from drinking "spirits" before work but allows males to do so. As the authors note:

> Drinking at Brady's is the central symbol of membership in this small society and when someone is excluded from this kind of ritual participation they become, even if momentarily, marginal participants. Handicap rules for women in our culture often function in this way . . . to insure that males stay at the center of social significance and that women remain . . . at the periphery [pp. 37–38].

There is the "cross-over [role change] phenomenon," with its peculiarly asymmetrical character in which

> . . . a man loses if he does women's work . . . and so . . . avoids it or refuses to switch [but] a woman gains and is usually eager to cross over. . . . When a man crosses over to assist a woman, she should thank him . . . but when a woman crosses over to assist a man . . . *she must still express gratitude* [p. 41].

There is the "joking relationship" which softens and thus gives stability to the inequities of male-female interactions in the bar. There is the particular (but hardly unrepresentative) status hierarchy of Brady's which functions to strengthen the bonding between males but undercut it between females. There is the subtle affirmation of maleness in the ceremonies of "asking for a drink." And there are many more such phenomena noted in the book.

In addition to shedding light on the intricacies of socially constructed gender, *The Cocktail Waitress* contributes to our understanding of personal relationships in urban public settings. As the authors' descriptive and analytic materials make clear, Brady's Bar, for many of its customers and employees, is far more than simply a drinking or working place. It is a locale within which acquaintanceships, friendships, and intimacies are engendered, nurtured, and sustained. And for some of these relationships, it is a locale within which their existence is totally bounded. Students of the city have, I think, underemphasized the importance of such forms of human connection. It is one of the assets of this volume that it provides its readers with some rare close looks at the character and on-going creation of these wonderfully urban and urbane relationships.

To treat the commonplace with seriousness and respect, as this book does, is not perhaps to make much stir in the social science community. But I think it is from studies such as this that a truly relevant and *social* science will emerge.

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Conceptions of Crowding

Crowding and Behavior. JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN. x, 178 pp. Trade edition, Viking, New York, 1975. $8.95. Educational edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1975. Paper, $4.50.

The Environment and Social Behavior. Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding. IRWIN ALTMAN. Brooks/Cole, Monterey, Calif., 1975. xii, 256 pp., illus. $6.95.

Until recently, behavioral research on crowding consisted mostly of observations of animals living in conditions of high density or of humans living in cities. From these studies, the main answer that emerged to the classic question "What are the consequences of crowding?" was "Lousy!"

The two books under review provide contrasting examples of recent advances in the analysis of human crowding. Freedman writes exclusively about crowding within the traditional context, with a focus on the implications for life in large cities. He adopts a narrow conceptual orientation and finds a single generalization by which to interpret empirical results. Altman, in contrast, is concerned with understanding general relationships among environmental factors and behavior. His focus is upon an individual's ability to control social interactions through interpersonal spacing and territoriality mechanisms. Crowding in his view is a subjective state occurring at the end of a causal chain of coping mechanisms, signifying that something in the system has blown. The differences between these approaches can best be illustrated by a brief account of each author's orientation.

In keeping with the tradition established by animal research and research concerned with establishing correlations between urban crowding and behavioral phenomena, Freedman defines crowding in terms of population density. Crowding, as the independent variable, is a situational characteristic. Freedman reviews a mounting body of evidence, to which he has made major contributions, showing that increasing levels of density do not invariably produce negative consequences for humans, but may sometimes produce positive or neutral ones. When the classical question is phrased in terms of behavioral consequences of physical density, Freedman's answer is "It depends." Many authors give this answer because the concept physical density is a crude umbrella covering a variety of different, and sometimes unrelated, dimensions. It is Freedman's contention, however, that density per se serves to intensify the response an individual would typically make in a given situation because density heightens the importance of other people. It is predicted that situations evoking pleasant responses will become more pleasant as density increases, while situations evoking unpleasant responses will become more unpleasant.

There is much merit in proposing a testable idea. Appropriate tests of the intensification hypothesis will involve two restrictions. The hypothesis is intended to apply to density levels not sufficiently extreme to produce such negative by-products as physical discomfort, inability to move, or unpleasant odors. The second restriction, concerning the types of reactions expected to intensify, is not directly discussed in the book. Consistent with worries about whether crowding is good or bad, intensification is illustrated by reference to a positive-negative feeling dimension. Most of the examples cited and three of the studies designed by Freedman to test the intensification hypothesis, contained in appendices, involve such affective feeling. For other types of reactions, such as helping, self-disclosure, and dominating, the prediction of intensification would not seem as intuitively compelling.

Altman's analysis is a break from the crowding research tradition to which Freedman's work belongs. It represents a view currently gaining ascendancy among social scientists which locates crowding as a subjective state occurring as an outcome of interpersonal processes. According to this view, one must discover antecedent variables other than aspects of physical density to predict subjective crowding and its behavioral consequences. The particular antecedent variables deemed necessary to induce crowding vary considerably, with physical density not even included in some lists. Prominent in all lists, however, is a variable that is stressfully unpleasant, such as a need for more space or an excess of social interactions. Because crowding is defined as involving something unpleasant, it is pointless to ask whether it is pleasant or unpleasant. Instead, the major issues become defining the antecedent conditions for the occurrence of crowding and predicting the coping reactions induced by crowding.

