NIH officials, who claim no role for themselves in restructuring medical education, would, however, like to make training programs as attractive to qualified M.D.'s as possible. Existing programs for advanced research training are among those they cite as being "squeezed" by the stabilization policy.

Another troublesome—and perennial—issue for NIH is the endless stream of proposals from special interest groups for the creation of new categorical institutes. Nearly a dozen such proposals have been put forth in Congress in recent years, including one for an Institute for Research on Dysautonomia, a rare familial condition characterized by emotional instability and motor incoordination. NIH's most recent brush with the special interest institute contingent came last year when legislation to create a National Arthritis Institute nearly made it through Congress (*Science*, 7 January, p. 39) Wyngaarden's opposition was unmistakable.

In an effort to handle issues regarding the most appropriate organizational structure for NIH, Wyngaarden has called for an 18-month study to be conducted by the Institute of Medicine (IOM). Given the research community's general opposition to creating institutes disease-by-disease, it would not come as the "engine" that drives the whole enterprise, it makes sense to treat them so favorably.

Wyngaarden, who for his part seems to want a modification rather than abandonment of stabilization, noted in its defense that it is "a politically facile concept that helps us generate support." Indeed, as Fredrickson once predicted would happen, Congress is attracted to the idea of protecting 5000 grants each year in the budget. The next meeting of the Director's Advisory Committee, in a departure from the previous practice of covering the waterfront, will deal exclusively with stabilization policy and closely related issues.

—BARBARA J. CULLITON

Reagan Refuses to Budge in Weapons Talks

The Administration endures a string of arms control embarrassments but its views remain intact

No one can accuse the Reagan Administration of hesitation on the topic of nuclear weapons. In January, the U.S. plan for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe was assailed by the Soviet Union, criticized by some influential West German politicians, and privately panned by associates of Eugene Rostow, the top U.S. arms control official, who was sacked for general obstreperousness. At the end of the month, however, President Reagan was determined to press forward with the controversial weapons plan.

According to his proposal, the United States is to deploy during the next few years more than 500 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in England, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Unlike existing U.S. missiles in Europe, the Pershing II and the cruise missile are both mobile and highly accurate. The avowed purpose of their deployment is to counterbalance a similar Soviet missile, the SS-20, which the Soviets began to deploy in 1977. The Soviets have scattered more than 300 SS-20's, with three warheads each, among 37 different sites.

The Administration, along with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has advertised the SS-20 as a new threat, designed specifically to imperil Western forces from a great distance without fear of Western retaliation. According to a 1979 NATO communique, the SS-20 casts "doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression." Loosely translated, this means that they've got some and we don't, and they can hit us, but we can't hit them.

But the Soviets and some Western scholars see things differently. They say that the situation in Europe is not new, because the SS-20 is no more threatening than two existing Soviet missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5. Robert Berman and John Baker, the authors of a recent book entitled *Soviet Strategic Forces*,* state that the SS-20 is merely the long-awaited Soviet response to the U.S. deployment of Polaris missiles aboard nuclear submarines patroling the European coastline. The Polaris is capable of destroying the SS-4 and the SS-5, and the Soviets have been struggling since the mid-1960's to craft an appropriate strategic response.

In spite of these claims, the Administration believes that the presence of the SS-20 justifies the existence of the Pershing and the cruise missile. An official involved in the U.S. effort notes that "although we have other nuclear weapons of different kinds deployed in Europe, and in some categories more than the Soviets do, it is important to maintain deterrence across the spectrum of nuclear forces—to balance everything, so that the enemy doesn't think he has superiority anywhere."

This is why the Administration proposed last year to cancel the Pershing and cruise missile deployments if the Soviets destroyed their SS-20's. As another top Administration official explains, "both sides have more warheads than they can possibly need. The major thrust of our proposal is to reduce to much lower equal levels." The snag is that such an agreement would not include French and British nuclear forces, which the Soviets find no less threatening. The British have approximately 250 warheads on submarines and aircraft, and the French have roughly 131 warheads on submarines, missiles, and aircraft. Both are planning to expand their forces in the near future.

Last summer in Geneva, Soviet arms negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky proposed informally that the Soviets drastically reduce the number of their SS-20's in return for limited U.S. deployment of cruise missiles and no deployment of the Pershing. The Soviets worry about the Pershing in particular because of its great speed, which would permit its use in a highly effective preemptive attack against Soviet command posts and other strategic targets. Under the Kvitsinsky proposal, the number of warheads on both sides, including those held by the British and the French, would be about the same.

Paul Nitze, the top U.S. negotiator in the European weapons talks, thought

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that the proposal was worth serious consideration, as did his boss, Eugene Rostow, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This was no small recommendation, for Nitze and Rostow had served together during the 1970's on the Committee on the Present Danger, a group devoted to advertising the Soviet menace. Nitze and Rostow circulated the proposal among an ad hoc committee of Cabinet secretaries and top aides, bypassing the standing interagency committees on strategic weapons and arms control.

