Missile Deployments Roil Europe

Deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles was primarily due to Western commerical and political forces, not Soviet deployment of the SS20

No defense decision has so strained the Western alliance, so disrupted domestic European politics, and so awakened the average citizen to the risks of nuclear destruction as the decision made by NATO in 1979 to install new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Although the initial phase of the deployment has been successfully carried out—the first of 108 new Pershing missiles and 464 new cruise missiles apparently became operational in Germany and Great Britain on the last day of 1983—it has left in its wake an unforeseen series of painful and potentially lasting military and political consequences.

The deployment was largely intended, for example, to allay European concerns about an expanding Soviet military threat, but instead it has actually caused many in Europe to fear their principal ally—the United States—more than their principal enemy. Blended at an early stage with negotiations designed to achieve reductions in the nuclear armaments of both the United States and the Soviet Union, the deployment has led instead to the cessation of all U.S.–Soviet arms control talks, and a pledge by the Soviets to aim new weapons at both the United States and its allies. Another major goal of the deployment was to strengthen the Western alliance and bind the Europeans closer to the United States; instead it has led to considerable intergovernmental bickering, generated widespread public disaffection, and, in recent months, raised the specter of a wave of antinuclear European terrorism.

In Europe and the United States, there is increasing recognition that this is not what was intended, that careful plans have now gone awry. Even the program's original framers—the high-level officials who formulated the deployment plans at a series of closed intergovernmental meetings—have begun to express misgivings, to wonder if their analysis was somehow faulty and their judgment badly askew. For there is now the undeniable possibility that with enormous public protests and extremely threatening missiles on both sides, Europe is far less secure and less closely allied with the United States than it was before the deployment decision was made.

At the center of the controversy are several increasingly widespread concerns. One is that despite the deployment of a new Soviet missile, the SS20, the Pershing II and the cruise missile upset an existing overall nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby stimulating and perpetuating a senseless arms race. Another is that the weapons themselves, by virtue of their special new capabilities, increase the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. For even though each replaces an existing nuclear weapon based in Europe—the Pershing II replaces the Pershing IA and the cruise is seen as a substitution of sorts for the old British Vulcan bomber—both are capable of destroying more targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in less time than their predecessors.

The keys to this capability are the missiles' revolutionary radar guidance mechanisms, which are theoretically capable of steering a warhead directly at the target, thereby ensuring its complete destruction. In addition, both new missiles have sufficient range to reach a substantial number of troop concentrations, naval bases, airfields, command and control centers, medium-range nuclear missile sites, and intercontinental-range missile sites in the western region of the Soviet Union. The Pershing has aroused particular concern because it can strike these targets in only a matter of minutes. Previous highly accurate U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe either had substantially less range or substantially slower speed.

One popular fear is that by deploying weapons that pose a swift and accurate threat to weapons on the other side, the West has sharply increased the Soviets' incentive to launch a preemptive attack in the midst of a tense international crisis—an attack that would have horrifying consequences for Europe and perhaps, eventually, for the United States as well. Another concern stems from European awareness that the Pershing II will be integrated into both the tactical and strategic war plans of the United States. The fear is that it could therefore be used—possibly without the approval of all NATO members—to launch an attack unprovoked by events in the European theater, thus drawing the Europeans into



Substantial unrest has greeted NATO's plan to deploy the ground-launched cruise missile, as shown at right, at six bases in Western Europe.

a dispute which they would rather avoid.

Whether or not these claims are warranted, it is clear that their wide acceptance was largely unforeseen by the nations that had a hand in the deployment decision. As is often the case with such joint miscalculation, many of the participants now seek to diminish their own roles. In the United States, the government now portrays the deployment as a fulfillment of the alliance's historic responsibility to West Germany, which is situated after all on the front lines of any conflict with the East. In Germany, the government has presented it primarily as a fulfillment of its historic responsibility to share the defense burdens of the alliance in general and the United States in particular. Nearly all of the NATO countries pin ultimate responsibility for the new Western missiles on the Soviet Union, which aimed the SS20, a modern missile of its own, at a variety of European targets beginning in 1977.

