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Migration and Western Europe: The Old World Turning New

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The 1960s meant a historical turn of Western Europe, becoming an immigration area. Net immigration has been concentrated to some of the prosperous Western European countries and has been mainly determined by the demand of their particular national labor regimes. The size of alien employment has been very differently affected by the 1973 crisis, but a multiethnical society will remain a novel feature of most Western European countries. Political abdication from full employment and technological change makes a ghetto of un(der)employment a likely prospect of a large part of the second generation of recent immigrants into Western Europe.

POST–WORLD WAR II MIGRATIONS HAVE TRANSFORMED Western Europe to an extent and a depth which Europeans—citizens, politicians, official statisticians, scholars—are still only beginning to cope with. Currently there are more foreign-born residents of Sweden (7.8% in 1985) or of the United Kingdom (7% in 1983) than of the United States (6.0%, 1981–1985) (*1*). The proportion of resident aliens at the end of 1984 or 1985 was 9.1% in Belgium, 8.1% in France, 14.4% in Switzerland, and 7.1% in West Germany (*2*).

Recent migrations have changed the position of Europe in the world and inter-European relations as well as the internal structure of Northern and Central European societies. Of old, at least since the beginning of the conquest of the Americas, Europe was a continent of emigration. Between 1850 and 1960 it has been estimated that about 55 million people, equivalent to about 18% of the Western European population in 1910, left Western Europe for other continents (*3*). However, after the end of World War II, Western Europe became a region of immigration.

If we disregard the force migration of Germans from Eastern Europe into West Germany in the aftermath of the defeat of the Nazis—an exodus of massive proportions, landing 8 million people in the Federal Republic by 1950, 16% of the total population of the country—the historical turn took place in two stages. The first one occurred in the 1950s, resulting in a migration surplus in Western Europe (including Greece) of almost 500,000 for the decade (*4*). But this first wave of net immigration had a rather special character that might be thought of as temporary. It was heavily dominated by East Germans moving into West Germany, 3 million between 1950 and 1960 (*5*).

The second phase, however, showed decisively that fundamental structural changes were taking place. Counting in decades, the key period runs from 1964 to 1973. Then migration for all the countries of the area (including Greece) taken together showed a surplus of 2,314,000 (*6*). In France and Germany the demographic impact of immigration was quite dramatic: 37% of French population growth between 1964 and 1973 was due to immigration, and at its recent height, in 1970, net immigration meant a population increase of 0.35%. At its peak in Germany, in 1968–69, net immigration each year added 0.9% to the total population, and for the years 1964 to 1973, immigration accounted for 90% of population growth (*6*). As a yardstick for comparison, take a figure from U.S. immigration at its peak. In 1913, net arrivals of immigrants from overseas corresponded to 0.9% of the then American population (*7*), the same as net migration into West Germany in 1968 and 1969.

The turn of Western Europe from a people-exporting to a people-importing area was the product of two migratory changes. One, and the more important one, was the opening of immigration routes from outside Western Europe. By the mid-1980s, there were from major ethnic groups about 6.7 million registered non–Western European resident aliens and ex-colonial immigrants in the Western European countries of significant gross immigration, about 2.2% of the total population (*8*). This opening was above anything else a reversal of the old colonial relationship of European settlement. Modernizing social changes combined with little or truncated development, after as well as before independence, turned the old colonizing countries into ex-colonial labor markets. Of the 6.7 million mentioned, 3.9 million are ex-colonials. (Returned European settlers are not counted here.)

The second process involved has been a redirection of Western European emigration from intercontinental to intracontinental migration. Finnish emigration was redirected already after World War II to Sweden. But for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain the turn

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came about 1960. The change was mainly an end of mass emigration to Latin America, due to economic stagnation there. Both processes, then, imply an epochal shift in the relationship of Europe to what is now called the Third World (*9*).

National Trajectories of Migration

Western Europe is not a political unit, nor until the 1960s was it an area of migration. Therefore, we had better distinguish the national histories of international migration (Table 1).

