

# SALT Supporters of Two Minds on Treaty

*Leaders of the FAS divide on whether to demand promises of improvement now or simply lobby for SALT II*

The bane of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) for 7 years was the "fractionated" warhead, that devilish innovation of the late 1960's also known as MIRV, short for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Now that the draft of the SALT II treaty is in hand, the nightmare of bargaining for MIRV's is over. It has been replaced with a new fractionation problem, this one involving political opinion.

As the ratification vote in the Senate draws near, it seems that the debate will not divide in a clean split between hawks and doves. There are at least two camps of hawkish senators itching to rewrite the treaty, and, more telling, some of the arms control advocates said this spring that they think the treaty is so thin they may want to pen their own additions to it. This is considered an idle threat, but perhaps it should not be, for the debate will be shaped by the enthusiasm, or lack of it, that treaty supporters bring to the Senate. The fractionation of the treaty defenders is evident just now at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), which is entering the fray with a divided leadership.

Jeremy Stone, director of the FAS, publicized his doubts about the treaty in an editorial in the *New York Times* on 11 March, about a week after three liberal senators announced that they found the treaty inadequate. The three were William Proxmire (D-Wis.), George McGovern (D-S.D.), and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.). They said on 5 March that they were considering withholding their support for SALT II until they were reassured by the President that it would lead to actual reductions in weapons stockpiles.

Stone's article in the *Times*, sketching roughly the same argument, brought a sharp rebuke several weeks later from a dozen senior members of the FAS, including such heavyweights as Richard Garwin of International Business Machines, Jerome Wiesner, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Hans Bethe of Cornell, and others.\* It appeared as a letter in the *Times* and was signed by weapons expert Herbert Sco-

ville, Jr., and the president of the California Institute of Technology, Marvin Goldberger. They wrote that they supported the treaty and thought it naïve to try to improve SALT II so late in the game. Several of them later told *Science* that they personally agreed with Stone's analysis of the treaty's flaws, but disagreed with his decision to publicize them. Stone and the other leaders of the FAS are eager to smooth over their differences, but in private they still hold clashing views.

Meanwhile, the FAS has polled its 5000 members—as it always does on such occasions—to determine what its official position should be. Stone reported that with the first 1200 ballots counted, the votes are running as follows: 14 percent support the treaty with some enthusiasm, 39 percent support it but are dismayed by its inadequacy, 20 percent believe the FAS should support the treaty only if "some credible commitment is made at the final signing" to reduce strategic weapons stocks, 12 percent support the treaty unless it emerges that "a firm commitment to deployment" of the MX missile has been made as a price for the hawks' support, and 14 percent urge that the treaty be deferred and improved, "especially if defeat looms."

The FAS was organized by atomic scientists in 1946 to lobby for controls on the nuclear weapons they helped to create. Although the FAS does not have a loud voice, it has considerable influence when it speaks on nuclear matters, partly because of its members' expertise and partly because its statements are carefully designed to represent a majority view. A division in the FAS thus has a twofold significance: it muffles the organization's voice and signals that there are problems of real substance in the treaty.

Stone believes that Scoville, Goldberger, and company are following an

overly cautious tactical approach that will allow the hawks to dominate the debate and prove the thesis that the only people who must be accommodated in the end are the weapons builders. Stone's critics, on the other hand, argue that by attacking the treaty he is taking an extremely risky path that threatens to splinter the only community that supports SALT.

The contest is of more than parochial interest because the vote in the Senate will be very close. A shift of a few fence-straddlers in one direction or another could make or break SALT II, and many senators would feel less compunction about killing the treaty if it were seen as a sham in any case. The Administration needs 67 votes to win ratification. The Democratic whip, Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), gave the following head-count in May, 3 to 6 months before the debate is expected to begin: 20 senators are solidly against ratification, 10 are leaning against, 40 are leaning strongly in favor, 10 are possibly in favor, and 20 are considered unpredictable.