None of these assertions is wholly accurate. A series of interviews with more than 20 key government officials in England, Germany, and the United States reveals that U.S. influence on the deployment decision was substantial, but also that other NATO countries played key roles in moving it along. In addition, contrary to popular belief and official pronouncements, the decision was not merely a response to the deployment of the SS20, but was motivated in large part by a simple desire on the part of the West to replace its old European-based nuclear weapons with new and more capable ones. As noted by a British official who was involved in the debate at the time, "It is a myth that the deployment in the West was caused primarily by the SS20. It was a gap in our own nuclear response capability—due to the increasing vulnerability of aircraft—that drove us, not a judgment that we needed a system equal to that of the Soviets." A high-ranking official in the German Defense Ministry agrees: "Even with no SS20, this gap would have appeared in our strategic options, and the military would have searched for something to fill it."

One of the major ironies in this story is the fact that the decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles was set in motion by a U.S. proposal to enhance the strength of conventional forces in Western Europe. This proposal, which involved the establishment of a series of committees on such perennial topics as force readiness, command and control, and logistics, was first presented to the heads of government in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in May 1977, shortly after President Carter's inauguration. Nine of the committees were to devote their attention to conventional force improvements, but the tenth—and last—was to examine the prospects for modernization of NATO's nuclear forces.

The author of the proposal was Robert Komer, an astute and ebullient former strategic analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and the RAND Corporation then serving as a Pentagon consultant on NATO affairs. As he now explains, the tenth committee initially amounted to little more than sugarcoating on the bitter pill formed by the other nine. "America's allies have from the beginning been much more interested in nuclear deterrence than in building up a credible conventional defense. Therefore we wanted the Carter initiatives to have just enough nuclear content to prevent the allies from accusing us of neglecting or abandoning that side before anything else had been put in its place." Walter Slocombe, who was then in charge of the Pentagon's international security affairs office, agrees. The nuclear committee was merely "a cosmetic addition" to the overall initiative, he says—something aimed more at winning political sympathies than producing revolutionary changes.

By 1979, of course, this emphasis had shifted. The new nuclear missile deployments eventually captured the bulk of NATO's attention and energy, while the improvements in conventional forces were quickly approved and then just as quickly set aside, due to disinterest or even outright opposition among the European members of NATO. This shift was primarily due to the Europeans' interest in more modern and more plentiful nuclear weapons, and to the sympathetic hearing they received in the special nuclear committee, formally known as the High Level Group (HLG).

The lead role in the HLG, as in most NATO committees involving nuclear issues, was taken by the United States. Its chairman was David McGiffert, a highly regarded attorney and former under secretary of the U.S. Army who was then serving as assistant secretary of defense for international affairs. The committee staff was also American, which meant that summaries of meetings and formal proposals were often written on a U.S. letterhead. German critics of the deployment decision have made much of this fact, hinting that its deliberations were manipulated and that the Pershing and cruise were foisted on unwilling European participants.

Actually it did not matter much who chaired the HLG. The members were mostly senior officials from NATO defense ministries, and virtually all favored some form of weapons modernization. McGiffert recalls that the meetings went smoothly and that no one insisted from the start that the deployment was a silly and politically dangerous idea. "It certainly is not true that America rammed the deployment down the throats of the Europeans," remarks another U.S. participant. "But neither is it true that the Europeans wanted it and the United States was dragged along, kicking and screaming."

The delegates from Germany were interested from the outset, for an assortment of reasons. For several years, the Germans had been concerned that the United States' historic promise to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe lacked the ring of truth. A decade earlier, when only a few Soviet nuclear weapons were capable of reaching U.S. territory, this pledge had seemed geniune. But with the development by the Soviets of a roughly equivalent strategic nuclear force, the Germans had come to believe, with substantial prodding from conservative U.S. political figures, that the Soviets might believe the United States reluctant to put its own cities at risk in order to protect Western Europe. Helmut Schmidt, who was then the Chancellor, was never worried that this could lead to a Soviet invasion. "These people do not want a war with the West," he said. "They want peace." But he believed, in light of the increasing uncertainties of the U.S. strategic nuclear commitment, that any Soviet advantage in theater nuclear weapons raised the possibility of debilitating political blackmail.