All countries of Western Europe, except France, have been emigration countries. Since 1815, Western European migration has had six periods of nationally unevenly distributed trend breaks (the beginning of overseas emigration uncounted): the late 19th-century boom, the aftermath of World War I, the onset of the Depression, the aftermath of World War II, the final phase of the post–World War II boom, and the onset of the 1973 oil crisis. But ceasing to be a country of out-migration does not necessarily mean becoming an immigration country, here defined as having a sustained net immigration equal to or exceeding one promille of the resident population. Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom—in the latter case in spite of a substantial gross immigration—have not become immigration countries in this sense. And recent Finnish, Greek, Italian, and Portuguese—and Irish in the 1970s—immigration is almost exclusively or overwhelmingly the return of former emigrant nationals.

The Historical Sociology and Politics of the Demand for Foreign Labor

European emigration was basically supply-determined by the push of demography, closed opportunities, and persecution, and by the pull of available land, higher wages, and more freedom (*10*). The major waves of Western European immigration during the past century, on the other hand, have been strongly demand-determined (except for West Germany until about 1960). Demand has initiated, directed, and controlled immigration, and in this century demand has been politically organized by, or at least under, the auspices of immigration governments. The master form has been a bilateral treaty between a recruiting and a recruitment country (*11*). Demand has been for labor, which takes us to the functioning of labor markets. We shall see that this demand is not simply and directly related to an overall scarcity of native labor, but is also largely due to domestic social divisions, both outside and in the labor market. The popular concept of a "dual labor market" appears too crude to capture the complexity and variety of these divisions. To demonstrate this, we shall briefly go through the most important cases of turns toward massive immigration.

Switzerland in the 1890s. Switzerland was an old out-migration country, mainly exporting mercenaries but also civilians. As emigration units the majority of the confederated Swiss cantons, in 1827, concluded agreements of free settlement with the kingdoms of France and Piedmont-Savoy, 21 years before there was free settlement among the Swiss cantons themselves. The post-1848 federal government then concluded free settlement treaties with a large number of countries. Here was the legal framework for the sudden turn in the 1890s (*12*). The change involved a decrease, by 40% compared to the previous decade, of Swiss emigration, but the latter still remained high, 1.7% of the native population from 1888 to 1900, about the same from 1900 to 1910 (*13*). The new demand for labor came in part from the engineering industry but, above all, from the surge of Alpine railway construction and from the construction industry in general. The Swiss were little interested in those jobs, in part because strong handicraft traditions and a widespread ownership and co-ownership of land had impeded proletarianization, in part because many had the option of emigrating to a higher end of the labor market as craftsmen and skilled service personnel (*13*, p. 182).

After World War I in Switzerland, France, and Beligum. The postwar migration policies of these countries were established during the war. Switzerland, as a small neutral country anxious to keep out of the conflicts of her neighbors, closed her borders to keep draft evaders and refugees out. A quasi-insurrectionary general strike by a largely foreign radical working class frightened the ruling class, and a postwar policy of diminishing economic dependence upon foreign workers ensued (*12*, p. 198). Therefore, Switzerland fell out from the other immigration countries in this period, for a time becoming an out-migration country again.

Table 1. Periods of significant net migration into or from Western European states, 1815 to 1984 (*42*). Significant net migration is defined as at least one per thousand population. Longer periods may include odd years with a migratory balance or with an opposite sign. Except for the times since 1973, periods shorter than 5 years are not noted, nor are the years of the two World Wars.

