elected officials, families, and close friends.

Despite the hardships all the whistleblowers endured, Glazer and Glazer expect the incidence of whistleblowing to increase because, first, they believe whistleblowing is becoming a "social movement tied together by a common ideology of accountability, emerging leaders who articulate its goals, national exposure, and organizations committed to implementing strategies to bring about reforms" (p. 242), and second, they do not expect the forces that gave rise to the movement to abate soon. By the end of the book they have abandoned the balanced and scholarly tone of their earlier chapters and become advocates. Most readers will probably understand and sympathize with their position.

The courage of the dissenters is inspiring and to some extent reassuring. It is nice to know that people exist who will act on their principles, whatever the costs, and we can hope that more will emerge if they are encouraged to do so. The book ends on that hopeful note.

But the main emotions triggered by the account are more likely to be anger and alarm—anger that in the cases of whistleblowing reported on, those in authority tried to cover up wrongdoing when it was revealed to them rather than correct it, alarm because, though they did not in the end succeed in the cases reported, we do not know how much of the time such coverups are successful. How many who speak out are silenced by the campaigns of intimidation launched against them? How many who could speak out are afraid to because they know of the costs others have borne? Most alarming is to contemplate what these silences might be hiding and how harmful to society it could be.

Clearly, what Glazer and Glazer's account reveals about our society and about those who manage its most powerful organizations is deeply disturbing. Management in this country has shown itself to have a frightening capability to protect itself by hiding misconduct and other defects with grave social consequences. Some managers have been all too willing and able to try to break those who, in the words of one whistleblower, were guilty of "committing the truth" (p. 209). But the authors' account is incomplete. Perhaps in other organizations reformers were heard and heeded. It would be nice to have a book that documented the instances when management was responsive and responsible before the public was watching so that we can learn more about how organizations of all kinds can encourage the reporting of errors and misconduct and generally foster accountability.

But that is not what this book is about. Glazer and Glazer's research alerts us to the great difficulties of assuring accountability in our highly technical and complex society. They see whistleblowing as one way to achieve some measure of accountability. Few will quarrel with their hopes that whistleblowing will become easier. But the real cures lie elsewhere.

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Getting By in a Bureaucracy

Moral Mazes. The World of Corporate Managers. ROBERT JACKALL. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. xii, 249 pp. $21.95.

What would Max Weber write about bureaucracy had he begun his studies in 1980 rather than 1890? Robert Jackall suggests one path in *Moral Mazes*, a book that blends much of what we know about bureaucracy with fresh data on managerial ethics based on five years of qualitative fieldwork in three organizations. Although Jackall studied only private corporations, his findings seem generic to bureaucracies private or public. The larger question Jackall confronts is the moral underpinnings of organizational decision-making, specifically the death of the Protestant ethic in the workplace. Jackall argues that the absolutism of the Protestant ethic of an earlier managerial morality has given way to the ambiguities of a bureaucratic ethic. The book is full of interesting anecdotes, observations, and generalizations that flesh out this main point.

The new normative repertoire consists of sets of principles that managers use according to their immediate audiences and situational exigencies. For subordinates climbing the corporate level, principles such as "never embarrass your boss," "never stay in one job too long," "always follow your boss's cues," and "avoid making decisions, but appear willing to take risks" are paramount. Superiors when dealing with their subordinates should adhere to principles such as "always have a subordinate ready as a fall guy," "always back your people," and "separate yourself from the negative consequences of a subordinate's actions." And all managers should follow the maxims of "admitting a mistake only when it prompts concessions from adversaries (the norm of reciprocal concessions)" and "never [having] a relationship with a colleague that is irreplaceable." When representing the corporation to outside publics, managers must be flexible and adopt whatever stance is necessary to protect their personal (career) interests and those of the corporation. Again, social context determines the normative repertoire from which managers choose. External communication directed toward stockholders, for example, calls for moral justifications based on efficiency and return on investment, whereas corporate responsibility is the moral language appropriate for communicating with the wider public. It is apparent that some of these principles are at odds with each other, creating daily tensions that managers handle through "cover stories" that weave seemingly improbable facts and contradictory principles into believable tapestries. In the world of the manager, form dominates substance; impression management and reading through it are the key to survival and success.

As mechanical as these rules may seem, their actual implementation depends on two local factors: the social style of the organization and the manager's personal competence. The *kinds* of cover stories one tells, *how* bosses back their people, and *how* people plan and execute career moves vary from organization to organization. Managers fail most often, Jackall implies, because they are socially incompetent: They follow a moral principle inappropriate in a particular context or follow the right principles but in a manner at odds with the prevailing social style in their organization.

These observations are intriguing on their own and demonstrate the fruits of careful field research. What makes *Moral Mazes* especially interesting, however, is Jackall's explanations of managerial ethics. It is here that he directly confronts the legacy of Weber.

On one level Jackall anchors his explanations in managerial self-interest, which emphasizes how managers exploit their surroundings for their own ends. But he goes beyond this explanation to make distinctively sociological arguments about how bureaucracy creates the conditions that compel managers to operate in this fashion. To do so he draws upon Weber. Weber argued that rational-legal bureaucracies, more than other forms of organization, efficiently utilize vast amounts of material and human resources toward collective goals because of their basis in formally rational procedures, including official top-down command structures within specific jurisdictions, objective measures of personnel competence, accounting methods for dealing with material and human resources, and the outward suspension of personal in favor of organizational interests. Weber also argued that bureaucracies experience tensions between formal (procedural) and substantive rationality (that concerned with outputs). Managers are at the crux of this tension because they must meet both criteria: They must achieve personal and substantive organizational goals but adhere to procedures even when those procedures do not serve either set of goals. For procedures, not outputs, are at the core of bureaucracies. It is the necessity of circumventing procedures to get things done while at the same time satisfying procedural rules that requires the invention of cover stories.