This notion, that a modest Soviet advantage in any type of nuclear weapon could be exploited for political purposes, had been promoted for years by strategic weapons analysts at the RAND Corporation and other conservative think tanks in the United States.* It never attracted much support from the U.S. arms control community, where most experts think that such an advantage is politically useless. But Schmidt, a former defense minister who maintained close friendships with defense intellectuals in

*In 1974, for example, James Schlesinger, a former weapons analyst at RAND who was then serving as the U.S. defense secretary, had widely advertised the idea that for deterrence to succeed, it was important "that we not only have the equivalent physical capability to the other superior power, but also . . . that we be perceived as equal by all parties." Albert Wohlstetter, another well-known strategic analyst, pushed this line at a series of Pentagon-sponsored workshops attended by influential German weapons officials, including several who participated in HLG meetings.

the United States, had been persuaded by arguments of the U.S. weapons analysts in the mid-1960's. And so he became agitated when he learned in the mid-1970's, through a series of U.S. briefings in both Washington and Brussels, that the Soviets had begun to develop a modern, theater nuclear missile, the SS20.

As the first broadly successful Soviet missile powered by solid, not liquid, fuel, it was clearly a distinctive technological improvement. Its accuracy was roughly three times better than that of other medium-range Soviet missiles, which enabled it to carry warheads with substantially less thermonuclear yield. Unlike its predecessors, which carried just one warhead, the SS20 had three, each capable of landing on a separate target. It was considerably more reliable, and it could be readied for launch in a matter of minutes, not hours. Finally, unlike its predecessors, the SS20 was a mobile missile and therefore much more likely to survive an attack from the West. Over the past 7 years, the Soviets have deployed 378 SS20's capable of hitting targets in Western Europe, Africa, or Asia (but not in the United States).

Paul Nitze, who for the past 2 years has been the chief U.S. negotiator at the theater nuclear arms talks, speculates that the SS20 was developed as part of a routine nuclear modernization. "There are, of course, a thousand and one different components to any weapons-building decision," he told *Science* in a recent interview. "My guess is that they developed another nuclear missile, the SS16, with the purpose of having a mobile, survivable, intercontinental system and ran into trouble with the third stage. Their engineers then concluded that the first and second stages alone were a better device, and the SS20 was developed in this peculiar way as a replacement for aging SS4's and SS5's"—missiles that were first deployed in the late 1950's and early 1960's. "The SS4's were thought to have insufficient range, and the main problem with the SS5's was the fact that they had great big dirty warheads, which were inappropriate for precision targeting," Nitze adds.

A similar view is expressed by Raymond Garthoff, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who formerly served as deputy director of the bureau of politico-military affairs in the State Department. "There was a compelling military technical rationale for the SS20 deployment," he says, including a desire to target U.S. aircraft and submarines based in England, Scotland, and Spain, as well as British, French, and Chinese nuclear forces and a variety of short-range nuclear weapons deployed around the continent. "And the Soviet decision was almost certainly made on those grounds," he adds. This is also the judgment of Robert Komer.

Helmut Schmidt, however, viewed the SS20 in a different light. He concluded, as did many conservatives in the United States, that the principal rationale for the missile's construction was not military but political—that what the Soviets intended was "psycho-political" blackmail. This interpretation had been promoted in 1976 by Fred Ikle, a former RAND Corporation weapons analyst who then directed ACDA.† In a widely publicized speech, Ikle pointed to the SS20 and the Soviet's new Backfire bomber and remarked dramatically that "the spectre of such weapons grows like a towering cloud over Europe and Asia."

David McGiffert

The HLG quickly endorsed an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in nuclear weapons.

According to Walter Stuetzle, a close friend of Schmidt's who directed the policy planning office in the German Defense Ministry from 1976 to 1982, the Chancellor's preference was to restrain the deployment of the SS20 through arms control. He first tried to persuade President Ford to negotiate limits on both the SS20 and the Backfire bomber in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, then under way. The Soviets were stiff-necked, however, and U.S. officials eventually determined not to let German concerns stand in the way of what they thought was a sound strategic weapons agreement.

President Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, initially both made light of the SS20 problem, to Schmidt's acute dismay. They dispatched Walter Slocombe and David Aaron, a National Security Council staff member, to Europe in an attempt to tame the German anxieties. "We gave them a series of briefings in which we went over all the numbers: here's what they've got, here's what we've got," Aaron recalls. "We told then we've got ICBM's, we've got SLBM's, we've got several hundred warheads deployed on Poseidon submarines assigned to NATO headquarters; we've got your people at our target planning headquarters in Omaha. There is no target gap here; we target with our stuff things of interest to Western Europe, just like we target things of interest to ourselves; we have limited options so that we can attack these targets without setting off World War III; but on the other hand we're not afraid of World War III because we're all in this together. And they looked at us and said that's fine but the Russians are deploying the SS20 and we haven't got anything like it."

This was, of course, no abstract ideological compulsion. From the mid-1970's onward, the Germans—as well as the British—had their attention firmly focused on the U.S. cruise missile, in a belief that it would be an economical and highly useful addition to NATO's arsenal, and, incidentally, a useful counter to the SS20. A high-ranking British official recalls, for example, that the cruise—a hybrid rocket and drone aircraft—then "looked like it would be relatively cheap. It was supposed to have both conventional and nuclear applications. It could have a wide spectrum of potential ranges. It could be delivered in a number of different modes. Certainly some of the military here thought it was an innovation of enormous importance."

This enthusiasm, which was widespread among European officials, had its roots in the peculiar history of the cruise missile, which for years had been little more than a box of impressive military hardware without a clear mission or a devoted sponsor. David Aaron, who had also served on the National Security Council during the Nixon Administration, recalls that the missile got its first big push in 1972, "when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent over their wish list for enhanced security under the SALT I regime." With no clear idea what it was good for militarily, Aaron, with strong support from Henry Kissinger, had promoted the cruise missile as a useful bargaining chip for the next round of negoti-

†Ikle is now under secretary of defense for policy in the Reagan Administration.

ations. Millions of dollars in government contracts for its development were awarded to Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Lockheed.

During the early 1970's, however, lobbyists for these corporations had trouble whipping up much support for the cruise missile in Washington. The Air Force almost immediately saw it as a strategic threat to its bomber force, the Army and the Navy had trouble deciding how to make it useful, and the arms control community was aghast at the difficulties its diminutive size created for treaty verification. In a shrewd marketing move, the contractors went overseas.

Hans Eberhard, who was director of the Armaments Directorate in the German defense ministry from 1975 to 1981, remembers that "the U.S. manufacturers badly wanted a European endorsement for the cruise missile. They even offered the opportunity to cooperate in production, in hopes that certain European nations would then pressure the United States to produce it in large numbers." Like his counterparts elsewhere in NATO, Eberhard looked to the Pentagon in Washington for an objective assessment of such pitches. "We got good advice that it was a valuable weapon," Eberhard says, from both Harold Brown, the defense secretary, and William Perry, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering.

One of the cruise missile's principal attractions was its extreme accuracy, which in combination with low-yield nuclear warheads would theoretically permit the destruction of an enemy target with less damage to nearby European towns and citizens. The British, in particular, were excited by its relatively low cost because two legs of their nuclear triad—the Vulcan bomber and the Polaris submarine—were about to be retired and the cruise seemed like an inexpensive replacement. Lawrence Freedman, a professor of war studies at Kings College in London, says that these views were largely implanted in Europe by such U.S. proponents of the cruise as Richard Burt, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Jacquelyn Davis.‡ Slocombe agrees. It was "the right wing in the United States, the same crowd of people that didn't like SALT II," that whispered in the ears of the Europeans about the virtues of the cruise missile, he says.

‡Burt, who was then at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, went on to write about defense matters for the *New York Times* and is now an assistant secretary of state for European affairs in the Reagan Administration; Pfaltzgraff and Davis direct the conservative Institute for Foreign Policy Studies at Tufts University, which sponsors annual seminars for European defense officials on strategic issues.

