The section on sanctification and social control is equally stimulating, but I will limit myself to a single observation. It is ironic that Drennan concludes this last substantive section of the book with a discussion of the baleful effects of cognitive dissonance, while Flannery in his epilogue emphasizes that the mature and creative archeologist must continue to exist in deep cognitive dissonance.

Among the many points of sharp disagreement between Flannery and myself I will note only two.

The "fire-serpent" mentioned above is in my opinion incorrectly identified. This supremely important deity is a cayman with affixed elements of the harpy eagle. The "flaming eyebrow" often discussed in the book is a shorthand notation signifying the harpy eagle's crest, and thus carrying the denotation of "sky" or "upper half of the universe." These details of identification take on vast significance when one compares the iconographic structure underlying Olmec religion with that underlying Chavín religion, the earliest complex religion of the Central Andes. The two appear to be identical.

On the more general level, I would point to a statement Flannery makes on p. 2:

> Out of this initial stage of agriculturally based villages, the later high civilizations of Mesoamerica developed. With the appearance of these "primary village farming communities," Mesoamerica first became definable as a culture area, distinct from the desert food-gatherers to the north and the tropical forest peoples to the south.

I would rewrite the second sentence to read:

> With the appearance of these farming communities in Mesoamerica, Mesoamerica shared an essentially uniform culture which extended continuously from Mesoamerica to Northern Peru. This uniform agricultural basis *is* Tropical Forest Culture. It is only around 1000 B.C. that Mesoamerica on the one hand and the Central Andes on the other started to differentiate from this uniform agricultural substratum and embarked on their somewhat individual paths toward civilization.

The difference between these two points of view is profound. The fact that such profound disagreements can still be maintained shows vast areas of ignorance that should provide for at least 25 more years of active archeological research—all, it is to be hoped, up to the standards set forth in this volume.

Chapter 12 is Flannery's affirmation of a dedication to archeology. Throughout the book he has pointed to the polarization of archeological thinking and procedures between the admirable goals of the new archeology, embodied in the fanaticism of his Skeptical Graduate Student, and the pragmatism and deeply informed intuition of the Real Mesoamerican Archeologist. This polarization leads only to impasse, and Flannery continues to reach for a higher level of explanation that will embrace and transcend both positions.

Near the end, the Skeptical Graduate Student makes reference to *Heart of Darkness*. This is perhaps the one false note in the characterization of Flannery's three protagonists. The S.G.S.'s I have known read Ursula Le Guin and Tolkien, but otherwise seem to be rereading Hempel. None have read *Heart of Darkness*. The deeply expressed feelings of Flannery's last pages again forced my mind back to *Death in the Afternoon*. Amazed at the number of contradictory and apparently impossible demands that the art of bullfighting places on the matador, and the importance of all of these demands to a concept of manhood, the old lady remarks, "It must be most dangerous then to be a man." Hemingway replies, "It is indeed, madame, and but few survive it." Mesoamerican archeology is vital because at least one has continued to cope with all the demands the art of archeology lays on its practitioners. It is appropriate that this remarkable book is dedicated to the memory of another remarkable man, the late Matthew Stirling.

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Clan and Land

The Demystification of Yap. Dialectics of Culture on a Micronesian Island. DAVID LABBY. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976. xiv, 144 pp. + plates. $12.95.

What is so mysterious about Yap, an island in the U.S. Trust Territory of Micronesia? The reader of travel literature who has encountered Yap is likely to think of it as "the island of stone money," a place where people exchange large perforated stone disks—so large, in fact, that some must be carried on a pole through the middle by a team of men. The author mentions the stone money briefly, but the mystery that really interests him is the complex social structure of the rather small population (about 2600 at the end of World War II, although perhaps once a dozen or so times as large). The people of Yap were divided into two largely endogamous castes or classes, landed nobles and landless commoners, and each class was in turn divided into several ranks which tended to be separated from adjacent ranks by taboos on sharing food and by a hierarchical etiquette. The Yapese also had exogamous matrilineal clans, but tended to follow strict patrilineal inheritance of land and political office.

The author's mentor, David Schneider, claims in the foreword that the book provides a Marxist—that is, materialist and dialectical—solution to these mysteries. This is a refreshing approach, since the number of avowedly Marxist anthropologists in this country is rather small and the typical American anthropologist is devoted to describing "his people" in what he sees as their own terms and to emphasizing their incomparability to anyone else.

Marxist orientation notwithstanding, however, the greater part of this book is devoted to explaining the distinctive vocabulary and figures of speech that the people of Yap use to talk about their society and system of land tenure, and it gives only summary information about the material operation of the system. Evidently the Yapese still talk about the matrilineal clans as owning land, although they also recognize that, with clan exogamy and de facto patrilineal inheritance of land, each new generation must see a new clan introduced to each landed estate as the "owner" for the lifetime of the in-marrying women and their sons. While Labby writes at times as though the landed estates are generally preserved intact from one generation to the next in the hands of a single principal male heir, his description of the estates as being passed from one matrilineal clan to another would seem to imply that brothers and perhaps other matrilineal relatives of the main heir share some rights in the estate. One wonders, for instance, about the fate of younger brothers of the heir if they and the heir marry women of different clans: Can they permanently split off a share of the estate? Must their descendants be excluded from the inheritance and become landless commoners? Are there landless nobles?

