Finland. Since then, about a dozen companies in the United States have been producing interferon from leukocytes, fibroblasts, and lymphoblastoids, and by recombinant DNA techniques. The cost of producing enough interferon to treat one patient ranges from $20,000 to $30,000. As more interferon is produced by the genetic method, the price should drop to $200 to $300.

"You've got to go for broke," says Rauscher.

Even though interferon has shown only modest success in treating cancer, all is not lost for the millions of dollars invested so far, according to Rauscher, who has played an important role in the cancer society's decision to push interferon. Interferon is showing significant activity against both RNA and DNA viruses, which could give the substance equal, if not greater, commercial value over its use as an anticancer agent. The side effects of interferon, when given for viral treatment, are almost nonexistent in studies thus far, because the interferon is administered in much lower doses than in anticancer protocols. A number of investigators believe that interferon could prove to be therapeutic in the treatment of herpes virus diseases, for instance.

"I never thought interferon was a magic bullet for cancer treatment, but you've got to go for broke," Rauscher said. Scientists still have to experiment extensively with it to ascertain its ability to enhance a combination of other medications or its ability to stimulate the body's immune system after a patient has gone into remission.

"The jury is still out on interferon," Rauscher said. "There are many things yet to try with it."

The cancer society has nearly spent $6.8 million to purchase interferon, whereas the National Cancer Institute has spent about $11 million. The institute began phase I trials in mid-February to determine dosage regimens for patients. The NCI–phase I studies will include about 150 patients and will continue for 9 months to a year. Trials with leukocyte interferon will be carried out at Stanford, the Sidney Farber Cancer Institute, and Georgetown University. Lymphoblastoid studies will be conducted at the University of California at Los Angeles and at Duke University Medical Center. Leukocyte interferon produced by recombinant DNA will be tested at NCI, the National Naval Medical Center, and the National Institutes of Health Clinical Center. Studies with interferon produced by Hoffmann–La Roche were recently started at Stanford and the M. D. Anderson Clinic of the University of Texas.

—MARJORIE SUN

Califano Tells Tales of the Top Post at HEW

Carter's controversial cabinet member says that special interests have stymied the government's ability to confront tough issues

Joseph Califano, Jr., in his new book, *Governing America*,* tells an amusing anecdote about his tenure as the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) under President Carter. "In 1977," he writes, "evangelist Oral Roberts asked to see me about a hospital and medical school he wanted to build at Oral Roberts University," in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Roberts complained that the Oklahoma health planning agency, which is funded by HEW, had opposed his project because there were already too many hospital beds in the area. "Because Roberts had been a former law client of mine, I disqualified myself. The next evening, Oklahoma congressman Jim Jones . . . asked urgently that I just say hello to Roberts, which I agreed to do."

Jones and Roberts arrived later, along with several of Jones's congressional aides. When Roberts repeated his desire to talk with Califano about the hospital, Califano again said no. Roberts "rose from the couch, a towering figure looking down at me. 'Well, you're not disqualified from praying for us, are you?' His left hand firmly clasping my right hand, the electricity of a powerful preacher gripping us all, we stood . . . [with] our heads bowed. Oral Roberts prayed for the construction of the hospital and medical school."

As Secretary of the largest federal agency, Califano found himself in awkward circumstances with special pleaders on more than one occasion. Interests groups, he writes, have proliferated in number and are strangling the ability of the government to confront controversial issues such as civil rights, abortion, and health care. "Such issues spark conflicts among the biases, economic interests, political ambitions, and personal values that divide the country"—conflicts so severe, he says, that meaningful action can no longer be taken without substantial changes in the structure and process of government. "The boundless challenge of the Secretary's job was to try to deal fairly with these issues, to promote social justice, and to persuade, educate, cajole and plead with the people, the Congress, and the public servants"—a challenge he was eager to accept but which he only partially discharged.

Califano recounts that he was initially tapped by Carter for reasons having little to do with his administrative skill and legal acumen. As a presidential candidate, Carter needed an emissary to the Catholic community, a spokesman who could transmit his own strong opposition to abortion. Califano agreed to play the part in hopes of eventually being appointed HEW secretary, an ambition he had harbored, he says, since leaving Lyndon Johnson's staff in 1969. Even though he believed the post was "the most treacherous turf in Washington," next to the White House, Califano wanted an opportunity to implement the Great Society programs he had helped craft for Johnson. When picked, he said, "I thought you'd never ask, Mr. President."

Controversy surrounded his activities from the start. His opposition to federally funded abortions, although shared by the President, alienated several con-

*J. Califano, Jr., *Governing America* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1981).