Having embraced these arguments wholeheartedly, the Europeans became worried that the Carter Administration might actually use the cruise missile as its original sponsors intended—as a chip to be bargained away in exchange for substantial Soviet concessions in the strategic arms limitation talks. Their fears were exacerbated by several factors: A draft treaty circulating among the allies in 1977 contained provisions that might have constrained the transfer of advanced weapons technology to U.S. allies and explicitly limited the number, type, and range of the cruise missiles that could be deployed. There was a general impression that the Administration was "neither seasoned nor hard-

Walter Slocombe

The Pershing was seen as a "boring Army equipment modernization."

headed" in negotiations, as one British official puts it, and apt to give the cruise away without actually obtaining meaningful concessions. But nothing did as much to heighten the desire for the cruise as the deliberate attempt by several high-ranking Administration officials, including Leslie Gelb of the State Department and David Aaron, to dampen the Europeans' enthusiasm with a discussion of its limitations. A former analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recalls that the European reaction to this attempt was "damn, they're just trying to talk us out of something we might want so they can ensure their own security."

German and British officials quickly concluded that the way to keep this from happening was "to impress on the Americans how important cruise missiles were to the alliance," Slocombe says. After raising the issue privately with little result, Helmut Schmidt, easily the most dynamic and blunt-spoken head of state in Europe, decided to vent his feelings publicly in a speech in London before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential conservative think tank on nuclear weapons issues. "Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations," Schmidt said. "So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support the present strategy." Stuetzle, who is generally credited with drafting these remarks, explains that Schmidt's purpose was to call attention to the need for a Western response to the SS20, again not because of its military threat but because the lack of any Western response might be taken by the Soviets as evidence of a weakening U.S.-European relationship.

Made just a week before the HLG was established, the speech created a considerable stir on both sides of the Atlantic. McGiffert, the HLG chairman, recalls that the subsequent commotion helped persuade everyone to think first about modernizing long-range and not battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. But he, as well as many of the other HLG members, emphasize that the HLG was disposed toward such modernization anyway, and that Schmidt only stoked the flames. Another U.S. participant, who asked to remain anonymous, states flatly that "if Schmidt had made no speech, we would have deployed the weapons anyway; he only hastened a political process that was already under way."

Thus it was no surprise when, at the second HLG meeting, held in February 1978 at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, the members readily agreed that what Western Europe needed most was "an evolutionary upward adjustment" in long-range nuclear weapons systems. Their report cited mostly routine military explanations: NATO's existing weapons were simply too old; the warheads were outmoded and possibly unsafe; they were no longer powerful or accurate enough to destroy hard enemy targets; and too many weapons were concentrated near the German border, where they were vulnerable to capture or destruction in the early stages of a conflict. Since the F-111 and Vulcan bombers might soon be incapable of penetrating Soviet air defenses, it was especially important to deploy new weapons with a similar capability—such as new missiles, for instance. As a British official explains, "everyone agreed that it would

have been an extraordinary time for NATO to dispense with a capability which it had possessed for 20 years—that is, the ability to threaten the Soviets from Europe without involving strategic systems—a capability provided by aircraft. One could argue about whether the recommendation would have been made if no such capability had existed; but it seemed quite important not to remove something that was already in place."

Not only did the HLG want new systems, it wanted them based on land instead of at sea. Hardly any HLG members liked the idea, floated by U.S. defense secretary Harold Brown early in 1977, of basing any new weapons at sea on submarines or surface ships. Brown reasoned that such weapons would have the advantage of relative immunity from attack, as well as a considerably lower political profile. Helmut Schmidt favored the idea for a time, but HLG members from other nations, led by those from England, worried that any movement of weapons offshore would be taken by the Soviets as a sign of diminished U.S. commitment to the protection of the continent. "The fear was not that America would actually be apprehensive about the use of its weapons on ships; the fear was that the Soviets would think that America would be apprehensive—in short, we fear what the Soviets think the Americans will think," an official in London explained. "So long as there is some distinction, even though it may be very small, deterrence is enhanced by the existence of European-based systems." The official adds, however, that in light of the political tumult caused by the decision to base the new weapons on land, "I am genuinely not sure that I would make the same decision again."

