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National Parks: The Dilemma of Development

Many variables affect development in the national parks. Compromise is needed to maintain park quality.

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The national parks of the American West have traditionally been the subject of much debate; such debate persists largely because of the popularity of the parks themselves and the resulting intrusions of human artifacts on park landscapes. Development centers are the major example of such intrusions, and much of the debate has focused on the extent to which these concentrations of tourist, administrative, and supportive facilities detract from scenic resources of the parks and what, if anything, can be done about it (*1*). A frequently suggested solution involves the use of alternatives to the traditional development center sites. On the basis of work done in 16 western national parks, I shall outline some of the circumstances that led to the locational pattern of today's development centers and discuss advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of alternative locations that are aimed at reducing depreciation of scenic resources (*2*). I then suggest a general approach that emphasizes compromise among those variables that are relevant to the issues involved.

Current cultural landscapes are products of past perceptions of needs, reactions to conditions, and decisions about ways of meeting demands—regardless of whether the landscape in question is urban, agricultural, or a development center in a western national park. In general, today's development centers were established many decades ago and resulted from decision-making that occurred under circumstances far different from present condi-

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tions. A brief look at some of these circumstances may help place development centers in their proper historical perspective, thus permitting more enlightened solutions to contemporary problems.

Historical Contrasts

Apart from changes in such broad issues as societal perceptions of nature and man's place in it, and in the varying roles that should be played by government and business in the provision of services, perhaps the most important area of difference between the early period of decision-making (before 1920) and the present is that of transportation. Until the years 1910 to 1916, when automobiles were first admitted into the parks on a regular basis, horse-drawn vehicles were the principal means of transportation in the parks. The speed of these vehicles averaged some 6 miles per hour. The pace of travel increased with the admission of the automobile, but it nonetheless remained slow since the roads were not designed for motor vehicles and significant road improvements did not begin until the mid-1920's. Roads within the parks were often narrow, twisting, steep, or some combination thereof. Road surfaces frequently consisted of discomforting amounts of either mud or dust, and always seemed to have a generous assortment of ruts, holes, and bumps. In short, for many decades, travel within the parks was not particularly pleasant, even by standards of the day.

Another area of difference between the early decision-making years and the present is the attitude of park officials with respect to the encouragement of tourism. During the earlier era, especially during the National Park Service's first few decades, visitation by the public at large was actively encouraged by park officials (*3*). Efforts to increase tourism were spurred, at least in part, by an official desire to establish broad popular support for the parks as a means of counteracting political and economic interests that were hostile to the national park concept or to particular parks. In addition, for many years it was thought that if enough visitors could be attracted, the parks would become financially self-supporting. Such a goal was worthy of pursuit given the economic mood of the nation and the small amount of funding provided by Congress.

Another difference between the earlier period and today is in the number of visitors. Precedent-setting park legislation and executive action took place when annual visitation was either nil, as in the case of Yellowstone (which is the single most important park from the standpoint of precedents), or very small by current standards. For example, in 1920 Rocky Mountain was by far the most visited of the western parks and had only 240,000 visits for the year. By contrast, during August 1973, an average of only 11 days was required to record 240,000 visits (*4*). There was little or no expectation among early decision-makers that such large numbers of tourists would eventually come to the parks. Consequently, there was little or no consideration of the possible negative impacts on scenic park resources that might result from development centers large enough to accommodate the needs of visitors whose numbers have grown to more than 2 million annually in each of six western parks and to more than 1 million in five others.

Early era visitors to the parks had usually invested a good deal of time, money, or both in their park excursions. They were principally interested in viewing those specific scenic wonders and curiosities that had made the area worthy of national park status. Given the difficulties of park travel, the official desire to foster tourism, and the general lack of comprehension of the potential for negative landscape impact, there is little wonder that in park after park the early decision-makers elected to place tourist facilities near those sights most favored by park visitors. And, motivated by interests of efficiency and severe budgetary constraints, those same decision-makers normally chose to juxtapose administrative and supportive facilities with the tourist operations. As time passed and visitation increased, more and more facilities were needed for operation of the parks. Owing to the inertia inherent in existing development centers and, again, to budgetary realities, facility expansion through the years almost always took place at those centers that were established early in a park's history.