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gressmen and some traditional HEW constituent groups during the hearings on his nomination. There was a brief fracas over his hiring of a personal chef. And then he plunged into the substantive but highly sensitive issues of national health insurance, hospital cost-containment, cigarette smoking, school desegregation, the Bakke case, welfare reform, and a curtailment of social security benefits. Although a theme of the book is that a good job was performed under trying circumstances, Califano acknowledges that his record of success in these areas is limited.

One reason for this record is that Califano was so committed to liberal ideals that he only reluctantly struck political compromises. His temperament may best be described as individualistic, and his style was such that, during a meeting with Southern senators who disliked his antismoking campaign, he thought nothing of admonishing one to extinguish his cigarette. Califano recounts numerous lectures on practical politics by Lyndon Johnson, lectures made necessary perhaps by the fact that Califano's own beliefs constantly strained the bounds of practicality.

Califano's willingness to ruffle political feathers in pursuit of personal goals and ideals was displayed early on by his replacement of Theodore Cooper, the assistant secretary of health under President Ford. Califano faulted Cooper for his participation in decisions that led to the disastrous effects of the swine flu immunization program. Still, "several congressmen had asked me to keep Cooper in his job, and he even had mild support within the Carter camp," Califano writes. Fifteen minutes into a meeting with Cooper, Califano concluded that moving him quickly "was critical to restoring confidence in the Public Health Service. He was badly shaken by the swine flu episode, bitter over his treatment in the press, and defensive about every judgment and recommendation he had made . . . refusing to recognize the extent to which the episode had set back all immunization efforts, even those to protect against childhood diseases such as polio and rubella."

Cooper, who is now with the Upjohn Corporation, says Califano's recollection is "incorrect and patent nonsense. There was no defensiveness, no bitterness, and no criticism of the press. He told me right off that he wanted his own man in the post, before any discussion of substantive matters."

It was Califano's independence—from both Congress and the White House—that apparently led to his own firing by Carter on 18 July 1979. He provoked early White House criticism with several of his appointments to top HEW posts. Hale Champion, a financial officer at Harvard University, who was named by Califano as the undersecretary, was disliked by Carter's close aides because he had worked for Morris Udall during the Massachusetts primary. Although Carter assured Califano that he had no personal objections, both Champion and Califano were unsettled by anonymous leaks of White House displeasure. Similarly, when Califano attempted to remove David Sencer as director of the Center for Disease Control because of his involvement with Cooper in the swine flu debacle, "Sencer promptly enlisted Georgia friends of the President to bolster his position," Califano says. Carter telephoned to say that he wanted Sencer kept, but Califano refused. After a brief discussion, Carter acceded "with obvious reluctance," Califano says.

Joseph Califano, Jr.

A sometimes abrasive style

Jill Krementz

There were additional, substantive disagreements between Carter and Califano on such topics as the specifics of a new welfare plan, development of a national achievement test for elementary and grade schools, and the creation of a new Department of Education. The disputes were occasionally petty. At one point, for example, Carter challenged Califano to hire more females and minorities, sending along a White House staff analysis of 20 recent HEW appointments that showed a preponderance of white males. Califano's reaction was probably symptomatic of his troubles with the White House. The staff analysis was distorted, he claimed, "and the house Carter lived in was made of glass. I sent back a complete list of the top 23 jobs on his own staff, in the same format: 20 were held by white males, two by white females, and one by a black male."

Califano exhibited similar bravado with his publicity drive against cigarette smoking, an effort that endangered Carter's political support in the South. Claiming that "ninety percent of adult smokers want to quit," Califano writes that he initiated the drive "to spur that latent desire in adults to action." Califano writes that Carter was warned repeatedly by his allies in the South that the effort would cost the party votes and ensure the reelection of conservative Senator Jesse Helms in the tobacco state of North Carolina. "Carter put 'the smoking program' at the top of a list of items he wanted to 'keep off my desk and on your own desk.' " White House health adviser Peter Bourne tried to neutralize the political effects on Carter by telling the American Cancer Society that smoking "is a relaxing experience which gives pleasure and relief at times of stress. . . . It may be that certain chemical breakdown products of tobacco have beneficial or mixed effects." As pressure mounted, Carter himself rose to the industry's defense, promising a federal research plan "to make the smoking of tobacco even more safe than it is today."

As the political impact of Califano's initiatives grew worse and worse, Carter's more conservative aides came to suspect that Califano was disloyal. Doubts were initially planted during the Administration's negotiations with Senator Edward Kennedy (D–Mass.) on a proposal for national health insurance, when Kennedy shrewdly exploited Califano's liberal views to press for a broader plan than Carter desired. At one point, Kennedy urged Califano to resign in protest against cuts in HEW's budget made by Carter's Office of Management and Budget. Later, Carter aides accused Califano of leaking negative comments about the proposed Department of Education to the Washington *Post*, his former legal client. Califano denies such leaks, although he fought against the new department within the Administration. It

was, he thought, an ill-conceived political payoff to the National Education Association.