The same argument underlies Jackall's analysis of the role of the bureaucratic ethic in the moral order of society. Just as managerial cover stories weave together facts and ethical principles to conceal tensions between procedural, personal, and substantive goals inside organizations, public relations activities do the same for communication between organizations and their publics. Managers engaging in external communication often invent and disseminate cover stories that legitimate organizational decisions, mistakes, and policies to the outside world. They too must choose not only appropriate moral justifications for their decisions and actions according to the audience to whom they are communicating, but also stories that are consistent with their social context (that is, cover stories in one industry may take different forms from those in another).

These explanations are particularly enlightening because they do not rely on so-called "moral crisis" arguments proposed by business scholars and journalists or on bare-bones rational-choice arguments proposed by economists and sociologists. From the moral crisis perspective Jackall's findings would illustrate a loss of ethical verve by American business and political leaders that has filtered into every part of American life. The rational choice view would lend greater weight to the inexorable self-interest of people and see the situational ethics that Jackall describes as generalizable across all organizations and historical epochs. Jackall, like Weber before him, argues more convincingly that the roots of the moral order of modern managers lie in the social structure of rational-legal bureaucracy. *Moral Mazes* is a finely crafted work that can and should be read by both scholars and practitioners interested in organizational life. It will surely be the standard by which to measure future studies of morality and bureaucracy.

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Trends in the Job Arena

Employment Futures. Reorganization, Dislocation, and Public Policy. PAUL OSTERMAN. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. xii, 207 pp. $24.95.

Consider the labor market for professors. It is shaped by an unusual institutional arrangement—tenure, a guarantee of almost lifetime employment after successful completion of a 6-to-10-year probationary period. Of course, professors do change jobs, and the forces of supply and demand govern both the rate at which this occurs and the compensation received. Nevertheless, these market forces, as well as the other conditions of life in this labor market—worker levels of effort over the life cycle of employment, employer monitoring of worker performance and employer decisions regarding compensation and promotion, worker turnover rates—are adjusted to the central fact of essentially complete job security for tenured workers.

This represents an extreme version of what Osterman calls the salaried model, in which, after a probationary period, employment security with the firm is essentially guaranteed. Some (albeit weaker) version of this model characterizes much white-collar and some blue-collar employment. Juxtaposed to this is the industrial model, in which the employer adjusts the size of the labor force at will, typically in response to changing market conditions. Osterman organizes his discussion of labor markets and employment policy around the contrast between these two "ideai type" employment systems. In so doing he contributes to a growing literature in which labor market analysis is enriched by the attempt to *jointly* consider market forces and the institutional arrangements within which they are operating.

The book has two main concerns. The first of these is to summarize labor market facts and trends in the current time period. The second is to suggest a national employment policy responsive to these facts and trends. Central to both discussions is the difficulty in finding reemployment, and the lower wages when it is found, encountered by some laid-off experienced workers.

Osterman defines a laid-off worker as a "loser" from the experience if he or she has either failed to find a new job or found one but had to take an earnings cut of 25% or more. Using data collected in 1984, he finds that one year after layoff, one-third of workers can be defined in this way. (This finding is replicated with 1986 data.) The chance of falling into this category is increased if the worker is black, poorly educated, or blue-collar or (among those reemployed) finds work in a different industry from the one she or he was laid off from. Osterman concludes that this reemployment difficulty faced by experienced workers constitutes a legitimate issue for an active national employment policy. By contrast with those of other writers, his policy prescriptions aim at fundamentally altering certain of our labor market institutions. These institutions, he believes, are the cause of the problem.

This brings us to the contrast between the salaried and the industrial employment models. These are the two alternative, dominant models defining the internal labor market arrangements (job classification, movement of workers across jobs, security, wage rules) of core (non–low-wage) firms. The industrial model resulted from union successes in the 1930s and was solidified in the postwar period. It involves narrowly defined jobs, with wages attached to the job rather than the individual. The ability of management to redefine work and transfer workers across jobs is limited. However, management *is* free to lay off workers at will, generally via reverse seniority. Through imitation and union-threat effects, this employment system has spread beyond its original stronghold of blue-collar jobs in unionized firms and industries. Nevertheless, it is still primarily a blue-collar employment system.

By contrast, the salaried model is typical of much white-collar employment. Here, job descriptions and career lines are more flexible and wages are set on a more personalistic basis. Workers provide a flexible response to the firm's needs in return for a commitment to avoid layoffs except under extreme circumstances. The firm's commitment to the worker's job security is central to this model. Osterman quotes the personnel director at IBM: "We believe that if people are not worried about being laid off they are flexible in making the changes we ask of them." Temporary workers, overtime, and outsourcing provide buffers against market shocks.

In the author's view, we are at the beginning of a time of change in these internal labor market arrangements. The industrial system is under pressure from new technologies that are altering traditional job classifications and whose demand for worker flexibility pushes employers toward a version of the salaried model for blue-collar workers (a push they sometimes resist quite strongly, bargaining hard for changes in work rules