Thus, current park development centers are normally adjacent to, within, or near major scenic attractions. They are often poorly planned amalgams of structures that differ widely in such characteristics as age, state of repair, architectural rendering, and esthetic appeal. They are focal points not only for tourists wishing to view outstanding natural attractions, but also for tourists who are seeking a meal, a bed, groceries, a tank of gas, or souvenirs. They are not only points of concentration for structures housing these and other tourist services, but for offices, warehouses, and maintenance buildings as well. They are usually residential areas for employees of concessioners, and often for Park Service personnel too, and therefore frequently contain various combinations of dormitories, apartments, duplexes, and single-family dwellings.

Variables Affecting Development

At least three variables have appeared in this discussion. They are as follows: (i) the financial, in terms of obtaining funds for park projects; (ii) the esthetic, in terms of containing development below some threshold of excessive scenic depreciation; and (iii) the social, in terms of striking a balance among divergent visitor expectations and opinions. In the framework in which the parks operate, it is not possible to optimize more than one variable at a time. For example, removing all facilities from the parks would certainly reduce that scenic depreciation attributable to human artifacts to a minimum, thus optimizing the esthetic variable. However, that approach would undoubtedly be too costly and hence unacceptable in terms of the financial variable. It is unacceptable in terms of the social variable as well, since the legislative record unequivocally demonstrates that the parks were never intended to be, nor does the public want them to be, wholly wilderness areas (*5*).

Whether or not a particular development center excessively detracts from scenic park resources is a matter of personal taste. Opinion on such matters varies widely among park visitors and among park decision-makers and others considered expert on national park affairs (*6*). For some, just the visitor center and parking lot at Old Faithful may represent excessive scenic spoliation (let alone the plethora of other human artifacts at the site). Others might well react positively to hypothetical plans that call for the building of a series of towers amid the geysers so that tourists may view the eruptions from new vantage points.

In spite of the range of opinion on specifics, most park users and administrators would probably agree that for each development center there exists some amount or condition of development that represents a threshold beyond which additional development would be judged to be excessively depreciative of scenic resources. Among the development centers most frequently mentioned as having crossed such thresholds are the Old Faithful and Lake-Fishing Bridge areas in Yellowstone, Grand Canyon Village in Grand Canyon National Park, and the complex in the Upper Yosemite Valley (*7*).

Excessive scenic depreciation at these and other development centers is attributed primarily to the presence of too many people and too many structures not principally involved with appreciation of scenic attractions. The Lake-Fishing Bridge area, Grand Canyon Village, and the Yosemite Valley complex each have a summer resident employee community with a popu-

lation in excess of 1000; and each can provide lodgings for at least 2500 tourists, not including campers (*8*). They each contain hundreds of structures.

There is no doubt that visitors must be provided with food, shelter, and various supplies. There is no doubt of the need for personnel and administrative and supportive activities in conjunction with the operation of the parks. However, there is serious doubt that such large numbers of these facilities and activities need to be in close spatial association with prime park attractions, especially in view of current numbers of visitors and the removal of such historical justifications as transportation difficulties. Thus, the use of locations away from prime scenic resources is often suggested to resolve the dilemma of providing needed facilities while maintaining scenic integrity. Below I shall discuss the locational alternatives and their associated advantages and disadvantages.

Alternative Development Sites

Generally, there are two types of practical alternatives to current development center sites: park gate or near park gate locations outside park boundaries, and less scenic areas within the parks themselves. Alternatives of the latter kind are perhaps best suited to the larger parks with widely separated attractions and high internal road mileages, as at Yellowstone or Yosemite.

Both types of alternative locations have the advantage of reducing scenic depreciation by drawing facilities and activities away from principal scenic resources. They have the common disadvantage that substantial amounts of money would be required for their construction and millions could be lost in unrecoverable capital investment tied up in existing development centers. The National Park Service alone has more than a $30-million investment in the physical plant in Grand Canyon. The financial difficulties are quite significant and require elaboration since all park proposals must eventually face the funding issue.

