that the proposal was worth serious consideration, as did his boss, Eugene Rostow, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This was no small recommendation, for Nitze and Rostow had served together during the 1970's on the Committee on the Present Danger, a group devoted to advertising the Soviet menace. Nitze and Rostow circulated the proposal among an ad hoc committee of Cabinet secretaries and top aides, bypassing the standing interagency committees on strategic weapons and arms control.

The ground-launched cruise missile (above) is considered less provocative than the Pershing because of its slow speed.

This displeased several Administration officials, including Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense who chairs one of the standing interagency committees. When Perle, who is widely known as a weapons hawk, learned what was going on, he expressed opposition not only to the proposal itself but also to the manner in which it was reviewed, as did several other committee members. Shortly thereafter, William Clark, the President's national security adviser, sent a letter to Secretary of State George Schultz directing that all future arms agreements be examined by the regular committees. Kvitsinsky reported in Geneva that the proposal had been rejected in Moscow, and Nitze said that the same had happened in Washington.

Although Rostow's supporters in Washington sought to portray this episode as the cause of his firing on 12 January, it was really only one of several reasons. Rostow and the White House had clashed over the appointment of several deputies at ACDA (see *Science*, 17 December 1982, p. 1203), and Rostow had embarrassed the Administration by publicly airing internal disputes on ratification of the limited threshold test ban treaty and other topics. Late last year, Rostow had promised to quit if the Senate failed to approve Robert Grey as ACDA's deputy director, and the White House withdrew the nomination in December. Rostow failed to take the hint, and several weeks later got the message directly from Schultz and Robert McFarlane, a deputy to William Clark. Both Nitze and Edward Rowny, the U.S. representative to the strategic arms reduction talks, were consulted in advance, and both had agreed to stay on after Rostow's departure.

The Soviets made great strides in public relations while the U.S. arms control establishment was in turmoil. In December, Soviet President Yuri Andropov proposed a compromise deployment plan similar to that put forward by Kvitsinsky, signaling a change of heart by the Politburo. He suggested that the United States cancel the Pershing and cruise missile deployments in exchange for the destruction of all SS-4's and SS-5's and the withdrawal of all but 150 or so SS-20 launchers, a number equivalent to the number of British and French launchers. Subsequently, the Soviets hinted that some of the SS-20's might be destroyed, not just withdrawn.

This is probably a major topic of discussion in Geneva, where the talks resumed on 27 January. After meeting with Reagan, Schultz, and other top Administration officials, Nitze returned with "the necessary authority to explore with my Soviet counterpart what give there is in the Soviet position." He is not authorized to offer any new U.S. proposals. As one high Administration official explains, "the events of recent weeks show that the firmness of our position and the rightness of our position can produce movement by the Soviets. We want to see more."

If the Administration refuses to budge from the "zero-zero" option in the future, it will find itself under increasing pressure from its European allies. Already, Hans-Jochen Vogel, the Social Democrat's candidate for president in West Germany, has forcefully called for American concessions, and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt has requested more flexibility. Helmut Kohl, the current chancellor, has been placed on the defensive for continuing to support the U.S. position. Germany is a pivotal state because all 108 Pershing II's are scheduled for deployment there. The national election will be held on 6 March.

—R. JEFFREY SMITH

Who's Who in the Social and Behavioral Sciences

Faculty members in social and behavioral science programs at the University of Chicago and the University of California (UC) at Berkeley have been given the highest overall grades for quality by their academic peers, according to a survey published by the National Academy of Sciences. Chicago's social and behavioral sciences faculty received a 4.51 grade average, while Berkeley's got a 4.47 average.

The grades, which reflect little more than prestige, are reported in the fifth and final volume of the academy's series on the quality of graduate programs at American universities. This report,* like its predecessors, contains a mass of information on each program, ranging from the number of faculty members to the number of papers they publish.

The most interesting—and most controversial—information is derived from the reputational survey. Some 1770 academic social and behavioral scientists were asked to rate the overall quality of faculty members in programs at other universities, on a scale of 0 (not sufficient for graduate education) to 5 (distinguished). Just over one-third of those asked declined to participate, some registering "strong objections" to the whole exercise, the report states.

Although the report studiously avoids ranking institutions in terms of their prestige, most readers will look to see who came out on top. So here, for what it is worth, is a list of the top-rated institutions in each discipline, with their scores on the 0 to 5 scale:

Anthropology: UC Berkeley, 4.6; Chicago, 4.6; Michigan, 4.5; Pennsylvania, 4.1; Arizona, 4.0.

Economics: MIT, 5.0; Harvard, 4.9; Chicago, 4.8; Princeton, 4.8; Stanford, 4.8; Yale, 4.7; Minnesota, 4.4; Pennsylvania, 4.3; Columbia, 4.2; UC Berkeley, 4.1; UC Los Angeles, 4.1; Northwestern, 4.1; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.1.

Geography: Minnesota, 4.6; Chicago, 4.3; Pennsylvania State, 4.3; UC

**An Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States: Social and Behavioral Sciences* (National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1983).

