Book Reviews

Leanings of the Professoriate

The Divided Academy. Professors and Politics. EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR., and SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975. xviii, 418 pp. $17.50. Sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

Contrary to the general impression, the political views of American professors have only recently become the target of large systematic surveys. Before the 1950's, the closest thing to a national quantitative study of the opinions of American academics was a modest inquiry by a sole researcher into their belief in God and immortality. This lack was not simply a reflection of the general skimpiness of research resources; it bespoke the existence of a certain kind of professoriate—small, sheltered if not reclusive, of no great consequence in the public world. It took the emergence of a different kind of professoriate—teeming, highly visible, engaged as victim or protagonist in every major social controversy—to convince the survey analysts and their patrons that it deserved the flattery of their attention and the growing lavishness of their costs. More than narcissism or curiosity, a sense of political importance and vulnerability drove academics to this mode of self-inspection. The first large-scale survey of the politics of academic social scientists (Lazarsfeld-Thielens, 1958) was inspired by the assaults of Senator McCarthy and his supporters on those particularly exposed members of the profession. The first cross-disciplinary survey of faculty opinions on economic and social issues (National Opinion Research Center, 1966) was prompted by the increasing involvement of professors in the programs of the New Frontier and the Great Society. And the first massive tapping of faculty—and student and administrative—opinion on a broad range of national and academic issues (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1969) was occasioned by the campus disorders that began at the end of the Johnson presidency. The last gives incontrovertible evidence that "big" survey research has come to academe. With a sample of extraordinary size (60,000 full-time faculty members), a questionnaire of unusual length (300 separate items, 100 of them touching on current issues), and a budget and processing operation that required the support of two Maecenases and three research centers, the Carnegie survey presents an almost vulgar display of technical capacity and empiric riches.

E. C. Ladd, Jr., and S. M. Lipset have used the data generated by this survey, along with the results of a smaller follow-up survey conducted three years later, as grist for a number of published articles; *The Divided Academy* is a collection, amplification, and extension of what has already appeared in print. Most of the readers of this work will agree that large-scale survey research, addressed to academic persons, yields a number of important benefits. Its insistent timeliness permits one to see how this critical group stands on the latest issues, whether these be the latest issues of 1969—the Vietnam war, student disruptions, urban riots—or the latest issues of 1972—affirmative action, institutional neutrality, academic unionism. Its comparability (more or less) with systematic surveys of the broader public allows one to judge, with more than impressionistic confidence, how far academics differ from their compatriots. Nor are the benefits limited to descriptive findings. Thanks to its breadth of interrogation, the Carnegie survey shows up disparities between faculty responses to remote and to impinging issues, and thus reveals at what points an alarmed self-interest comes into play to shape opinion. Thanks to its sizable "*n*," it allows the sample to be extensively subdivided and a wide range of potential causal variables to be assayed. Ladd and Lipset are seasoned practitioners of statistical reportage and multivariate manipulation, and for such purposes furnish texts and tables that are admirably informative and trim.

The authors, however, seek still more from their data. Their main operating assumptions are that basic ideological predispositions can be derived from clusters of answers to current political questions, that these predispositions can be located on a continuum running from "left" to "right," and that the relative strength of one factor—"intellectuality" or "intellectual bent"—can account for group differences along that scale. Ladd and Lipset, of course, are not unique in their quest for attitude configurations, unilinear political gamuts, and explanatory master-keys. But the question that arises is whether these familiar ambitions of political sociology can be sustained by the evidence at hand.

The authors believe that four issue-specific questions, plus a double-weighted question asking respondents to categorize themselves politically, have the power to uncover and identify ideologies. They base this belief on the clear-cut finding that academics differ from the general public on these issues—that they are much more likely to favor the busing of schoolchildren to achieve greater racial balance, to blame white "racism" for Negro riots, to support the legalization of marijuana, and to urge the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam—and on the supposed statistical discovery (only partly demonstrated in the text) that these opinions are highly correlated with one another and with opinions on several sorts of campus issues. If it is held that one thinks ideologically when one answers queries on current questions with some consistency, then these questions may have diagnostic power. On the other hand, if it is presumed that one thinks ideologically when one responds to immediate issues by considering them in the light of one's moral and intellectual commitments, then these questions, and any other questions of a similarly superficial character, cannot be regarded as effective probes. On the latter assumption (which recognizes that responsive consistency may merely be a product of test-taking sophistication, and which satisfies our feeling that ideology must be something substructural and enduring), it would make better sense to pose ideological questions in order to gain ideological information. But the survey not only failed to ask ideological questions (no one was asked to ponder the competing claims of freedom and order, efficiency and social justice); it even failed to take an ideological census (no one was asked to state whether he was a Marxist or a Maoist or a follower of Milton Friedman or John M. Keynes). No doubt survey questions about society and nature are difficult to formulate—almost as difficult perhaps as survey questions about deity and soul. No doubt, too, questions about busing and Vietnam have the virtues of explicitness and simplicity. But without a penetrating questionnaire can the survey analyst ever hope to fathom mind-sets? Ask William Graham Sumner how he felt about American ar-

mies in Asia, high tariffs, and literary freedom, and this strong opponent of imperialism, protectionism, and censorship would have revealed a consistent strain of liberalism. Don't ask him about what social classes owe to one another, or about the obduracy of human cultures, or about the moral value of hard work, and you would not learn that he was, in fact, an arch-conservative.