In preparing for the big debate, Stone deliberately provoked a little debate within the FAS over the position it ought to take. This is his job, he says. He began to churn the waters in an FAS newsletter last September with an editorial titled "MAP or SALT?" Stone wrote that deployment of the new MX (missile experimental) in a multiple aimpoint (MAP) basing system could vitiate this particular treaty and cripple future attempts to negotiate arms limitations. "We are either going to move toward the elimination of land-based missiles or we are going to have to admit that SALT has failed to control offensive weapons agreements," he claimed.

The MX will present an intractable problem, particularly if it is deployed in the MAP or "shell-game" system now planned for it.† In simple terms, this innovation, which the Pentagon has its heart set on, could, if deployed, destabilize the arms balance and force the

\*Other signers were Ruth Adams of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Abram Chayes, Paul Doty, and George Kistiakowski of Harvard, Sidney Drell of Stanford, Gerard Piel of *Scientific American*, and Charles Townes of the University of California at Berkeley.

†For a detailed analysis, see "The MX missile: A look beyond the obvious," *Technology Review*, May 1979.

United States and the Soviet Union into a decade-long frenzy of missile building. It would cost the United States more than \$30 billion. The SALT II treaty forbids deployment of any new missile for 3 years, as long as the protocol is in effect. But after that it permits one new missile per signatory, a loophole written specifically for the MX. In a letter on 21 March, President Carter wrote the three rebellious doves in the Senate that the "critically important and difficult decision" on the MX "must be made outside the context of SALT." He promised: "I will not be influenced by factors relating to SALT ratification in making my decisions on this or any other defense issue." Yet the decision to fund or not to fund an MX construction program will be made this summer before the treaty comes to a vote, and the lobbying is now quite intense.

Stone continued to stir up the FAS early this year, proposing a plan of his own for reducing the number of land-based missiles and setting out a number of dovish arguments for and against the treaty. He stressed an unpleasant truth: "doves are rising in defense of the treaty they privately consider a sham." In March he proposed an alliance between hawks and doves critical of the treaty, not to force amendments to SALT II, but to "give a sense of the Senate as to its desires for the future." By this tactic, he hoped to wring a promise from the Administration to do something specific, either in the summit meeting sealing the treaty (15 to 18 June) or in the earliest stages of SALT III negotiations. The idea was to attach to the treaty a written pledge that both signatories would begin negotiating to lower the number of land-based missiles. This would please arms controllers for obvious reasons; it ought to appeal to hawks as a way of reducing the threat posed by the Soviet Union's ever more accurate MIRV's. It would serve as a tactical gimmick as well, giving undecided senators an opportunity to straddle the fence to the bitter end, allowing them to vote twice: once in a "tough" protest adding something to the treaty, and afterward in a "soft" vote for the treaty itself.

This editorial was approved by the FAS council; the more pungent version that appeared in the *Times* was not. In the latter, Stone theorized that the defeat of any particular treaty could lead to passage of a better one. He wrote that passing a sham treaty could do as much damage to arms negotiations as rejecting SALT II. He called SALT II "short on substance" and recommended a hawk-dove alliance to improve it. Above the

article was a cartoon of a magician's hat labeled "SALT II" with missiles exploding above the brim.

This ignited the Scoville-Goldberger riposte. They made a down-the-line defense of the Administration and brushed aside Stone's complaints thus: "While the treaty does not end the arms race and solve all our security problems, it is by no means as short on substance as Stone would have us believe." They listed its virtues (see box) and concluded that it was akin to treason for a dove to point out SALT II's failings: "by poor-mouthing" the treaty, they claimed, Stone "is probably increasing the likelihood that it will not be ratified."

Stone calls that the "Scoville letter." Then came the Holdren letter, an ex-

pression of support for Stone in the FAS newsletter written by John Holdren, of the University of California at Berkeley. Eight others signed it. Holdren explained later that he was moved to write because he thought it "unfortunate that a collection of FAS sponsors chose to write a letter that appeared to attack Jeremy personally and question his sincerity." Stone had been "lacerated" in the *Times*, Holdren said, and it was important to have "some show of support." Holdren "would hate to see a real split in the FAS."

