

ers whom they regard as less expert in some areas of technology than scientists and engineers from U.S. industry.

Problems of funding on the American side are always mentioned by commentators on the agreements. From the beginning, activities by American scientists and administrators have been financed by transfers of funds within agency budgets. This has put the financial burden of providing hospitality to visiting Soviet scientists on their American hosts. And the costs of travel by Americans to the Soviet Union has depleted slim travel budgets of U.S. agencies. Strongly recommended is the conversion of costs of implementing the agreements to line-item status in the budget so that funds can be appropriated specifically for these costs. One of the sources of the difficulty has been that the bilaterals

were established by Executive agreement and were never transmitted formally to Congress for approval and subsequent formal oversight.

In assessing the pros and cons of the agreements from the U.S. standpoint, it is necessary to take into account Soviet attitudes and goals and whether they have changed. One section of the Garwin panel report written by Loren Graham of Columbia and titled "Speculative analysis of the Soviet perception of the S & T agreement" offers a perspective on the question. At the outset, the Soviets were perceived to be primarily interested in being on the receiving end in the transfer of U.S. technology. The main U.S. interest was in cooperation in fundamental science. Soviet policymakers believed that U.S. industry, which controlled technology, would seize the opportunity

provided by the agreements to make sales of technology. As it turned out, although some 50 U.S. companies have signed letters of intent and there has been some commercial activity outside the agreement, virtually no significant transfer of technology has occurred under the aegis of the bilaterals. This is ascribed by some to U.S. government controls on the export of technology which might strengthen Soviet military capabilities, but others note that industry was reluctant to sell technology which could make the Soviets direct competitors in world markets, particularly when Soviet problems with foreign currency made them unwilling to pay what U.S. sellers regarded as adequate prices.

Most observers feel that the original political attitudes which made the agreements possible 5 years ago continue on both sides. Soviet leaders are thought to see economic cooperation with Western nations, including the cooperative agreements on science and technology with the United States, as necessary in improving the performance of the Soviet economy. The main U.S. motive is seen as the belief that cooperation with the Soviets will reduce tensions between the two superpowers and promote international stability. In former Secretary of State Kissinger's phrase, the agreements will provide "incentives for restraint."

While the basic decision that the agreements continue to be politically worthwhile to the United States has been made, there appears to be serious purpose behind the effort headed by Press to assure that the agreements are not only "mutually beneficial," as the wording of the preamble of the S & T agreement puts it, but that the scientific and technical benefits to the two countries be roughly equal. What the advisers recommend is not a demand for "microequality," that is, balanced returns on every project or agreement, but "macroequality," that is, rough parity of benefits when all the agreements are considered.

To achieve this end would require much better coordination of negotiation and decision making on the American side than has been the case. Implementation of individual agreements seems to have proceeded in a decentralized, often rather ad hoc fashion. One strong criticism of the bilaterals here has been that a U.S. "national strategy was lacking." It seems virtually certain now that Press will be made responsible for coordinating the Soviet-U.S. bilaterals. And the present assessment being conducted by his office is a necessary first step in getting the agreements under better control.—JOHN WALSH

## Daddario Resigns Abruptly from OTA

Emilio Q. Daddario, the former Congressman who has served as director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) since it began functioning some 3½ years ago, has unexpectedly announced his intention to leave the troubled agency by 1 July.

In an 18 May letter to the Technology Assessment Board, the OTA's governing body, Daddario noted that the pending completion of several OTA projects by 1 July "brings to an end the first phase of OTA activity which has been of a building and exploratory nature. I had always planned to leave OTA when that period of evolution had been reached."

But the announcement caught even the closest observers of the agency, which advises Congress on technical issues, by surprise. "He always said he would not serve out a full six-year term," commented one veteran OTA staffer. "But the timing of his announcement was unexpected."

The abruptness of Daddario's decision led to speculation that there may be more to the resignation than has been revealed. One theory was that Daddario may have gotten another job offer which was too good to refuse. A press release issued by OTA says simply that Daddario "expects to make an announcement about his plans in the near future."

A second theory was that Daddario may have bailed out—or been pushed out—because of repeated criticisms over the past year of OTA's performance. Congressional staffers who work for four key legislators on the OTA board insist that neither the board nor its chairman, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), asked Daddario to resign. But whether the incessant sniping chased Daddario out is not clear.

Daddario, who is currently president of the AAAS, failed to return repeated phone calls from *Science* over a 2-day period. His staff said he was tied up in meetings and speech-giving.

During his years of stewardship, the agency has been the target of critical evaluations from the first chairman of its own advisory council (Harold Brown, currently secretary of defense); the House Commission on Information and Facilities; and the Commission on the Operation of the Senate. Its management has been defended by Representative Olin E. Teague (D-Tex.), who chaired the OTA board last year. Still another evaluation, requested by Kennedy, is about to start under the auspices of OTA's advisory council, which is now headed by Jerome Wiesner, president of MIT. The target completion date is this fall.

Some OTA staffers feel they are being investigated to death.

—PHILIP M. BOFFEY