

Nuclear-Weapon Decisions

Nuclear Non-Proliferation. An Agenda for the 1990s. JOHN SIMPSON, Ed. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987. xvi, 237 pp. \$42.50. Ford/Southampton Studies in North/South Security Relations. Based on a symposium, Guernsey, U.K., March 1986.

Without the Bomb. The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. MITCHELL REISS. Columbia University Press, New York, 1988. xxii, 337 pp. \$35.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation examines how the nonproliferation regime, and particularly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), can be nurtured and kept effective when proliferation trends continue to threaten global security. The symposium on which the book is based grew out of a research project headed by John Simpson, one of several important efforts in Western Europe to expand attention to the problems of containing proliferation and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The papers constitute a policy reconnaissance of the environment in which the NPT will be reviewed at five-year intervals, in 1990 and again in 1995, when a deliberate decision will be required to extend the treaty if it is not to lapse. The book calls on policy-makers and opinion leaders to prepare to support this central feature of the regime and provides a sophisticated assessment of resources and options for that task.

Though weighted toward Western European and U.S. contributors, the book contains some useful representation from developing countries, including a chapter by Mohammed Shaker, president of the third NPT Review Conference, held in 1985. It includes the contributions of a senior generation of practitioners (Sir Ronald Mason, science adviser to the U.K. Defense Department, David Fischer, formerly chief of external relations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Charles Van Doren of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency); of a currently active generation (Shaker of Egypt and Lewis Dunn, until recently Van Doren's successor at ACDA); and of those who may become practitioners in the future. In a world of changing fashions, this continuity of labor is vital.

The book is organized in four parts, each with an overview by Simpson. The first surveys the status of the nonproliferation

regime and of proliferation in the late 1980s. The contributors cautiously conclude that the worrisome near-nuclear countries probably will stay non-nuclear unless there are radical upheavals in circumstances affecting their regional security. Part 2 looks ahead to 1995 and suggests that the pivotal factors in proliferation are more likely to be political than technical and will be shaped mainly by the intensity of the U.S.-Soviet political relationship and a general drift in international relations from global reference points toward particularism reflecting the variety of local cultures and quarrels.

Options for strengthening the nonproliferation regime are the focus of part 3. Dunn and Harald Müller both emphasize building on the existing institutional foundations, with minor adaptations, rather than responding to particularist pressures with radical revisions of the NPT, IAEA, or the other established international arrangements for controlling proliferation. Philip Gummert offers a thoughtful appraisal of a sensitive and rarely studied issue—the opportunities and pitfalls of intervening politically in the internal decision-making of proliferant countries that have consciously adopted autarkic nuclear development strategies.

The last part deals with the longer term future. David Fischer assesses the possibly severe challenges posed by amendments to the NPT or efforts to prevent its extension in 1995. Joseph Pilat and Van Doren explore various scenarios to characterize the workings of the system of international nuclear cooperation in the absence of or during a breakdown of the NPT—pictures that are not necessarily disastrous, but clearly grim enough to warn against complacency. Simpson's concluding essay pulls the strands together in an agenda for fortifying the NPT and its chances for extension in 1995.

Mitchell Reiss's *Without the Bomb* is a portrait of six countries that could have "gone nuclear" but did not, or least did not go "all the way": Sweden, South Korea, Japan, Israel, South Africa, and India. Each has acquired the technical means to build bombs. So far, none is an acknowledged nuclear power. In a simplistic theory of international relations—which Reiss uses as his foil—sovereign states covet and invariably acquire the military instruments they have the means for. Thus, Reiss sets up the

puzzle of nuclear-capable countries that forgo the bomb. His book is an effort to explain why this logic does not necessarily apply. His explanation gives most of the credit to factors other than the formal non-proliferation regime.

To "go nuclear" all the way is to declare, build, and deploy nuclear weapons. The world's five recognized nuclear powers all meet these criteria. The six picked out by Reiss admittedly fail this three-cornered test. But a jury today using the evidence Reiss himself presents might convict Israel and South Africa of going nuclear by setting just the first criterion aside, and India of going nuclear by dwelling only on the second. Thus, the sample actually is a mixed bag ranging from committed non-nuclear (Sweden and Japan) to quasinuclear (India) and probably covert nuclear (Israel and South Africa) powers.

Not surprisingly, given that the phenomenon he attempts to explain, nuclear abstention, carries such different meanings from one case to the next, Reiss's theoretical analysis is less than tidy. At bottom, he finds that domestic factors and penalties in bilateral relations weigh heavily, which is to say that states on the bomb threshold often find they are not sure they want to cross it after all, or are reluctant to admit it publicly when they do, because of political costs or perceived risks.

In contrast, Reiss's case studies of nuclear development and decision milestones are tidily written. Yet these show signs of being unevenly researched and, as historical renditions, should be approached with caution. In four of the cases (Israel, South Korea, South Africa, and India) Reiss documents a common theme: the manipulation by national leaders of the "threat to proliferate" for political or foreign policy objectives. He also nicely illustrates the nonproliferation side of this coin; the leverage of the threat to proliferate disappears if the state in question openly goes nuclear. Awareness of this penalty, Reiss discovers, helps to explain the decisions of the quasinuclear and covert nuclear states to avoid dropping their veils completely.

In his chapter analyzing the findings from the cases, Reiss is concerned first and foremost with political motivations for restraint. He seeks to identify the external and internal incentives for forgoing nuclear weapons and to determine which dominate in each case. Not surprisingly, the balance varies considerably.