A curious footnote is that Stone and Scoville went through this before when the Vladivostok agreement was announced in 1974, but the roles were then reversed. Stone argued that the agree-

## What SALT II Provides

The SALT II treaty which Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev are planning to initial in Vienna this June has three parts: a protocol that will expire in 1981, a treaty that will expire in 1985, and a joint statement of principles that will be used as the beginning text for SALT III. Among other things, the protocol temporarily forbids the flight testing or deployment of mobile strategic missiles. It also puts a temporary check on cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear-armed, banning those with a range of more than 372 miles from deployment on land or sea carriers. (Some long-range cruises are permitted on bombers.) These limits will be renegotiated or allowed to expire in 1981.

The treaty itself puts ceilings on the number of nuclear delivery vehicles permitted in several categories. The Vladivostok accord of 1974 limited the overall weapons stockpile to 2400 vehicles on each side; now the figure is cut to 2250, to be achieved by 1981. To abide by this agreement, the Soviet Union will have to dismantle 250 to 300 launchers over the next 3 years.

The treaty limits the number of MIRVed warheads and/or bombers loaded with long-range cruise missiles to 1320 on each side. It sets lower ceilings on the number of MIRVed submarine, air-launched, and intercontinental missiles. For the first time, it puts a stop to MIRVing: neither side may test or deploy an intercontinental missile with more than ten MIRV's (the maximum now feasible) or a submarine missile with more than 14 MIRV's. It puts a limit on size: neither side will be allowed to develop missiles larger than the Soviet SS-19, although the Soviets will be allowed to keep the 300 or so giant SS-18's which they now possess.

There is one major loophole, however. The treaty specifically permits the deployment of one new strategic missile after 1981. On the American side this would allow for the use of the MX, a weapon which, as presently conceived, could stimulate a new arms race. For this reason, Senator Proxmire likes to say that SALT II will "make the world safe for the MX." Both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to share information on missile testing and to refrain from interfering in one another's electronic spying on weapons systems. State Department officials insist that the verification of Soviet compliance is in no way dependent on voluntary cooperation.

Lastly, the statement of principles makes a general promise to continue the SALT process, to reduce the number of strategic weapons, place qualitative limits on new weapons, and resolve the outstanding issues (such as the future of the MX) left dangling in the protocol. This last section, containing promises for the future, is the one that arms control advocates would like to see strengthened immediately—if possible, during the summit meeting in June.—E.M.

ment was too fragile to endure strong opposition; Scoville, that it was not worthy of support. They gave separate press conferences, and in the end, a majority held with Stone.

Scoville said that this time he "didn't want to get into a hassle with Jeremy in public." Several others had the same response. Garwin considered the split to be "a very slight difference of view on tactics." Yet both he and Scoville called Stone's approach naïve, unrealistic, and potentially disastrous. Most important, Garwin said, is that for the Senate to reject SALT II now would be to tell the Soviets and the world that the Carter Administration is impotent. This might make it impossible to negotiate *any* agreement in the future, for who bargains with the powerless?

Bernard Feld, a specialist in arms control at MIT and chairman of the executive committee of the Pugwash Council, shares Scoville's outlook, but he did not sign the Scoville letter. Those who want to move ahead on arms control, in his view, must "put up a brave front." Ratification of SALT II is "an absolute prerequisite for getting on with the task, and it seems to me it would be an unmitigated disaster if it were not to be ratified. I don't think we have the choice that Jeremy would like us to have."

Like his critics, Stone describes the division as a mere quibble over tactics, a subject, however, on which he considers himself better informed than most. He wrote recently that "at least a wing of the FAS should be working to preclude SALT III from duplicating the under-achievements of SALT II by getting suitable commitments *now*." The Scoville group "fails to appreciate why this is a uniquely important time to complain and exert pressure unlike the last 7 years," Stone argued in the latest newsletter. He does not believe the SALT process is as fragile as it has been depicted. If the treaty runs into trouble, "It's not going to be defeated," he said, "it's going to be deflected" by senatorial tinkering.