Berkeley, 4.2; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.1; UC Los Angeles, 4.0.

History: UC Berkeley, 4.8; Harvard, 4.8; Yale, 4.8; Princeton, 4.7; Chicago, 4.5; Columbia, 4.5; Michigan, 4.5; Stanford, 4.4; Johns Hopkins, 4.3; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.2; UC Los Angeles, 4.1; City University of New York, 4.0; Pennsylvania, 4.0.

Political Science: Yale, 4.8; UC Berkeley, 4.7; Harvard, 4.7; Michigan, 4.6; Chicago, 4.5; MIT, 4.3; Stanford, 4.2; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.1.

Psychology: Stanford, 4.8; Harvard, 4.6; Michigan, 4.5; Yale, 4.5; UC Berkeley, 4.4; Pennsylvania, 4.4; UC Los Angeles, 4.3; Minnesota, 4.3; UC San Diego, 4.2; Chicago, 4.2; Illinois, 4.2; Carnegie-Mellon, 4.0; Columbia, 4.0.

Sociology: Chicago, 4.7; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.6; UC Berkeley, 4.5; Michigan, 4.5; Harvard, 4.3; North Carolina, 4.3; Columbia, 4.2; Stanford, 4.2; Arizona, 4.1; UC Los Angeles, 4.1; Washington at Seattle, 4.0.

Reagan Orders Review of Controls on Research

The Reagan Administration has launched a high-level review of ways to control the publication of scientific papers that contain unclassified, but militarily sensitive information. The review, which is being coordinated by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), was initiated by a presidential directive issued without public announcement on 23 December. The study is to be completed by 1 March.

The directive and a covering letter signed by National Security Adviser William P. Clark indicate that the review will be more concerned with how, rather than whether, publication of such information should be controlled.

The review is a belated response to the National Academy of Sciences' report on scientific communication and national security, which was published last September (*Science*, 15 October 1982, p. 271). Known as the Corson report, the Academy's study was conducted amid growing apprehension in the scientific community over the Reagan Administration's announced intent to curb leakage of sensitive scientific information to the Soviet Union and its allies.

The Corson report in essence concluded that basic research was not the source of much technology leakage and that it should remain as unfettered as possible. It acknowledged, however, that there is a legitimate need to classify work in a few fields, and said there are some very limited "gray areas" that may require controls short of classification. The latter suggestion is the starting point for the new review.

According to President Reagan's directive, the review is supposed to come up with recommendations for pinpointing research that poses a potential security problem "So as to focus . . . efforts efficiently and to avoid raising fears of intrusion within the scientific community."

The Corson report suggested that federally funded research in the gray areas be controlled through restrictions written into grants and contracts, perhaps requiring prepublication review of potentially sensitive papers. The Department of Defense already requires this in many areas. Reagan's directive requires OSTP to determine whether such a mechanism is feasible for all federally funded research, and whether an appeals mechanism should be set up to ensure that restrictions are appropriate and workable.

The review will also look into the controversial question of whether export and visa controls should be used to restrict the access of non-U.S. citizens to sensitive research. The Corson report concluded that export controls are inappropriate in this area, in part because their use can pose severe problems in university departments containing foreign graduate students. Export controls essentially prohibit the transfer of scientific information to a foreign national.

Reagan's directive also requires the review to come up with proposals for improving the dialogue between the federal government and the scientific community over the imposition of controls on publication. And it states that special care should be taken "to weigh the anticipated benefits of any restrictions against the costs of slowing scientific and technical progress."

The review is being carried out by an interagency committee under the chairmanship of OSTP Deputy Director Ronald B. Frankum. The committee contains representatives from the agencies that have been pushing most strongly for increased controls on the dissemination of sensitive scientific and technological information—the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It also includes representatives from the National Science Foundation, the Department of Health and Human Services, and seven other agencies.

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense has established a group under the chairmanship of Richard Perle, assistant secretary for international security policy, to review the department's procedures for controlling export of technology to the Soviet Union. Perle is said to be a hard-liner on these matters.

Top Health Policy Official Leaving OSTP

Denis J. Prager, one of the longest-serving staff members in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), is leaving the White House. He has offered his resignation and is expected to leave in the next few weeks.

Prager, who joined OSTP in 1978, is one of only two Carter appointees to stay on into the Reagan Administration. He says his departure is not prompted by disagreements over policy. "It just seems like the right time to think about doing something else," he told *Science*, though he does not have another job lined up.

As assistant director for life sciences and institutional relations, Prager has been concerned with policies affecting biomedical research. He earned the enmity of part of the agricultural research establishment by spearheading an OSTP study that called for a shake-up of the agricultural research system (*Science*, 24 September 1982, p. 1227). More recently, he has headed a review of federal policy for the regulation of carcinogens (*Science*, 3 December 1982, p. 975). With Prager's impending departure, OSTP's continued interest in both these controversial areas is now in doubt.

Colin Norman