Funding Problems

Money for park projects has been difficult to obtain since Yellowstone was created, and usually it has not mattered whether it was a park administrator applying to Congress for funds or a concessioner seeking private capital, since neither source has generally thought of the parks as being particularly good investments. In earlier times Congress frequently let years pass between the establishment of a park and its first appropriation. Yosemite was established in 1890 yet did not receive any funding until 1898—in the amount of $8000 (*9*). Congress also kept tight limits on building costs. For example, in 1940 no park building costing more than $3000 could be built without the express consent of Congress; at that, the $3000 limit represented a doubling of the $1500 ceiling that had been in existence since 1918 (*9*). The situation has not improved much; in 1973, for the park system as a whole, there was a $28 million backlog in maintenance operations and a $2.5 billion backlog in approved construction projects (*10*)! In addition, the Executive Branch, operating through the Office of Management and Budget, has applied strictures of its own. During fiscal 1973 nearly $40 million of congressionally approved funds were impounded, and a Park Service staff ceiling of 7061 was imposed even though Congress provided for a staff of 7960 (*11*).

Private capital is the second major source of funds for park projects. It is the long-standing policy of Congress and the Park Service that private capital be used for the construction, maintenance, and operation of concession facilities and that concessioners be allowed a reasonable return on investment (*12*). However, through time, large-scale investments of private capital have been relatively infrequent and have involved a very small proportion of the total number of concessioners. During the period from 1900 to 1930 lodgings were built in some western parks with the use of railroad capital. Later, during the Mission 66 (1956 to 1966) program to rehabilitate park physical plants, other large private investments were made in some parks. Since 1966, four large, profit-oriented corporations have become park concessioners: General Host in Yellowstone; TWA Services in Bryce, Zion, and Grand Canyon North Rim; MCA Incorporated in Yosemite; and Amfac, through its Fred Harvey subsidiary, at Grand Canyon South Rim and Sequoia–Kings Canyon.

Concessioners have long been faced with difficulties such as high construction and maintenance costs, inadequate labor pools, short operating seasons, Park Service regulations, and so forth that have too often led to inadequate profits. Profits averaged only 3.8 percent on gross income for all concessioners in the park system in 1969 (*9, 13*). The general hesitancy on the part of profit-seeking private capital to become involved in park projects is not difficult to understand. In fact, Amfac has already withdrawn from its Sequoia–Kings Canyon operation and General Host is dissatisfied with the return from its Yellowstone investment. TWA Services and MCA are also having difficulties with their concessions, although these difficulties are not wholly of a financial nature. A private capital alternative is available in the form of nonprofit organizations, although such organizations have comparatively limited funds available for investment. Nonetheless, this alternative source of private capital is used in parks such as Sequoia–Kings Canyon, Mount Rainier, and Grand Teton where the principal concessioner is now a nonprofit organization.

Pros and Cons of Alternative Sites

In addition to their common advantage of reducing scenic depreciation and their shared disadvantage of requiring large capital investments, each of the two locational alternatives has particular positive and negative characteristics. Perhaps paramount among the positive aspects of the park gate alternative as compared with use of sites within the parks is that the use of park gate sites could be expected to be the most thorough means of reducing scenic resource depreciation. Surely locating facilities outside park boundaries is the most far-reaching approach to the problem of human artifacts impinging on park landscapes. It might also be expected that the use of such sites would minimize disruption of park ecosystems. Because of these and other factors, the park gate alternative is generally endorsed by organized conservation groups whose views are frequently solicited by both Congress and the National Park Service.

Another positive attribute is that park gate sites are generally available, at least from the standpoint of land ownership. Lands surrounding the western parks are, with few exceptions, controlled by the federal government—a fortuitous circumstance in view of the often long and costly process of land acquisition in recreation areas. Also of significance is the presence of already established developments at several park gate or near park gate locations. Communities such as West Yellowstone, Montana; Springdale, Utah; Cortez, Colorado; and Jackson, Wyoming provide an existing physical plant on which to build, as well as the advantages which can be derived from the presence of established business and governmental operations. Moreover, park gate sites are likely to be more attractive to private capital since entrepreneurs would encounter fewer restrictions as to services and products they may offer to the public and to prices they may charge.

Park gate sites carry with them certain disadvantages. While these sites are gener-

ally favored by conservation organizations, they are not nearly so popular with most of the public that uses the parks. Park users now, like their counterparts in an earlier era, prefer facilities near a park's scenic resources. Lodgings and campgrounds near prime scenic attractions are always the first to be filled. The sight of lines of tourists awaiting a lodging or campground vacancy near prime scenic attractions while facilities away from such sights are only partially filled is a common one throughout the western parks. Although it is true that lands adjacent to the parks are generally under federal jurisdiction, that jurisdiction normally lies with the U.S. Forest Service. The National Park Service and the Forest Service have often been at odds over matters pertaining to national parks and outdoor recreation, as was the case with the Forest Service's reluctance to see North Cascades National Park created out of national forest lands and the Park Service's refusal to upgrade a road through Sequoia Park in order to serve a recreation area proposed by the Forest Service at Mineral King (*14*). New or expanded developments at park gate sites within the national forests could well be the foci of additional jurisdictional haggling between the two federal agencies.

