of human history. The "abrupt jump" into food production appears to cover a range of some 4000 years—from 9000 B.C. to 5000 B.C.—which may well prove to be a minimum. In any event, it is equal to four-fifths of the period in which writing has existed! At the same time the evidence indicates that the changes which led to the establishment of the final village community were complex in nature, involving different localities, different plants, different animals, and different technological innovations, all progressing at different speeds. It was only with the general acculturation of communities within the general Near Eastern region to one another's advances that the level of Primary Village Efficiency was reached. The steps proposed by Zeuner, insofar as animals are concerned, are (i) the domestication of the dog as an aid to hunting; (ii) the cultural control of herds of sheep or goat; (iii) the domestication of plants and the beginning of settled life; (iv) the domestication of cattle; (v) the invention of plough and wheel; and (vi) the domestication of the transportation animals. Thus, we are presented with a fresh basis of discussion for problems of zoology, anthropology, and archeology, which, despite their long history, remain to be solved.

Soviet Propaganda: Its Techniques, Doctrines, and Practices

Daniel Lerner

Frederick Barghoorn's new book is assured of a *succès de scandale*. His arrest in the U.S.S.R. on 31 October 1963 created an international incident, and his detention during the first 16 days of November made him a *cause célèbre*. Deeply identified with this cause were governmental officials, newsmen, and academics concerned with Soviet-American cultural exchanges and propaganda barrages—and these are the primary audience for his book—**Soviet Foreign Propaganda** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964. ix + 329 pp. $6). No conjunction of subject and author could be more topical.

Be it noted that Barghoorn has done nothing to promote or profit from the publicity that encircled him. From the moment of his release he has conducted himself modestly and moderately. He continues to do so in this study, which was completed before his arrest. If the recent publicity brings him a greater measure of fame and fortune than comes to most academic scholars, it should be acknowledged that Barghoorn deserves the fallout from his *succès de scandale*.

For on the question that is more important to readers of this journal—Does his book merit the more durable success earned by good scholarship?—the answer is yes. Indeed, this book confirms Barghoorn's stature as a leading scholar on the Soviet system of international communication. It focuses the findings of two decades of sustained and serious investigation, as reported in such earlier works as *The Soviet Image of the United States* (1950) and *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* (1960), in a keen analytical exposition of current policy and practice in Khrushchev's U.S.S.R.

Barghoorn begins with an exegesis

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of Soviet propaganda doctrine, shows how "the line" is developed, and explains the crucial role in this development of the "image of the adversary." The Soviet approach to three major issues of international politics and propaganda is then expounded in three separate chapters: "Peace and war"; "The uses of nationalism"; "Modernization: The Soviet model." The next two chapters are entitled "Techniques", and "Organization and media." The book concludes with a chapter in which the author evaluates the effectiveness and limitations of Soviet propaganda. There is an index.

Interest focuses, irresistibly, on the relationship between Barghoorn's personal arrest, detention, and release (an obvious "case study" in Soviet foreign propaganda) and his objective analysis of the general process. On this relationship, Barghoorn is reticent. In all probability his manuscript was already in press when Barghoorn returned from his ordeal, and little is said about the incident and its relationship to his interpretation of the Soviet method. Indeed, in the final paragraph of his preface, Barghoorn says only this much:

> After completing this study, I made another trip to the USSR and was arrested and detained by Soviet State Security police from October 31, 1963 until November 16. This action adds a new dimension to the Soviet propaganda techniques discussed in Chapter VII. Among its probable motives was a desire to lend some semblance of credibility, however contrived, to the increasingly frequent Soviet charges that American Sovietologists are really "spies" in disguise.

In chapter 7, on techniques, we find that the first reference is to "the more or less common tasks confronting all propagandists." Not a word about his personal experience. This is why whatever *succès de scandale* the book receives will be shortlived; the scandal-seekers will be scandalized by his indifference to the popular potential. This is why, however, Barghoorn will earn a much smaller, but more durable, audience of serious readers who want to learn how Soviet foreign propaganda operates.