Country	Emigration	Immigration
Austria*	1922–26, 1949–61	1965–73
Belgium	1847–66	1922–33, 1945–75
Denmark	1866–1914, 1926–30	
Finland	1860s†, 1945–70	1981–
France		1830–37, 1875–86, 1920–31, 1948–73
Germany‡	1848–96	1947–1973
Greece§	1950–74	1975–
Ireland‖	1832–1970, 1982–	1971–78
Italy	1860s–1971	1982–
Netherlands¶	1880–1913, 1946–57	1964–81
Norway	1849–1930	
Portugal**	–1973	1981–
Spain **	1888–96, 1904–14, 1919–25, 1949–1974	
Sweden	1830s, 1848–1930	1945–70, 1974–
Switzerland††	1870s–1891, 1919–25, 1975–78	1892–1913, 1928–31, 1945–1973
United Kingdom‡‡	1901–31	
England and Wales§§	1881–1926	1838–49, 1931–39, 1959–64

*The Austrian Republic from 1920 only. †Before World War II Finland has a pattern of migation oscillating strongly from year to year. ‡From 1842, territory as of 1871–1937, after World War II the Federal Republic only. §Covered from 1920 only. ‖From 1910, territory of the Republic only. ¶Data from 1841. **From 1850 onward. ††From 1872. ‡‡Covered from 1901 only. §§From 1838 to 1975.

In France, on the other hand, as part of mobilization for the war effort, the state took charge of the recruitment of foreign workers, mainly Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek. After the war, a special labor importation corporation was set up, in close cooperation with the state, by the big employers of the Mine and Metallurgy Industries Association. The main objective was to recruit Italians and Poles for the mining and steel industry, for which few French workers could be found in spite of considerable paternalist efforts (*14*). Before the war, Belgians had provided a substantial part of mining and steel work in northern France, as well as at home, but after it there was in Belgium a scarcity of native labor for this kind of work. Belgium too resorted to an organized recruitment of Poles, Italian, Czechs, and other Eastern Europeans (*15*). In both countries there was also a substantial nonorganized immigration of Eastern European Jews and of Russian refugees.

After World War II. The special German case apart, the largest postwar immigration effort was proposed by the French. French immigration policy came out of a very interesting political and scientific debate. One camp in the early postwar discussion, represented by, among others, the great demographer Alfred Sauvy and the future Foreign Minister Robert Schumann, argued the necessity of a massive immigration in order to achieve the necessary reconstruction of the country. The Planning Commission, headed by Jean Monnet, on the other hand, saw mass immigration as only one option. The alternative, also deemed possible, was raising the productivity of the French economy. The populationists won politically, and a state body was set up to organize immigration. The immigration of Germans, Spanish, Portuguese, North Africans, and sub-Saharan Africans was deemed undesirable, which mainly left Italy as a recruitment area. Due to the malfunctioning of the French postwar currency and for other reasons, France turned out much less attractive to Italian immigrants than planned. Instead came the first massive Algerian immigration, made possible by the proximity of and the legally open entry from this then part of the French empire (*14*, p. 10).

The Belgian government also turned to Italy, signing an agreement with the latter in 1946 to recruit 50,000 Italian workers in exchange for the delivery of 3 million tons of coal (*15*, p. 312).

Switzerland resorted to her pre–World War I policy of recruiting foreign, mainly Italian, labor for expanding the heavy manufacturing and construction industries. But this time it was an immigration corseted in a draconian framework of legal and police control, established during the Depression of the 1930s. Whereas the French immigrationists planned for the settlement of families of desirable immigrant workers, their assimilation, and even for the "francisation" of their names, the Swiss created a class apart of an "alien work force" (*12*, p. 200). Internationally competitive wages made this policy successful.

The peak of the postwar boom. The largest part of this immigration wave was directed by the West Germans, and the Federal Republic also had the most extensive debate about migration policy. The debate about and the planning for non-German immigration had already began in 1954 and 1955. There was at this time still not full employment, but the drying up in the near future of the Eastern European reservoir could be foreseen and, most directly, there were difficulties in recruiting laborers to agriculture. The reasons for labor import were set out in the October 1955 issue of the business journal *Industriekurier* (*16*):

> —native labor reserves can only be utilized through regional mobility which is limited by available housing, whereas alien labor can be housed in barracks (which also happened in the first period of non-German mass immigration);
>
> —an increased entry of women onto the labor market is undesirable for reasons of family policy;
>
> —an accelerated technical rationalization faces limits on the capital market;
>
> —a prolongation of working time is politically unfeasible.