Another complication is likely to come from a need to include state and county governments in the decision-making process. These bodies are already quite sensitive to the presence of national parks within their boundaries and park-oriented developments outside the parks are far more open to pressures from them than are similar developments within the congressionally established enclaves that are the national parks. At sites where development already exists, the wishes of local entrepreneurs could muddy the decision-making waters even further. Moreover, many of the existing park gate communities have themselves been characterized by poor planning and insufficient capital investment over the years and would require substantial refurbishing to reach satisfactory esthetic levels.

In contrast to park gate locations, the advantages and disadvantages of the use of alternative locations within the parks yet away from prime scenic areas may now be apparent. A definite advantage lies in the simplified decision-making process associated with the use of such sites. No agencies outside the Park Service would need to be involved in decision-making to the same degree that they would be expected to be involved in decisions dealing with sites outside park boundaries. This is not to say that various federal, state, and local agencies, as well as the general public, need not or should not be consulted or give advice. Such a policy would be antithetical to the much needed regional approach to recreational planning. Rather, it suggests that such issues as overall size of a given development, architectural controls, determinations of proper functional contents, and so forth would be expected to be resolved in a more efficient and integrated manner, resulting in more satisfactory development. Another positive aspect of the use of sites within the parks is that the general public would likely be more receptive to these alternatives, for, after all, the purpose of the tourist's park journey is to seek and attain a park environment (*15*). As with park gate sites, alternative locations within the parks may be new sites or sites that already contain some degree of development. Those sites where existing development might be expanded, such as at Wawona in Yosemite, have the advantage of an existing physical plant on which to build, whereas hitherto unused sites offer the opportunity for completely integrated planning.

Alternatives within the parks are not without their disadvantages. Some might argue that a chosen site is not far enough away from principal scenic areas and thus excessive scenic depreciation would persist, nullifying the whole point of using an alternative location. If a chosen site was without a history of human occupation there might arise difficulties such as excessive disruption of plant and animal communities. And, if a chosen site were within an area of the park designated as wilderness in accordance with the Wilderness Act of 1964, there would be legalistic difficulties.

Toward a Balancing of Variables

To achieve an optimal solution it is necessary to reach some compromise among the three significant variables mentioned above—the financial, the esthetic, and the social. In the first instance it must be realized by the Congress and the Executive that federal investments in the parks must be greatly increased. Annual Park Service appropriations, averaging $255 million for fiscal years 1971 to 1975, could easily be doubled or tripled without fear of waste, so great is the backlog of approved Park Service maintenance and construction projects (*16*). If, in accordance with traditional policy, private capital is to be sought for concession operations, then additional federal funds are needed to ease concessioner costs and make park concessions a more attractive investment. No amount of dedication on the part of Park Service personnel, innovative planning, or enlightenment of park visitors can overcome inadequate levels of federal funding. Too long has compromise among the variables been heavily weighted in favor of the financial. It is time for more balance.

In order to prevent further erosion of scenic qualities by development centers that are judged to excessively detract from scenic resources, the administrative and supportive operations should be relocated to alternative sites such as those discussed above. Employee housing, maintenance buildings, and warehouses have too often been juxtaposed with tourist facilities in deference to the financial variable. Administrative and supportive facilities at the large development centers in the western parks are quite extensive, and their relocation should prove more than adequate in reducing scenic depreciation to satisfactory levels. In most cases it should not be necessary to relocate existing tourist facilities, although extensive refurbishing may be required if the esthetic variable is to receive adequate attention.

