

couple, one child"; (iii) to persuade couples wishing for a second child to have planned spacing; and (iv) to avoid second or multi-births outside planning (with proper flexibilities for national minorities).

Advocacy of "one couple, one child" does not mean that every couple must have only one child. The 1985 statistics show that only about 20% of China's 190 million married couples of childbearing age have expressed a wish for one-child families; nearly 20% of eligible couples currently have third and subsequent births.

Three points should be clarified.

1) Some Chinese regulations do stipulate certain conditions under which couples may have two children, with the implication that other couples, if having a second child, will have to pay certain fees to the public welfare fund to lighten the burden on society. This is not meant to stop a second or third birth entirely, since even children born out of wedlock are protected by law.

2) Psychologically speaking, if couples were encouraged to have one child each, a portion of them would tend to have two. If they were encouraged to have two children each, then there would be more cases of third and high-order births. That is the general phenomenon in rural areas of China.

3) The important thing is that people's wishes are respected. China has carried out public education in various forms to encourage the practice of the one-child family norm, but has not used coercion to force it upon the people. In China, human responsibilities are stressed as well as human rights. All policies, no matter how good, must be adopted on the condition that the majority of the people will accept them.

ZHAO ZHIPEI

*State Family Planning Commission,
2 Nanshuncheng Street, Xizhimen,
Beijing, China*

NOTE

1. This letter is condensed from a longer manuscript available from the author.

Response: In writing our article, we hoped to stimulate research and debate on alternatives to the one-child-per-family policy, a policy of obvious high cost both to the Chinese population and, in political terms, to the Chinese government.

Zhao does not address the nature of the analysis presented in the article. The article was not about China's current fertility policy and whether or not it has "broken down." (In fact, as we point out, it has been extraordinarily successful in meeting its demographic objectives.) Rather, the piece addressed the issue of policy criteria—the

number and kinds of factors that should be considered in the formulation of a demographically effective, socially and economically desirable, and culturally acceptable population policy.

Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s the number of factors considered in the formulation of China's population policy appears to have widened. In our article we further expanded the range of factors that, arguably, should guide policy choice to include the policy's macrodemographic impact on population size and aging; its microdemographic effects on the family's ability to support the elderly, its economic capabilities, and the position of women; and the cultural acceptability to the Han Chinese population. Most of the article consisted of an evaluation of the present policy and five hypothetical policy alternatives with regard to these criteria. Our conclusion suggested that when the policy options are weighed with all these criteria, the present policy ranks below the other options. We argued that the 27-4 option is appealing not so much because it meets China's specified demographic objectives—although it does so—but because it succeeds in achieving a wide range of desirable social, economic, and demographic goals.

With regard to the timing of childbearing, we maintain that the demographic impact of delayed childbearing has consistently been underestimated in China. Even though, as Zhao indicates, current policy continues to advocate late marriage and long spacing, in fact these policy elements have been given less emphasis than the reduction in the number of children. As a result, in some parts of the country the age at marriage and childbearing has recently been falling, with obvious consequences for population growth rates.

Zhao's comments on "cultural conditioning" as expressed in peasants' marriage and childbearing desires are very much to the point. Where we differ from Zhao is in the policy implications of these cultural preferences. He implies that because "there is not likely to be a single woman in the rural area who would wish to delay having her first child until the age of 27," a policy stipulating such a delay is not worth considering. Our view is that all options should be open for discussion. On the issue of delayed childbearing, we would point out that demographic preferences of individuals do not exist in a vacuum, but are subject to constraints—most particularly, in the case of China, constraints imposed by the needs of society as determined by its leaders. With regard to delaying childbearing until age 27, our argument is not that peasants would wish to do so, but that, given a societally

dictated choice between having one child any time or two children beginning at age 27, a rural Chinese couple might well prefer two children at a later age. Our general aim here was not to advocate any specific policy, but to expand the range of options available to policy-makers, offering policy alternatives that may be more in line with individual preferences and more effective in achieving national demographic targets than the current policy.

A trip to China in the fall of 1987 indicated that scholarly interest in population policy alternatives is growing. We welcome further dialogue on the desirability of different options and the criteria underlying policy choice.

SUSAN GREENHALGH

JOHN BONGAARTS

*Center for Policy Studies,
The Population Council,
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza,
New York, NY 10017*

Newton Gravitational Constant

A controversial topic of late is the possible variation with distance of the Newtonian gravitational constant, G . One explanation for this phenomenon is a possible fifth force in nature. Because the ramifications of such an important new effect would be far reaching, there is considerable enthusiasm among scientists to perform experiments that might shed light on the issue. The strongest evidence for non-Newtonian behavior is the difference between the value of G measured in an Australian mine shaft, where the length scale of the experiment was hundreds of meters (1), and the value of G determined very accurately in the laboratory over a length scale of tens of centimeters (2).

In his report "Borehole measurement of the Newtonian gravitational constant" (21 Aug., p. 881), A. T. Hsui correctly concludes that his results for G are "generally consistent with those of the Australian experiment." Although it is difficult to compare the uncertainties of the various results because the geophysical error bars contain a subjective element, Hsui's results are also consistent with the value of G found by Luther and Towler in the laboratory and, indeed, with the value surmised by Isaac Newton some 300 years ago (3). The unavoidably large uncertainty in Hsui's measurement that comes about from inadequate density information does not allow a conclusion to be drawn about the discrepancy between the value determined by Stacey's group in Australia and the laboratory value. Contrary to the statement in This Week in