

Townsend's claims, but he has doubts about the accuracy of Townsend's dust level readings. The dust aspiration device in the Garvey elevator may be of marginal benefit, Maness says, because an owner must be concerned about dust not only in the leg but throughout the plant. Maness argues that the sensible approach would be to ask industry to abide by performance standards for dust control. The problem is too complex to be codified into a simple rule.

According to David Bossman, treasurer of the American Feed Manufacturers' Association, "probably the key point" in mandating a dust-free environment is the economic value of the dust itself. Even the best grain in this country may contain as much as 2 percent dust and foreign matter. Other nations like Australia and Canada do not permit such high levels of junk material, but no one who processes grain in this country is willing to throw away the dust because there is no law forbidding its resale and no one wants to discard the enormous revenues. "If you remove 1, 2, 3, or 4 percent of your purchased material in the form of dust," Bossman asks, "what do you do with it?" Do you set up an elaborate parallel system to collect and package it, or "Do you leave it where it is and treat it as best as you possibly can?"

The problem is complicated, Bossman says, because dust is dangerous to handle and difficult to transport. The elevators at the ends of the distribution system probably handle enough volume to justify an investment in dust pelleting equipment on a profit-making basis. They could package and resell the dust to feed manufacturers. But the smaller elevators at the starting end of the distribution system do not handle a volume large enough to pay for the \$100,000-plus pelleting operation. "They'll either disobey and put the dust back in or they'll store it," which would be unsafe, Bossman claims. He is convinced the industry will fight the one-eighth-inch standard "down to the wire."

—ELIOT MARSHALL

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New Security Measures Denounced

New government attempts to tighten controls against security leaks, including increased use of lie detector tests, were portrayed as unproductive, undignified, and undemocratic at recent hearings held by Representative Jack Brooks (D-Texas).

One of the issues is a presidential fiat, issued last March, whose primary purpose is to stem leaks to the news media. Known as National Security Decision Directive 84, it requires all employees with access to classified information to sign a nondisclosure agreement. More significantly, it requires people with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)—who number about 127,000—to submit any intelligence-related material prepared for public consumption to prepublication review. This is not time-limited, and would presumably apply to anything from a letter to the editor to Reagan's memoirs. The directive also permits agencies dealing with classified information to require employees—at the risk of "adverse consequences"—to submit to polygraph tests in the course of an investigation of a leak.

Most witnesses were highly critical of the directive. The American Association of University Professors expressed alarm at its broad sweep and "intimidating character," and suggested that the existence of prepublication censorship would discourage academics from accepting government responsibilities. Former Deputy Under Secretary of State George W. Ball said he was "deeply disturbed by the potential harm" the measure could do. "Only those with ignorance or contempt of our laws and traditions could have written" such a directive, said Ball. He added: "Our current obsession with the Soviet Union must not lead us to imitate their practices."

Another controversial policy statement, depicted as a logical extension of Directive 84, was unveiled at the hearings by Justice Department official Richard K. Willard, the architect of Reagan's secrecy initiatives. Willard proposed that agencies inaugurate their own programs of random polygraph screening of employees cleared for Special Access Programs for the purpose of uncovering or deterring breaches of security. Anyone who refused to cooperate would be denied future access to classified information.

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DOD) wants to increase its use of polygraphs. It has proposed expanded use of testing as a condition of access to various high-level intelligence programs, as well as random checks on employees with special intelligence clearances.

Willard and Richard D. Stilwell of DOD expressed high confidence in polygraphs. Stilwell said the Central Intelligence Agency experience has been "extraordinarily successful," with polygraphs uncovering "significant information" in 46 percent of cases. Willard said "the overwhelming majority of studies" show an accuracy rate of 70 to 95 percent, and opined that government results were closer to 95 percent because of the high quality of its procedures.

These assertions do not jibe with findings contained in a recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) on "The Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing." OTA director John H. Gibbons testified that his staff reviewed several thousand studies and concluded that "meaningful evidence" of validity of polygraphs exists only for criminal investigations. He said the accuracy of polygraph results ranges from 17 percent to 100 percent. He added that even with 98 percent accuracy, the technique would be inappropriate for screening large numbers of people since the tests would produce too many false positives. Gibbons observed that polygraph use by the United States government far outstrips that in any other free country, and has tripled in the past 10 years.

Some skepticism toward the secrecy initiatives has been building in Congress, which has amended the DOD appropriations bill to prevent DOD from implementing its polygraph proposal before next 15 April. The day after the Brooks hearings the Senate passed an amendment to the State Department authorization bill postponing implementation of the prepublication review process for 6 months.—CONSTANCE HOLDEN