At one point, in a jocular vein, Ladd and Lipset suggest that it might be "far less meaningful to ask an American intellectual today, 'Are you a liberal or conservative?' than to ask 'Are you *Commentary* or *New York Review of Books*?' " Indeed, they might have been well advised to have taken their jest seriously (though with less parochial examples). To ask people of learning what they read, and in which authors they find their guides, might well be to increase the chance of gaining entry into that screened interior of thought and feeling where political identities are cast. Conversely, to ask professors to place themselves in one of five positions on a prefixed scale is to run the risks inherent in coercing testimony. For one thing, the position rubrics—"strongly conservative," "moderately conservative," "middle-of-the-road," "liberal," "left"—are not bland résumés of political opinions; they are vernacular symbols with their own attractive and repulsive force. Though it can be shown that political opinions and position choices are statistically related, it cannot be known whether the self-styled "conservative" or "liberal" is responding to convictions in his mind or to the popularity of the labels. For another thing, both the referents and the fashionableness of these rubrics alter a great deal over time. The Carnegie survey, in one of its few calls for political retrospection, asked respondents to categorize the political views they held when they were college students. The conclusion drawn by Ladd and Lipset from these responses is that professors shift to the right as they get older no matter where they now are or what their starting point; the difficulty Ladd and Lipset slide over is that they cannot tell, with unstable yardsticks, whether it is people or labels that have aged and changed. Even more worrisome are the distortions that are inevitably introduced by the imposition of a single spectrum. The implication of the orderings here provided is that "left" is "liberal" only more so, and that "moderately conservative" is the same as "strongly conservative" only less. Perhaps, on certain issues, the differences between one position and another are merely incremental. But often, as we have lately rediscovered, the differences are qualitative and definitive, reflecting the implacable opposures of sobriety and fanaticism, reformism and revolutionism, the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of absolute ends. Not to realize that democratic politics may be a world rather than a degree removed from extremist politics is either to foreshorten the range of existing options or to give the rabid fringes an unwarranted gift of near-allies.

In a new work now being serialized in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, Ladd and Lipset conclude, on the basis of a yet more recent survey, that the American academic profession "is notably inclined toward liberal and egalitarian social programs," but that most of its members are "not radical," are "not disenchanted with the basic operations of the American polity," and are not inclined "to entertain sweeping economic or political changes." A careful reading of the substance of *The Divided Academy* would lead to a similar conclusion. On the strength of the factual evidence here presented, what stands out about this profession, aside from its liberalism, is its moderateness. For what it means, only 4 percent of all faculty respondents identified themselves in 1969 as "left," only 3 percent as "strongly conservative." On campus issues, the vast majority of respondents exhibited a distaste for student violence, an attachment to academic freedom, a capacity to distinguish demonstrations from disruptions and desired ends from repugnant means. In presidential elections (according to various cited polls), faculty members have long eschewed extremes, resisting the blandishments of third-party candidates. All in all, the specific findings of this volume paint a picture of an unusually temperate professoriate, one that is apparently far less given than its foreign counterparts to mount assaults against the social order.

Unfortunately, in this volume, this picture is sometimes smudged by the authors' rhetoric and procedures. For greater ease in cross-tabulation, they combine "liberal" and "left" into a single variable, thereby suggesting that their antinomies can be escaped simply by an act of hyphenation. In stressing political divisions in the academy, they call attention to deviations from the norm, so that the fact that 35 percent of the social scientists scored "very liberal," or that 11 percent of the sociologists voted for Henry Wallace, tends to stand out in high relief. But most of all, by seizing on "intellectuality" as the major explanation for why some professors are biased toward the "liberal-left," and by defining this attribute as an inherent tendency to be "questioning, critical, socially disruptive," the authors employ words that are filled with exaggeration and that lend support, probably unintended, to a prime piece of antiacademic folklore. It is surely worthwhile asking why it is that members of research-centered universities, members of the social disciplines, Jewish members of all faculties, and high academic achievers generally are disproportionately liberal in their positions on public issues. But there is no reason, a priori, why one factor should be held to explain this, least of all a factor that is vaguely defined and may be undefinable (Is "intellectuality" a mental, social, or cultural trait? Does it appear full-blown or in varying amounts?) and that contains its own political biases (Are all "liberals" intellectuals? Are all "conservatives" of an uncritical and accepting mind?). As the authors themselves suggest, a number of alternative explanations—selective recruitment, ethnic traditions, political nepotism, associative patterns, the very demands of the subject of inquiry—can emerge from plausible speculation or be teased out of the surveyed facts.

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Social Transactions

The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN and BERT R. BROWN. Academic Press, New York, 1975. xii, 360 pp. $16.50.

Bargaining and negotiation occur at all levels of social interaction: between husband and wife, between students and teachers, between labor and management, and, at the highest level, between nation states. Since bargaining is such a pervasive phenomenon, there is, of course, a long history of theoretical concern with the subject. Economists and mathematicians were the first to recognize the importance of its normative (prescriptive) aspects. Among social psychologists, however, interest in bargaining is of only recent origin, spanning the brief period of about 20 years.

Probably the first experimental studies directly examining the bargaining relationship were the classic ones of Deutsch and Krauss and of Siegel and Fouraker, both published in 1960. There were also some concurrent theoretical developments in social psychology. Most notable was the work of Thibaut and Kelley and of Homans, who interpret social interaction as an exchange of rewards among the participants. They assume that the participants mutually attempt to maximize rewards and minimize costs, and if such a "social contract" were to be broken one or more of the participants could be expected to