treaty and the offensive arms agreement —provisions from which on-site inspection was absent.

SALT II

In the United States, one basic, overridingly important guideline for the SALT II negotiations was shaped by the congressional reaction to SALT I. Senator Henry Jackson (D–Wash.), a member of the Armed Services Committee and long identified with the military, warned that, once the Soviets had caught up in MIRV technology, they could take advantage of the higher missile numbers given them in SALT I to achieve military superiority.

At Jackson's urging, Congress amended its resolution approving the 5-year interim agreement by calling upon the President to seek "equality" in strategic forces for the United States at the next round of SALT. The Nixon Administration, though it seemed to regard the Jackson amendment with some ambivalence, did not oppose it.

Indeed, one of its top spokesmen, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, told Congress he could not support the agreements unless money was provided for a variety of new weapons and weapons R & D. Laird also emphasized the bargaining chip argument. In his opinion, the Moscow agreements were made possible by the Safeguard ABM system and the MIRV'ed Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles, and future agreements would be encouraged by such new weapons as the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and the submarine-launched cruise missile.

The SALT II negotiations began 6 months after the signing of the Moscow agreements. No one has yet done for SALT II what Newhouse did for SALT I, but, from what can be learned of these negotiations, it seems that they transpired in three phases.

Phase I. Beginning in November 1972 and extending into the fall of 1973, this phase was taken up with a futile attempt to reach a permanent arms limitation agreement. Although each party had pledged in the Moscow agreements to seek such a limitation, neither was able to put aside uncertainties as to future weapons development and verification problems and make a permanent commitment. The paradox was that, for a permanent agreement to be acceptable, it would have required such massive arms reductions as virtually to represent a step toward nuclear disarmament—something both sides regarded as too difficult and extreme, certainly for the moment.

Phase II. From November 1973 through the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of June 1974, the negotiations focused on the possibility of extending the interim agreement for 2 or 3 years beyond its 1977 expiration date, with one crucial addition—a limitation on MIRV's. A simple freeze on MIRV's, which was discussed, would have meant no more MIRV deployment by the United States and no further MIRV testing by the Soviet Union. From the Soviet standpoint, this was unacceptable because the United States already had many MIRV's, whereas the Soviets had none. What the Soviets wanted was to stop or slow down the U.S. deployment

Biomedical Research Panel Named

On 31 January the White House announced the names of the seven members of the President's Biomedical Research Panel. They now have 15 months in which to assess the biomedical and behavioral research supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Institute of Mental Health. In April 1976 they will tell the President what government policy for research ought to be.

Franklin D. Murphy, chairman of the board of the Times Mirror Corporation in Los Angeles, which publishes the Los Angeles *Times*, is chairman of the panel. In the past, he has been dean of the medical school and chancellor at the University of Kansas, and chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles. Robert H. Ebert, dean of the Harvard Medical School, was named cochairman of the panel.

Murphy, who has kept abreast of issues in biomedical science through reading and through his many friends in medical schools, speculates that "Leonardo Da Vinci himself would be unable to come up with a report on biomedical research that will satisfy everyone." Nevertheless, he hopes to diminish the inevitable criticism by seeking the opinions of as many persons as possible, saying that it is important that the panel do a lot of listening.

Although the panel has yet to set its agenda—its first meeting is on 24 February—it is clear that in one way or another it is going to have to address questions about federal funding of research and the distribution of research scientists in various fields. Ebert is already known as a man who does not look at the issues from the conventional point of view. He has said that the country should consider abandoning its policy of funding research on a categorical basis, disease by disease, or institute by institute, and substituting a single budget for NIH (*Science*, 2 November 1973). The idea is compatible with those of some officials in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and is one of the things that has attracted Secretary Caspar Weinberger to Ebert. Weinberger was a strong advocate of the appointment of both Murphy and Ebert to the panel.

Benno C. Schmidt, in his capacity as chairman of the President's Cancer Panel, is, by law, a member of the panel. (Schmidt's appointment to the cancer panel expires in mid-February. At this writing it is not certain whether he will be reappointed, even though Frank C. Rauscher, director of the National Cancer Institute, and others associated with the cancer program are anxious to have Schmidt stay on. As is typical, the White House apparently is not going to let anyone know what its intentions are until the last minute.)

Other members of the biomedical panel are Ewald W. Busse, chairman of the department of psychiatry at Duke University; Albert L. Lehninger, director of the department of physiological chemistry at the Johns Hopkins University Medical School; Paul A. Marks, Vice President in Charge of Medical Affairs, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons; and David B. Skinner, chairman of the department of surgery, University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics.—B.J.C.