The social variable is extensively intertwined with any set of park proposals. Park visitors arrive with a variety of expectations. The conservationist speaks of crowds, overdevelopment, intrusion on natural landscapes, and the decline of the park experience; yet attendance figures indicate that environmental disruption has not reached unacceptable levels in the minds of most park tourists. On the other hand, our society has generally viewed the national parks as places for relaxed nature appreciation within largely unspoiled, scenic, natural landscapes, as opposed to commercial playgrounds amid scenic beauty. Consequently, such activities and facilities as motorboating, water skiing, conventions, banks, and the equivalents of small department stores are just as incongruous with park precepts as are proposals that would noticeably restrict the average visitor's use of the parks. An adequately funded compromise among variables is needed if the national parks are to remain a source of national pride and inspiration.

References and Notes

1. For example, see three views in *Century Mag.* **39**, 474 (1890); *ibid.* **40**, 797 (1890); *ibid.* **45**, 472 (1893); also, H. Chittenden, *The Yellowstone National Park* (Robert Clarke, Cincinnati, ed. 6, 1910); Directors at the specified times, *Reports of the Director of the National Park Service* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1917 to 1950); B. DeVoto, *Harper's* **209**, 49 (1953); R. Kahn, *Christian Science Monitor* (weekend issue, 14–16 September 1968); Conservation Foundation, *National Parks for the Future* (Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1972); and three articles by A. Smith, Ed., *Natl. Parks Conserv. Mag.* **39**, 4 (1965); *ibid.* **40**, 12 (1966); *ibid.* **41**, 9 (1967).
2. Alphabetically, the parks studied were: Bryce Canyon, Crater Lake, Glacier, Grand Canyon, Grand Teton, Kings Canyon, Lassen Volcanic, Mesa Verde, Mount Rainier, Olympic, Petrified Forest, Rocky Mountain, Sequoia, Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Zion.
3. No better illustration can be found than R. Yard, *National Park Portfolio* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1916, 1921, 1925). Re-

cently the Park Service has been involved in attracting inner city residents to areas within the park system and is also promoting such areas as part of the nation's bicentennial celebration.

4. Annual visitation data are available from the National Park Service in *Public Use of the National Parks: A Statistical Report* (published for the periods 1904 to 1940, 1941 to 1953, 1954 to 1964, and 1960 to 1970). A monthly summary of visitation and overnight use has been published by the Park Service since September 1964 and is titled *Public Use of the National Parks*. Each issue gives totals for the month, year-to-date totals, and comparative totals with the previous year. The July issue provides fiscal year totals and the December issue contains calendar year totals.
5. Significant legislative and executive actions pertaining to the parks may be found in the following Government Printing Office publications: National Park Service, *Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park System* (1970); H. Tolson, *Laws Relating to the National Park Service, the National Parks and Monuments* (1933); T. Sullivan, *Laws Relating to the National Park Service, Supplement I* (1944); *Proclamations and Orders Relating to the National Park Service* (1947); _____ and H. Tolson, *Laws Relating to the National Park Service, Supplement II* (1963).
6. A variety of opinions may be seen in: C. Stevenson, *Reader's Digest* **66**, 45 (1955); P. Friggens, *ibid.* **82**, 190 (1971); E. Julber, *ibid.* **83**, 125 (1972); C. Wirth, *Natl. Geographic Mag.* **130**, 7 (1966); G. Hartzog, Jr., *ibid.*, p. 48; W. Williams, *ibid.* **141**, 616 (1972); D. Butcher, *Atlantic Monthly* **207**, 45 (1961); V. Huser, *Natl. Parks Conserv. Mag.* **46**, 8 (1972); L. Merriam, Jr., *ibid.*, p. 4.
7. See, *Grand Canyon National Park, Master Plan, Final Working Draft* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971); *Yellowstone National Park, Master Plan* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973); *Yosemite National Park, Master Plan, Preliminary Working Draft* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971).
8. From personal communications with park superintendents.
9. J. Ise, *Our National Park Policy* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1961).
10. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973, pp. 229, 395.
11. _____, *ibid.*, pp. 239, 378–379.
12. National Park Service, *Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park System*, appendix F.
13. W. Everhart, *The National Park Service* (Praeger, New York, 1972), p. 119.
14. Public Land Law Review Commission, a report to the President and Congress, *One Third of the Nation's Land* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 28.
15. Precise measures, in terms of extensive surveys, of tourist attitudes concerning development within the parks or preferred locations for facilities are generally lacking. The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in their report number 5 [*The Quality of Outdoor Recreation: As Measured by User Satisfaction* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 62] surveyed users of Glacier, Mount Rainier, and Rocky Mountain parks to determine if they felt the individual park was "over-developed," development was "just about right," or "underdeveloped." For Glacier, of those surveyed, 1.6 percent answered overdeveloped, 82.6 percent responded just about right, and 15.8 percent chose underdeveloped. For Mount Rainier the corresponding percents were 1.5, 67.0, and 31.4, and for Rocky Mountain they were 4.3, 78.2, and 17.4. The National Park Service plans a visitor survey of Yosemite Valley users in the summer of 1975. In a recent unpublished survey of 11 national park experts, I found that 10 experts felt that the majority of the park visitors preferred facilities within the parks and at sites near prime scenic resources [A. Fitzsimmons, thesis, University of California at Los Angeles (1975), table 29].
16. Annual appropriations, in millions of dollars, for fiscal years 1971 to 1975, were, respectively: 164, 241, 235, 294, and 343. Although total appropriations have clearly increased, there has been no appreciable increase in funds available for maintenance and construction at individual parks because of inflation, expansion of the park system, increased visitation, and spending priorities that have emphasized pollution control and the bicentennial celebration. I thank J. E. Spencer of the Department of Geography, University of California at Los Angeles, for his advice and comments.

