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(quoted in Drollette's article). But this dosage is below the immunogenic and infectivity threshold in 28 of the 30 species tested (four animals per test)—only about 1/30,000 of the dose a predator would receive eating a single infected rabbit liver. To test human susceptibility, Australian authorities examined serum samples from only six people (all were laboratory workers and were antibody-negative) and did not examine high-risk individuals such as ranchers, biologists, and hunters who handle infected rabbits. One laboratory worker tested during an RHD outbreak in Mexico was positive for the RHD antibody (2).

Sudden appearance (3) and high mortality (95%) indicate that that RHD almost certainly did not originate in rabbits and is not species-specific. The cause of death (disseminated intravascular blood clots with fibrin-depleted blood oozing from orifices and into tissues) is not described for any other calicivirus. The likelihood of this "hemorrhagic" factor emerging in other species infected with caliciviruses is unknown. The mechanisms of virus movements across land and ocean channels are unknown.

Rabbit calicivirus has yet to be grown in cell culture. Therefore, vaccines and some diagnostic reagents are ground-up livers from diseased rabbits. Koch's postulates are unfulfilled, and, consequently, there is confusion about etiology (3, 4).

Adequate surveys to determine disease or infection in nonrabbit species that have been exposed naturally have not been carried out. Serologic testing of extremely small numbers of nonrabbit species, exposed experimentally and naturally, has yielded antibodies [in the mouse, kiwi, dog, fox, and human (5)], yet without proof (mice excepted), Australian officials have stated that infection did not occur. Despite much evidence suggesting otherwise (6), Australian government agencies declared RHD to be species-specific for rabbits and not infectious to other animals or humans. [Four of the five known calicivirus groups cause disease in humans (7)]. These same agencies have notified the Australian people that it would be safe for them to eat rabbits exposed to RHD and to feed these rabbits to their pets (1).

I discussed these critical factors with Drollette, but he did not mention them in his article. These factors were considered by the recently elected Australian government in rethinking the official position on the targeted March-April 1996 release of this new hemorrhagic disease virus. Additional studies have been ordered before reconsideration of RHD virus as a "biological agent" and a sanctioning of its deliberate spread. If these studies are carried out to truly test the

host specificity and zoonotic potential of this new and deadly virus, then scientific credibility could be restored.

Alvin W. Smith
*Laboratory for Calicivirus Studies,
College of Veterinary Medicine,
Oregon State University,
Corvallis, OR 97331, USA
E-mail: smithal@comail.orst.edu*

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Corrections and Clarifications

In the third sentence of the next-to-last paragraph of the report "Structure of the atmosphere of Jupiter: Galileo probe measurements" by A. Seiff *et al.* (10 May, p. 844), "300 µbar" should have read, "0.3 µbar."

Figure 8 (p. 514) of the Research Article "Observations of Saturn's ring-plane crossings in August and November 1995" by P. D. Nicholson *et al.* (26 Apr., p. 509) was printed upside down.

The caption of table 1 of the report "Fluorescent hydroxyl emissions from Saturn's ring atmosphere" by D. T. Hall *et al.* (26 Apr., p. 516) should have pointed out that the orientation of the Faint Object Spectrograph that acquired spectra at five target locations above Saturn's ring plane can be seen in a figure provided by the authors at the following URL site: <http://www.sciencemag.org/science/scripts/display/short/272/5261/516.html>.

Letters to the Editor

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