An aide to one of the senior Democrats who will carry the burden of the pro-treaty debate described how the tinkering will proceed. There will be three kinds of amendments offered, two of them "killers," and perhaps a fourth innocuous motion in the form of a "sense of the Senate" resolution. During the Panama Canal debate, the aide explained, the late James Allen dredged up a forgotten rule and showed the Senate that it had the right to amend international treaties on a line-by-line basis. Senators' memories are short, but not so

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## DNR Given Up as a Loser, Citizen Support Lacking

To the surprise of nearly everyone, President Jimmy Carter has decided to abandon his proposal to bring the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Forest Service, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together into a new Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Still more surprising, the official who took the lead in urging the President to drop the proposal was Secretary of the Interior Cecil D. Andrus, whom Carter planned to appoint as Secretary of DNR.

Carter is the fourth president to try to group the natural resources management agencies in a single department, and like the other three—Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Nixon—he seems to have failed. This is not for lack of merit in the proposed reorganization plan. That substantial economies and gains in efficiency would result from the plan does not seem to be questioned by most persons familiar with resource management problems. Overall, the proposed reorganization plan was expected to eliminate 2000 personnel positions and to save \$100 million annually.

Why, then, has the plan been abandoned?

As head of a big, new department with a \$8.6 billion budget, Secretary Andrus would have had a much enhanced position in the Carter cabinet. Yet, according to White House sources who know what went on when the Secretary and key presidential advisers met with Carter on 15 April, Andrus had concluded that to try to push the plan through Congress would be futile and dangerous for Interior.

Up until very recently, the President had intended to submit the plan to Congress under the Executive Reorganization Act, whereby it would become effective unless disapproved by either house within 60 days. But opposition to this strategy by Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and majority leader Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.), who favored the proposed reorganization but felt no new department should be created without an act of Congress, led the President to de-

cide not to press it and to submit a bill instead (*Science*, 25 May).

Andrus was getting a lot of heat from the bureaucratic fiefdoms at Interior, which, unlike Andrus himself, stood to lose from the reorganization. While willing to stand this heat as long as there was a reasonable chance the reorganization would go through, Andrus now foresaw only a long, frustrating siege of congressional hearings in which his agency would be under heavy criticism and threat of legislative tampering.

Harrison Wellford, the Office of Management and Budget official who has been in charge of reorganization planning, observes that a reorganization proposal of this kind generates powerful opposition in Congress, the bureaucracy, and among resource user groups, and—despite its merits—generates little political support to offset that opposition. The result, in his view, is that such a plan will never be approved, not in this Administration nor in any other, unless a broadly based citizen lobby similar to Common Cause gets behind improving government efficiency.

As Wellford sees it, congressional committees, such as the Senate and House committees on agriculture (which have jurisdiction over the Forest Service), become intensely antagonistic because they do not wish to lose any power or control. Their antagonism is encouraged covertly by officials in the bureaucracy who feel threatened. Resource user interests have long established ties and relationships with certain agencies and tend to fear that any change in existing bureaucratic arrangements will, from their standpoint, be for the worse. For instance, the timber industry perceives Andrus as an environmentalist and does not want the Forest Service placed under his authority.

Wellford goes on to say that, while the advantages of reorganization are not seriously disputed, few members of Congress see enough political benefit in it to themselves to be willing to help push it through. There is no pressure on them to act from citizen groups lobbying for reorganization because abstractions such as "better government" are not likely to move people to lobby. "People need a more selfish interest to act," Wellford observes.

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short as to obliterate this lesson. Any amendment of this type—no matter how sweetly worded—would probably be rejected by the Russians and must be viewed as a treaty killer. The other type of killer would not change the text but would add a “reservation” or “understanding” at the end, modifying the substance of the text. Amendments of this sort are anticipated, and they will undoubtedly read like reason itself. A third type—an add-on that does not modify the treaty’s substance—should be con-

sidered benign. Senators Gary Hart (D-Colo.) and John Culver (D-Iowa), both treaty supporters, will offer one of these benign additions, requiring Senate approval of any decision to extend the protocol of SALT II beyond the date of expiration, now set for 1981. The treaty will run until 1985.

Stone wants to lead the FAS into the midst of this brawl, with the idea that he might be able to shape the wording of an amendment, if there is one. At worst, if the treaty seems doomed, he would like to be on hand at the burial so as to miti-

gate the hawkish overtones of the vote.