Employers also stressed the "total" mobility of foreign workers as a major advantage. Government spokesmen emphasized the general labor scarcity to be foreseen after the drying up of the East German reserves and the specific advantages to be derived from the price-stabilizing effects of the high savings ratio of foreign workers and from their contributions to paying for German pensions (*5*, p. 195).

A labor import agreement, for a time a fairly marginal one, was made with Italy in 1955, followed by ones with Greece and Spain in 1960, with Turkey in 1961, with Portugal in 1964, and with Yugoslavia in 1968. As in Switzerland, the import of labor into West Germany was legally framed by very restrictive decrees dating from the 1930s, narrowly circumscribing the permits of aliens and fully controlling their movements, a framework from which European Economic Community nationals (Italians) were exempted (*17*). Remarkably enough this piece of German legislation from January 1933, which had been brought into Austria by the Nazi Anschluss, was still in force, governing the recruitment of foreign workers into Austria, which gathered momentum toward the end of the 1960s (*18*). But the guest worker legislation of the Depression was not capable of mastering the tight labor market and the more humane sociopolitical situation of the 1960s and early 1970s. By 1978, 23.7% of the alien population of West Germany was under 16 years of age, in Switzerland 27.2% was under 16—about the same proportion of foreign children as in the more official immigration countries of France (25.2% in 1975) and Sweden (30.3% in 1976) (*19*).

Competition in the Italian labor market, from the Germans, the Swiss, and North Italian employers, led the French government in the early 1960s to issue a new series of immigration or free migration agreements, with Spain in 1961, with Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Mali, and Mauretania in 1963, with Senegal in 1964, and with Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1965. The peace agreement with the Algerians in 1962 also included a clause of free migration (*20*).

Manufacturing and Construction

The bulk of immigrant laborers are manufacturing workers; manufacturing ranges from 43% of foreign employment in Switzerland to 54% in West Germany with France in between (*21*). The last Western European wave of immigration coincides with the last expansion of manufacturing employment in the immigration countries in a context of full employment, with a registered unemployment below 2% by around 1960. For the two major net immigration countries of this period, manufacturing employment reaches its all-time high in 1974 in France and in 1970 in Germany. In Austria this occurred in 1982 and in Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland about 1965. As a proportion of total employment, manufacturing in France and Germany peaked in 1973–74 and in 1970, respectively (*22*).

By the end of 1985, aliens accounted for 10.7% of all employment in the West German manufacturing industry and for 30.5% in the Swiss (*21*). Their share of manual work is much higher, for example, 27% of all assembly and assistance workers in engineering, 25% of chemical workers, and 24% of metal manufacturing workers in Germany (*23*).

There is one major industrial branch with a remarkable variation of immigrant employment—construction. In France and Switzerland, this is an important part of alien employment. In France in 1979, construction work employed 29% of foreign workers, which constituted about 20% of the employment in the industry (*24*). In Switzerland, at the end of 1985, construction workers represented 12.5% of the foreign labor force, and aliens made up 38% of the construction work force (*25*). In Britain, the Irish are traditionally

concentrated in construction, with 30% of the Irish work force in Britain in 1966, and 8.6% non-British workers, slightly above the relatively even sector-distributed foreign labor force (*26*). In Germany in 1985, only 10% of construction workers were foreign, down from 12.5% about 1970, and only 9% of employed foreigners are to be found in construction (*27*). But the real contrast is Sweden, where (at the end of 1986) construction constitutes no more than 3.6% of foreign employment and where aliens account for only 3% of the work volume carried out (*28*). The wage structure is correspondingly different. Putting average wages in manufacturing at 100, in 1982 construction wages were 98.6 in France, 101 in Switzerland, 102 in Britain, 105.5 in Germany, and 116.8 in Sweden (*29*). This is most likely rather the cause of different sources of labor supply than the effect of foreign imports. Construction has been a high wage industry in Sweden for some time, with entry through a well-established apprentice system and with very strong unions. Construction shows more clearly than most branches—although the few Irish in English coal mining also provides a good contrast to mining in Belgium and France—that the native attractiveness of jobs is partly variable, with particular regimes of labor.