In Theory and in Practice

In pitching his level of discourse at "the more or less common tasks," he means to address the audience of propaganda specialists—and he does so successfully. In focusing his generalizations about propaganda on Soviet doctrine and practice, he means to reach the audience of Sovietologists, and again, insofar as I am competent to judge, he does so successfully. Bringing together these two concerns, propaganda as a mode of international political competition and the Soviet theory and practice of this mode, provides Barghoorn with a perspective that cuts deep into the complex of international life today.

It is a perspective that enables Barghoorn to explain why Khrushchev's well-known promise to "bury" capitalism, which later was interpreted figuratively, was meant "in deadly earnest." It clarifies the crucial role of "peace propaganda" in Soviet strategy—"probably the most powerful psychological instrument of world communism since the bolsheviks came to power in 1917" —and articulates the dialectic whereby the U.S.S.R. is always on the side of "peace" even when it is engaged in war. The dialectical understanding of nationalism—whereby acts by the United States are castigated as "imperialism" but the same acts, when performed by the U.S.S.R., are blessed as "internationalism"—is made explicit in a manner that also clarifies the tautology underlying Soviet policy on "national liberation."

This leads to an especially interesting discussion of the Soviet model of modernization. The present CPSU program states that Soviet socialism can transform a backward country "into an industrial country within the lifetime of one generation and not in the course of centuries." This claim of historical acceleration is coupled with a claim of sociological universality. Thus this declaration in *Pravda*: "In the countries of socialism the model for the future of all mankind is being built." This projection of the Soviet model as the "future of all mankind" is cardinal in its world propaganda operations, for it is the psychic pillar on which reposes confidence in "the ever-increasing strength of the forces of socialism and peace and the simultaneous weakening of the forces of imperialism."

This indicates the importance attributed to building such confidence in the future of the Soviet, for that confidence is the Soviet access route to the hopes and wishes of people in the underdeveloped and modernizing lands. The focus on appeals to the preliterate and quasi-literate peoples of the world has occasioned an important modification of propaganda technique. Barghoorn writes: "One of the distinctive features of Soviet propaganda, both domestic and foreign, since the death of Stalin, has been a partial return to the utopian visions contained in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. . . . Once again the communists are holding out many of the values of the great world religions. . . . Moscow seeks to associate Soviet socialism with all of the legitimate aspirations of mankind."

From this visionary core of the U.S.S.R. as mankind's future there radiate two major propaganda themes that have direct operational impact on international politics. One is Soviet achievement in science and technology, especially in the race, as Soviet sources put it, "to master the cosmos." The other is Soviet support of "wars of national liberation," support given despite the Soviet commitment, dialectically, indeed precisely because of that commitment, to peace.

The propaganda effort to associate space superiority with Soviet socialism is massive and incessant. Just before taking off in Vostok IV, cosmonaut Pavel Popovich made the following statement: "I go to cosmic flight with great pride for our great Soviet people, blazing a trail for all mankind to the communist future." When Popovich returned from his space rendezvous with Andrian Nikolaev, Khrushchev spoke of socialism as the "reliable cosmodrome" from which mankind would master the cosmos. Barghoorn reports a quantitative content analysis of Soviet radio propaganda, which shows how consistently linkages between Soviet socialism, space science, and economic development are asserted and repeated.

Sound and Fury—and Facts

How does Barghoorn evaluate all this? His concluding chapter opens with these questions: "What is signified, after all, by the sound and fury of Soviet foreign propaganda? How effective is it?" He gives no simple answer, but he explains why there is no answer that is both simple and true. Historically, *agitprop* played a relatively larger role in Soviet foreign operations than it does today. Though the Soviet propaganda budget continues to swell, the swelling is even more rapidly in its budgets for science and

technology, for education and economic expansion, for military research and development, and for modernization programs abroad. Since the U.S.S.R. does in fact now have many achievements to talk about, its propaganda strategy has shifted considerably from the doctrinal dogmatics of earlier decades. The recent line has been the "overtake and surpass" theme, with its visionary projection of the U.S.S.R. as the "reliable cosmodrome" of the drive to a Brave New World for all mankind.