Many top Carter Administration officials saw the HLG recommendation for what it was, a camouflaged order for controversial new cruise missiles, a technology that posed serious obstacles to meaningful arms control. But their opposition was muffled by a desire to get European support for treaty limitations on strategic weapons. "The Europeans made it quite clear that if we wanted to see the SALT II treaty alive, we should do something to address their concern," Slocombe says. And so, after a brief internal debate, the United States officially lent its support to what many of its prominent military officials—such as NATO commander General Alexander Haig, as well as Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, and Harold Brown—had sought for some time.

As to the choice of weapons to be deployed, "people have in their heads that there is a precise military black box, where data go in and a reasoned judgment comes out. It simply didn't happen that way," a top U.S. participant says.

The cruise missile was of course an obvious choice for political reasons. But the Pershing II was included in the deployment largely as a result of quick thinking and aggressive lobbying by its principal contractor, the Martin Marietta Corporation. The missile, which had been under development since 1974, was at the outset supposed to have a better warhead and greater accuracy than the Pershing IA, but essentially the same

R. Jeffrey Smith

Helmut Schmidt

The SS20's threaten "freedom of decision."

short range—400 miles, or less than needed to reach any targets in the Soviet Union. Early in 1978, however, company officials got wind of the emphasis on long-range weapons in the secret HLG meetings, and so they proposed to substantially increase the Pershing's capability. In a series of meetings with officials of the U.S. Army and various members of the HLG, Martin Marietta representatives pointed out that with the addition of a second stage, the missile would easily be able to hit targets in the Soviet Union from deployment sites in Germany.

The missile became an easy choice for the HLG because this slight modification was then regarded as routine and noncontroversial. As Slocombe explains, "part of the original political interest in the Pershing II was precisely the idea that this was a boring Army equipment modernization program to which nobody would pay very much attention. I don't think it was ever a terribly good political judgment, but it was a judgment some people made." David Aaron agrees. "We thought it would slide over the threshold of existing deployments easier than a brand new weapons system."

Helmut Schmidt and his advisers eventually came to regret their acquiescence to the U.S. proposal for Pershing II deployment in Germany. "Most people thought the Pershing was a simple modernization," Stuetzle says. "What we all missed at the time was the profound difference between a weapons system that reaches the Soviet Union and one that doesn't. We didn't analyze carefully enough the fact that the Pershings, which had this capability, would only be stationed in Germany, making us the primary target of the protests. Perhaps we should have insisted that they be stationed in Italy and Britain too." Hans Apel, who was then the German defense minister, told *Science* that "we didn't anticipate any problems. It looked so simple just to replace the Pershing IA's with more modern weapons. Nobody thought about any political repercussions."

In addition to selecting the type of weapons to be deployed, the United States—with the allies' approval—determined how many, using nothing better than what one of the participants describes as a "visceral feeling" about the number needed to pose a sufficient deterrent. "We did do a target evaluation to get some sense of what the very high priority order of targets might be," McGiffert says, but it apparently had little impact on the final decision. "The outcome proved to be heavily dependent on uncertain assumptions about the contribution of tactical forces to a general nuclear response," another U.S. participant explains. Given the absence of any objective criteria, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their annual strategic planning document, suggested an enormous number of warheads—more than 1000—while the State Department said that only a hundred or so were necessary; this was further narrowed to a range of 200 to 600. And the final decision was made by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, who wrote in his memoirs that he favored a relatively large number—572 warheads on 108 Pershing II's and 464 cruise missiles—because of the likelihood that the Europeans would whittle this number down (they did not) or that some would eventually be traded away in negotiations with the Soviets in exchange for reductions in the number of SS20's.

