years has been as a vehicle for a handful of scientists—namely, Edwin H. Land of Polaroid Corporation, William O. Baker of Bell Laboratories, and James R. Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—to influence technical decisions.

Land and Baker have served on the board continuously for 15 and 17 years, respectively; Killian retired from it for health reasons in 1963, having served for 6 years. Edward Teller and John S. Foster, Jr., have sat on the board since 1971 and 1973, respectively.

Land and Killian, with Baker as a consultant, served on the PFIAB's predecessor, the Technical Capabilities Panel (TCP). The TCP was set up by Eisenhower in 1954 to assess the country's vulnerability to surprise attack. But it is best remembered because the scientists, led by Land, decided that the U-2 spy plane—then an obscure design held by Lockheed Aircraft Corp.—should become the backbone of U.S. reconnaissance. Several sources say the group pushed for the most advanced design, for the most sophisticated cameras and radars, and for getting the Air Force (which was unenthusiastic about the project) to build the plane within 2 years.

When Eisenhower set up the board in 1956† Mansfield and congressional leaders were moving to establish a joint House-Senate oversight committee. Killian was made chairman of the Eisenhower board, and the board was ordered, among other things, to "conduct an objective review of the foreign intelligence activities of the government." But like the TCP, the Eisenhower board was known for its advocacy of certain technologies.

One particular problem it faced was what kind of satellite system should follow the U-2. At that time, the Air Force supported direct radio transmission of images from a satellite, through its Midas program. However, the board chose to back the CIA's view that better photographic resolution and greater coverage were possible if, instead, film were dropped from the satellite and recovered by airplane.

The latter plan proved the better one. Within months of the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 plane in May 1960, the first aerial recovery of a capsule dropped from a Discoverer satellite took place. Yet, even today, the problems associated with transmission of high-resolution images from space have not been fully resolved.

It was under President Kennedy, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, that the PFIAB came closest to playing the watchdog role which has always been implied in its mandates. Kennedy claimed he had been badly misinformed prior to the invasion attempt. He was convinced that the intelligence community needed to be thoroughly overhauled. Clark Clifford, whom Kennedy appointed to the board, recalls that PFIAB then enjoyed considerable power because the President backed it. "He let the [intelligence] community know that if they didn't cooperate they were definitely in peril."

According to official records, between May and November of 1961 the PFIAB met 25 times. This was more often than it had convened during its previous 5 years of existence. Clifford estimates that of the 180 recommendations it made to Kennedy, some 170 were adopted. Among the recommendations were proposals to establish the science and technology directorate in the CIA and to consolidate some military intelligence activities in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Under both Johnson and Nixon the board seems to have gone into a decline, although the lack of available information on its technical achievements may simply be due to the tighter security surrounding the more recent history of intelligence gathering. However, Clifford, who was chairman under Johnson, makes no bones about the fact that there was a definite decline in presidential interest in the board. And a congressional staffer ventured that "if you had asked him, President Johnson probably couldn't have named who was on the board."

Nixon is said to have met more frequently with PFIAB, but it is unclear whether, as a result, the board had more influence. Several people on the board or close to it during that period say it had no knowledge of covert operations—either of the domestic spying revealed in 1974 or of the CIA's involvement in Watergate. According to some accounts, the board helped persuade Nixon to approve the *Glomar Explorer* caper—CIA's daring, but only partly successful, attempt to use an alleged ocean mining barge to raise a sunken Soviet submarine.

President Nixon clearly viewed the prestige of appointment to the board as a way to reward political friends. He appointed a number of such friends—who had no particular background in intelligence—to it: John Connally, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz, and economist and sculptor Leo Cherne.

This history, although sketchy, does not bear out the notion that PFIAB has been a zealous overseer of the more sordid activities of the intelligence community. Some who are familiar with it, such as Clifford, argue that it is inherently unable to be much of a watchdog. Since it is part of the executive, yet meant to police the executive, it will always resemble the hound in the Sherlock Holmes story who failed to bark during the robbery because he was friendly with the thief.

Others, such as Baker, argue that the board's job never was meant to be general oversight of the bureaucracy. It was to pass on the quality of intelligence itself. "Judging the quality of intelligence is almost wholly separable from judging the bureaucracy that produces it," he says.

But CIA critics Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, in their book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Knopf, New York, 1964; pages 334–335), argue that even in this more limited, technical advisory role the PFIAB has done the intelligence community a disservice.

> The PFIAB had tended to operate with the assumption that all information is "knowable" and that the intelligence community's problems would be solved if only more data were collected by more advanced systems. This emphasis on quantity over quality has served to accentuate the management problems that plague American intelligence and, in recent years at least, has often been counterproductive.

The PFIAB's lack of success as a stern overseer of the intelligence community could have been due to the fact that it lacked specific powers of enforcement. President Ford has proposed that the new Intelligence Oversight Board have such powers. But it may turn out after all, that part-time citizens' committees are, by definition, not quite up to the massive task of intelligence oversight.

—DEBORAH SHAPLEY

† It was then called the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. The name was changed to its present form in 1961.

RECENT DEATHS

Ray T. Dufford, 84; professor emeritus of physics, University of Evansville; 1 November.

John R. Dunning, 67; former dean, School of Engineering and Applied Science, Columbia University; 25 August.

Hamden L. Fornker, Sr., 78; former professor of education, Teachers College, Columbia University; 25 November.

Samuel S. Kistler, 75; former dean of engineering, University of Utah; 13 November.

Chester R. Longwell, 88; professor emeritus of geology, Yale University; 15 December.

Charles H. Newton, 45; professor of sociology, Memphis State University; 12 November.

Robert D. Patton, 74; professor emeritus of economics, Ohio State University; 13 November.