we continue to support these men when they are not coming up with anything definite?' " Meites recalls.

To answer that question, the Endocrinology Study Section convened a sort of trial by jury under the guise of a scientific conference held at Tucson, Arizona, in January 1969. The Guillemin and Schally teams were invited to give progress reports before a carefully picked audience of experts in related fields. "Their support was on the brink because they were chasing each other rather than the real problem. The NIH wanted to use the audience's reaction as a means of assessing whether or not to go on funding the field," says Murray Saffran, a member of the study section at that time. The accused were not explicitly informed of the Damoclean nature of the meeting, but they were well enough aware that events had reached a critical pass.

The Tucson conference was one of the turning points of modern endocrinology. What in large part made it so was a finding which Guillemin, after 14 years of effort, reached just 3 weeks before the conference began.—NICHOLAS WADE

Next week: The 3-lap race to Stockholm.

Navy Meeting Drifts on a Sea of Unanswered Questions

Top level Navy brass, other government officials, and prominent civilians met at the Naval War College in Newport in late March to discuss the Navy's future. More important than the meeting's failure to resolve anything (what meeting does, after all?) was the sheer scope of disagreement on fundamental issues. Indeed, the number of problems the Navy is working on led one Air Force officer present to remark on the Navy's willingness to air its troubles publicly, before Congressional staffers, the press, business leaders, and other members of the military. "We have our problems too," he said, "but we try to keep them to ourselves."

The present crisis stems from the fact that the country sank some $150 billion—the preponderance of its defense spending—into Vietnam, mostly to pay for soldiers, logistics support, munitions, and the like. During that time, the Navy obtained rather little for capital investment in across-the-board modernization. The winding down of the war and the decrease in the defense budget in the early 1970's continued the trend. So today, many Navy officers are alarmed by the age and small numbers of Navy things—ships, planes, submarines, antisubmarine warfare systems, and even mines.

None of this would be a problem if funds were available to buy more equipment. But opposition in Congress, a stern attitude by the Carter Administration and high inflation have prevented the Navy from getting all the money it wants and from buying as much as it needs with the dollars it has. Thus the stage is set for a major, sometimes bitter debate in Washington—which spilled over to Newport—about the Navy's future.

Indeed, the importance of the Newport meeting was emphasized when the Administration used the occasion to deliver a stiff warning. Edward Jayne II, associate director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for national security affairs, told the Navy that if it didn't "get its act together" by this time next year on its outstanding shipbuilding claims (which total $2.7 billion and involve one key yard that has threatened to stop work until the claims are settled), the President will favor the Air Force and the Army in the next budget. Jayne told his uncomfortable audience that the shipbuilding claims had already been the "single most prominent reason" why President Carter had declined to give the Navy added funds for new ships in the fiscal 1979 budget, now before Congress.

But shipbuilding was only one of an awesome range of problems discussed; among them were:

▶ *The global Soviet Navy*. During the Vietnam period, Soviet production of ships, submarines, and antiship planes and missiles rose unchecked. Today the Soviet Navy, once an inconsequential coastal force, can operate in the major oceans of the world, creating a new threat to the United States. As Navy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr., noted, for the first time in 30 years the United States "faces a capable opponent at sea in the Soviet Navy." Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who formerly served as an adviser to Kissinger, provided the political underpinnings to this situation by saying that it was here to stay: even if the Soviets respond to Western pressures on their internal policies they will continue to seek to have a global military reach. Finally, the Soviet Navy's precision weapons, such as its antiship cruise missiles, have led critics to say the carriers are vulnerable and the Navy to argue for more money—such as for the $900-million-per-ship Aegis system—to keep the carriers secure.

▶ *Third World Intervention*. In addition to the Soviet problem, Navy leaders believe their forces must be ready to fight in Third World conflicts, such as that smoldering now in the Horn of Africa. The Navy must be prepared, as Undersecretary R. James Woolsey said, to conduct operations "on, under, above, and along the shores of 70 percent of the earth's surface"—a rationale used to justify bids for more ships and planes. But the Navy's critics, a few of whom were at the meeting, say that for these conflicts against mere Third World powers, the Navy does not need the most sophisticated and expensive systems.

▶ *Fleet size*. No one can agree on what size fleet the country should have, a problem that leaves both strategic planners and shipbuilders in the lurch. The week before the Newport meeting, President Carter signed off on a 5-year shipbuilding plan for the Navy, which would increase the force from its present level of approximately 450 ships to 525 by 1985. It called for maintaining a fleet of about 500 ships through the end of the century. But "Seaplan 2000," a major Navy study released at the meeting, illustrated the Navy's higher aspirations by concluding that 585 would do just fine. It all sounds like so much bean counting until one realizes that a single carrier group, consisting of a new carrier, four nuclear escort ships and two protective submarines, costs $7.2 billion—not including other support ships and aircraft.