Labby has an ecological or materialist explanation for the development of Yapese social structure. He postulates an earlier period shortly after initial settlement when the matrilineal clans held on to land continuously and worked it largely by shifting slash-and-burn cultivation, which is conducted most efficiently by cooperative work teams larger than a conjugal family household. A localized matrilineal extended family would be effective for this purpose, and arrangements like this are actually found elsewhere in some other islands in the gener-

al region. Labby postulates, following Jacques Barrau, that as the population increased there was a shift from extensive, slash-and-burn agriculture to a more intensive, permanent agriculture emphasizing swamp taro (*Colocasia* and *Cyrtosperma*). Swamp taro cultivation can be carried on efficiently by conjugal family households and is more likely to be carried on by men than by women, according to a comparative study of food crops in the Caroline Islands which Labby cites. This shift in cultivation, he suggests, led to an increasing tendency for the men of the matrilineal clans (i) to reside on and work their own clan property instead of moving to their wives' lands on marriage and working those, and (ii) to pass on some—in later periods all—of their share of their own matrilineal clan lands to their wives and thence to their sons. Since there is in other matrilineal societies in Micronesia an occasional transfer of land from men to women at marriage and a more widespread tendency for men to try to give a little land to their sons, this hypothesis is plausible. Labby postulates that these changes in inheritance of land occurred in a densely populated society, which fostered intense competition for land and the growth of a view that the recipients of land (the wives and their sons) are indebted to the givers (the men) and are inferior to them, even polluting and dirty, and therefore should not eat food from the same garden or food cooked on the same fire. Again, this is logically consistent, although an extreme development.

As for the dialectic of Marxism, Labby mentions repeatedly a "dialectic between clan and land," by which he seems to mean concretely a kind of exchange between a land-owning man and his wife in which the man progressively transfers rights to pieces of his estate to his wife and their sons—who are necessarily members of their mother's matrilineage and thereby share her property rights. This transfer is phrased as a payment to the wife and her clan for her labor in the land, her care for her husband, her bearing his children, and so on. This exchange of land for wifely service strikes me as rather different from standard Marxist dialectic, but Labby argues that this husband-wife relationship, which is also in a sense a relationship between their two clans, serves as a prototype for relationships between social classes and political entities such as villages and districts.

Labby's book is short. In a longer work I would hope he would consider other possible approaches in some detail, if only to dismiss them authoritatively. For instance, he mentions that some Yapese clans attribute their origin to "people of Malaya," an area that was historically strongly subject to influence from India. The division of Yapese society into endogamous classes separated by food-sharing taboos has suggested to others the caste system of India. Could this complex social system have originated not in a gradual local development but in a wholesale introduction of the Indian caste system by migrants or castaways from one of the Hinduized states of Southeast Asia? Are there apparent Hindu influences in other aspects of the culture of Yap?

To deal with this and other questions much more evidence than Labby presents is needed. Some of it is available in scattered writings of earlier authors. Some of the evidence may—though the people of Yap have a reputation for cultural conservatism—be irretrievably lost owing to recent acculturation. In part Labby's work is salvage ethnography—an effort to dredge from the memories of old people the way the society worked a century ago when Western influence was still minimal. Labby appears to have an impressive grasp of the language and current culture of Yap. I hope he will prepare a lengthier description of it in the future to provide a more solid test of the value of his innovative approach.

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Psychological Theory

Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance. ROBERT A. WICKLUND and JACK W. BREHM. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1976 (distributor, Halsted [Wiley], New York). xvi, 350 pp. $16.50. Complex Human Behavior.

Cognitive dissonance theory was first formulated by Leon Festinger in 1957. According to this theory, whenever a person has two or more cognitions that are inconsistent with one another the person experiences a motivational state that is referred to as cognitive dissonance. A person experiencing cognitive dissonance feels pressure to reduce the dissonance and to avoid increases in it. The consequences of the pressure include changes in cognitions, changes in behavior, and selectiveness in taking notice of new information and opinions.

In *Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance*, Wicklund and Brehm attempt to evaluate the current status of cognitive dissonance theory in the light of the considerable amount of research the theory has generated. To accomplish their purpose, the authors have attempted to assess the extent to which the basic propositions of the theory have been supported by research and the extent to which dissonance phenomena can be interpreted in terms of alternative theories. After giving an outline of dissonance theory, the book summarizes an amazing array of research on various processes relevant to the arousal and reduction of dissonance, and discusses applications, variations of dissonance theory, alternatives to dissonance theory, and basic issues that remain to be resolved. The material is well organized, except that chapter 5 (which presents evidence for basic propositions) would more appropriately follow chapter 1 (which presents the basic theory).

Perhaps the most important contribution made by the book is the explicit statement of the conditions that are necessary for the occurrence (or at least the demonstration) of dissonance-like effects. Wicklund and Brehm's review of relevant research makes it clear that when two or more cognitions are in a dissonant relationship the predicted effects do not necessarily occur. Their modified version of dissonance theory holds that cognitive dissonance is aroused only if the person feels responsible for the cognitive inconsistencies. In view of the importance they attach to personal responsibility, it is surprising that Wicklund and Brehm ignore the research that has been done on the attribution and perception of responsibility. There is a notable correspondence between the conditions that are presumed to be necessary to create feelings of personal responsibility and the variables that have been shown to determine the attribution of responsibility. For example, in a typical dissonance experiment the subject is induced to perform some act (commission) that has foreseeable consequences under conditions of choice (intentionality). Furthermore, it is usually argued that dissonance can be reduced by justification of the action. A considerable body of research based on attribution theory shows that attribution of responsibility is influenced by the same variables—commission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. The theoretical framework of dissonance theory could be strengthened by integration with attribution theory.

A particularly praiseworthy aspect to Wicklund and Brehm's presentation is the extension of dissonance theory to phenomena that previously were pre-