

gers noted at the conclusion of his testimony. Indeed, it is the role of the publisher that seems to concern Rogers as much as the Rorvik claim itself.

After the hearing, Rogers wrote to the Association of American Publishers to say, "I am somewhat surprised that the book publishing industry does not have some canon of ethics or at least guidelines. I am very concerned over the lack of responsibility on the part of the J. B.

Lippincott Company . . . in publishing the Rorvik book as non-fiction." (Lippincott officials have refused to deal directly with questions about their reasons for publishing the book—now on the best-seller lists—but it is known that the company is in such a poor financial state that its merger negotiations with Harper & Row are in peril.

There is, apparently, nothing illegal about what Rorvik and Lippincott have

done, although some groups, as well as individual scientists named in the book, have wondered about a suit for false advertising. As Rogers wrote to the publishers association, "There are good reasons why books are categorized as fiction or non-fiction. If the public is to continue to have confidence in these designations, then the industry must insure that they indeed have meaning."

—BARBARA J. CULLITON

President and Science Adviser Push for a Foundation for Development

The White House is backing creation of a Foundation for International Technological Cooperation designed to assist less developed countries (LDC's) to make more effective use of science and technology. President Carter launched the idea publicly in a speech to the Venezuelan Congress on 29 March. Carter's science adviser, Frank Press, who heads the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), was charged with working out basic details of form and function for the foundation and for doing the initial missionary work on its behalf.

After weighing the pros and cons of an immediate push to establish the foundation, the Administration has decided to wait and include it in a package of proposals it plans to put forward next year for the restructuring of the whole foreign assistance program. However, a start will be made in the interim by setting up a planning office to develop the foundation concept further. This planning office would report to Agency for International Development (AID) Administrator John J. Gilligan, but in his capacity as principal adviser to the President on development policy rather than AID chief.

When the idea of the foundation was broached on Capitol Hill some weeks back, the Administration appeared to have its work cut out for it. Congress is in the midst of its consideration of foreign aid legislation and, since the foundation idea was not included in Administration proposals on the subject, the proponents of the foundation were starting from scratch. Furthermore, the initial reaction to the foundation idea was colored by suspicion that the new entity might prove more effective in funneling R & D money to American universities than in

actually fostering development in LDC's. Efforts by OSTP representatives to explain the idea more fully seem to be earning it a friendlier reception.

Proponents of the foundation reject any implication of a Treasury raid. They argue that the whole point of the foundation is to enable LDC's to identify their own problems and build the scientific and technological capacity to solve them. To do this, advocates would like to see a public foundation operate in the style of the Rockefeller Foundation and with the status of the National Science Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation has traditionally operated its overseas programs with a relatively small, highly professional headquarters staff in the United States. The emphasis has always been on building up indigenous staff in the country where a project is being carried out and on arranging for American experts to help the process by working abroad. NSF is seen as a desirable model for the new foundation since it has been able to support research and education on a long-term basis without the operational responsibilities which tend to distort the R & D efforts of mission-oriented federal agencies.

The weakness of the U.S. foreign aid program in introducing science and technology into LDC's is widely acknowledged. The original "know-how, show-how" methods which worked reasonably well in the technical assistance programs for industrialized countries have been much less satisfactory when applied to the LDC's.

The idea of a foundation to assist development is not new. The direct antecedent of the Administration proposal is a Brookings Institution study,

An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies, commissioned by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance early in the new Administration and completed last fall. The Brookings study expounds a theory and strategy of development which over the past several years has won wide acceptance among those concerned with development issues in universities, private foundations, and advisory organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences. The Brookings study expresses a view of science and technology in the development process summed up in the following excerpt:

In the final analysis, development is an indigenous phenomenon. Aid givers can help to introduce new technologies, develop institutions, train people and make capital available. But local social and political factors, the culture, and the leadership must be receptive to change. The policies which emerge are the key.

Especially in dealing with the least developed countries, the United States has been finding it difficult to adapt existing AID machinery to achieve the goals of the successful aid giver. The U.S. foreign assistance program has gone through several major phases since it was established three decades ago. The first object was to rebuild the industry and economic infrastructure of the Western European countries and Japan. Then in the 1950's, prompted by the Cold War, the United States concentrated on providing economic and military aid to friendly countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc and to "uncommitted" nations, particularly those which were strategically located. In the 1960's, emphasis shifted to development programs in Latin America and Southeast Asia, primarily because of the Castro revolution and growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and the accompanying rise of public skepticism about American involvements overseas was a factor in forcing a reappraisal of foreign assistance policy. Inflation and increasing federal budget

deficits also exerted pressure on funding of foreign aid programs. And the lessons of development in nations such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil, which had gained impetus from high levels of foreign aid and an inflow of capital in the 1950's and 1960's, influenced a reconsideration of aid strategy.