Immigration into Particular Regimes of Labor

Demographic developments and general labor market conditions provide only a broad, usually low-working causal basis for the new European pattern of migration. The concrete demand for foreign labor has been determined by conjunctions of specific, historically evolved national labor regimes. These regimes involve the industrial and property structure, technological patterns, the position of women in the labor market, the position of labor in the domestic job markets, and internal migration patterns. The most relevant aspects of the historical evolution of these labor regimes are experiences of non-regulated in-migration and national population politics.

The little proletarianized Swiss labor regime faced great problems in meeting the sudden demand for masses of unskilled labor at the time of the difficult railway construction in the late 19th century, a demand which easily could be met by foreign labor because of pre-existing migration treaties made for opposite purposes. This made labor by aliens part of the Swiss way of life, of the Swiss labor regime, but the size of the alien work force remained a political option. The organized labor import into Belgium after both World Wars and into France after World War I was too specific to be explained by the hecatomb of the war, and it seems rather to have speeded up a process, begun before the war, of substituting foreign for reluctant native labor. This acceleration was directly made possible by state experiences of labor mobilization during the war and, possibly, the prospects of increased indigenous labor elsewhere. Concern with a low birth rate and slow-growing population had been a largely militarily motivated national concern in France since its first defeat at German hands in 1871. After World War II a peopling concept of reconstruction came to prevail over a productivist one.

The "German miracle" had obviously, and unexpectedly, benefited from the large influx from the East, and a continuous import of labor had become part of the West German labor regime. Well before the domestic labor force was fully employed, the ruling forces of the country were planning for a widening of the areas of foreign supply. On a much smaller scale, Swedish industry had become accustomed to Nordic immigration after the war, which also made it easy to throw the recruitment net wider in the 1960s.

The extensive postwar industrialization required more factory labor, which was not that easily attracted in the prosperous 1960s, although Norway and Denmark managed it without making significant use of foreign labor, and Britain without active recruitment. The late emigration countries, Austria and the Netherlands, on the other hand, found it most convenient to import labor, in spite of an extremely low, till the early 1970s stably so, female labor force participation in the Netherlands. In Austria, the import of labor was accompanied by a decline of female labor force participation in the 1960s and 1970s (*30*).

The Crisis, New Labor Regimes, and Foreign Labor

The 1973 crisis brought a structural transformation of the world economy. It immediately altered the labor market situation and, with the exception of Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland, European governments soon abdicated from attempting to maintain full employment (*31*). Although the size of alien populations has continued to rise, through family reunions mainly, the number of foreign workers has gone down.

The most drastic change is to be found in Austria. Between 1973 and 1984 the number of employed foreign workers in Austria declined by 38.7% at the same time as the number of native workers and employees increased by 27.4% (*32*). Austrian full employment policy is more nativist than the better known Swiss one. Foreign employment in Switzerland was 11.9% less in 1985 than in 1973 after a partial recovery since 1977, whereas native employment was 0.4% less (*33*).

Changes in West Germany have also been dramatic. Between the end of 1985 and 1973, the number of employed alien wage and salary earners has been reduced by 39%, whereas the number of German workers went down by 5.1% (*34*). Aliens in the labor force have also decreased in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, by 13 to 15% since the peak. But their number has risen in France, by 30.4% between 1973 and 1983 (there was a decline from 1977 to 1981), and by 23.9% in the United Kingdom; these declines were accompanied by increase in the native labor force of 6.3 and 3.6%, respectively (*35*).