The ground-launched cruise missile (above) is considered less provocative than the Pershing because of its slow speed.

This displeased several Administration officials, including Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense who chairs one of the standing interagency committees. When Perle, who is widely known as a weapons hawk, learned what was going on, he expressed opposition not only to the proposal itself but also to the manner in which it was reviewed, as did several other committee members. Shortly thereafter, William Clark, the President's national security adviser, sent a letter to Secretary of State George Schultz directing that all future arms agreements be examined by the regular committees. Kvitsinsky reported in Geneva that the proposal had been rejected in Moscow, and Nitze said that the same had happened in Washington.

Although Rostow's supporters in Washington sought to portray this episode as the cause of his firing on 12 January, it was really only one of several reasons. Rostow and the White House had clashed over the appointment of several deputies at ACDA (see *Science*, 17 December 1982, p. 1203), and Rostow had embarrassed the Administration by publicly airing internal disputes on ratification of the limited threshold test ban treaty and other topics. Late last year, Rostow had promised to quit if the Senate failed to approve Robert Grey as ACDA's deputy director, and the White House withdrew the nomination in December. Rostow failed to take the hint, and several weeks later got the message directly from Schultz and Robert McFarlane, a deputy to William Clark. Both Nitze and Edward Rowny, the U.S. representative to the strategic arms reduction talks, were consulted in advance, and both had agreed to stay on after Rostow's departure.

The Soviets made great strides in public relations while the U.S. arms control establishment was in turmoil. In December, Soviet President Yuri Andropov proposed a compromise deployment plan similar to that put forward by Kvitsinsky, signaling a change of heart by the Politburo. He suggested that the United States cancel the Pershing and cruise missile deployments in exchange for the destruction of all SS-4's and SS-5's and the withdrawal of all but 150 or so SS-20 launchers, a number equivalent to the number of British and French launchers. Subsequently, the Soviets hinted that some of the SS-20's might be destroyed, not just withdrawn.

This is probably a major topic of discussion in Geneva, where the talks resumed on 27 January. After meeting with Reagan, Schultz, and other top Administration officials, Nitze returned with "the necessary authority to explore with my Soviet counterpart what give there is in the Soviet position." He is not authorized to offer any new U.S. proposals. As one high Administration official explains, "the events of recent weeks show that the firmness of our position and the rightness of our position can produce movement by the Soviets. We want to see more."

If the Administration refuses to budge from the "zero-zero" option in the future, it will find itself under increasing pressure from its European allies. Already, Hans-Jochen Vogel, the Social Democrat's candidate for president in West Germany, has forcefully called for American concessions, and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt has requested more flexibility. Helmut Kohl, the current chancellor, has been placed on the defensive for continuing to support the U.S. position. Germany is a pivotal state because all 108 Pershing II's are scheduled for deployment there. The national election will be held on 6 March.

—R. JEFFREY SMITH

Who's Who in the Social and Behavioral Sciences

Faculty members in social and behavioral science programs at the University of Chicago and the University of California (UC) at Berkeley have been given the highest overall grades for quality by their academic peers, according to a survey published by the National Academy of Sciences. Chicago's social and behavioral sciences faculty received a 4.51 grade average, while Berkeley's got a 4.47 average.

The grades, which reflect little more than prestige, are reported in the fifth and final volume of the academy's series on the quality of graduate programs at American universities. This report,* like its predecessors, contains a mass of information on each program, ranging from the number of faculty members to the number of papers they publish.

The most interesting—and most controversial—information is derived from the reputational survey. Some 1770 academic social and behavioral scientists were asked to rate the overall quality of faculty members in programs at other universities, on a scale of 0 (not sufficient for graduate education) to 5 (distinguished). Just over one-third of those asked declined to participate, some registering "strong objections" to the whole exercise, the report states.

Although the report studiously avoids ranking institutions in terms of their prestige, most readers will look to see who came out on top. So here, for what it is worth, is a list of the top-rated institutions in each discipline, with their scores on the 0 to 5 scale:

Anthropology: UC Berkeley, 4.6; Chicago, 4.6; Michigan, 4.5; Pennsylvania, 4.1; Arizona, 4.0.

Economics: MIT, 5.0; Harvard, 4.9; Chicago, 4.8; Princeton, 4.8; Stanford, 4.8; Yale, 4.7; Minnesota, 4.4; Pennsylvania, 4.3; Columbia, 4.2; UC Berkeley, 4.1; UC Los Angeles, 4.1; Northwestern, 4.1; Wisconsin at Madison, 4.1.

Geography: Minnesota, 4.6; Chicago, 4.3; Pennsylvania State, 4.3; UC

**An Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States: Social and Behavioral Sciences* (National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1983).