Congress in the 1970's has been critical of AID for inefficiency and slowness to act and for a buildup of bureaucracy in this country at the expense of field operations. The legislators also grew increasingly disenchanted with AID emphasis on large projects—dams, roads and power plants, for example—which seemed to emulate uncritically the Western model of development through industrialization and urbanization. There was concern that aid tended to enrich elites in LDC's without improving the income or living conditions of the majority of people.

Acting on these attitudes, Congress in 1973 adopted a "new directions" program for AID. The main message to the agency was that foreign assistance programs should focus on helping poor people in the poorest nations. Emphasis was to be placed on smaller assistance projects, particularly in rural areas. The stress was to be on agriculture, population control, health, education, and the general category of human resources development.

A practical effect of the new directions initiative was to put further strain on the AID bureaucracy. Earlier criticism of AID efficiency caused Congress to impose heavy accountability requirements. Not only did the new directions program dictate a larger number of smaller projects, but AID, in effect, was required to get congressional committee approval of new projects or of significant cost increases for existing projects. Although AID had been pressured to shift personnel overseas to the "field," the new directions mandate is said to have caused an administrative overload and to have exercised a further depressing effect on agency morale.

President Carter made it clear after taking office that he was committed to concentrating foreign aid in the poorest nations. The Brookings study squared with this Administration view that aid should promote the "satisfaction of basic human needs."

These ideas are reflected in legislation proposing a major overhaul of the foreign assistance apparatus approved by Senator Hubert Humphrey shortly before he died. The "Humphrey bill," co-sponsored in the Senate in an act of fraternal piety by his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, was in-

troduced in the Senate in January in recognition of Humphrey's long and effective championing of foreign aid. The main change under the Humphrey bill would be replacement of AID with an International Development Cooperation Administration which would administer economic assistance programs now run by other federal agencies, notably the State and Treasury departments, as well as by AID.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred consideration of the Humphrey bill until next year because of the long debate on the Panama Canal treaties. A House International Relations Committee task force, however, studied the Humphrey proposals and recommended that some of them be incorporated in the current AID authorization bill (H.R. 12222). This section of the bill, passed by the House on 15 May, directs the President to come up with plans to implement by executive order the changes in the bill designed to strengthen the aid programs including creation of a new agency to replace AID.

The new foundation is intended to implement the Administration view that—as an OSTP statement on the foundation put it—"When employed within the right policy and management framework, scientific and technological advances can be significant factors in determining the rate and direction of economic and social development."

Foundation Functions

The foundation would assist developing countries in strengthening indigenous scientific and technological institutions and support education and training programs in developing countries and the U.S. The foundation would also be expected to coordinate the science and technology activities relevant to development in all government agencies and to provide planning and evaluation capabilities for all U.S. foreign aid activities. Another function would be to encourage and support research on the development process in universities and other selected scientific and technological institutions. Proponents of the foundation are somewhat sensitive about the subject of R & D for development. Such R & D currently has a dubious reputation in Congress where it is thought that university researchers have tended to pursue their own research interests without much regard for the utilization of that research in promoting development abroad. Congressional skepticism has been directed, in particular, at Title XII of current foreign aid legislation, which includes support for agricultural research for development.

About \$40 to \$50 million a year has been allocated to research mostly in U.S. universities, notably land-grant institutions. Title XII was enacted in 1975 and congressional staff is especially critical of the program in its earlier phases. These sources say there now appears to be more "in country" activity, that is, interaction with agricultural scientists and producers in LDC's. Advocates of the foundation have suggested safeguards to prevent "internalization" of its programs—that is, concentrating work in the United States. One such suggestion is for the formation of an advisory council with some of its members coming from LDC's to ensure that foundation activities remain genuinely collaborative.

The basic purpose of the foundation would be to help LDC's find solutions for their scientific and technological problems and help build institutions and train people in the LDC's so that they will be able to solve their own problems.

An old indictment of AID is that it has never given science and technology its due, either conceptually or in respect to emphasis and funding. A strong argument for the foundation is that in at last providing a focus for science and technology, it could help overcome those shortcomings.

A practical problem facing proponents of the new foundation is that the idea is viewed on the Hill as an Administration proposal based on a Brookings idea. With Congress in its present cool mood toward Carter, the Administration's imprimatur on legislation provides no big boost. As for foreign aid in particular, Humphrey's death left aid without a champion of comparable enthusiasm or influence. Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) is expected to move into the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee—which has jurisdiction over foreign aid legislation—at the start of the next Congress. Church, who has shown signs of disenchantment with the aid program in general, has not studied the foundation idea sufficiently yet to take a position on it.

Press, who was instrumental in convincing Carter to adopt the foundation idea, has begun the job of informing and persuading legislators and staff on the merits of the foundation. Press and his aides have at least until January to make their points. They are likely to have firm support from foreign-aid experts outside the government. But, under the circumstances, the campaign for the foundation should provide a real test of the effectiveness of the President's science adviser as the President's science advocate on Capitol Hill.—JOHN WALSH