

Lang claims that his broader purpose is to spark a debate on the conduct of political and social science. Many practitioners, he says, are in the habit of making broad and sloppy generalizations, encouraged in this kind of thinking by the schools and the news media. In addition, Lang says that writers who rely on the trappings of science (equations and statistics) may be seen as more "objective" than those who do not, and this troubles him.

The Lipset and Huntington files are case studies in Lang's ongoing campaign to "clean up the area where the academic world meets the political world and the world of journalism." The reason for the emphasis on personalities, according to Lang, is that his method requires him to build from a concrete case, meaning an individual.

For the record, Lang advertises that he has tackled scholars on the political left as well as the right, although there are fewer examples of this. For example, a recent file in Lang's cabinet deals with an article in the *Nation* by Jon Wiener. Wiener attacked a historian at Yale, Henry Turner, Jr., as being one of a group of anti-Marxists who were trying to ruin the career of another historian, David Abraham. Abraham, a Marxist, had published a book that claimed to give documentary evidence that German busi-

nessmen encouraged and backed Hitler. Since then, Abraham has confessed that the book contains serious errors, some of which were brought to the attention of the academic community by Turner. Lang came to Turner's defense and organized a letter of protest to the *Nation*. The magazine's handling of the letter generated yet more protests, and the file thickened. Lang then got into a debate with Yale officials over their decision to let Wiener speak while refusing Lang equal time.

In an earlier campaign, Lang sought to defeat the government's requirement that academic grant recipients fill out "effort reports," segregating time spent on research from time spent on teaching. The two are inseparable, Lang maintains. The 20-year battle over "A-21," so called after the federal regulation at issue, ended in a stalemate in the early 1980's. Lang is proudest of this struggle, in which he won the endorsement of 27 academic senates.

The Lipset and Huntington files are different, however, and not so warmly received. It is unlikely that the Academy will set up a platform, as Lang would like, for a sparring match between the disciplines under its roof. But the file on Huntington remains open, and Lang, being Lang, is not about to close it. ■ **ELIOT MARSHALL**

make a wistful comment: "If a reversal of the decision to withdraw existing stocks were possible, it would be desirable." But a reversal is unlikely, given the "new political reality" created by promises to get rid of such weapons.

The main point, according to Nye, is that NATO must not let disagreements over chemical weapons cause internal division. "Modernization has gotten more attention than it deserves," Nye said, and the furor over binary weapons has distracted people from bigger issues. The best deterrent NATO can adopt is to maintain a united military front.

NATO could respond to the Soviet threat of chemical warfare with a variety of projects. First, it could attempt to minimize the new transport problem it has created. No specific solutions were suggested. Second, NATO should emphasize defensive technologies. More research should be devoted to developing protective clothes and masks, monitoring devices, alarms, and special communications gear. Third, NATO should consider increasing its use of nonchemical defensive weapons, such as interceptor missiles, as a means of limiting the effectiveness of any Soviet assault.

In planning for the future, the Aspen report says, the importance of Soviet stockpiles should not be exaggerated. Even if the stocks are large (estimates range from 20,000 to 700,000 metric tons), only a limited fraction of the total has any strategic value, for a massive attack would move the conflict out of the chemical and into the nuclear realm. For this reason, NATO does not need to match Soviet chemical stocks ton-for-ton in order to deter their use. The Western allies need to maintain a stockpile just large enough to persuade the Soviets that they would gain no advantage by initiating the use of chemicals.

The best solution to all of these problems, the Aspen group said, would be to eliminate chemical weapons entirely. However, the outlook for a negotiated agreement is not good at present. For months, the main barrier has been the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a system for verifying compliance with a ban. No fresh ideas have been placed on the table since Britain's proposal last July for a modified approach to America's insistence on short-notice "challenge inspections" (*Science*, 8 August, p. 617).

Despite the stalemate, the experts grasped at a straw of hope. Talks on chemical weapons are not likely to get entangled in the Strategic Defense Initiative, they said. As the winter of 1986 approaches, this small virtue has much to recommend it. ■

ELIOT MARSHALL

Chemical Weapons: A Plan for Europe

NATO painted itself into a corner on chemical weapons policy this year, according to a report released by the Aspen Study Group, a private think tank, on 21 November.

The Alliance made two mistakes, according to the arms controllers and strategic thinkers from the United States, Britain, and West Germany who wrote the report. NATO's first mistake was to agree to remove all chemical munitions from West Germany by 1992. This was done in order to win political approval for plans to "modernize" NATO's stockpile, as promoted for many years by the United States. Doing away with forward-based munitions in Europe worsens the dependence on the United States as a "distant arsenal," the report says. Because of the obvious transport problems that could arise in wartime, the deterrent value of having chemical weapons is reduced, but not eliminated.

Second, the allies may have erred in choosing the U.S. Bigeye binary bomb as one of the main elements of modernization, along with a new artillery shell. According to speakers at the news conference on 21

November, the Bigeye is known to have technical flaws (*Science*, 21 November, p. 930). It also seems inadequate for the role it must play in Europe. What is feared most is a limited use of chemicals to pave the way for a conventional assault by Soviet troops. The Aspen group claims that for NATO to nullify this threat, it must be able to raise the same threat itself, in a convincing fashion. But the new weapons appear to be neither reliable nor suitable for limited, surgical applications.

Joseph Nye of Harvard, cochairman of the Aspen study group, said that the report was conceived months ago as a means of pouring oil on troubled waters. But, as it turned out, there was no trouble, no "hysterical crisis," as one speaker said. The fact that NATO has promised to divest itself of chemical munitions while requiring no concession on the Soviet side has caused no furor. But Nye says that NATO is tiptoeing around a sleeping dog; it may awake later.

Against that possibility, the Aspen report lays out what its authors view as a calm and reasonable strategy for dealing with chemical weapons in Europe. In passing, they