

periences that he believes to be characteristically human, and it is all very well to be shown how even God himself finds his place as that whose existence must be postulated since without it the highest goal-seeking of truth, beauty, and goodness would be like an ignorant child crying for the moon. There is much in this book that is admirable, but one or two doubts keep intruding. How do we judge what is a "higher" goal or a "lower" one? What makes the goal of the thug or the megalomaniac "better" or "worse" than that of the office boy or the poet? What is the meaning of "goal" itself, unless there is a human mind to experience and judge? And what of the host of evolutionary processes—the dinosaur and the diplodocus—that went wrong? Are we not in danger of failing to recognize that the answers to questions like these lie partly in and partly out of biology? And are we not in danger of forgetting that human wretchedness and human greatness walk hand in hand, and that in the fullness of human living there are undercurrents of blood and sweat and tears that no biology—whether of the spirit or emergent evolution—can properly comprehend? There is something in this book that is well worth saying; but there is still something more to say.

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Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society. vol. I. A New series in continuation of *Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society*. Royal Society, London, 1955. 263 pp. + plates. 30s.

This new series of brief biographies maintains the high standards of the series it replaces. Each memoir includes a full page photograph of the subject, an account of his life and scientific accomplishments, and a complete bibliography of his publications. They are models of their kind that might well be consulted by anyone faced with the unhappy task of preparing an obituary notice.

Accounts of the lives of the following are presented: Wallace Alan Akers, Herbert Stanley Allen, Richard Stafford Cripps, Arthur Lee Dixon, Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, John Theodore Hewitt, James Peter Hill, Frederic Wood Jones, Heinrich Kayser, Arthur Keith, George Martin Lees, John Edward Lennard-Jones, Emmanuel Marie Pierre Martin Jacquin de Margerie, Edward Mellanby, Archibald Read Richardson, Redcliffe Nathan Salaman, George Frederick Charles Searle, and Alan Mathison Turing.—G.DuS.

Imagination's Other Place. Poems of science and mathematics. Helen Plotz, Comp. Crowell, New York, 1955. 200 pp. \$3.50.

Although the 20th century seems to have raised a barrier between science and the arts, poets have always seen the same vision as scientists. This anthology attempts to show the reader that Milton went to Galileo for sometime inspiration—that poets and scientists are no strangers. ("Euclid alone has looked on beauty bare," said the late Edna St. Vincent Millay.)

The book is divided into four sections, the first on astronomy and geography. Here man's speculation about his universe ranges from Shakespeare's

The heavens themselves, the planets and
this center

Observe degree, priority and place. . . .

to Emily Dickinson's wondering

. . . why heaven did not break away
And tumble blue on me.

Among the poems in the second section, on physics, mathematics, and chemistry, one finds in Carl Sandburg's "Arithmetic" the waggishly profound lines

Arithmetic tells you how many you lose or
win if you know how
many you had before you lost or won.

In this section, the least adequate of the four, also appears a paraphrasing of Lewis Carroll's "The Jabberwocky" entitled "Plane Geometry," one of the few choices about which one questions the anthologist's judgment.

In answer to the Psalmist's "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?" the anthology offers the reader the third and best selected group of poems, called "Both man and bird and beast." If the reader is "the egregious egoist" that Elinor Wylie says man is (in "Cold-Blooded Creatures"), he will be delighted with these reflections of himself in the poetic pool. He will be startled by Ogden Nash's

Among the anthropophagi
People's friends are people's sarcophagi

and be awed by Alexander Pope's stern advice,

Know then thyself, presume not God to
scan,
The proper study of mankind is Man.

The poems in the last section eulogize the courage, faith, and vision of great men of science, from Newton to Einstein. Here the quality of the poetry is not as good as the spirit that underlies the selection.

Much space is given in the anthology

to the modern poets (T. S. Eliot, Dylan Thomas, W. H. Auden, Marianne Moore), but Pope, Wordsworth, Shelley, Emerson, and Tennyson tell the reader how other centuries have seen science.

The book will appeal to readers who see, or want to see, that both scientists and poets attempt to answer the same questions.—J.M.F.

Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. John B. Carroll, Ed. Technology Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge; Wiley, New York; Chapman and Hall, London, 1956. 278 pp. Illus. \$6.

The hypothesis suggested by Benjamin Lee Whorf that the structure of a person's language is a factor in the way in which he understands reality and behaves with respect to it has attracted the attention of linguists, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers, as well as a large segment of the public. The present book includes "nearly all of Whorf's writings which are pertinent to . . . the principle of linguistic relativity" (p. 23), as well as other general linguistic writings of interest. The papers are followed by a bibliography of Whorf's published and unpublished writings, and a list of related books and articles. Some of the papers are published for the first time, the most important of these being "A linguistic consideration of thinking in primitive communities" (pp. 65-86).

John B. Carroll suggests, in a lucid introduction, the process by which Whorf's early thinking, at times purely visionary and even mystical, developed into a stimulating and challenging theory of the relationship between linguistic structure and nonlinguistic behavior. Indeed, one cannot help wondering, with Carroll, "what makes the notion of linguistic relativity so fascinating even to the nonspecialist. Perhaps it is the suggestion that all one's life one has been tricked, all unaware, by the structure of language into a certain way of perceiving reality, with the implication that awareness of this trickery will enable one to see the world with fresh insight" (p. 27).

The hypothesis that the structure of the language one habitually uses influences the manner in which one understands his environment has thus far neither been proved nor disproved. However, that Whorf often substituted affection for objectivity in his analysis of Indian languages becomes apparent with the reading of almost any of the papers in this volume. Thus, statements such as those to the effect that the Hopi lan-