This strategy may seem elaborate for someone who has no vote in the Senate. It is designed to counterbalance the rightward drift in the debate, and as such it is partially manufactured for political effect. This is what makes some FAS members uncomfortable, of course. As Garwin put it, “I don’t know about vote counting; I have to say what seems right, not speak for effect.” But even he agreed that if he thought he could obtain a better treaty by joining in Stone’s pressure tactics, he would do it.—ELIOT MARSHALL

## UN Meeting in Vienna Unlikely to Be a Waltz

### *“North” and “South” countries proceeding warily toward UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development*

The long and elaborate formal preparatory process for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) to be held in Vienna in August is grinding into its final phase with the agenda still unsettled and prospects for substantive agreement between the less developed countries (LDC’s) and the industrialized countries doubtful at best.

All is not necessarily lost, however. With UN conferences, knots have a way of being cut in the last weeks, often in the last days before a conference convenes as government upper echelons finally focus on the difficult problems. Further, there is the question of how success or failure should be measured at such meetings. One reasonable point of view is that what is really important is not the output of harmonious rhetoric, resolutions, and formal accords, but what happens before and especially after the meeting. And there are signs that preparations for UNCSTD have put some potential adversaries on better terms of understanding and, significantly, encouraged the international scientific community to assume a more active interest in problems of development.

It is generally agreed, however, that the enlightened sounding “ascending” process by which individual countries and regional groupings of nations were to generate topics for the conference has not worked very well. A fifth and final preparatory committee—“prep com”—meeting for UNCSTD is scheduled for late June when an effort will be made to complete negotiations on a “program of action” for Vienna. On the calendar are

chronically controversial topics such as technology transfer.

From the outset, technology transfer, which is assigned top priority by the less developed countries, has been a major sticking point in the so-called North-South dialogue. Pre-UNCSTD discussions on the issue have demonstrated differing general approaches to development by the LDC’s and the industrialized countries. LDC’s stress access to technology and urge the creation of strong, formal international arrangements to guarantee such access. Industrialized countries, particularly the United States, emphasize the necessity of increasing the LDC’s capacity to utilize technology and favor discussion of specific measures to achieve that end.

The LDC’s have acted collectively under the aegis of the Group of 77, a bloc of Third World countries formed in the 1960’s to achieve common political objectives in the UN and its specialized agencies. The Group of 77 name is retained, although membership has grown to about 120 countries as the UN has expanded. In recent years, the Group of 77 has organized its efforts around the goal of achieving a New International Economic Order, which denotes a restructuring of aid, trade, and financial arrangements between the LDC’s and industrial countries to redress inequities between the two groups (*Science*, 7 October 1977).

The Group of 77 recognizes science and technology as crucial factors in development and has pressed for the holding of UNCSTD as a kind of capstone to a series of UN conferences on global is-

sues held in the 1970’s. During the first three preparatory committee meetings, however, the LCD’s were unable to develop detailed positions on major issues.

One problem is that many LDC’s lack expert staff and adequate funding needed to formulate and adopt policy stands on complex science and technology issues. Prep com meetings, in effect, provided the opportunity for the Group of 77 to caucus and work out unified positions.

During the first two prep com meetings, discussions on a program of action, which will guide the Vienna meeting, were quite diffuse. At the third meeting, the Group of 77 did reduce a longer list of topics that had been put forward by the conference secretariat into three main “target areas.” These are as follows:

- 1) Strengthening of scientific and technological capacity of the developing countries.

- 2) Restructuring of the conditions for access to scientific know-how and technology as an integral part of the efforts to establish the new International Economic Order.

- 3) Improved coordination of scientific and technological activities within the United Nations system and an increase in financial resources for those activities.

These are expected to provide a rubric for proceedings at Vienna, but the problem has been to flesh out the agenda sufficiently to indicate to participating countries what they should be prepared to discuss in detail.

At the fourth prep com meeting in early May, the Group of 77 confirmed that they intended to use the UNCSTD meeting to demand the transfer of tech-