Reiss suggests that internal factors dominate in three cases. In Sweden, where nuclear weapons research was not stopped until the early 1970s, not going nuclear finally is attributed to the delicacy of the governing

party's hold on power. In Japan, the explanation is the famous "nuclear allergy" conditioned by the nation's unique experience as a victim of nuclear bombing. In India, it is a conscious assessment of tradeoffs in domestic economic and political costs.

For the other three nations, external factors appear to be dominant. The security tie with the United States is more important to South Korea, given the threat from heavily armed North Korea, than having its own nuclear weapons. Both Israel and South Africa, in the class of "besieged states," risk intensifying local threats and international antagonism if they go nuclear openly, but profit from being perceived as latent nuclear powers. They exercise restraint, but in a highly calculated way, and barely.

Reiss then infers that the nonproliferation regime was not a major restraining factor in any of these cases. Apart from challenging the conventional wisdom, the purpose of this observation is not clear. It should be no surprise to find that three countries in the sample—countries that openly reject the NPT, a central feature of the nonproliferation regime—are not directly restrained by that aspect of the regime. The inference is surprising, however, in the cases of Sweden, Japan, and South Korea, since all are NPT members. But is it correct?

There is a way out. Reiss finds that a nonproliferation norm acts as a less tangible restraint on nuclear decisions in each selected case. He regards this norm, somewhat arbitrarily, as political and therefore different from the nonproliferation regime, which he construes narrowly in legal and technical terms. Therein lies the mistake. The regime has legal and technical attributes, to be sure, but it could never have formed unless it was based on constructs, effort, and adjustment that were inherently political. The norm itself is integral to the regime. That it is observed in some degree even by threshold states that reject certain formal institutions of the regime is reassuring. But would it be so if most states had not joined those institutions?

These two books are quite different but complementary for those who need to understand what is happening on the proliferation front. The Reiss contribution is readable and informative, and valuable in its political focus on how states decide not to go (overtly) nuclear. The Simpson book is indispensable for those who need to know in practical terms how the issues will be framed when the NPT is reviewed and, if they have a mind to play a part, how to get ready.

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Academic Trials

Cold War on Campus. A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control. LIONEL S. LEWIS. Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1988. x, 358 pp. \$29.95.

Cold War on Campus by sociologist Lionel Lewis is based on an examination of the cases of 128 faculty members whose appointments were lost or threatened between 1947 and 1956 as a result of their political beliefs or activities. Drawing on the records of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and on the archival collections of more than 20 colleges and universities, Lewis has sought to compile comparable data on the disposition of each of the 128 cases.

The faculty involved, Lewis concludes from these data, were a more or less conventional lot, including both junior and senior faculty from among the full range of academic disciplines. The overwhelming majority were white males, with Jews perhaps overrepresented. Though most identified themselves (or were identified by others) as radicals and dissenters, only a small minority were highly active politically. In short, there was little aside from their political beliefs to distinguish them from other faculty. Almost half of them came to the attention of academic authorities only after they had been summoned to appear before congressional committees, usually the House Committee on Un-American Activities or the Senate Internal Security Committee. Others were identified as a result of their unwillingness to sign loyalty oaths, their support for Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party, or other political activities. Nor, according to Lewis, did the characteristics of the institutions at which they taught have much impact on how their cases were settled. Faculty at larger or more prestigious institutions were apparently at no less risk than those teaching at smaller or more parochial schools.

The disposition of cases involving individual faculty varied widely. Dismissal, in most cases, came only after protracted hearings, committee meetings, and other deliberations. Virtually no one defended the right of Communists to teach; the Association of American Universities (AAU) expressed a consensus among academic administrators when it declared, in 1953, that scholarly integrity and independence were incompatible with membership in the Communist Party and that such membership "extinguishes the right to a university position." Faculty accused of Party membership or sympathies were required to clear themselves by testifying as to their political beliefs

and activities. Those called before congressional committees were particularly vulnerable. If they denied accusations by the committee, they were liable to prosecution for perjury. If they testified as to their own beliefs and activities, moreover, they were required to testify as well concerning the beliefs and activities of others—to become informers. Yet to refuse to testify, to invoke the First or Fifth Amendment, was viewed by many institutions as grounds for dismissal. Faculty members had, most authorities agreed, a duty to cooperate fully with congressional investigations. The invocation of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, the AAU concluded, "places upon a professor a heavy burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university an obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society." Those faculty members who fully cooperated with congressional investigators generally managed to keep their jobs. So did some who refused to testify before congressional committees but who were willing to talk freely before colleagues and university authorities. Those who refused to testify before both congressional committees and university authorities, who argued that their political beliefs were irrelevant to their competence as teachers and scholars, were almost invariably dismissed.

The principal actors in this process, according to Lewis, were college and university administrators, who, he believes, could have stood up to outside pressures (as in fact a handful did). They did not do so, he argues, not because they feared communism or subversion but because they feared that they and their institutions would suffer from damaging public relations. Institutional politics, not ideology, he concludes, drove the cold war on American campuses.

Unfortunately, *Cold War on Campus* is a badly flawed book. It is, despite citations from many archival sources, both poorly researched and poorly documented. Many important archival collections are ignored, as is much of the secondary literature. Information on faculty and institutions, we are told, was "encoded," but nowhere is there a systematic presentation of such information. The notes are highly incomplete, failing to include, for example, the collection from which a citation has been taken or its location. The volume is neither well organized nor well written. Nor, finally, is the author's reasoning always persuasive. Should one conclude, for example, that because institutional politics played an important role in the disposition of individual cases ideology was therefore unimportant or the struggles occurring on campuses therefore were not "another arena for the larger ideological