National patterns continue to vary. Active, although voluntary, return migration policies have been pursued by Germany, most effectively, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. But more important has been the government control of short-term labor contracts, decisive in Austria and Switzerland, significant also in Germany. The Swedish reduction is completely spontaneous, mainly due to a narrowing of the income and labor market gap between Sweden and Finland (*36*). Migrant workers have been affected both by exported and by host country unemployment. Global French and British unemployment rates are higher than the German but have never been as high as that among foreign workers in Germany, 13.9% in 1985 and 21% in the four northenmost German states (*23*, p. 31).

An extreme case is the Dutch situation. In early 1987 the unemployment rates among West Indians and the Moluccans (both ex-colonial immigrants) in Holland was 45%, among Turks and Moroccans (recruited labor) 40% (*37*).

The labor regime is changing. The heavy, unskilled manufacturing jobs, for which immigrants were recruited, are irreversibly declining. Many of the latter are, or are considered by employers, incapable of learning the new automated forms of production (*38*). There are and there will probably be some more outlets in the catering industry and in personal services. But the main tendency of European labor markets seems to be that the new labor regime will require more formal qualifications and will offer fewer jobs without formal qualifications. The children of immigrants receive much less post-elementary education than natives. The former made up 7.9% of the total German school population, but accounted for only 2.7%

of the apprenticeships in 1983 (*39*). In this way, the unemployment of tomorrow is being produced today.

The New World as a Ghetto?

Western Europe has indeed become a New World, in the sense of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies shaped significantly by immigration. In spite of restrictive labor market policies and of official encouragement of return migration by continental European countries, the resident alien population of the Western European immigration countries increased by 2.1 million (naturalizations uncounted) between 1985 and 1973 (*40*). Even countries of recent major emigration, such as Greece and Italy, are getting immigrant ethnic minorities (*8*). The rich cultural potential of this new influx has been very little tapped so far. European social sciences and humanities, for example, have, on the whole, expressed little interest in and produced little new knowledge about the countries of out-migration, about their relations to Western Europe, and about the bearing of immigrant experience upon psychology and psycholinguistics. Current migration research tends to stick very closely to immediate policy issues. (As such, it usually plays a supportive role, which is far from unimportant.) With a few odd exceptions here and there, the esthetic impact has been confined to English and French ex-colonial literature.

The prospects for a large number of recent immigrants into Western Europe and for their children seem bleak. They arrived in the final stage of a labor regime of extensive industrialization, which has now ended. The young, vigorous workers recruited from outside in the 1960s and early 1970s facilitated the mobility of the native Central and Northern Europeans into more pleasant jobs, increased the profitability of the industrial expansion, and contributed heavily to paying for the enormous growth of the welfare states, from which old-age natives benefited most (*41*). The migrants and their families also gained, from work and higher wages, perhaps also from wider cultural experiences. But now, many migrants are worn out, their labor is no longer wanted, and they are uprooted from their countries of origin, while confronted with rising racism in their new home countries. Their children are often already strongly disadvantaged in the schooling process.

Options are still open, but the current predominant tendency—not without its counterpoints—is that the Old World turned New is getting the worst of both worlds, the underclass ghettoes of the New while keeping the traditional cultural closure of the Old.