NEWS AND COMMENT

1977 Budget: Rise in R & D Funds Includes Boost for Basic Research

In a budget in which he puts high priority on cutting the rate of growth of federal spending, President Ford has given federal science substantially more than a cost-of-inflation increase. Defense and energy R & D again get favored treatment, but Ford has also included a significant boost for basic research outside the two favored areas.

Total support for basic research would increase from about $2.4 billion in the current year to $2.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1977, or about 11 percent.* For the National Science Foundation (NSF), the increase would mean a rise of 20 percent in funds for basic research. The special handling of basic research, reportedly, was at least partly due to late lobbying of a receptive President Ford by Vice President Rockefeller, presidential science adviser and NSF director H. Guyford Stever, industrialist Simon Ramo, and other friends of science in good standing at the White House (see box).

One noteworthy development in the biomedical research budget is a leveling off of funds for the National Cancer Institute (NCI) after several years of very rapid growth. Funds for cancer research rose from $185 million in 1969 to about $690 million a year currently. The budget calls for an increase in FY 1977 of only $276,000 for NCI. Increased funding for NCI's parent, the National Institutes of Health, however, would total more than $93 million, with several other institutes getting larger increases in funds than at any time since the so-called war on cancer began at the start of the decade.

The usual caveat about presidential budgets should be noted. A budget is in many ways the manifestation of a hallowed federal numbers game. Budget figures are requests for funds to spend; actual expenditures are determined by congressional appropriations action and by decisions by the Administration as the fiscal year unfolds. Expenditures often vary widely from budget figures, and the variations tend to be widest when different political parties control the White House and Congress, as is now the case. It should also be remembered that at this stage the Administration is talking in global figures and that a program-by-program analysis will reveal cuts and shifts in funds which will mean disappointment for groups of researchers inside and outside of government.

The budget is always a vehicle for the exposition of a President's economic and social policies. And because this is a presidential election year, the Ford budget is being interpreted as a political document which not only defines his differences with the Democrats, but also with his rivals for his own party's nomination, notably Ronald Reagan.

The new budget is being viewed as a curtain-raiser to a contest with the Democratic-led Congress. Ford is expected to stress the fight against inflation and efforts to maintain the momentum of recovery in the economy. The Democrats indicate they will emphasize the unacceptability of high rates of unemployment. The principal issue between White House and Congress will almost certainly be the level of federal spending and the resulting deficit. The conflict is not a new one between Republican presidents and Democratic congresses, but this year the encounter will have some fresh elements, since Congress will be in the first year of the new congressional budget process which requires it to set spending maximums and to stay within them. Last year a dry run of the system provided mixed results.

An early test will occur when Congress seeks to override President Ford's veto of a $36-billion appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The bill was passed by Congress late last year and vetoed by Ford as being "inconsistent with fiscal discipline and effective restraint on government

*Total R & D obligations, which include funds which may be spent in future years, would rise from $22.2 billion for the current fiscal year to $24.7 billion next year. Because the start of the fiscal year has been shifted to 1 October from the 1 July date which prevailed in the past, the new budget includes a 3-month "transitional quarter" with $5.5 billion earmarked for R & D activities.