By undertaking the ambitious task of setting up a framework for integrating the interdisciplinary evidence regarding person-environment relationships, Altman confronts these issues. Central to his pursuit is the concept of privacy, which is defined not by the mere absence

of other people but as "selective control of access to oneself or to one's group" (p. 18). Privacy, thus, is a matter of regulating interpersonal or group boundaries. It is only through inadequate control of social interactions, on the side of more interactions than desired, that the subjective state of crowding occurs. Individuals who feel the stress of crowding are expected to engage in coping behaviors to restore the desired level of privacy. The key to understanding the consequences of crowding resides in the success of the coping behaviors. Altman's analysis is frankly a preliminary statement which integrates concepts previously treated as disparate topics. It is an excellent initial taxonomy of important variables, whose specific relationships must be detailed by future research.

Both books were written to be textbooks and contain material that is not strictly necessary for supporting the major themes. This does, however, provide an opportunity for placing the analyses in a larger context and for explicating their implications. Each book, for example, concludes with a chapter on applications to environmental design. True to their different perspectives, Freedman's recommendations revolve around increasing the positiveness of people's responses to the urban environment, whereas Altman's suggestions emphasize design flexibility aimed at permitting individuals to attain their desired level of interaction with others.

These two views of crowding, as is perhaps already evident, do not represent alternative interpretations of the same phenomena, and they must be judged by different criteria. For Freedman, the critical issue is the correctness of the intensification interpretation, and the range of behaviors to which it applies. The test of Altman's contribution will be whether it serves as a template for future theoretical developments and empirical research.

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The Tasks of Sociology

The Idea of Social Structure. Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton. LEWIS A. COSER, Ed. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1975. xii, 548 pp. $12.95.

The late 1940's and early '50's were one of those periods in which sociologists try to find themselves: try to find problems that are worth a grown person's time and some methods by which they can be dealt with. Robert Merton emerged in that period as a model of the complete sociologist—"Mr. Sociology," *The New Yorker* called him in its 1961 profile—and he remained his profession's first citizen until the middle '60's, when sociology again experienced a loss of purpose. There are significant papers in this tribute upon Merton's 65th birthday, but the collection's larger significance is its examination of the ideas and tools that empowered a generation of sociologists. It is the right gift for the man who gave form to the sociology of science: a challenge for his further understanding.

Several of the papers recall the problems with which Merton wrestled in the 1930's and the experiences that shaped his solutions. Lewis Coser and Robert Nisbet offer an informal conversation about the period, its outlook and its limitations. Coser separately examines the uses that Merton made of the European sociological tradition to form his own sociology. Paul Lazarsfeld gives us an account of his and Merton's collaboration in the organization of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia and of Merton's developing fluency in the use of sample surveys and in the formulation of research having import for social policy.

All these papers provide helpful background. Arthur Stinchcombe goes further and tries to specify the appeal, the power, and the limits of Merton's sociology. His is perhaps the central paper in the whole symposium, and I shall return to it in talking about the book's larger significance.

Twelve of the papers look again at topics on which Merton has worked. A number of them move us well beyond existing knowledge. This is true, for example, of Robin Williams's reexamination of relative deprivation. It was recognized 30 years ago (and long before) that it is not so much the absolute degree of difficulty in people's lives that determines their readiness for social protest as it is the discrepancies between life as they know it and their expectations of how people like themselves should fare. Williams recasts extensive findings on this topic from psychology and the social sciences, putting them into a social-structural framework and developing a set of propositions which is at once a synthesis and a prospectus for further research. A pair of papers, one by Jonathan Cole and Harriet Zuckerman and the other by Stephen Cole, contain fresh developments in the sociology of science. Cole and Zuckerman trace the rise of the sociology of science itself. They make a statistical analysis of books and papers in this field to record its growth and crystallization. Stephen Cole employs a factor analysis to identify major schools of thought in the study of social deviance and assembles statistical evidence on their rise and decline. We shall, however, need more information about Cole's factor-analytic procedures in order to evaluate his interpretations. (Cole and Zuckerman find that Merton's papers on science were paradigmatic for the recent growth of the sociology of science. Cole shows us that Merton's essay on social structure and anomie provided one of the few foci for studies of deviance and was drawn upon by most of the major schools.) A fourth seminal paper is the speculative essay by Rose Coser. She builds on Merton's discussions of reference groups to recast proposals by George Mead and by Piaget that experiences in complex organizations lead to the growth of cognitive complexity in their participants.

The last set of papers are designated by the editor as "in the spirit of Merton." As that heading suggests, they are both substantial and diverse. Two are especially provocative. Robert Nisbet proposes that the Italian Renaissance was not so much a formative period in European life and thought as a kind of "origin myth" by means of which people at a much later time sought to legitimate their own aspirations. His case seems strong when he considers the continuity of philosophical ideas or of social thought from the 12th to the 17th centuries, but he may need to consider developments in the arts and the sense of contemporaries that something new was afoot in civic affairs and in value emphases before settling on his conclusions. And Alvin Gouldner sharpens for us a sense of the political and ethical meaning of a focus on studies of everyday social life as against a focus on studies of "great