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21. Calculations from *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 1986* (Berne, 1986), pp. 97 and 341; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1986* (Wiesbaden, 1986), p. 105; *Données Sociales* (INSEE, Paris, ed. 4, 1981), p. 92. The French figures refer to the 1970s, the others to 1985. Manufacturing work occupied 60% of the foreigners in Sweden in 1970, but an extensive employment of immigrant women in the public social sector, largely as hospital auxiliaries, has led to a situation where manufacturing and public services each account for a good third of immigrant employment [E. Wadensjö, *Immigration och Samhällsekonomi* (Studentlitteratur, Lund, 1973), p. 158; *Arbetsmarknaden 1970–1983* (Statistiska Centralbyrån, Stockholm, 1984), p. 101].
22. Data from OECD (*6*, country table III) and P. Flora *et al.*, *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815–1975* (Campus, Frankfurt, 1987) vol. 2, chap. 7.
23. H. Werner, *Arbeitsmarktsanalyse 1985 anhand ausgewählter Bestand und Bewegungsdaten* (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg, 1986), unpublished work report, p. 36. French data appear more irregularly, but, for example, by the end of the 1970s, 26% of the employment in the French auto industry was alien [M. Goubet and J.-L. Roucolle, *Population et société française 1945–1981* (Sirey, Paris, 1980), p. 25.]
24. See *Données Sociales* (INSEE, Paris, 1981), p. 92, and OECD (*6*, p. 225).
25. Calculated from *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz* (*27*, pp. 97 and 341).
26. Calculated from S. Castles and G. Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structures in Western Europe* (Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1973), table 15.
27. Calculated from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik* (*27*, p. 105).
28. Calculated from *Statistiska Meddelanden Am 11 8701* (Statistiska Centralbyrån, Stockholm, 1987), pp. 36 and 40.
29. Calculated from Swedish Employers' Confederation. *Wages and Total Labour Costs for Workers. International Survey 1972–1982* (SAF, Stockholm, 1984), pp. 38 and 72.
30. OECD, *Historical Statistics 1960–1983* (OECD, Paris, 1985), p. 34.
31. See G. Therborn, *Why Some Peoples Are More Unemployed Than Others* (Verso, London, 1986).
32. Calculations from Frey (*2*, p. 20) and OECD (*6*, pp. 158–159).
33. Calculations from *Statistisches Jahrbuch* (*27*, p. 91 and 341). Swiss reduction of foreign employment was somewhat more drastic than the Austrian, 24.7% from 1973 to 1977 as against 23.2% from 1973 to 1976 in Austria.
34. Calculations from Frey (*2*, p. 20), *Statistisches Jahrbuch* (*27*, p. 105), and OECD (*6*, p. 240).
35. Calculations from Frey (*2*, p. 20), and OECD (*6*, pp. 220–221 and 444–445). The Austrian, German, and Swiss figures refer to employment, the other are labor force data, including the unemployed.
36. See H. Körner and U. Mehrländer, Eds., *Die "neue" Ausländerpolitik in Europe* (Verlag, Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn, 1986).
37. Internal report of the Dutch Ministry for Social Affairs, presented in the VPRO television program on 1 February 1987.
38. A series of Dutch examples of this new exclusion process was given in *NRC Handelsblad*, 10 June 1987, Supplement, p. 3.

39. U. Mehrländer, in *Guests Come to Stay*, R. Rogers, Ed. (Westview, Boulder, CO, 1985), pp. 169 and 174.
40. Frey (*2*, p. 17) and *SOPEMI* (*8*, p. 70).
41. Estimates for Sweden have indicated a substantial transfer of incomes from immigrants to natives by the public sector. It culminated around 1970 but still occurs [J. Ekberg, *Inkomsteffekter av invandring* (Acta Wexionensia, Växjö, 1983).
42. Except for the period before 1950 in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the data come from official population statistics: P. Flora *et al. State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815–1975* (Campus, Frankfurt, 1987), vol. 2, chap. 6.1; OECD, *Labour Force Statistics 1964–1984* (OECD, Paris, 1986), national table 1; from 1964 the end-year data of the the OECD have been used. For Greece, Portugal, and Spain, population statistics for 1950 to 1963 are taken from U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, *Labour Supply and Migration in Europe* (United Nations, New York, 1979), table 11.9; thereafter data are from OECD. For the period before 1950, the data derive from the registration of emigrants, related to the population [W. Woodruff, *Impact of Western Man* (St. Martin's, New York, 1966), p. 106; B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750–1970* (Macmillan, London, 1975), tables B1 and B9].