▶ *Manpower*. As ships, planes, missiles, and anti-missiles become more sophisticated they require better trained

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people to operate and maintain them. But U.S. population trends are working against the Navy, which must attract its recruits as volunteers; literacy levels in youth are not encouraging, and even today, after 6 weeks training, some young recruits are put on board ship barely able to read. Declining birth rates also mean that the pool of young people from which the Navy will have to draw in coming decades will be far smaller than in the recent past. The Navy is considering whether it can alleviate this problem by allowing women in more traditionally male jobs.

▶ *Gobbledygook*. Navy officers at the meeting and the War College keep talking about whether the Navy's mission should be "sea control" (protection of merchant marine and convoys) or "power projection" (attacks onshore), while some civilians griped that these terms are meaningless and probably obsolete. For instance, the carriers are designed to launch major attacks, that is, to "project power," and yet the main mission of their new fighter, the F14, is one of "sea control"; it is effective against the Soviet Backfire bomber whose probable job would be to attack merchant shipping. There are other examples, too, which show that Naval doctrine and lingo are not in step with the actual configuration of forces.

▶ *Being out of fashion*. Since taking office just over a year ago, the President's military policies have stressed improving the picture in Europe, where coordination between the United States and its allies had been neglected during the war in Vietnam. Representing the White House at the Newport meeting was Victor Utgoff, of the National Security Council staff, who told the audience that this interest in NATO did not imply anything glamorous or new for the Navy. "Emphasis in repairing the alliance would not seem to rest with building new ships," he told them; "It would take too long." Utgoff smilingly predicted that the high-level interest in NATO matters would pass once the situation had been improved. He thus implied that the White House thinks that the Navy's problems can stand to wait awhile before getting top-level attention.

▶ *The unknown future*. Participants at the meeting talked a lot about the Lewis and Clark expedition, the point being that the Navy has no more idea now of the threats it will face in the year 2000 than Lewis and Clark did when they readied for their journey up the Missouri in 1804. Thirty years ago, speakers noted, Israel barely existed, the People's Republic of China had not emerged, there had been no Middle East oil crisis, and most of the Third World was still colonized. But, typical of the range of disagreements at the meeting, some participants were more impressed than others by the lessons of Lewis and Clark. Some Navy officials argued that the range of unknowns means that the service needs maximum "flexibility," while others, primarily Jayne, the self-styled "black hat" from OMB, argued that the Navy must define its future mission more closely, including some things and ruling out others, despite these unknowns.

For all the talk of history and doctrine, however, the participants kept returning to the shipbuilding claims question, which will clearly dog the Navy's public image and its relations with the White House in the coming year. But for all the brave talk about what the Navy can do about this problem, participants rarely spoke about the man at the heart of it, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the Navy's 77-year old nuclear propulsion guru, who, through his friends in Congress, controls other naval policies, including promotions. Some $2.4 billion of the $2.7 billion shipbuilding claims against the government stem from the nuclear program, and the industry seems to be preparing a case to the effect that their losses are all Rickover's fault; Rickover, meanwhile, has testified to Congress that the claims are "garbage."

Historically, the Navy bureaucracy has been rather inclined to settle the claims in order to get on with the job of building up the fleet to 400, 450, or 500 ships, but Rickover usually urges that the government not give the shipyards a dime. Ironically, at a time when the Navy has as many philosophical questions about its future as any time in the last 40 years, its immediate fortunes may be determined by the more earthy business of its relations with Rickover and with its shipyards.—DEBORAH SHAPLEY

Congressional Investigators Sniff Out Unused Federal Lab Space

When investigators on the staff of the House Appropriations Committee set out 5 years ago to survey and study research laboratories owned by the federal government, they were amazed to learn they were traveling in unmapped territory. No comprehensive list of laboratories, staff, and equipment existed. No list of unoccupied space in the laboratory buildings existed. No single federal agency, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White House, had ever exercised oversight powers to insure that the labs were economically and efficiently run.

Recognizing an area that was ripe for closer supervision, the investigators recommended immediate homesteading either by OMB or the federal housekeeper, the General Services Administration (GSA). The suggestion was based in part on a finding that federal labs had been overbuilt, underused, and unnecessarily costly.

Normally, when one of the congressional appropriations committees states such a conclusion in strong language, someone somewhere in the city of Washington jumps. Late last year, tenacious committee investigators decided to find out who and how far. In what must have been a surprise, they found the 1974 situation essentially unchanged. And their report,* published recently, contains a scathing critique of every agency that was or should have been involved. In a city where officials pride themselves on understatement in judgments of one another, the language of the report stands out like a blast of fresh air in the summer smog.

Representative Jamie Whitten (D–Miss.), who is chairman of the appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over most federal research, introduced the report by noting that coordination and accountability within the bureaucracy for the 779 federal labs has been abysmal. As a result, 77 new research fa-

*Part 2, *Investigative Report on Utilization of Federal Laboratories, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture and Related Agencies*, Committee on Appropriations, Government Printing Office, 1978.

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