Califano attributes most of the anonymous White House criticism to Carter aide Hamilton Jordan and press secretary Jody Powell. Both were interested in little except feathering Carter's political nest, he reports. Neither returned phone calls nor complained to Califano directly about the political consequences of his positions. "I'm not interested in the substance. I'm interested in the politics for the President," Jordan supposedly said during a discussion of national health insurance. It seems plausible that neither Jordan nor Powell ever really took to Califano, who was after all the

> Powell and Jordan complained that "Joe was going his own way."

sort of Washington insider that Carter and the Georgians had campaigned against. Califano enjoyed good relations only with Stuart Eizenstat and Jack Watson, more liberal White House aides.

Califano's firing occurred much as it was described at the time. Carter wanted to impose greater discipline on his Cabinet, and Powell and Jordan complained that "Joe was going his own way." Carter himself explained that Califano's problem was "you and some members of the staff—particularly Ham, Jody, and Frank Moore [the congressional liaison]—have not gotten along." Califano writes that this statement rang true, and all he could say in response was, "It's your decision, Mr. President." Carter, concerned about Califano's potential defection to the Kennedy campaign, then offered him the post of ambassador to Italy, Califano says.

By the end of the experience, Califano had learned several important lessons. One is that "governing America is not only a matter of ideology. . . . Open-minded pragmatism is required." Another is that many of the Great Society programs created constituency groups that now pursue narrow interests—a circumstance, he says elsewhere, that poses "the severest threat to governing for all the people." Califano seems to acknowledge that the social experiment he helped to craft in the 1960's has gone partly awry.—R. JEFFREY SMITH

DOE Blocks Mailing of "Antinuclear" Publication

Energy secretary James Edwards has ordered a halt to distribution of a Department of Energy publication because of its allegedly antinuclear bias. The document is the January issue of *Energy Consumer*, a low-budget magazine launched in 1979, which is sent out to about 100,000 people.

The issue, which contains articles and reprints of articles by energy experts on the subject of "energy and the environment," was the last one to be compiled under Carter's energy secretary, Charles Duncan. Among articles on such subjects as solar energy and acid rain are two articles on nuclear energy. One, by a scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council, discusses problems of radioactive waste and advocates "a cautious approach to the further development of commercial nuclear power." The other, an excerpt from writings of the Ford Foundation's Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, is generally positive toward nuclear power, although it favors a more restrictive siting policy for plants.

This seems to be pretty moderate stuff—but not, apparently, to devotees of nuclear power, particularly constituents of Senator James McClure (R–Idaho) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, who bombarded his office with letters and phone calls protesting the articles. McClure conveyed his concern to DOE that, according to an aide, the articles were "not in line with administration policy," and Edwards forthwith ordered a freeze on the copies of the magazine—about 12,000—that had not yet been sent out.

According to DOE public information officer William Greener, a "temporary hold" was put on the mailing pending a review by DOE's policy development people, who are also reviewing the contents of the next issue, on "energy and the elderly." Greener explains that it was decided in February that "things of a policy nature shouldn't come out without approval by the secretary." The DOE has also gotten angry mail, containing statements such as: "I cannot recall being so upset by anything sanctioned by the government," and "It's quite clear that the Department of Energy continues to be used as a mouthpiece for environmental organizations." McClure, who is chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, wrote to the department that "my constituents characterize the issue as an anti-nuclear handbook containing technically incorrect information and negative reports about nuclear waste." An official in DOE's Office of Consumer Affairs says the public affairs office reviews every issue before it goes to print and as far as she knows the articles contain no inaccuracies. But the January issue was reviewed before the change of administrations.

Senator Mark Hatfield (R–Ore.), who had an article against nuclear war in the same issue, has expressed strong displeasure with Edwards' action. But future Idaho readers of *Energy Consumer*—if, indeed, the magazine continues at all—are unlikely to be offended as long as Edwards, an ardent supporter of nuclear power, remains in office.

—Constance Holden

House Science Panel Throws Down Gauntlet

A House science subcommittee has challenged the Reagan Administration by voting a hefty portion of the funds that the Administration wants to cut from the National Science Foundation's budget. Most conspicuous is the inclusion of some $65 million more than the $9.9 million in science education funds that the Administration requested in its revised budget.

On a party-line vote decided by its Democratic majority, the subcommittee on science, research, and technology set a total of $1160.6 million for NSF's fiscal year 1982 budget, some $127.1 million more than the Administration asked. The bill contained almost $293 million less than the Carter Administration requested in January.

Specific major additions in the bill reported out by the subcommittee, besides those for science education, were $16.5 million for upgrading university instrumentation and laboratories and $18.7 million above the $37.7 million in the Reagan budget for

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