Schmidt, who had by this point encountered some opposition to the deployment within his own party, insisted that the missiles, and therefore the responsibility, be spread throughout the alliance. And so it was decided at a subsequent HLG meeting, held at the

North American Air Defense Command headquarters in Colorado Springs, that cruise missiles would also be deployed in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, in addition to Germany and Britain. The document that summarized all these decisions was drawn up immediately thereafter by members of the U.S. delegation, who went off to a nearby ski area with a secretary in tow. "It worked out very efficiently," one of the participants said. "We would write for a couple of hours and then take a couple of hours off while the secretary typed it up, and go skiing and then come back and revise it." In October 1979, the deployment plan was formally ratified by NATO's defense and foreign ministers.

McGiffert, who led the HLG throughout its deliberations, says that he still thinks they made the right decision. "But one should ask that question 3 or 4 years from now when we are better able to see whether the rift in the German defense policy consensus is a permanent feature which gets in the way of sensible defense decisions. From the point of view of deterrence, there is no question that it was the right thing to do. On the other hand, looked at from the broader point of what has it done to the fabric of the alliance, I think the jury is still out." A high-level British official expands on this point. "The question," he says, "is whether the damage to deterrence that comes from having put the alliance through a severe test of cohesion is now greater that it would have been without any deployment."

In public forums, the United States has portrayed the decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles as an extraordinary exercise in political and military diplomacy, brought about by independent European desires for a technological riposte to the SS20. A close review of the decision reveals that it was actually far more routine. Some military officials desired newer, more capable weapons; military contractors desired more business; and conservative U.S. weapons analysts developed the appropriate strategic rationale. Through indirect channels, they played on their allies' natural fears about the depth of the American commitment. And the resultant political pressures steamrollered all opposition. One suspects, without any direct knowledge, that Soviet decision-making on the SS20 took a somewhat similar course. In this manner do the nuclear arsenals on both sides expand in directions that sow alarm among the general public.—**R. Jeffrey Smith**

Part one of four parts.

China, U.S. Positions Closer on Nuclear Deal

Access to American technology was high on the agenda for discussion in the recent visit to Washington of China's Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, with nuclear technology providing some of the stickiest issues. Zhao said in remarks at a state dinner that progress had been made in negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries but that problems still remained. Some U.S. officials, however, expressed the view that Zhao's comments on the issue indicated a modification of China's policies that would make it possible to conclude such an agreement, although tough bargaining would be required.

During the prime minister's visit, an accord on the exchange of scientific and technological information originally signed in 1979 was extended. A new bilateral agreement was also signed to promote trade between the two countries and to provide for cooperation in the development of energy resources and of other sectors of the Chinese economy. In addition to these intergovernmental agreements, the U.S. National Academies of Science and Engineering signed an agreement with China's commission on science and technology for a cooperative program in applied research under which scientists and engineers from the two countries will be brought together for seminars and short courses.

China has indicated interest in purchasing U.S. nuclear technology in order to develop its nuclear power industry and the Reagan Administration has been carrying on negotiations with the Chinese with a view to enabling U.S. nuclear industry to export to China.

The main obstacle to an agreement has been the long-standing differences in nuclear nonproliferation policies between the two countries. The United States is bound by requirements of the international Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) that appear to conflict with the Chinese position on nonproliferation.

China, which has possessed nuclear weapons since 1964, has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and declined to join international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not have them. The Chinese have argued that the treaty gives an unwarranted advantage to the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

In recent years, the Chinese have been accused of actions that violate international norms in dealing with nonweapons states. According to press reports, China is alleged to have provided weapons design information and aid in uranium enrichment to Pakistan and is said to have provided heavy water to India and enriched uranium to Argentina and to have supplied reactor grade uranium that ended up in South Africa.

UPI

Prime Minister Zhao in Peking

Recently Chinese statements and actions have indicated a willingness to modify their stance on nonproliferation. For example, the Chinese late last year joined the International Atomic Energy Agency which administers the international safeguards program which is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Observers suggest that China's shift in policy may be prompted by its decision to embark on a program of building nuclear power plants. The Chinese are understood to be interested in making Westinghouse its nuclear supplier. The Chinese have indicated that they plan to make public their choice of a contractor in April. This puts pressure on the Administration to complete negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement, which is required by the NNPA if U.S.