In the emerging nations of Afro-Asia, and in the revolt-torn lands of Latin America, the Soviet appeal has fitted nicely with local wants. Castro's Cuba is an obvious success for Soviet foreign propaganda—unique today but indicative of a potential for future successes. The legal conviction of communists for organizing the egg-throwing party against Richard Nixon is less important than the recognition of their contribution to the shaping and sustaining of an environment in which this action was felt by its perpetrators to be a "blow for freedom." (No American should overlook the fact that the Boston "tea-party" had much of the same sort of euphoria that animated the Latino "egg-party.")

Soviet success grows more doubtful as one comes nearer home base. It is true that in the modernized world the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow is the first university to be named for an African, but it is also true that this university witnessed the first organized demonstrations of Africans against "discrimination" in the U.S.S.R. The male vanity culture of the Russians is not quite up to the "universalistic" proclamations of Soviet propagandists.

In the rest of Africa, Soviet propaganda has had little resonance. The U.S.S.R. got out of the Congo fast and gave up its potential influence there, and at the same time put itself in a dog-in-the-manger posture by refusing to contribute to the operational costs of the United Nations. In South Africa, the U.S.S.R. trailed the West by far in denouncing apartheid as a viable social policy. In the Middle East, despite substantial commitments of money and motivation, the U.S.S.R. has gotten nowhere. Neither Egypt nor Syria nor Iraq has been willing to become a Soviet agency. Indeed, each has, by its handling of the local Communist Party, kicked the U.S.S.R. in the shins.

In Asia, given the Sino-Soviet split, the U.S.S.R. has become increasingly less effective. Giving India military aid against Red China only accentuates the essential opportunism (and hence the floundering) of Soviet practice. The U.S.S.R., despite its dialectical virtuosity, is likely to come some croppers as it tries to maintain the dual posture of "peaceful coexistence" with the West while sponsoring "national liberation" in the East. The Eastern peoples are likely to perceive their own victimization by Soviet opportunism, just as the Western peoples have come to see Soviet efforts to exploit their war fears as, according to Barghoorn, "a gigantic piece of bluff" (presumably since the Cuba missile crisis).

Summary

The effects of Soviet foreign propaganda, so evaluated, are diffuse and limited. In the underdeveloped areas, Soviet output nurtures and sustains a "climate of opinion" that predisposes "oppressed" peoples, under the leadership of indigenous "progressive intellectuals," to think and act anti-American. In the advanced countries of the West, it helps to "neutralize" pronational and anticommunist thought and action. Throughout the world it has constructed linkages among the radicalized intelligentsia, linkages that are sustained by many subsidiary non-Soviet channels of information and propaganda manned by just these radicalized individuals.

Barghoorn's measured evaluation culminates a thoughtful and documented study. He neither views with alarm nor emulates the ostrich. His judicious, scholarly, and perceptive analysis is a genuine contribution to our understanding of Soviet foreign propaganda in the disorderly arena of contemporary world politics.

International Order and the Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons

Hedley Bull

The ideas that the increase in the number of nuclear states is corrosive of international order, and that a proper concern of arms control is to arrest or inhibit it, have been familiar to students of international security problems for almost a decade. In the last few years, however, and especially since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, these ideas have become part of the currency of debate among the great powers themselves. In particular, the ideas have taken their place in what may be called the ideology of the Soviet-American détente; they serve as weapons with which the United States and the Soviet Union rally support for their own policies and opposition to those of France and China. Thus pressed into the service of powerful interests, predictions about the dire consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons have become more shrill and demands that it be brought to a halt more insistent.

Richard N. Rosecrance, editor of the volume under review—**The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons** (Columbia University Press, New York, 1964. 344 pp. $7.50)—and principal contributor to it, is, I believe, correct in taking a more sober view of this matter. The first important study of the spread of nuclear weapons, *The Nth Country Problem* by W. Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser (1958), confined itself

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